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1. Deepening reform and opening-up for 
China to grow into a high-income country
Ligang Song, Yixiao Zhou and Luke Hurst
Searching for new engines of growth
In the past four decades, the Chinese economy has experienced three growth 
surges. The first took place following the period of ‘reform and opening-up’ from 
the late 1970s; the second occurred following the implementation of taxation 
reforms in 1994; and the third happened after China’s accession to the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001 (Figure 1.1). Over the entire period of reform 
(1978–2018), the annual growth rate of the economy was more than 9 per cent 
and China’s per capita income reached US$9,600 in 2018. Rapid growth in China 
has led to its economy making up a greater share of both the Asian and the global 
economies. In 1980, China contributed about 2 per cent of the global economy; 
in 2018, this was nearly 16 per cent (Figure 1.2). Furthermore, the importance 
of the Chinese economy is seen not only in its scale, but also in its contribution 
to global economic growth. In 2018, China was the largest contributor to global 
economic growth, at 32 per cent; emerging and developing economies excluding 
















Figure 1.1 Official real GDP growth in China, annual percentage change, 
1980–2018
Sources: IMF (various years).












































































Figure 1.2 China’s share of global GDP and of emerging and developing 
Asia GDP, 1980–2024 (per cent)
Note: Post-2017 data are estimated values.
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Figure 1.3 Contributions to global growth (yearly average)
Source: Authors’ calculations from data on GDP based on the purchasing power parity (PPP) share 
of the global total and the growth rate of global GDP at constant prices (IMF various years).
While growth in China is still robust, it has been slowing since 2010, as a result 
of headwinds (Figure 1.1). A question one may ask is whether those headwinds 
will derail that economic growth and prevent China from reaching high-income 
status or whether there are ways by which China can overcome these headwinds and 
continue to grow, albeit at a slower trajectory, in the next phase of its development. 
In this chapter, we aim to understand some of the causes of the growth slowdown 
and identify new sources of long-term growth through the lens of growth theories. 
1. Deepening reform and opening-up for China to grow into a high-income country
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The ‘East Asian’ growth model allowed several emerging countries and economies 
to become industrialised and to catch up with the living standards of the advanced 
economies. This model—featuring openness to trade and investment—has also 
benefited China since its reform and opening-up policies were introduced, and the 
Chinese economy has become increasingly integrated with the global economy. 
During this phase, the main drivers of growth were structural changes in the 
economy away from the agricultural sector towards the manufacturing and service 
sectors, which were propelled by fundamental reforms in both rural and urban areas 
(Figure 1.4). As workers move from rural to urban areas, the increase in labour 
combines with capital and imported technology to yield rapid productivity growth 
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Figure 1.4 Value-added shares by sector in China, 1994–2016
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from WIOD (n.d.).
As China continues to catch up with the technology frontier and move up the global 
value chains, innovation has become increasingly necessary to sustain productivity 
growth. As innovation activities pick up, the research and development (R&D) 
intensity of the Chinese economy has been rising (Figure 1.5). However, innovation 
activities are intrinsically risky and the outcomes are often uncertain. Therefore, 
productivity growth naturally becomes harder to achieve, and this is one of the 
fundamental causes of the growth slowdown as observed in the continuous drop in 
China’s total factor productivity (TFP) in recent years. 





















Figure 1.5 Research and development as a share of GDP (per cent)
Source: OECD (n.d.).
The second cause of the growth slowdown is China’s ageing population, which 
causes a decline in the share of the working-age population in the total population. 
The share of those aged 15–64 in the total population reached a peak of 78 per cent 
in 2010 and has been declining since, to 72 per cent in 2017 (Figure 1.6). 
This demographic change reduces the labour supply. In the earlier model of growth, 
focusing on labour-intensive manufacturing production and trade, China relied 
on a large labour supply. Therefore, transitioning to new engines of sustainable 
growth and maintaining that growth over the long term will mean relying more 
on innovation and less on the supply of labour or factor inputs. Furthermore, the 
ageing population will bring about a lower savings rate, as was observed in Japan 
(Golley et al. 2018). Although China’s previous rapid growth, combined with 
lagging social institutions and industrial reform, induced a very high savings rate 
among households and state-owned enterprises (SOEs) (Bayoumi et al. 2012), 
the savings rate has been falling in the past few years. The national savings rate 
peaked at 51.5 per cent of GDP in 2010 and fell to 46.4 per cent of GDP in 2017. 
The decline in the savings rate exerts downward pressure on domestic investment 
and the current account surplus, as shown in Figure 1.7. 
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Figure 1.6 Share of population aged 15–64 (percentage of total)
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Figure 1.7 Savings, investment and external balance in the Chinese economy, 
1987–2017
Note: I, C, CA, G, ∆R, Sd refer to investment, consumption, current account, government purchase, 
change in reserve, and domestic savings.
Sources: Authors’ calculations based on data for the current account and change in official reserves 
from SAFE (n.d.) and other data from the CEIC Database.
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The above analysis originates from supply-side factors, including technical, 
institutional and demographic changes. In the short run, demand-side factors also 
play important roles in determining the growth rate. More subdued investment 
and  net export growth tend to slow GDP growth from the demand side of the 
growth equation. 
Although we see in Figure 1.7 that consumption and government purchases 
have both grown as shares of GDP since 2010, the more recent data suggest that 
consumption growth has slowed since the second quarter of 2018 and government 
purchase is expansionary but cautious (Song and Zhou 2019). Investment growth 
is slowed both by lower savings growth, as discussed earlier, and by relatively weak 
business confidence. The contribution of investment growth to GDP growth fell 
from 2.1 percentage points in the third quarter of 2018 to 0.8 percentage points 
in the first quarter of 2019. Similarly, net exports weakened due to lower savings 
growth and the rise in trade tensions between China and the United States. 
Net export growth was in negative territory in the first three quarters of 2018 and 
returned to positive values in the fourth quarter of 2018 and the first quarter of 
2019 (Figure 1.8). 
At this juncture, the key questions are what the new drivers of economic growth will 
be and how to bring them about. The answer we propose is that there is still great 
room and scope for further reform to unleash a new round of relatively rapid and 
high-quality growth, which will allow China to become a high-income economy. 
We argue that new growth engines are to be found in the following areas. First, 
deepening institutional reform and improved institutional design and quality 
will allow the Chinse economy to be integrated more closely into global markets. 
This will require China, together with its trading partners, to uphold multilateral 
principles and the international rules-based trading system, and to explore ways 
in which that system can be reformed to accommodate new patterns of trade 
and investment flows. This task is especially important given the current trend of 
deglobalisation with rising protectionism. Second, further opening-up of goods, 
capital and labour markets and lowering of market barriers are required to expand 
global collaboration on research, innovation and business activities. Third, further 
improvements in education and skill levels and reduction in poverty are needed to 
enhance equality of opportunity and alleviate rising income inequality. There is still 
a significant gap between China and the advanced economies in terms of education 
levels and technical capability. Therefore, there will be significant room for Chinese 
talent to contribute more to the global technology pool. 













03/2015 06/2015 09/2015 12/2015 03/2016 06/2016 09/2016 12/2016 03/2017 06/2017 09/2017 12/2017 03/2018 06/2018 09/2018 12/2018 03/2019 
%
Final	Consumption	Expenditure Gross	 Capital	Formation Net	Export	of	Goods	and	Service
Figure 1.8 Contributors to GDP growth in China, 2015Q3– 2019Q1
Source: CEIC Database. 
From the perspective of growth theories, it is worth noting that these reforms will 
help deliver endogenous technological and institutional innovations that will lead to 
higher productivity growth in the long run. It is well understood that the ultimate 
long-run driver of a country’s growth performance is productivity growth (Solow 
1956; OECD 2012). Also, importantly, contributions to the global technology pool 
can benefit all countries’ technological progress and economic growth under market 
mechanisms (Jones and Romer 2010). 
The first piece of evidence of the significant room for China to improve its business 
and institutional environments comes from the ‘Doing Business’ statistics reported 
by the World Bank (2019a). In 2019, the statistics for China are based on surveys 
conducted in Shanghai, one of the most mature commercial and international 
metropolitan cities in mainland China. The results show that China ranked 
46 out of 190 countries and regions on the overall Ease of Doing Business Score. 
In comparison, the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region ranks fourth among 
all countries and regions. The more detailed rankings for various aspects of doing 
business provide a further sense of where the most stringent bottlenecks are and 
where future institutional and policy reforms can be focused (Figure 1.9).








































Figure 1.9 Ease of doing business rankings for China, 2019
Source: World Bank (2019a). 
A positive development in enhancing the institutional environment is that a set of 
new policies has recently been introduced. One example of these is the introduction 
of the principle of ‘competitive neutrality’ in the ‘Guiding Opinions on Promoting 
the Healthy Development of Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises’ recently issued 
by the General Office of the Communist Party of China Central Committee and 
the General Office of the State Council (The State Council 2019). The guidelines 
require the implementation of policies that help small and medium-sized enterprises 
(SMEs) compete fairly in markets. Specifically, the guidelines emphasise policies 
that include lowering barriers to market entry, creating fair competition, providing 
easier access to credit, lowering the tax and regulatory burden, enhancing innovation, 
encouraging private entrepreneurship and reducing the influence of political 
connections.
The essence of the principle of competitive neutrality is that all actions taken by the 
government should have a neutral impact on market competition between SOEs 
and other enterprises—that is, government actions do not favour any actual or 
potential market participation. In particular, SOEs should not have an improper 
competitive advantage resulting from government policies or regulations. The 
principle of competitive neutrality was originally proposed by Australia in 1996 
(Commonwealth of Australia 1996). At the time, it was stated that government 
commercial enterprises should not enjoy a net competitive advantage over their 
private sector competitors simply because they were owned by the government. This 
concept was later also explored in policy research conducted by the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). Broadly summarised, there 
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are four aspects of the concept: 1) in the case of SOEs providing public services 
or undertaking public policy functions, they should be given fair and transparent 
compensation for their costs; 2) there should be equal treatment of SOEs and 
other enterprises in regulation and government procurement; 3) in debt financing, 
SOEs should not benefit from explicit or implicit state guarantees; and 4) in equity 
financing, the state as a shareholder requires SOEs to provide market return on 
investment (Capobianco and Christiansen 2011). China has now adopted the 
concept of competitive neutrality in reforming its SOEs and nurturing the private 
sector. The United States has already applied the concept to the binding rules of 
its bilateral trade negotiations such as its free-trade agreement with Singapore, the 
new North American Free-Trade Agreement, the Trans-Pacific Partnership and 
the ongoing negotiations with Japan and the European Union, and between China 
and the European Union in terms of bilateral investment treaty negotiations.
Another encouraging development is the introduction of policies to further open 
markets to foreign investment. In financial markets, these measures include removing 
limits on the foreign ownership of local banks, scrapping size limits for foreign firms 
and allowing foreign insurance groups to set up in China. Under the new plans for 
financial liberalisation, the upper shareholding limits in a Chinese commercial bank 
for a single Chinese-funded bank or a single foreign-funded bank will be abolished 
simultaneously (Yu 2019). The National People’s Congress adopted the new Foreign 
Investment Law in March 2019. Under this law, the principle of non-discrimination 
will be added to administrative approval procedures, along with increased financial 
penalties imposed on those who infringe trademark rights. In the meantime, the 
procedures and time it takes to receive construction permits will be sharply reduced 
(Hu 2019). 
The above policies are aimed at helping attract overseas investment and helping 
China remain one of the world’s leading destinations for foreign direct investment 
(FDI). After China’s WTO accession, an unprecedented accumulation of foreign 
investment, combined with new access to markets in the advanced economies, 
delivered another growth surge in the country. However, there is still scope for 
foreign investment to contribute further to China’s economic growth. And there 
is great potential in financial integration and opening-up to help enhance China’s 
growth. Figure 1.10 shows that, although FDI in China has experienced very strong 
growth, its share in total investment in China has declined since 1994. As savings 
rates fall in China, more foreign investment will help generate investment and 
growth activities. 







































Foreign	 direct	investment,	net	 inflows	(2015 billion US$), RHS
Figure 1.10 FDI inflows and its share of total domestic investment in China 
(per cent)
Notes: We obtain data for inward FDI as share of GDP in China. We calculate total domestic investment 
as a share of GDP in China. We then calculate the share of FDI inflows in total domestic investment by 
dividing the former by the latter. For the red series, real GDP is calculated in constant 2015 US dollars. 
This is then multiplied by the share of inward FDI in GDP to obtain inward FDI in constant 2015 US dollars.
Sources: Authors’ calculations based on data from CEIC Database; IMF (various years); UNCTAD (n.d.).
Using new policy levers to move towards a more open, transparent and fair market 
environment for all firms and to link and integrate domestic and international rules 
for commerce will help the Chinese economy integrate more deeply and smoothly 
into the global market. It is well understood that trade helps firms stay competitive 
by exerting constant pressure to innovate and improve the quality of products and 
services in the international market (Bernard et al. 2007; Zhou and Song 2016). 
Furthermore, competing with foreign firms in the domestic market has similar 
effects. Although the contribution of net exports to GDP growth may wind down 
as a result of economic rebalancing towards more consumption-driven growth, the 
importance of openness extends beyond raising GDP and rests more on driving 
productivity growth. 
Besides improvements in the institutional environment, another source of future 
growth is boosting the education and skill levels of individuals (Khor et al. 2016). 
Despite China’s significant achievements in enhancing education, the Chinese 
economy still suffers a shortage of human capital compared with many other 
developing and advanced economies. Comparing the share of the labour force that 
has attained at least some upper secondary schooling (upper secondary attainment) 
in China with that in other countries (for example, high-income/OECD countries 
and a subset of G20 middle-income/Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa), 
Khor et al. (2016) find that, in 2010, only 24 per cent of China’s entire labour 
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force (individuals aged 25–64 years) had ever attended upper secondary school, 
and this rate was less than one-third of the average in OECD countries. China’s 
overall upper  secondary attainment rate and the attainment rate of its youngest 
workers (aged 25–34) are also the lowest of the BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, 
India, China and South Africa), with the exception of India, for which data were not 
available. As human capital is critical for innovation and knowledge-based growth, 
continued investment in education and skills should be a policy priority. 
This book consists of contributions from young economists who have closely 
researched the latest developments in the Chinese economy. Their new analytical 
perspectives and findings help us better understand and identify future directions 
for the Chinese economy, as seen through the eyes of the young.
Structure of the book
The book begins with a chapter by Guiying Laura Wu that details the challenges of 
capital allocation China is facing after 40 years of reform. To frame the discussion, 
Wu provides a comprehensive survey of the existing literature to construct a general 
framework with which to investigate the interaction of financial frictions and policy 
distortions with TFP loss. The chapter discusses the quantitative implications of 
aggregate efficiency loss within such a framework. Wu concludes that the structural 
reforms that are particularly relevant to capital misallocation are mainly those in the 
enterprise sector and the financial system. These findings provide a guide for future 
reforms to improve capital allocation.
Chapter 3 uses an impressive set of data, including 4 million Chinese manufacturing 
company samples from 1998 to 2013, to understand debt and credit misallocation 
in Chinese corporations. The authors—Ninghua Zhong, Mi Xie and Zhikuo Liu—
find that, during the 16-year period analysed, most firms were deleveraging, with 
‘the simple average and median of debt ratio decreased from 65 per cent in 1998 
to 51 per cent in 2013’. Of the companies that increased their leverage, most were 
large-scale, listed SOEs. Interestingly, the authors find that the characteristics of 
private firms change with the changes to leverage, but those of SOEs do not. The 
authors conclude that the huge amount of credit being allocated to the state sector 
is the reason for the declining credit efficiency in China.
The authors suggest that the ‘main battlefield for deleveraging is the state-owned 
sector, especially inefficient and large enterprises, which usually have severe 
overcapacity’, and the government should therefore promote market-oriented 
reforms of SOEs. But these SOE reforms need to be complemented by increased 
leverage in efficient areas with market-oriented reforms of commercial banks and 
other financial intermediaries so that valuable credit resources can be allocated to 
productive enterprises.
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There is rising concern about the economic slowdown occurring in China. 
In Chapter 4, Jiao Wang and Ran Li develop an extension of the standard New 
Keynesian dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model to understand China’s 
monetary policy, along with the main causes of fluctuations in the country’s business 
cycle, providing a novel way of examining the rules governing China’s monetary 
policy. Using a hybrid form of monetary policy rule, the authors find that the People’s 
Bank of China adjusts the policy rate in response to inflation, output growth and real 
money growth. Neutral technology shocks are the main drivers of the fluctuations 
in output and consumption, while investment-specific technology shocks are the 
primary source of variations in investment. Wang and Li conclude that, after more 
than 30 years of driving high-speed economic development, a structural break in 
the development of neutral technology may have caused China’s GDP growth to 
slow since 2010. This conclusion points to the need for the Chinese Government 
to encourage technological innovation and industrial upgrading. 
In Chapter 5, Yuhan Zhao, Moyu Chen and Yu Sheng use extensive farm household 
survey data to investigate the evolution of the household registration (hukou) 
system at the provincial level between 1981 and 2013, and to understand its 
impact on off-farm employment in rural China. The authors also make a significant 
contribution by compiling a comprehensive indicator to capture the transtemporal 
and cross-regional changes in the household registration system during the post-
reform period. The analysis finds that off-farm employment of rural labour increased 
with the relaxation of household registration policies during the post-reform period; 
this is particularly the case for full-time off-farm employment. The analysis implies 
that barriers related to the hukou system still prevent the integration of rural and 
urban labour markets. 
Following on from the previous chapter’s analysis of the impact of hukou reforms on 
off-farm employment, Chapter 6 investigates the growth, scale and characteristics 
of nonstandard employment (NSE) in China. Analysis of the 2016 China Urban 
Labour Survey (CULS), undertaken by Yongjie Wang, contributes three important 
findings: first, the proportion of NSE in urban China in 2016 was 34.95 per cent, 
indicating that NSE has become an important feature of China’s labour market. 
Second, those working in NSE in China have comparably low levels of job 
satisfaction, low wages, high overtime rates, low social insurance coverage and 
inadequate wage rights protection. Third, labourers with lower levels of educational 
attainment, age disadvantages and those who are unmarried and have rural hukou 
are more likely than others to engage in NSE. Wang argues that targeted policies 
need to broaden the employment choices for those who are more likely to engage in 
NSE and measures need to be taken to strengthen the collective bargaining power of 
NSE workers by, for example, absorbing nonstandard workers into labour unions. 
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The development of rural e-commerce in China could unlock significant economic 
benefits, including more inclusive growth, poverty alleviation and inequality 
reduction. In Chapter 7, Sherry Tao Kong explores the ways in which the Chinese 
Government has ‘not only allowed space for digital companies to experiment, but 
also introduced a wide range of policies and projects to improve the country’s internet 
infrastructure to promote the development of e-commerce’. Through her analysis 
of the growth of Taobao villages across China, the author finds that the promise of 
e-commerce for rural development in China is not guaranteed: ‘Reliable internet 
access, trustworthy digital transaction methods and convenient parcel delivery and 
logistics services are necessary but insufficient conditions to realise the promise of 
e-commerce in less-developed areas.’ It also requires organic grassroots growth and 
supportive top-down policies. 
Since the end of 2012, the Chinese Government has implemented a number 
of policies aimed at helping the country become a global leader in innovation. 
In Chapter 8, Zhongyu Ma, Huiqing Gao, Weihua Yin and Zhichao Wen use 
local survey data to understand the impact of these policies and the potential for 
improvement. The authors find that policies to promote innovation are working 
well. China is, however, in the early stages of innovation development and, 
consistent with theory, it is experiencing interruptions that slow progress. Two such 
interruptions include inconsistencies in the issuing of intellectual property policy 
and incomplete policy implementation. While China’s innovation is currently in 
its initial phase—characterised by high investment—the authors suggest that these 
upfront costs will produce high yields in coming years. 
In Chapter 9, Liqing Zhang, Yan Zhang and Zhixiao Dong investigate the effects 
of China’s financial services liberalisation on the financial constraints of China’s 
listed firms. The authors set up an exogenous policy measure of China’s financial 
service liberalisation based on a thorough policy review. Using the latest panel data 
(for the period 2010–15), the analysis shows that China’s financial liberalisation has 
diminished the financial constraints on the country’s listed firms; notably, China’s 
formal external financing channels through banks and other financial institutions 
have been enhanced by trade credit, especially for larger firms. The analysis also 
supports the idea that financial liberalisation eliminates ownership discrimination. 
The development of China’s SMEs is vital to the country’s future economic growth, 
job creation and innovation. In Chapter 10, Qin Gou and Yiping Huang analyse 
whether the SME financial support scheme has effectively promoted banks’ credit 
allocation to SMEs. The authors use a unique bank branch survey dataset to analyse 
the impact of the policy. The analysis suggests there have been mixed outcomes, 
with increased lending to SMEs that fell short of the initial loan requirements, 
while other SMEs that exceeded the initial loan requirements received smaller loans. 
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On the costs of the scheme, Gou and Huang note that it increases the credit risk of 
small banks and decreases their profits. The authors suggest the business, financial 
and innovation environments need to be fundamentally improved.
One of the biggest threats to the global economy is the escalating trade war between 
the United States and China. In Chapter 11, Deborah H.Y. Tan and Chen Chen 
use the G-cubed multi-country model to understand the potential costs of the 
China–US trade war and suggest ways to mitigate them. The findings suggest that 
a bilateral trade war will impose larger costs on China in the short term, while 
the United States will suffer a similar adverse impact on growth in the medium 
term. The authors note that, while the current policy approach of the Chinese 
Government of matching tariffs is the ‘sensible and conservative option that cushions 
the economy adequately in the near to medium terms, while reducing the chances of 
international repercussions’, the government has more severe options available, such 
as redeploying US holdings, if it is ‘pushed into a very tight corner’.
In Chapter 12, Jane Golley, Yixiao Zhou and Meiyan Wang investigate the level 
of equal opportunity in the annual labour income of Chinese individuals, with 
a focus on the role of gender. In their analysis of data from the 2010 Survey of 
Chinese Women’s Social Status, the authors show that ‘gender is the number 
one determinant of unequal opportunities, ahead of socioeconomic, regional 
and urban–rural divides’. The analysis goes on to assess the underlying causes of 
gender earnings inequality; this micro-analysis indicates that gender (via returns on 
education) and marriage are the most significant determinants of the gender income 
gap. Based on the findings, Golley, Zhou and Wang offer a number of important 
policy recommendations, including targeting education policies at girls from poor 
rural families, assisting young women to exit the agricultural sector and find off-
farm employment and ongoing reform to the hukou system.
As Chinese companies invest overseas in larger numbers and on larger projects, they 
are encountering a number of political obstacles in host countries. In Chapter 13, 
Bijun Wang and Xiao He provide one of the first empirical investigations into 
Chinese  outward direct investment (ODI) projects that have been blocked. 
Using a unique dataset, the authors find that several factors increase the likelihood 
of an investment being blocked, including large scale, technological intensity and 
a poor bilateral relationship with the host country. Given these characteristics are 
commonly associated with blocked investments, Wang and Xiao recommend several 
strategies to reduce the probability of Chinese projects encountering obstacles, 
including breaking large-scale investments into multiple smaller investments, 
focusing on industries that receive less public and government scrutiny and 
increasing intellectual property protections and R&D spending in host countries. 
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The final chapter by Luke Hurst follows on from Chapter 13 by providing a detailed 
case study of Chinese investment during the iron ore boom. The chapter considers 
two important questions: Does access to state capital reduce the ability of others 
to compete in the market? And is the Chinese state using capital to lock up 
strategic resources? 
Using a unique dataset of 50 iron ore procurement arrangements, the findings 
suggest that state-owned financing institutions were involved in the majority of 
investments and most investments were undertaken by central and provincial-level 
SOEs in concert with non-Chinese partners. However, Chinese iron ore investors 
were most often operating outside their core competency and lacked long-run 
ownership advantages. The lack of iron ore development and operating competence 
meant they generally paired with a non-Chinese specialised fringe iron ore producer. 
The preference for quasi-integration through joint ventures with non-Chinese fringe 
iron ore producers means that Chinese state support effectively lowered barriers to 
market entry for non-Chinese fringe iron ore miners. On the second question, the 
application of a scorecard approach to the procurement data found that, instead of 
tying up resources, China’s aggregate iron ore procurement arrangements have led to 
a broadening of the competitive global supply base and increased access to iron ore 
for other buyers in the Asian market, as did the Japanese procurement arrangements 
in the 1970s and 1980s. This finding is consistent with research on Chinese oil 
procurement.
References
Bayoumi, T., Tong, H. and Wei, S.J. (2012), The Chinese corporate savings puzzle: A firm-level 
cross-country perspective, Working Paper No. 202012, Hong Kong: Hong Kong Institute for 
Monetary Research, available from: EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hkm:wpaper:202012.
Bernard, A.B., Jensen, J.B., Redding, S.J. and Schott, P.K. (2007), Firms in international 
trade, Journal of Economic Perspectives 21(3): 105–30. doi.org/10.1257/jep.21.3.105.
Capobianco, A. and Christiansen, H. (2011), Competitive neutrality and state-owned 
enterprises: Challenges and policy options, OECD Corporate Governance Working Paper 
No. 1, Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, available from: 
www.oecd-ilibrary.org/ docserver/ 5kg9xfgjdhg6-en.pdf?expires= 1559644294&id= id& 
accname= guest&checksum=784BBA6AF1A94075A5BBCB546658F3E2. 
Commonwealth of Australia (1996), Commonwealth Competitive Neutrality Policy Statement, 
June, Canberra: Department of Treasury, available from: archive.treasury.gov.au/
documents/ 275/PDF/cnps.pdf.
Golley, J., Tyers, R. and Zhou, Y. (2018), Fertility and savings contractions in China: 
Long‐run global implications, The World Economy 41(11): 3194–220. doi.org/10.1111/
twec.12602.
The Chinese Economic Transformation
16
Hu, Y. (2019), Foreign businesses get assurance as new trade rules ensure equality, Policy Watch, 
9 April, Beijing: The State Council of the People’s Republic of China, available from: 
english.gov.cn/policies/policy_watch/2019/04/09/content_281476600762343.htm.
International Monetary Fund (IMF) (various years), World Economic Outlook, Washington, 
DC: IMF.
International Monetary Fund (IMF) (2019), World Economic Outlook Database, April, 
Washington, DC: IMF, available from: www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2019/01/
weodata/index.aspx.
Jones, C.I. and Romer, P.M. (2010), The new Kaldor facts: Ideas, institutions, population, 
and human capital, American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics 2(1): 224–45. doi.org/ 
10.1257/mac.2.1.224.
Khor, N., Pang, L., Liu, C., Chang, F., Mo, D., Lovalka, P. and Rozelle, S. (2016), 
China’s looming human capital crisis: Upper secondary educational attainment rates 
and the middle-income trap, The China Quarterly 228: 905–26. doi.org/10.1017/
S0305741016001119.
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (n.d.), OECD Database, 
Paris: OECD Publishing, available from: data.oecd.org/.
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (2012), Looking to 
2060: A global vision of long-term growth, OECD Economics Department Policy Notes 
No. 15, Paris: OECD Publishing.
Solow, R. (1956), A contribution to the theory of economic growth, The Quarterly Journal 
of Economics 70(1): 65–94. doi.org/10.2307/1884513.
Song, L. and Zhou, Y. (2019), A balanced macroeconomic approach could be China’s 
panacea, East Asia Forum, 6 March, available from: www.eastasiaforum.org/2019/03/06/
a-balanced-macroeconomic-approach-could-be-chinas-panacea/.
Song, Z., Storesletten, K. and Zilibotti, F. (2011), Growing like China, American Economic 
Review 101: 202–41. doi.org/10.1257/aer.101.1.196.
State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE) (n.d.), Data and Statistics, Beijing: SAFE, 
available from: www.safe.gov.cn/en/.
The State Council of the People’s Republic of China (2019), Guiding Opinions on Promoting 
the Healthy Development of Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises, Beijing, available from: 
www.gov.cn/zhengce/2019-04/07/content_5380299.htm.
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) (n.d.), Statistics 
database, Geneva: UNCTAD, available from: unctad.org/en/Pages/statistics.aspx.
World Bank (2019a), Doing Business: Measuring business regulations, Washington, DC: 
The World Bank Group, available from: www.doingbusiness.org/en/rankings.
1. Deepening reform and opening-up for China to grow into a high-income country
17
World Bank (2019b), World Bank Open Data, Washington, DC: The World Bank Group, 
available from: data.worldbank.org/.
World Input Output Database (WIOD) (n.d.), available from: www.wiod.org/home.
Yu, C. (2019), Opening-up to boost finance sector, Policy Watch, 4 May, Beijing: The State 
Council of the People’s Republic of China, available from: english.gov.cn/policies/policy 
_ watch/2019/05/04/content_281476643005930.htm.
Zhou, Y. and Song, L. (2016), International trade and R&D investment: Evidence from 




2. China’s economic development: 
A perspective on capital misallocation
Guiying Laura Wu
Among the abundant and growing literature aiming to understand the miracle of 
China’s economic development, the contribution of capital reallocation to aggregate 
total factor productivity (TFP) gain has offered an important perspective. This 
chapter first describes the general framework that links resource misallocation with 
TFP loss. It then surveys the empirical evidence of capital misallocation in China 
and discusses the quantitative implications for aggregate efficiency loss within 
such a framework. Two potentially interesting sources of capital misallocation are 
investigated: financial frictions and policy distortions. These sources highlight the 
remaining challenges in capital allocation that China faces after 40 years of reform. 
Framework: Capital misallocation and TFP loss
Why was real gross domestic product (GDP) per capita in China only one-fortieth of 
that in the United States 40 years ago? And more generally, why are some countries 
so rich while others are so poor? An important finding economists have reached in 
the past two decades is that the differences in aggregate TFP are the dominant source 
of differences in GDP per capita. According to a growth accounting framework in 
Zhu (2012), growth in aggregate TFP has contributed more than 70 per cent to per 
capita GDP growth in China. What, then, has caused the substantial improvement 
in the aggregate TFP in China in the past four decades?
A new and growing literature, as surveyed in Restuccia and Rogerson (2013), argues 
that resource misallocation across heterogeneous firms in an economy lowers its 
aggregate TFP. For example, McKinsey Global Institute country and sector studies 
found large differences across firms within the same sector in many less-developed 
countries (South Korea, Brazil, Turkey and India). In fact, in many of these cases, the 
most productive firms within most sectors have productivity levels comparable with 
those in Western Europe and the United States, but there is a long tail of very low-
productivity firms. If resources could be reallocated from the low-productivity firms 
to high-productivity firms within a country, the aggregate output would increase 
even with the same amount of production factors, which would lead to an increase 
in the measured aggregate TFP. This means the efficiency of resource allocation 
offers a new perspective with which to understand cross-country income differences: 
the aggregate TFP loss in poor countries relative to the first-best aggregate TFP 
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they could achieve may arise from the resource misallocation in those countries. 
Although full liberalisation is a thought experiment, since there are many frictions 
that impede perfect reallocation in reality, one way to interpret this framework is to 
gauge the potential gain in aggregate TFP if such friction could be removed under 
a first-best situation.
Among various production factors, capital misallocation has been documented as 
a prevailing empirical phenomenon, both in less-developed economies in general 
(for example, Banerjee and Moll 2010) and in China in particular. In fact, the 
reallocation of capital within the manufacturing sector is a focal point in explaining 
the miracle of China’s economic development in Song et al. (2011).
Evidence of capital misallocation
Evidence of capital misallocation in China takes many forms. There are two ways 
to summarise this evidence: first, a direct approach to studying the cost of capital or 
return on investment and, second, an indirect approach to infer the misallocation 
from the dispersion of marginal product of capital. 
We start to present the evidence using the first approach. Although the aggregate 
marginal product of capital in China is about 20 per cent, as in Bai et al. (2006)—
a relatively high but still reasonable value by international standards for developing 
economies—there is a very different picture when we look at the evidence for the 
cost of capital or return on investment at more disaggregated levels. 
In a cross-country comparative study, Allen et al. (2005) find that China’s 
corporate governance, accounting standards and investor protection systems are 
poor at best, measured by existing standards in the literature, while its banking 
system is not well developed and is to a large degree inefficient. The Shanghai 
Stock Exchange and Shenzhen Stock Exchange have been growing rapidly since 
their inception in 1992, but their scale and importance are still not comparable 
with other channels of financing—in particular, the banking sector—for the entire 
economy. In this environment, Chinese firms must rely heavily on retained earnings 
to finance investment and operational costs. However, financial repression is far 
from uniform: Chinese banks, which are mostly state-owned, tend to offer easier 
credit to state-owned enterprises (SOEs), with less screening, higher lines of credit, 
lower interest rates and fewer collateral requirements. The Chinese stock market 
is disproportionately dominated by the SOEs and large semiprivatised SOEs. 
Not surprisingly, firms in the informal sector are subject to strong discrimination 
in credit markets. Many successful non-SOEs do not use any channel of formal 
financing during development (Allen et al. 2005: Figs 3-A and 3-B).
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Consistent with this institutional background and based on a survey covering 
a stratified random sample of 12,400 firms in 120 cities in China with firm-level 
accounting information for the period 2002–04, Dollar and Wei (2007) examine 
the  presence of systematic distortions in capital allocation that result in uneven 
marginal returns to capital across firm ownership type, region and sector. They 
provide a  systematic comparison of investment efficiency among wholly and 
partially state-owned, wholly and partially foreign-owned and domestic privately 
owned firms, conditioned on their sector, location and size characteristics. They find 
that, even after a quarter of a century of reforms, SOEs still have significantly 
lower returns to capital, on average, than domestic private or foreign-owned firms. 
Similarly, certain regions and sectors have consistently lower returns to capital than 
other regions and sectors. The findings in this pioneering work have been confirmed 
by many subsequent studies, as surveyed below.
A second source of evidence involves fitting a production function to firm-level 
data and directly estimating the distribution of marginal products. A key paper in 
advancing this structural approach is Hsieh and Klenow (2009). They assume that 
there are firm-specific wedges affecting total production and capital—essentially 
modelled as ‘taxes’. As a result of these wedges, firms produce amounts different to 
what would be dictated by their productivity and also may have different capital–
labour ratios. If there are no firm-specific distortions and all firms within a sector 
have the same markup, the TFP revenue (TFPR) will be equalised across firms 
within a sector. In general, variation of TFPR within a sector will be a measure 
of misallocation.
Hsieh and Klenow (2009) quantify the potential extent of misallocation using 
microdata on plants in the manufacturing sector in China, India and the United 
States. First, they find that there is greater dispersion of TFPR in India and China 
than in the United States. For example, for TFPR, the 90–10 ratio is 1.59 in China, 
1.60 in India and 1.19 in the United States. Second, they estimate that this could 
account for lower aggregate productivity. In particular, their estimates suggest that 
this type of misallocation could increase TFP in China by 30 to 50 per cent and in 
India by 40 to 60 per cent. Finally, they also find evidence for more rapid reallocation 
towards firms with higher TFPR in China than even in the United States, possibly 
reflecting rapid reallocation as less-efficient SOEs are being weeded out there. But 
reallocation away from less-efficient firms seems slower in India.
As pointed out by Restuccia and Rogerson (2013), the finding in Hsieh and 
Klenow (2009) remains the single strongest piece of evidence to support the idea 
that misallocation is an important component of cross-country differences in 
TFP. However, the highly parametric assumptions on preferences and production 
technology in this approach also face methodological challenges. The validity of 
the inference in Hsieh and Klenow (2009) hinges on two conditions: 1) average 
and marginal revenue products have the same dispersion; and 2) the dispersion 
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of marginal revenue products—a mirror image of price heterogeneity—reflects the 
magnitude of misallocation. Both conditions are strict. Condition (1) applies only 
to environments with homogeneous output and demand elasticities. Condition (2) 
will not necessarily hold in a dynamic environment with frictions such as adjustment 
costs. When it comes to the data, this approach needs another condition—that 
measurement errors do not add to the dispersions. Violation of any of the conditions 
would lead to biased estimations.
To address these concerns, Song and Wu (2015) develop a new method of identifying 
capital misallocation in a more general environment, where none of the conditions 
has to hold. The new method has a distinctive feature of matching a set of first and 
second moments of both the revenue–capital ratio and the profit–revenue ratio. 
The  profit–revenue ratio, which has not yet been explored in the misallocation 
literature, plays an important role in identification. Specifically, Song and Wu (2015) 
match the variance of the revenue–capital and profit–revenue ratios and the cross 
correlation between the two ratios. The three empirical moments allow them to 
back out the three parameters governing the magnitude of the misallocation and 
unobserved heterogeneities in output and demand elasticities. In addition, while 
the original approach uses cross-sectional data, the new method explores intergroup 
variations in panel data, which can effectively mitigate the bias caused by capital 
adjustment costs and measurement errors. 
Song and Wu (2015) then apply the structural estimation to firm-level panel data 
from the industrial survey conducted by China’s National Bureau of Statistics 
(NBS), using the generalised approach. They find that a full correction of capital 
misallocation would increase China’s manufacturing output by 20 per cent. 
In contrast, the original Hsieh and Klenow (2009) approach implies a much larger 
efficiency gain, of 35 per cent. This suggests that, first, it is indeed important to 
control for the unobserved heterogeneities in output and demand elasticities, 
investment frictions and measurement errors, to infer the correct magnitude of TFP 
loss from dispersion in marginal products. Second, even after controlling all these 
factors, one still identifies substantial TFP loss from capital misallocation in China, 
which confirms the main finding in Hsieh and Klenow (2009) and the misallocation 
literature at large. 
The seminal framework of Hsieh and Klenow (2009) has inspired many important 
studies. For example, Brandt et al. (2013) focus on factor misallocation at a more 
aggregate level, between provinces and between the state and nonstate sectors in 
China’s non-agricultural economy, which includes both manufacturing and services, 
and covering a longer period, from 1985 to 2007. They also decompose the overall 
TFP loss into the losses due to interprovincial and intraprovincial intersectoral 
distortions. They find, first, on average, the misallocation of factors across provinces 
and sectors resulted in a reduction of non-agricultural TFP of at least 20 per cent, 
with the intraprovincial distortions accounting for more than half of the total loss. 
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Second, TFP losses from interprovincial distortions were relatively constant over 
the entire period. Third, despite significant interprovincial labour flows, the TFP 
loss from interprovincial labour market distortions remains high due to an increase 
in the cross-province dispersion in TFP. Fourth, the measure of intraprovincial 
distortions declined sharply between 1985 and 1997, contributing to 0.52 per cent 
of non-agricultural TFP growth per year, but then increased significantly in the 
past 10 years, reducing the non-agricultural TFP growth rate by 0.5 per cent a year. 
Finally, almost all of the intraprovincial distortions were due to the misallocation 
of capital between the state and nonstate sectors, which increased sharply in 
recent years. 
Sources of capital misallocation
The qualitative significance and quantitative importance of capital misallocation in 
China raise one pertinent research question: what are the underlying factors that 
cause the misallocation? Two natural candidates have attracted increasing interest 
in recent literature: capital market imperfections due to financial frictions and 
nonmarket distortions induced by government policies. 
It is obviously difficult to make a clear distinction between financial frictions and 
policy distortions. They are not necessarily very different in conceptual terms, 
and they may also overlap with a number of other frictions and distortions that 
are very similar. Therefore, in this chapter, we narrow the definition of financial 
friction strictly to those factors that are due to imperfect information or imperfect 
enforcement in the capital market that would cause capital misallocation even in 
developed economies. We ask to what extent such factors contribute to the observed 
capital misallocation. This implies that all those nontypical financial frictions are 
labelled as policy distortions in a very broad sense.
Financial frictions
Quantifying how much of the observed capital misallocation can be attributed to 
financial frictions is the central theme of some recent literature—for example, Moll 
(2014) and Midrigan and Xu (2014), among many others. While modelling details 
and estimated magnitudes differ, these studies share a common methodology: they 
develop theoretical models and gauge the size of TFP loss by calibrating model 
parameters to match the distribution and dynamics of output across production 
units. Despite the financial underdevelopment and substantial capital misallocation 
in China, there have been relatively few studies that directly link financial frictions 
with capital misallocation and TFP loss in China. Ek and Wu (2018) and Wu 
(2018) are two attempts in this direction. Both papers offer novel identification 
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strategies that differ from the existing literature and apply such strategies to detailed 
firm-level panel data from China’s Annual Survey of Industrial Enterprises, covering 
the period 1998 to 2007.
Ek and Wu (2018) directly estimate the effect of financial frictions on capital 
misallocation using an inference from investment–cash flow sensitivity. Although 
investment–cash flow sensitivity is frequently used as an indicator of financing 
constraint, and financing constraint is a consequence of financial frictions, 
there has not been any research that connects capital misallocation directly to 
investment–cash flow sensitivity. This chapter fills this gap by providing a simple yet 
consequential theoretical model, which links the heterogeneity in investment–cash 
flow sensitivity—a common indicator of financing constraint—to the dispersion 
of the marginal revenue product of capital (MRPC), which is a direct measure of 
allocative inefficiency.
The validity of this new approach, of course, depends crucially on the answers to 
two methodological questions. First, is investment–cash flow sensitivity a reliable 
indicator of financing constraint? Even in perfect capital markets, cash flow sensitivity 
may result from measurement errors in Tobin’s q, from imperfect competition 
and/or decreasing returns to scale, from the presence of capital adjustment costs 
or from a combination of measurement errors in Q and identification problems. 
Furthermore, a firm’s cash flow position is endogenous to its productivity shocks 
and may contain information about its investment opportunities.
To address these concerns, Ek and Wu (2018) present a structural model of costly 
external finance. Firms in this model are allowed to face imperfect competition 
and/or use decreasing returns to scale technology. In the absence of any friction, 
their model generates the same optimal condition as those models in the recent 
literature: optimal capital stock is only a function of current output, Jorgensonian 
user cost of capital and production technology. This allows them to develop an 
empirical specification for investment that does not rely on Tobin’s q. They then 
consider an autoregressive–distributed lag structure to accommodate the possibility 
of capital adjustment costs, which yields an error correction specification, as in 
Bond et al. (2003). Under the null hypothesis of no financial friction, cash flow 
should not affect investment under this specification. Ek and Wu (2018) allow for 
the potential endogeneity of cash flow in their estimation using generalised method 
of moments techniques. They test whether the cash flow terms show significantly 
different predictive powers across those samples that produce significantly different 
investment–cash flow sensitivities.
The second concern about investment–cash flow sensitivity and financing constraint 
is the well-known Kaplan and Zingales critique. Kaplan and Zingales (1997) argue 
that investment–cash flow sensitivities do not always monotonically increase as firms 
become more financially constrained. Thus, one cannot in general use estimates 
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of investment–cash flow sensitivities to proxy the severity of financial frictions. 
The theoretical model in Ek and Wu (2018) shows that the relationship between 
investment–cash flow sensitivities and the severity of financial frictions indeed 
depends on the curvature of the profit function and the cost function of external 
finance. However, even though more financially constrained firms do not necessarily 
exhibit higher sensitivity, it remains the case that unconstrained firms should display 
no investment–cash flow sensitivity. Therefore, finding that one group of firms 
has positively significant sensitivity while the other group shows no sensitivity is 
a sufficient, though not necessary, condition of capital misallocation, which is indeed 
the general pattern of the empirical findings. Given that Ek and Wu’s identification 
strategy only relies on investment–cash flow sensitivities and not excess investment–
cash flow sensitivities, it is not subject to the Kaplan and Zingales critique.
When they apply the error correction investment model to a 10-year balanced 
panel  of US Compustat database firms, Ek and Wu (2018) do not detect any 
investment–cash flow sensitivity. In contrast, there are significant sensitivities for 
a 10-year balanced panel of Chinese firms. Within Chinese firms, when splitting 
the sample using any criterion based on age, size, ownership or political connection, 
and for both the balanced and the unbalanced panels, they obtain significant 
cash flow effects for firms that are young, small, non-SOEs and without political 
connections. The resulting aggregate TFP loss implied by these investment–cash 
flow sensitivities is 4 to 5.2 per cent for the balanced panel and 10 to 15.2 per cent 
for the unbalanced panel.
While Ek and Wu (2018) take a structural approach, the identification strategy in 
Wu (2018) is more of a reduced-form approach. In particular, it uses a program 
evaluation perspective to quantify the effects on capital misallocation of both 
financial frictions and policy distortions.
Financial frictions versus policy distortions
As mentioned earlier in this chapter, a stylised fact of the Chinese economy is that 
the cost of capital, the return to investment or the proxies for the MRPC differs 
significantly across firms with different ownership types. This distinct phenomenon 
has often been taken as direct evidence of policy distortions in capital allocation. 
After all, ownership should not matter for MRPC in a world without policy 
distortions, were ownership orthogonal of other firm characteristics that may affect 
MRPC. However, as a less-developed economy, China also has a less-developed 
capital market with a lagged legal, auditing and contracting environment. If firms 
with different ownership types systematically differ in other characteristics, such 
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as age and size, and if such characteristics do affect MRPC because of financial 
frictions, even in the absence of policy distortions, these firms could still have 
different MRPC under an imperfect capital market.
The unique institutional feature on firm ownership type and MRPC dispersion 
in China inspires us to design the following identification strategy. Imagine an 
investment-promoting program that offers favourable treatment to some firms. The 
treatment status of a firm depends on its ownership type. The exact treatment may 
take various forms—for example, an investment tax credit or a special bank loan 
with a low interest rate. The effect of the treatment is to lower the generalised user 
cost of capital, or the mirror image of the MRPC of those treated firms. Firms 
differ not only in their treatment status, but also in a set of firm characteristics, 
known as covariates in an evaluation problem, through which financial frictions 
operate to affect their MRPC. The average treatment effect of the program on 
MRPC dispersion can then be decomposed into the average treatment effect on 
treated (ATT) and the selection bias. The ATT is the difference between the actual 
MRPC of those treated and the counterfactual MRPC of those treated had they 
not received the treatment, which identifies the effect of policy distortions on the 
average MRPC dispersion across ownership type. The selection bias is the MRPC 
difference between the treated and the untreated in the absence of treatment, which 
captures the effect of financial frictions on the average MRPC dispersion across 
ownership.
In applying this identification strategy, Wu (2018) considers a structural model with 
both policy distortions and financial frictions. To nest those microfoundations that 
have been the most common building blocks in the recent literature on financial 
frictions and aggregate TFP, Wu allows for two types of highly synthesised reduced-
form financial constraints. The aggregate TFP loss in the model economy depends 
on the dispersion of the firm-specific MRPC, which is determined by some joint 
distribution of a set of parameters. These parameters govern the magnitude of firm-
specific policy distortions and financial frictions and characterise the state of firm 
productivity and internal funds. Wu then conducts propensity score matching based 
on a set of covariates that are suggested by the model through which financial frictions 
may affect MRPC, even in the absence of policy distortions. These covariates are 
exactly the same as those that appear in the vast theoretical and empirical literature 
on financial frictions. However, by matching firms that have different treatment 
status but are otherwise similar in terms of these covariates, one does not have to 
take a stand on the functional relations among these observed covariates and MRPC; 
nor does one need to specify the exact causal direction between the treatment status 
and the observed covariates.
The detailed firm-level panel data from China’s Annual Survey of Industrial Enterprises 
is employed to obtain point effect estimates on the ATT and the selection bias across 
different firm ownership types. For example, not surprisingly, an SOE, on average, 
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has an MRPC 42 per cent lower than that of a domestic privately owned firm, where 
policy distortions and financial frictions lower its MRPC by 22 and 20 per cent, 
respectively. More interestingly, the average MRPC of a foreign-owned firm is 
2 per cent lower than that of a domestic privately owned firm. But without policy 
distortions, its MRPC would be 20 per cent higher than that of a domestic privately 
owned firm due to financial frictions. This suggests that foreign-owned firms in fact 
receive similar levels of favourable policy distortions to state-owned firms.
Although such estimates are interesting in their own right, what truly helps us answer 
our research questions is a byproduct of the matching procedure—a counterfactual 
MRPC of those treated firms had they not received the treatment. Using this 
information, Wu (2018) calculates the aggregate TFP losses in a hypothetical 
economy without policy distortions, which turn out to vary from 7.3 to 9.4 per cent 
over the period 2000–07. Thus, her estimates of the effect of financial frictions 
on aggregate TFP loss are in line with Ek and Wu’s (2018), based on the same 
dataset but using a completely different approach. The annual average aggregate 
TFP loss in the actual economy reaches 27.5 per cent. This implies that 70 per cent 
of the aggregate TFP loss can be attributed to policy distortions. It also finds that 
the policy distortions have reduced the average MRPC in China by 15.5 per cent, 
which provides one possible explanation for China’s unusually high investment rate.
Policy distortions
Although a large literature has identified the policy distortions as an underlying 
source of capital misallocation and aggregate TFP loss in China, the policy 
distortions used in most papers are modelled in only an abstract and generic way. 
To offer specific policy implications, it is important to identify specific institutional 
factors that have distorted capital allocation.
Using matched samples of firms with balanced covariates, Wu (2018) evaluates 
several popular hypotheses on why the Chinese Government has introduced various 
rules, regulations and institutions that favour certain firms. From the public finance 
perspective, the first possible reason for a government to favour a firm is that the 
firm contributes significant tax revenue.
Second, a government may also distort capital allocation to pursue specific industrial 
policies. For example, China is well known for having adopted an export-led growth 
strategy since the beginning of its ‘reform and opening-up’ policy (Lin 2012). More 
recently, it has been suggested that China practices a form of state capitalism in 
a vertical industrial structure: SOEs are explicitly or implicitly allowed to monopolise 
key upstream industries, while the downstream industries are largely open to private 
competition (Li et al. 2015). Under these two hypotheses, firms in upstream 
industries that are exporting can expect to receive favourable policy distortions.
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Third, the well-known trade-off between growth and stability facing the Chinese 
Government has often been taken as an argument to justify policy distortions. 
To minimise social unease and reduce resistance to reform, the government may 
have a strong political motivation to maintain employment stability. For example, 
to avoid laying off workers or shutting factories during an economic downturn, 
the government usually asks the state-owned banks to bail out loss-making SOEs, 
which creates a problem known as the ‘soft-budget constraint’ (Qian and Roland 
1998; Brandt and Zhu 2001). Under this rationale, we may regard the government 
as a risk-averse social planner that optimally allocates capital according to the capital 
asset pricing model. If so, firms that are countercyclical have a smaller beta and only 
need to offer a lower required rate of return on capital.
Finally, differing from all the above hypotheses, which assume a benevolent 
government, an alternative hypothesis is that the government prefers firms with 
political connections. For example, Communist Party membership has been found 
to help private entrepreneurs obtain loans from banks or other state institutions 
(Li et al. 2008; Guo et al. 2014). Firms with government-appointed or government-
connected chief executive officers are found to face much less severe financial 
constraints (Fan et al. 2007; Cull et al. 2015). Since there is no information 
regarding a firm’s entrepreneur or chief executive officer in our dataset, whether the 
firm has a labour union is adopted as an alternative measure of political connection. 
Unlike labour unions in most Western countries, which help workers collectively 
bargain with employers for higher wages and better working conditions, Chinese 
labour unions pass on the ideology of the Communist Party to the workers and 
monitor whether the firm is ‘politically correct’ or at least is operating consistently 
with Communist Party policy.
To test these interesting hypotheses, Wu (2018) implements a regression using the 
restricted sample of matched firms. The dependent variable is the difference between 
the actual MRPC of a firm in a year and its counterfactual MRPC had the firm not 
received the favourable treatment in that year. The independent variables include the 
six factors inferred from the popular hypotheses. This produces a set of interesting 
findings. First, the actual MRPC of those firms that contribute high tax revenue is 
in fact higher than their counterfactual MRPC. This denies the first hypothesis that 
firms receive favourable policy distortions in capital because they contribute more 
tax revenue. Instead, it suggests that those firms that have received favourable policy 
distortions in capital also receive favourable tax treatment, such as tax breaks or 
direct subsidies. Second, averaging across the years, and all else being equal, a firm 
that is an exporter, belongs to an upstream industry and has a labour union has 
an MRPC 14 per cent, 2.6 per cent and 14.9 per cent, respectively, lower than 
otherwise. Finally, beta is the only variable whose estimates change the signs from 
significantly positive to insignificantly negative over our sample period. A positive 
coefficient on beta is consistent with the capital asset pricing model, thus verifying 
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the motivation of policy distortions as a trade-off between risk and return. The fact 
that beta becomes irrelevant after 2005 seems to indicate that employment stability 
was no longer a major concern for the government in more recent years. The same 
pattern is highlighted in Hsieh and Song (2015) using different evidence.
Three conclusions therefore can be draw from the empirical exercises. First, favourable 
policy distortions in capital go hand-in-hand with favourable tax treatment. 
Second, pursuing an export-led growth strategy and practising state capitalism 
are two important factors that drive policy distortions. Political connection with 
the Communist Party is another reason for firms to receive favourable treatment. 
Finally, concern about the trade-off between return and risk also leads to policy 
distortions but is relevant only in the early years of the study period.
Conclusions and policy implications
In recognising that both financial frictions and policy distortions have caused capital 
misallocation and aggregate TFP losses in China, this chapter uses an important 
perspective to understand China’s economic development in the past four decades, 
thanks to both the development of the financial environment and the economic 
reforms correcting overall policy distortions. To the extent that large and persistent 
capital misallocation still exists after 40 years of reform, the factors identified in this 
chapter can be interpreted as directions for further reform. The structural reforms 
that are particularly relevant to capital misallocation are mainly in the enterprise 
sector and the financial system—for example, those reforms proposed by the World 
Bank and the Development Research Centre of the State Council (2013). 
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3. Chinese corporate debt and 
credit misallocation
Ninghua Zhong, Mi Xie and Zhikuo Liu1
Introduction
After the 2008–09 Global Financial Crisis (GFC), the efficiency of credit allocation 
in China’s financial system dropped significantly. According to Figure 3.1, it took 
about RMB1 (US$0.14) of new credit to create a unit of gross domestic product 
(GDP) by 2008, but this credit intensity has since risen sharply and recently reached 
more than RMB3 (US$0.48).
Meanwhile, China’s broad measure of money supply (M2) surged after 2008, from 
RMB47 trillion (US$6.8 trillion) in 2008 to RMB155 trillion (US$23.3 trillion) 
in 2016 (Figure 3.2). That is, in eight years, M2 increased by more than RMB100 
trillion (US$16.6 trillion). Recently, China’s M2 has exceeded US$20 trillion, 
surpassing the largest economies in the world, including the United States, in 
absolute terms. In addition, the ratio of M2 to GDP in China has reached more 
than 200 per cent.
Combined, these data indicate that although the total amount of credit and 
financial resources is skyrocketing, the efficiency of their allocation is significantly 
deteriorating. In other words, large amounts of money have been allocated to 
inefficient areas or even wasted, resulting in a phenomenon called ‘finance does not 
support entities’, which is heatedly debated in mainland China.
With the declining efficiency of credit allocation, the overall rate of leveraging in 
China is on the rise. According to estimations by the Chinese Academy of Social 
Sciences and various other organisations,2 China’s total debt had reached RMB168 
trillion (US$27 trillion) and the ratio of total debt to GDP was up to 249 per cent 
by the end of 2015. This level was in line with that of some developed countries, 
including the United States, the United Kingdom and the euro area, but was much 
1 We thank Wing Thye Woo and other seminar participants at the Asian Economic Panel for valuable comments 
and suggestions. Ninghua Zhong acknowledges financial support from the National High-Level Talents Special 
Support Program (Young Top-Notch Talent Program), the Fok Ying-Tong Education Foundation of China 
(Grant No. 161081), the National Social Science Foundation of China (Grant No. 13&ZD015) and the Start-
Up Research Grant of Tongji University (Grant No. 180144). Zhikuo Liu acknowledges financial support from 
the National Natural Science Foundation of China (Grant No. 71503159) and the Program for Innovative 
Research Team of Shanghai University of Finance and Economics.
2 See the briefing meeting held by the Information Department of the State Council: www.toutiao.com/
i6296377658741621249/; and the report in the Financial Times: www.ftchinese.com/story/001067266?full=y.
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higher than that of developing countries such as Brazil (146 per cent) and India 
(128 per cent). It is estimated that this ratio is still currently above 250 per cent—


































New credit per unit of additional GDP  
Figure 3.1 Credit intensity (new credit/additional GDP) rising further
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Figure 3.2 Funding supply surges: increasing M2 and M2/GDP
Sources: CEIC Global Economic Database and NBS.
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Intriguingly, against the soaring trend of China’s corporate debt, many Chinese 
small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), as well as private firms, have found it 
increasingly difficult to obtain loans from the formal financial sector. On the other 
hand, the overall economy urgently needs to transform towards being innovation-
driven. Thus, more financial support is needed, and it is therefore argued that China 
should continue to use leverage.
Considering these factors, it is difficult to conclude whether China should continue 
leveraging. In fact, for a complicated economy such as China’s, any general conclusion 
could be biased and any unified policies and measurements may be inefficient. 
Perhaps, rather than discussing the overall ‘optimal debt ratio’ for the Chinese 
economy, we should first pin down some basic facts, such as: where is the leverage 
across different sectors, industries, regions, ownership types and periods? This is the 
first question we want to answer in this chapter.
Several recent reports have pointed out that nonfinancial enterprises have the 
highest debt across different sectors in China (for example, enterprise, residential 
and government), and that debt has risen rapidly since 2008. During the period 
2004–08, such debt accounted for less than 100 per cent of China’s GDP (Sina 
Finance 2017), whereas it reached 105.4 per cent of GDP in 2010, surpassing 
that of all other major countries (China News 2012). It continued to soar in the 
following years and reached 163 per cent in June 2015 (Caixin 2016). Moreover, 
according to estimates by Standard & Poor’s (2014), by the end of 2013, the total 
debt of nonfinancial enterprises in China was US$14.2 trillion, exceeding that in the 
United States (US$13.1 trillion). They further predicted that, by the end of 2018, 
China’s corporate debt would account for more than one-third of total corporate 
debt worldwide.
This chapter also examines the changes in corporate leveraging in China, mainly 
using data from China’s industrial enterprises that were above designated scale 
during the period 1998–2013,3 which come from the Annual Survey of Industrial 
Enterprises conducted by the National Bureau of Statistics of China (NBS various 
years). We first analyse the debt ratio (that is, total liabilities/total assets) of nearly 
4 million observations in this dataset. As can be seen from Figure 3.3, the simple 
average and median of debt ratio decreased from 65 per cent in 1998 to 51 per cent 
in 2013, representing a decline of 14 percentage points in 15 years and an average 
decline of nearly 1 percentage point annually.
3 During the period 1998–2006, those enterprises designated as being above scale were the entire state-owned 
industrial sector and the non–state-owned enterprises with an annual operating income of RMB5 million 
(US$0.68 million) or more. From the beginning of 2007, it excluded those whose annual operating income 
was less than RMB5 million even if they were SOEs. Furthermore, the standard has been raised from an annual 
operating income of RMB5 million to RMB20 million (US$3.17 million) since 2011.
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Furthermore, breaking down total debt into short-term debt (matured within one 
year) and long-term debt, we find that the ratio of average short-term debt to total 
assets decreased from 55 per cent in 1998 to 47 per cent in 2013 (see Figure 3.4), 
and the ratio of average long-term debt decreased from 11 per cent in 1998 to 
6 per cent in 2013 (see Figure 3.5). That is, the short-term debt ratio declined by 
8 percentage points during the sample period, while the long-term debt ratio only 
declined by 5 percentage points, so the short-term debt ratio contributes more to 
the decline in total debt ratio. However, given the very low initial level of long-term 
liabilities, it takes a much larger decrease indeed. It is worth noting that the median 
long-term debt ratio was zero for most years, indicating that more than half of the 
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Figure 3.3 Average debt ratio of China’s unlisted industrial enterprises
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Figure 3.4 Short-term debt ratio of China’s unlisted industrial enterprises
Source: NBS (various years).
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Figure 3.5 Long-term debt ratio of China’s unlisted industrial enterprises
Source: NBS (various years).
This declining trend is inconsistent with the rising corporate debt ratio that we have 
observed in the aggregate data. We thus deduce that it is a small sample of firms that 
have raised their leverage significantly. We thus divide the whole sample according 
to different standards and provide detailed statistical descriptions in section two. 
After elaborative examination, we summarise the following six facts.
• Fact 1: The longer a firm remains in the sample, the smaller is the decline in its 
debt ratio.
• Fact 2: The debt ratio of large enterprises decreased slightly, whereas that 
of SMEs dropped significantly.
• Fact 3: The decreasing range of the debt ratio of heavy industrial enterprises was 
generally much smaller than that of light industrial enterprises; and the average 
debt ratio of public utility enterprises was on the rise.
• Fact 4: The average debt ratio of enterprises in north-eastern and central China 
decreased the most—by more than 20 per cent—whereas the ratios of those 
enterprises in the developed eastern regions were quite stable.
• Fact 5: The average debt ratio of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) was always 
higher than that of private enterprises, which was, in turn, higher than that 
of foreign-funded enterprises. Among all types of enterprises, the average debt 
ratio of SOEs dropped the most. It is worth noting that the average debt ratio 
of longstanding SOEs was stable and rose after 2009.
• Fact 6: The average debt ratio of manufacturing enterprises listed on the Main 
Board was on the rise and surpassed that of unlisted companies after 2009.
Although these facts are simple statistical descriptions, they may provide an 
important basis for discussing the debt ratio in China and correct some existing 
mainstream views. First, in recent years, many media and institutional reports have 
focused on the record high debt ratios in China after the GFC, creating an idea 
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that the debt ratio of Chinese enterprises is generally on the rise. In fact, our six 
facts show that the increase in debt ratios is sharply concentrated in thousands of 
enterprises, most of which are large, state-owned and listed companies.
The following statistics best emphasise the sharp concentration of Chinese corporate 
debt. The data for Chinese industrial enterprises include about 345,000 enterprises 
for 2013; those enterprises had debts totalling RMB49.1 trillion (US$7.4 trillion). 
Nearly half of the total debt was held by the top 2,000 enterprises (RMB13.5 trillion; 
US$2 trillion) and more than one-quarter was held by the top 500 enterprises 
(RMB23.5 trillion; US$3.5 trillion). We also analysed the second dataset—that of 
Chinese listed firms—and obtained similar findings. According to our estimation, 
in 2015, the top 300 heavily indebted listed enterprises owed 82 per cent of all debt, 
amounting to RMB16 trillion (US$2.4 trillion), and the top 50 enterprises owed 
54 per cent of all debt, amounting to RMB11 trillion (US$1.7 trillion).
Among them, PetroChina—China’s largest oil and gas producer—was the most 
indebted listed company, owing RMB1 trillion (US$150 billion) in 2015. It was 
followed by China State Construction Engineering Corporation, China Petroleum 
and Chemical Corporation, China Railway Construction Corporation, China 
Railway Group Limited and China Communications Construction Corporation 
(which was listed in 2012 and did not release data before 2011). In 2015, those 
five companies held total debts of more than RMB3 trillion (US$450 billion). 
In addition, according to the 21st Century Business Herald, by the end of 2015, the 
total debt of the seven major coal enterprises in Shanxi exceeded RMB1.1 trillion 
(US$180 billion).4
Thus, China’s corporate debt issue is highly ‘structural’. Most debts are held by a 
small fraction of companies, whereas the debt ratio in most companies is declining.
After establishing the basic facts, sections three and four of this chapter attempt 
to further explore the question of whether the changing debt ratio is supported by 
economic fundamentals using both firm-level (that is, microlevel) and aggregate-
level (that is, macrolevel) data. China is not an exception to the rule that the rapid 
growth of developing countries is usually accompanied by an increase in the debt 
of the enterprise sector. Therefore, we need more precise analysis to answer the 
question of whether the rising leverage of nonfinancial enterprises is supported by 
their fundamentals—because, in the past few decades, with the rapid marketisation 
process in China, some of the main characteristics of Chinese enterprises have 
changed significantly. For example, their profitability has improved significantly 
(see Figure 3.6). It is reasonable for an enterprise to borrow more money from 
outside based on its rising profitability, because its expected cash flows will allow it 
4 See ‘Shanxi’s seven major coal enterprises’ debts reach Y1.1 trillion, and rely on government’s subsidies to pay 
wages’, China mining, www.chinamining.org.cn/index.php?m=content&c=index&a=show&catid=8&id=17540.
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to repay more debt.5 Similarly, some enterprises in China—mainly large SOEs—
have experienced rapid capital deepening. In other words, they have more fixed 
assets. It is also reasonable for these enterprises to borrow more because they have 
more collateral; if they cannot repay, they can sell off fixed assets. Such increases in 
leveraging are backed by economic fundamentals.
On the other hand, there are some increases in leverage that are not supported by the 
economic fundamentals and are thus deeply concerning. For example, many recent 
discussions have referred to state-owned ‘zombie’ enterprises. According to Tan et al. 
(2016), in 2007, 12.1 per cent of Chinese industrial enterprises were zombie firms, 
and their proportions of assets and liabilities were 10.7 per cent and 13.4 per cent, 
respectively.6 It is estimated that these proportions rose significantly after the GFC. 
The profitability of these enterprises is extremely low or even negative; nevertheless, 
even with high debt, they could survive if given substantial loans through the 
banking system. Meanwhile, many more profitable private enterprises are unable to 
borrow from banks. Such a contrast leads to reasonable conjectures about increasing 
credit misallocation.
To explore this issue, in section three, we start by referring to the literature on Western 
capital structure and examining the changes in six important corporate characteristics 
that determine credit financing. We find that the average size of Chinese enterprises 
during the period 1998–2013 increased and their operational risk rose; the proportion 
of tangible assets (mainly fixed assets and inventories) has been declining and profitability 
has been continuously increasing. These changes are a result at the firm (micro) level of 
the transformation of China’s economy towards being market-oriented. As competition 
in domestic and foreign product markets is becoming more intense, operational 
risks are increasing, while the profitability and scale of the surviving enterprises are 
becoming stronger and larger. In addition, market competition also forces enterprises 
to adopt a more competitive approach to production. Therefore, Chinese enterprises 
are constantly transforming to labour-intensive and light capitalisation, which is shown 
in the declining share of tangible assets.
These changing firm characteristics have varying influence on leveraging, therefore, 
we further refer to the standard regression models in the literature on Western 
capital structure to examine the relationships between these variables and the debt 
ratio. We find that, in the sample of private enterprises, the regression results are 
highly consistent with the Western literature; also, the changes in firm characteristics 
are consistent with changes in the debt ratio. For example: 1) the operating risk is 
negatively related to the debt ratio, so the rise in business risk may result in a decrease 
5 On the other hand, enterprises with high profitability tend to rely less on external capital because they can 
generate enough cash flow.
6 The methodology for identifying zombie enterprises refers to the CHK approach presented in Caballero et al. 
(2008).
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of the debt ratio; 2) the tangible asset is the collateral of debt financing and is 
positively related to the debt ratio, the decline of which may lead to a decline in the 
debt ratio; and 3) the average profit margin of an enterprise is negatively related to 
the debt ratio—that is, the relationship between internal cash and external financing 
is an alternative. Therefore, the increase in profitability may also be the reason for 
the declining debt ratio. We hence draw a preliminary conclusion that the financing 
decisions of private enterprises are in line with the principles of marketisation.
In the sample of SOEs, however, except for the profit margin, other important firm 
characteristics are insignificant or even have an unexpected sign; we can hardly explain 
the change in the debt ratio of SOEs by the changes in firm characteristics. Apart 
from these analyses, we have also examined Chinese listed enterprises and found there 
were about 160 listed SOEs whose profits (earnings) before interest and tax were not 
enough to pay off interest. These enterprises could only keep borrowing to repay old 
debts; as a result, the debt ‘snowballs’. This also indicates that the liabilities of some 
SOEs are too high, which eventually results in an excessive interest burden.
In section four, we use the aggregate-level (macro-level) data to provide further 
evidence of SOEs’ overleveraging. We find that state-owned industrial enterprises 
as a whole have been increasing their leveraging since 2008 and their overall debt 
ratio rose from 58 per cent in 2008 to 62 per cent in 2016, whereas the private 
sector has been underaccelerating its deleveraging, with the overall average debt 
ratio falling from 58 per cent to 52 per cent. In other words, the private sector has 
been deleveraging for more than a decade. Moreover, recently, private industrial 
enterprises as a whole contributed nearly 40 per cent of the total profit of all 
industrial enterprises, while their liabilities accounted for only 20 per cent of the 
total. In contrast, state-owned industrial enterprises as a whole contributed less than 
20 per cent of total profit, while their liabilities accounted for more than 40 per cent 
of the total. According to the Ministry of Finance, the total debt of the Chinese 
SOE sector has reached RMB100 trillion (US$15.1 trillion), whereas the return on 
total assets is only 1.91 per cent. Therefore, we draw a preliminary conclusion that 
the leveraging of SOEs is not supported by the economic fundamentals, and there 
are some nonmarket factors that are driving up their leverage.
It is noteworthy that this conclusion is also consistent with another important 
phenomenon that emerged after the GFC: SOEs are heavily involved in shadow 
banking activities such as entrusted lending or loans (China Business Journal 
2011). This suggests these enterprises do not have good investment opportunities 
themselves but are able to borrow large amounts of money from the financial system 
at a lower cost and then lend to others (for example, to the private sector) to obtain 
the interest spread, which also proves that the debt ratio of these SOEs is too high.
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This chapter differs significantly from the existing research on the capital structure 
of Chinese enterprises. Much of the research has been made by applying standard 
empirical tests from Western literature directly to Chinese enterprises and examining 
the power of the mainstream capital structure theories such as the ‘pecking order 
theory’ and ‘trade-off theory’ to impact Chinese corporate debt. For example, Chen 
(2004) finds that the capital structure of listed companies in China is not in line 
with the classic pecking order theory; rather, the order of their financing is retained 
earnings, equity financing and debt financing. Chen and Strange (2005) find that, 
unlike the expectation of the trade-off theory, Chinese listed companies do not show 
a stable optimal debt ratio. Newman et al. (2012) examined 1,539 privately owned 
SMEs in Zhejiang Province and found that firm size was positively correlated with 
the debt ratio, and there was a significant negative correlation between profitability 
and the debt ratio, which was consistent with the expectation of the pecking order 
theory. However, the relationship between the proportion of fixed assets and the 
debt ratio is not significant.
Other literature focuses on whether the main determinants of a firm’s capital structure 
in a developed country can explain the capital structure of Chinese listed companies. 
For example, Huang and Song (2006) find that the correlations between the debt 
ratio of listed companies in China and firm size—and between the debt ratio and 
the proportion of fixed assets, profitability, nondebt tax shields and growth—are 
basically consistent with the empirical findings from developed countries; the main 
difference is that the share of long-term debt in Chinese companies is very low. 
Bhabra et al. (2008) examine the long-term debt ratio of listed companies in China 
and find that it is positively related to firm size and the proportion of tangible assets, 
but negatively correlated with profitability and growth.
In contrast to this research, Li et al. (2009) consider unique institutional factors in 
China, and their work is the most like our chapter. They study the capital structure 
of Chinese industrial firms during the period 2000–03. They find that state-
owned and private enterprises have higher debt ratios than foreign-funded firms. 
In addition, in areas where the legal environment and the banking system are more 
developed, enterprises have lower total debt ratios.
The existing literature has focused on cross-sectional differences, whereas our 
chapter examines the changes in the time series—that is, trying to understand the 
significant changes in the debt ratio of Chinese enterprises in the context of China’s 
overall economic transformation. As we will show later, during the relatively short 
sample period of 1998–2013, the debt ratio and key characteristics of Chinese 
enterprises have changed dramatically. Such dramatic changes only happen in rapidly 
transforming countries such as China. In mature economies such as the United 
States, both the financing and the main features of enterprises are much more stable; 
therefore, studies of the capital structure of Western enterprises naturally focus more 
on the cross-sectional differences.
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More importantly, the main purpose of this chapter is not to test or develop the 
Western capital structure theories, but to provide valuable analysis of and suggestions 
for whether and how to deleverage in China. For these complicated issues, our 
research is still relatively preliminary. Our results indicate that a complete answer 
should include at least two parts. First, the financing decisions of some enterprises—
mainly private enterprises—are generally in line with the principle of marketisation. 
For these enterprises, adequate capital supply should be guaranteed so that the 
enterprises with fundamental support can borrow enough money. Second, there 
are many ‘nonmarket-oriented’ factors in the determinants of SOE debt. Thus, we 
should cease the transfusion of funds to inefficient firms as soon as possible and 
allocate new loans to the most efficient areas. Meanwhile, we suggest selling SOEs’ 
stock assets to repay the stock liabilities. Considering the already very high total 
leverage ratio in China, the efficiency of the allocation of incremental funds would 
determine the potential for China’s medium and long-term future economic growth.
Where is the leverage?
The data
The first firm-level dataset we examine comes from the Annual Survey of Industrial 
Enterprises conducted by the NBS from 1998 to 2013 (the data for 2010 is missing 
because of very poor quality), and the total original number of observations is 
3,911,364. We first examine the major accounting identities,7 requiring that the 
absolute value of [total liabilities + owner’s equity – total assets] be less than 1 per 
cent of total assets, resulting in 82,783 observations being deleted. Second, we check 
the identity of the total debt, requiring that the absolute value of [total debt – 
short-term debt – long-term debt] be less than 1 per cent of total assets, and delete 
203,920 observations. Third, we delete 4,774 observations with current liabilities 
larger than total liabilities, 3,314 observations with long-term liabilities larger than 
total liabilities, and 30 observations with a negative main operating income. Thus, 
the new total number of observations is 3,616,543.
In addition, some of the analyses in this chapter use the data for listed firms during 
the period 1998–2013 from the China Stock Market & Accounting Research 
(CSMAR) Database. We delete the observations for nonindustrial enterprises, and 
exclude firms listed on the Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises Board and on the 
Growth Enterprise Market, which results in a total of 20,306 observations. We also 
do 1 per cent and 99 per cent Winsorization for each firm-level variable.
7 There is a large amount of missing data for 2008 and 2011–13 for short-term and long-term liabilities, so only 
non-missing samples are considered for the proofreading of debt identities.
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Descriptive statistics on subsamples: Six facts
In this section, we present six facts about changes in the debt ratio of Chinese 
enterprises in the subsamples sorted by various standards. These facts are fundamental 
to further exploring China’s leveraging issues.
Fact 1: The longer a firm remains in the sample, the smaller is the 
decline in its debt ratio
Fact 1 is the conclusion drawn by grouping the whole sample according to the 
number of consecutive years in which the enterprises exist in the database. We divide 
the enterprises into four groups, with the years of existence of the sample firms 
being 3, 7, 11 and 15 years. Figure 3.6 depicts the changes in the average debt 
ratio of these subsamples; the average debt ratio of the enterprises with continuous 
existence of more than three years was 67 per cent in 1998 and dropped to 48 per 
cent in 2008—a decrease of 19 percentage points. However, the average debt ratio 
of those firms that have existed for more than 15 years declined from 58 per cent to 
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Figure 3.6 Debt ratio: Classified by years of existence
Source: NBS (various years).
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Fact 2: The debt ratio of large enterprises decreased slightly, 
whereas that of SMEs dropped significantly
We then classify the whole sample according to the size of the enterprises and 
conclude Fact 2. The division of large and medium-sized enterprises is based on 
the principle of the ‘Interim Provisions on Standards for Small and Medium-sized 
Enterprises’ formulated by the State Economic and Trade Commission, the State 
Development Planning Commission, the Ministry of Finance and the NBS in 
2003. Accordingly, companies with fewer than 2,000 employees, annual revenue 
of less than RMB300 million (US$45 million) or total assets of less than RMB400 
million (US$60 million) are defined as SMEs, while the remainder are defined as 
large enterprises. Figure 3.7 shows that the debt ratio of large enterprises decreased 
slightly, to 57 per cent, in 2013 from 61 per cent in 1998, whereas that of SMEs 
saw decreased sharply to 51 per cent in 2013 from 65 per cent in 1998. That is, the 
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Figure 3.7 Debt ratio: Classified by enterprise scale
Source: NBS (various years).
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Fact 3: The decreasing range of the debt ratio in heavy industrial 
enterprises was generally much smaller than that of light industrial 
ones; and the average debt ratio of public utility enterprises was 
on the rise
Fact 3 is the conclusion drawn by grouping the whole sample according to the 
industry of the enterprise. We divide the sample companies into 39 groups according 
to the two-digit industry classification number in the national economy. Because 
of the large number of industry groups, we do not report the results individually. 
In general, the debt ratio of heavy industrial enterprises saw a much smaller decline 
than that of light industrial enterprises. Figure 3.8 reports the debt ratio of several 
typical industries. For example, the debt ratio in the coal mining and washing 
industries fell to 58 per cent in 2013 from 61 per cent in 1998, and farm and sideline 
food-processing industries saw their debt ratio drop to 44 per cent in 2013 from 
72 per cent in 1998. The average debt ratio of public utility enterprises, however, 
was on the rise. For example, the average debt ratio of water production and supply 
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Coal mining and washing industry
Farm and sideline food processing industry
Water production and supply industry  
Figure 3.8 Debt ratio: Three typical industries
Source: NBS (various years).
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Fact 4: The average debt ratio of enterprises in north-eastern and 
central China decreased the most, by more than 20 percentage 
points, whereas that of enterprises in the developed eastern 
regions was stable
We conclude Fact 4 by dividing the whole sample according to the province in 
which the enterprise is located. The average debt ratios of enterprises in north-
eastern and central areas decreased by 20 percentage points, marking the maximum 
decline among different regions. Average debt ratios in the north-east, central and 
western regions were all about 69 per cent in 1998. The ratios declined to 45 per 
cent in the north-eastern and central regions by 2013 and to 55 per cent in the 
western region. The average debt ratio in the eastern region dropped by the smallest 
amount, to 55 per cent from 63 per cent in 1998 (see Figure 3.9). We have also 
examined the average debt ratio for each province and find six provinces stand out 
from the others. The average debt ratio in Beijing maintained a relatively stable 
trend; the ratio in Shanghai and Tianjin declined slightly while the average debt 
ratios in coastal districts such as Guangdong and Zhejiang increased slightly. Tibet 
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Figure 3.9 Debt ratio: Classified by enterprise region
Source: NBS (various years).





























































































Figure 3.10 Debt ratio: Several special provinces
Source: NBS (various years).
Fact 5: The average debt ratio of SOEs was always higher than 
that of private enterprises, which was, in turn, higher than that of 
foreign-funded enterprises. Among all types of enterprises, the 
average debt ratio of SOEs dropped the most. It is worth noting 
that the average debt ratio of SOEs in the sample that have 
existed for a long time was stable and rose after 2009
Fact 5 is the conclusion drawn by grouping the whole sample according to the 
registration type of enterprises and then examining their average debt ratio.8 During 
the period 1998–2013, the average debt ratio of SOEs dropped from 73 per cent to 
62 per cent, compared with the decline from 58 per cent to 50 per cent for private 
enterprises and from 55 per cent to 50 per cent for foreign-funded enterprises 
(see  Figure 3.11). The average debt ratio of SOEs has always been significantly 
higher than that in the private sector, while that in the private sector is generally 
higher than for foreign-funded enterprises.9 In addition, it is worth noting that it 
is becoming increasingly difficult for private enterprises to borrow money, and this 
trend seems to have begun earlier, in 2004, not after the GFC.10
8 The state-owned group includes SOEs, state-owned joint enterprises, state and collectively owned enterprises 
and wholly SOEs. The private sector includes privately owned enterprises, private partnership enterprises, 
private-limited enterprises and enterprises limited by shares. The foreign-funded sector includes joint ventures, 
cooperative enterprises, Hong Kong–owned, Macau-owned and Taiwan-owned enterprises and Hong Kong, 
Macau and Taiwan Investment Co. Ltd (if the investors from Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan gain an 
investment ratio of more than 25 per cent), and Sino–foreign cooperative ventures, Sino–foreign joint ventures, 
wholly foreign-owned enterprises and foreign investment companies (if the proportion of foreign investment 
exceeds 25 per cent). The mixed sector includes collective enterprises, joint stock limited enterprises (domestic 
capital) and other enterprises.
9 Regarding this result, Li et al. (2009) provide a careful discussion based on the dataset from the 2000–03 
industrial census.
10 Of course, the GFC significantly affected the private sector’s exports and reduced its profitability, thereby 
enhancing the demand for external funds. This makes the issue of private financing constraints more prominent.
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Figure 3.11 also suggests that the decline in the debt ratio of SOEs was the largest 
during the period 1998–2013. However, a more interesting result about the 
correlation between ownership and firm capital structure is shown in Figure 3.12. 
By narrowing the sample to stable enterprises that existed in the database between 
1998 and 2013 (that is, in existence over 15 years), we find the debt ratio of stable 
SOEs rose to 62 per cent in 2013 from 59 per cent in 1998, whereas the debt ratios 
of stable firms with other types of ownership were all declining.
Also noteworthy is the division within the state-owned sector in terms of access 
to loans. The average debt ratio of SOEs as a whole has decreased significantly, 
whereas only a small number among them has increased sharply. Based on this 
result, the reform of SOEs that was implemented in the past few decades seems 
to have broken the soft budgetary constraints of small and medium-sized SOEs. 
However, large SOEs still have easier access to capital, which could be the result of 
a policy—namely, ‘managing the big, liberating the small’—taken by the Chinese 
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Figure 3.11 Debt ratio: Classified by ownership
Source: NBS (various years).
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Figure 3.12 Debt ratio: Stable and persistent enterprises grouped according 
to ownership
Source: NBS (various years).
Fact 6: The average debt ratio of listed manufacturing 
enterprises was on the rise and surpassed that of unlisted 
companies after 2009
Finally, we put the debt ratios of listed and unlisted firms into one figure to conclude 
Fact 6. We use listed manufacturing companies that are traded on the main board of 
China’s stock market, which is the only board that existed before 2004. The contrast 
is obvious for both the level and the trend of debt (see Figure 3.13). In  1998, 
the average debt ratio of listed manufacturing companies was 39 per cent. This 
amount is not unusual, because listed firms raise money through equity financing, 
and thus their proportion of debt financing is usually lower than that of unlisted 
firms.11 However, a more important finding is that whereas the average debt ratio 
of unlisted manufacturing companies is declining, that of listed manufacturing 
companies has continued to rise and has reached 55 per cent, exceeding that of 
unlisted manufacturing enterprises since 2009.12
11 Huang and Song (2006) compare the debt ratio of listed companies in China with that of other countries. They 
find that the total debt ratio and long-term debt ratio of listed companies in China are significantly lower, while the 
proportion of equity financing is significantly higher. They suggest one of the reasons for this is the high valuation 
of listed companies in China. Some related literature (such as Chen 2004) proposes that one of the characteristics 
of the financing in Chinese listed companies is that equity financing has priority over bond financing.
12 The rise of the debt ratio in Chinese listed companies during this period is mentioned in some of the literature, 
such as Huang and Song (2006). The explanation they give is the development of the bond market. Nevertheless, 
they (along with other researchers) do not dig deeply into the analysis of this phenomenon.
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Figure 3.13 The opposing tendencies of debt ratios in listed and unlisted firms
Source: NBS (various years).
Is leveraging supported by economic 
fundamentals? Evidence from microlevel data
Changes in important firm characteristics
After describing the heterogeneous changes in the corporate debt ratio in China, we 
examine whether these changes are consistent with the changes in the characteristics 
of the enterprises. Hence, we focus on four key features of enterprises that are 
commonly tested in the literature on Western capital structure (see Rajan and 
Zingales 1995; Frank and Goyal 2003), including operational risk (volatility 
of profit), proportion of tangible assets, profitability and firm scale. Referring to 
previous research on the capital structure of Chinese enterprises (for example, Wu 
and Yue 2009), we also examine tax rates and nondebt tax shields. The changes in 
these six aspects over the period 1998–2013 are reported in Figures 3.14 to 3.19. As 
these six factors are the major dependent variables in the regressions reported later, 
we do not report their summary statistics, which have been provided in the figures.
What needs to be explained is as follows.
Our intention in this section is to explore whether changes in debt ratios are 
consistent with the changes of firm characteristics rather than to set up causal 
relationships. To demonstrate the causal relationships between various enterprise 
factors and the debt ratio probably requires exogenous shocks and well-designed 
identifications. The evidence provided in this chapter is mainly the correlation and 
therefore is relatively preliminary. Furthermore, our conclusion relies more on the 
results of the fixed-effects regression in the ‘Regression analysis’ subsection rather 
than the descriptive analysis in this subsection.
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The two mainstream capital structure theories—pecking order theory and trade-off 
theory—offer different predictions for the relationships between these variables and 
the debt ratio. We do not elaborate here due to space limitations.
Given a positive or negative relationship between a factor and the debt ratio, different 
interpretations can be presented based on different theories. In this section, we 
provide only one explanation, which we consider to be the most intuitive, avoiding 
more detailed discussions intended to distinguish between different theories, which 
would take much more space.
Analysing changes in these characteristics is, in itself, important for understanding 
the overall economic transformation that has taken place in China during this 
period. However, the focus of this chapter is on discussing whether these changes in 
time-series are consistent with the change in debt ratios. As for the reasons behind 
the changes, we offer only speculation that should not be regarded as rigorous 
analyses or conclusions.
Operational risk
We first examine the changes in operational risk, measured by the company’s 
standard deviation of the return on assets (ROA) over the past three years. This risk 
continued to rise after the late 1990s, soaring further in 2008, and then declining 
slightly (see Figure 3.14). The overall increase in this risk is due in part to the 
intense competition in China’s domestic product market and also because Chinese 
enterprises are becoming more involved in international market competition. Fierce 
competition makes it increasingly difficult for an individual enterprise to control 
the market and maintain a stable profit margin. Fluctuations in profits thereby 
enhance the uncertainty of future cash flows, which in turn reduce the probability of 
enterprises being able to obtain external funds. Therefore, the increase in operational 
risk may be one reason for the overall decline in the debt ratio.
Furthermore, Figure 3.14 also suggests that the less time a company has existed, 
the greater is the increase in operational risk. For example, the operational risk of 
enterprises that existed continuously for more than three years rose from 4.9 per cent 
in 2000 to more than 10 per cent in 2011; however, the risk for firms existing for more 
than 11 years changed by a much smaller margin. The reason may be that the less time 
an enterprise exists, the greater is the probability it will be withdrawn from the sample, 
indicating that the enterprise has a greater risk of bankruptcy and greater probability of 
default, which also reduces the probability of obtaining external financing. Therefore, 
Figure 3.14 is consistent with Fact 1, which we observed in Figure 3.6—that is, the 
less time a firm exists in the sample, the greater is the decline in its debt ratio.
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Figure 3.14 Operational risk: Classified by years of consecutive existence
Source: NBS (various years).
Proportion of tangible assets
The proportion of tangible assets—that is, the sum of net fixed assets and net 
inventories—in the total assets of Chinese enterprises declined from 63 per cent in 
1998 to about 48 per cent in 2013, representing a decrease of 15 percentage points 
in total (see Figure 3.15). The ratio of fixed assets to total assets and the proportion 
of inventories fell by about 9 and 6 percentage points, respectively.
The decline in the proportion of fixed assets in enterprises is an important 
manifestation of China’s economic transformation, indicating that the mode of 
firms’ production is changing towards greater consistency with their comparative 
advantages. More specifically, they moved away from a capital-intensive mode during 
the planned economy period, which violated comparative advantages, to a labour-
intensive mode (see Lin et al. 1998). The reasons for the decline in inventories 
are more complicated, possibly due to improvements in logistics or the decline of 
expected future demand. 
Both fixed assets and inventories can be used as collateral for debt financing, so 
the scale of tangible assets is an important factor in determining the financing 
ability of an enterprise. The higher the proportion of tangible assets, the lower is the 
degree of information asymmetry between the enterprises and the banks—thereby, 
the stronger the borrowing ability a firm has, the easier it will be to obtain debt 
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financing. So, the significant decrease in the proportion of tangible assets in Chinese 
enterprises in the period 1998–2013 is also likely to be an important reason for the 
overall decline in the debt ratio.13
0.1
1.1
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Mean: tangible assets
Mean: inventory
Median value: tangible assets
Median value: inventory  
Figure 3.15 The proportion of tangible assets in Chinese enterprises
Source: NBS (various years).
Profitability
Figure 3.16 depicts the sales profit margin—that is, total profit/main business 
revenue—in four groups of enterprises classified by ownership. The profit margin 
of all types of enterprises in China continued to rise as a whole and reached a peak 
by 2011, after which it began to decline slightly. In terms of ownership, the average 
profit margin of SOEs rose from –1 per cent in 1998 to more than 3 per cent in 
2011, whereas that of private enterprises was always the highest among the four 
categories; it started at less than 3 per cent in 1998 and rose to more than 6 per cent 
in 2011.
13 The changes in tangible assets can also explain Fact 3—that the debt ratio of typical heavy industrial enterprises 
is lower than that of typical light industrial enterprises in Figure 3.6. This may be due to the fact that the 
proportion of fixed assets of heavy industrial enterprises has declined by a relatively small margin. In addition, 
Figure 3.3 shows that the decline in the long-term debt ratio is even greater. Compared with short-term 
liabilities, long-term liabilities require a higher level of collateral. Bhabra et al. (2008) examine the capital 
structure of Chinese listed companies in different industries and find that capital-intensive firms such as those 
in manufacturing and utilities have more long-term debt. Therefore, the decline in tangible assets may also be 
an important reason.
The Chinese Economic Transformation
54
An increase in the level of profitability means more internal funds, which reduces 
the need for external financing. Therefore, the continuous rising average profit 
margin in Chinese enterprises may also be one of the reasons for the overall decline 
in the debt ratio. Furthermore, the increase in the profit margin of SOEs is most 
significant among the four groups, which is consistent with the largest drop in their 
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Figure 3.16 Sales profit margin: Enterprises grouped according to ownership
Source: NBS (various years).
Size
Figure 3.17 shows the size of four groups of enterprises, which is measured by the 
natural logarithm of total assets. The scale of Chinese enterprises as a whole was 
increasing—in particular, SOEs increased their average size by nearly 20 times from 
1998 to 2013. Generally, the larger a company is, the lower is its probability of 
bankruptcy and the higher is its debt ratio. Therefore, the change in scale does not 
seem to explain the decline in the overall debt ratio of Chinese enterprises.
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Figure 3.17 Size: Enterprises grouped according to ownership
Source: NBS (various years).
Tax rate
According to Western literature, the tax rate is an important factor in determining 
the capital structure of enterprises. Wu and Yue (2009) examine Chinese listed 
companies and find that change in taxation can lead to a change in the debt ratio. 
Enterprises should pay interest on debt financing and these expenses reduce their 
pre-tax profits, thereby reducing income tax. Thus, debt financing can offset part of 
the tax, which acts as a tax shield, and is the main benefit of debt described by the 
trade-off theory.
Figure 3.18 displays the income tax rate (income tax payable/total profit) of sample 
enterprises.14 It shows that the average income tax rate of the whole sample rose 
during the period 1998–2013. At the same time, we also notice that a certain 
proportion of the sample enterprises have a negative rate. To eliminate the influence 
of these enterprises, we then calculate the tax rate for those enterprises with a positive 
level of income tax payable (see Figure 3.18). This shows that the average tax rate for 
this group of companies stabilised at 27 per cent before 2006, and then decreased 
sharply in 2007 and 2008, after which it stabilised again, at about 22 per  cent. 
14 Strictly speaking, the actual income tax rate (income tax expenses/total profit) should be used here. However, 
this index is not available in the dataset for Chinese industrial firms, so we could only approximate it with the 
total income tax payable. In addition, income tax expenses include current income tax payable and deferred 
income tax.
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In short, it shows that there was no significant decrease in the level of tax that could 
be shielded by debt, so the change in taxation does not appear to be the main reason 
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Figure 3.18 Income tax rate of Chinese enterprises
Source: NBS (various years).
Nondebt tax shield
Like tax shields, depreciation can also reduce the pre-tax profits of an enterprise, 
thereby reducing the tax payable; hence, it is called a nondebt tax shield, which has 
a substitute relationship with the debt tax shield and is measured by (depreciation/
main operating revenue). It shows that the nondebt tax shields of the sample 
enterprises have dropped significantly as a whole (see Figure 3.19), which is 
consistent with the continuous decline in the proportion of fixed assets that we 
reported earlier and which should increase the incentive for companies to use debt 
shields to avoid taxation. According to Figures 3.18 and 3.19, the motivation for 
Chinese enterprises to use debt to avoid tax expenses has not been reduced, so tax 
considerations are not the main reason for the sharp decline in the debt ratio of 
Chinese enterprises.
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Figure 3.19 Nondebt tax shields of Chinese enterprises
Source: NBS (various years).
Regression analysis: Enterprise characteristics 
and debt ratio
Our analyses indicate that the overall decline in Chinese companies’ debt ratio 
may be due in part to the significant changes in the main characteristics of these 
enterprises, especially their operational risk, profitability and proportion of tangible 
assets. We use regression analysis to examine more rigorously the relationship 
between these characteristic variables and the debt ratio.
The explained variable TotLev in Table 3.1 is the debt ratio of each enterprise in the 
current year. We further control the debt ratio in the previous year (L.TotLev), based 
on the existence of the ‘optimal debt ratio’ (Levtt*), which is indicated by the trade-
off theory. It means that if the previous year’s debt ratio (Levtt-1) deviates from the 
optimal one, enterprises will adjust the actual debt ratio (Levt) to the optimal level 
in the current period, which is described by Equation 3.1.
Equation 3.1
Levt − Levt−1 = λ(Levt* − Levt−1) + εt
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Table 3.1 Debt ratios of various enterprises in China: Benchmark regression
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables All State Private Foreign
L.TotLev 0.269*** 0.365*** 0.194*** 0.314***
(0.002) (0.006) (0.003) (0.004)
L.STDROA –0.028*** 0.017 –0.046*** 0.025**
(0.005) (0.021) (0.006) (0.010)
L.Size 0.003*** –0.004* 0.005*** 0.010***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
L.Tng 0.010*** 0.003 0.004** 0.027***
(0.001) (0.005) (0.002) (0.003)
L.Npr –0.158*** –0.088*** –0.184*** –0.168***
(0.003) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006)
L.tax –0.020*** –0.028*** –0.015*** –0.029***
(0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
Nonpositive*L.tax 0.056*** 0.043*** 0.065*** 0.043***
(0.004) (0.008) (0.006) (0.010)
Observations 1,203,426 159,188 675,955 288,118
R-squared 0.825 0.879 0.821 0.818
Number of firm FE 328,727 47,290 212,433 70,412
Year dummies YES YES YES YES
Province*Year dummies YES YES YES YES
Industry*Year dummies YES YES YES YES
*** Statistically significant at the 1 per cent level
** Statistically significant at the 5 per cent level
* Statistically significant at the 10 per cent level
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses.
Here, λ is used to measure the speed of adjustment to the optimal level, depending 
on the characteristics of the enterprises and the macro situation (see Cook and 
Tang 2010). A more detailed explanation of this formula can be found in Flannery 
and Rangan (2006). The econometric model we use is the fixed-effect regression 
model. Because the debt ratio of the previous period is controlled, there may be 
a problem of first-order autocorrelation. However, Flannery and Rangan (2006) 
carefully examine various econometric models and conclude that sequence-related 
problems are not serious (see p. 479), whereas it is necessary to control the firm fixed 
effects and the annual dummy variables. Therefore, we refer to their study as well as 
follow-up ones (including Cook and Tang 2010) and use the ordinary fixed-effect 
regression model. The number of firm fixed effects controlled by each regression is 
reported in Table 3.1—for example, 328,727 different enterprises are included in 
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the full-sample regression. It is worth noting that because we control the variable 
STDROA, the sample firms that are included in the regression should have existed 
for at least three consecutive years.
We also control a set of dummy variables, including the annual ones (15 in 
total), (province × year) (465 in total) and (industry × year) (570 in total). Using 
these dummy variables and the firm fixed effects, we control not only the effects 
of certain fixed characteristics of the enterprises (such as the ownership type or 
political connections) on the debt ratio, but also the regional factors that affect the 
adjustment of the corporate debt ratio in each province every year (for example, the 
overall credit situation of each province in that year), as well as industrial factors 
(for example, the prosperity of each industry in that year). In addition, the set 
of (industry × year) being controlled in the regressions equals the average annual 
debt ratio of each industry being controlled. Frank and Goyal (2009) find that the 
average debt ratio of an industry has a reliable and stable explanatory power over 
the corporate debt ratio. By controlling these groups of dummy variables, we try to 
minimise various endogenous issues between enterprise characteristics and the debt 
ratio. Firm characteristics are lagged by one period to reduce the reverse causalities 
between these variables and the debt ratio. Because of the control of these firm 
characteristics and many dummy variables, the R2 of the regressions are all above 
80 per cent.
The results using the full sample are reported in Column (1), while Columns (2), (3) 
and (4) report the results using the subsample of state-owned, private and foreign-
funded enterprises, respectively.15 Our findings are as follows: 1) the coefficient of 
L.TotLev is (1 − λ), which means that the adjustment speed of private enterprises 
(1 − 0.194) is higher than that of SOEs (1 − 0.365); 2) the variable of STDROA 
is the standard deviation of ROA over the past three years, which is significantly 
negative in both the full sample and private enterprises, whereas it is not significant 
in the sample of SOEs; 3) Size is measured by the logarithm of total assets and 
is significantly positive in the full sample and for private enterprises, while being 
negative in the sample of SOEs (significance at the 10 per cent level); 4) as for 
the proportion of tangible assets to the total assets, Tng is significantly positive 
in the full sample and for private enterprises, but not significant in the sample of 
SOEs; 5) Npr represents the sales profit margin and is negative in all sets of samples, 
while its magnitude in the private enterprises sample is more than twice the effect 
for SOEs.
In sum, in the private sector, the relationships between these four variables and the 
debt ratio are consistent with the findings in the Western literature. The results in 
Columns (1) – (4) indicate that the financing decisions in Chinese private enterprises 
15 There is also a type of enterprise with mixed ownership; because of the unclear ownership and space limitations, 
we do not report the relative results.
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are more in line with those made by Western companies—in other words, they 
are more market-oriented. Nevertheless, only the result for the sales profit margin 
coincides with the Western empirical findings in the sample of Chinese SOEs.
In addition to these four factors, we divide the sample into two groups according 
to whether the enterprise’s income tax payable is positive in the previous period. 
Thus, one group includes those enterprises with a positive tax rate (nonpositive 
= 0) and the other includes those with a negative rate (nonpositive = 1). In the 
group with a positive tax rate, the variable of L.Tax that represents the tax rate in 
the previous period is negatively correlated with the debt ratio, and the negative 
effect in the sample of SOEs is even greater. In the other group, because the tax rate 
itself is nonpositive and the estimated value of L.Tax is positive, the actual effect is 
also negative. Briefly stated, for Chinese enterprises, the higher the income tax rate 
in the previous period, the lower is the debt ratio in the later period. This seems 
to indicate that Chinese industrial enterprises do not deliberately add liabilities to 
reduce taxation, which is contrary to the conclusions obtained from the existing 
literature examining China’s listed companies, including Huang and Song (2006) 
and Wu and Yue (2009). This issue is worth studying more carefully.
Through this analysis, we draw a preliminary conclusion that the financing 
decisions of some enterprises—most of which are private enterprises—are in 
accordance with the principle of marketisation. Meanwhile, the financing decisions 
of other enterprises—most of which are SOEs—contain many nonmarket factors. 
The financing behaviours of these enterprises lack support from the economic 
fundamentals. In other words, these firms have borrowed too much, which is not 
ideal because they must carry a high interest burden.
We have also examined Chinese listed companies to provide further evidence 
supporting our conclusions. According to our calculations, in 2015, there 
were more than 160 listed SOEs that did not have enough profits to cover their 
interest expenses (see Figure 3.20). What is worse, these enterprises had to borrow 
more money to repay the capital and interest; as a result, more and more debt 
is accumulated. We  found that, from 2010 to 2015, the total liabilities of these 
160 enterprises rose from RMB980 billion (US$145 billion) to RMB1.68 trillion 
(US$270 billion). In other words, the 160 enterprises in deficit borrowed RMB700 
billion (US$130 billion) in additional debt during this period. This also means the 
debt ratio of these enterprises is so high that it leads to heavy interest burdens. It is 
worth noting that our estimates are consistent with the estimates made in 2016 by 
Wang and Zhong (2016)—that the proportion of nonfinancial companies listed on 
the main stock market board that had lower earnings before interest and tax than 
interest expenses was 11.7 per cent in the first half of 2015. This means that 160 to 
200 large Chinese listed firms, most of which are state-owned, did not have enough 
profit to pay their interest.





















Figure 3.20 SOEs with heavy interest burdens
Source: CSMAR and authors’ calculation.
Is leveraging supported by economic 
fundamentals? Evidence from  
aggregate-level data
In this section, we provide more evidence regarding who should be deleveraging 
and who should be leveraging. As shown in Figure 3.21, the state-owned sector 
as a whole continuously increased its leverage after 2008, as its average debt ratio 
rose from 59 per cent in 2008 to 62 per cent by 2016. Moreover, the total debt 
of the state-owned sector continues to rise. According to data released by the 
Ministry of Finance, by November 2017, the total liabilities of the Chinese state-
owned sector reached RMB100 trillion (US$15.1 trillion). Among them, the total 
liabilities of the central SOEs were RMB51.5 trillion (US$7.8 trillion)—soaring by 
nearly 9.6 per cent compared with a year earlier—while those of local SOEs were 
RMB48.5 trillion (US$7.3 trillion), contributing to 12.3 per cent of year-on-year 
growth. The private sector has been deleveraging sharply, with the average debt ratio 
of private industrial enterprises falling from 56 per cent in 2008 to 50.7 per cent in 
2016 (see Figure 3.21). In other words, the private sector has been deleveraging for 
more than a decade.
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Figure 3.21 The average debt ratio: State-owned versus private enterprises
Source: NBS.
On the other hand, until recently, private industrial enterprises contributed nearly 
40 per cent of the total profit of all industrial enterprises, whereas their liabilities 
accounted for only 20 per cent of the total (see Figure 3.22). This means that 
the financial resources used by the private sector are far below their economic 
contribution. In contrast, SOEs contributed less than 20 per cent of the total 
profit of all industrial enterprises, while their liabilities accounted for more than 






1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Debt proportion: SOEs
Debt proportion: Private enterprises
Total Profit Proportion: SOEs
Total Profit Proportion: Private enterprises  
Figure 3.22 The contrast in total profit: State-owned versus private enterprises
Source: NBS.
It is worth mentioning that this gap between financial support and economic 
contribution is consistent with another important phenomenon arising after the 
GFC—that is, SOEs widely participated in various kinds of shadow banking 
activities. For example, using the data on entrusted loans published by the Shanghai 
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Stock Exchange and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange, Zhang et al. (2015) estimate 
that SOEs made 75 per cent of entrusted loans in 2013. This means these firms 
did not have good investment opportunities themselves but borrowed a substantial 
amount of money at a low cost from the financial system and then made loans to 
those companies that could not borrow from the formal financial system, at higher 
interest-rate-to-gain margins. Moreover, according to reports in the Financial Times 
on 16 August 2016, large Chinese SOEs were increasingly involved in entrusted 
loans when facing a downturn in their core business. The total stock of China’s 
entrusted loans reached RMB12 trillion (US$1.8 trillion) in June 2016, increasing 
by 70 per cent since early 2014. In addition, entrusted loans became the fastest 
growing area of China’s shadow banking industry. All these data prove that Chinese 
SOEs have borrowed too much money. Their debt ratio is too high and greatly 
beyond their ability to repay.
Therefore, to improve the efficiency of credit allocation, the first thing we should 
do is overcome the ‘polarity’ in financing activities between the state-owned and 
private sectors dating from 2008, so that the financial support to and economic 
contribution of the various sectors is roughly equal.
Conclusions and policy discussions
Recently, the demographic dividend that drove China’s rapid economic growth 
over the past decades has been rapidly exhausted. Because of the family planning 
policies that began in the early 1980s, China’s population will age rapidly in the next 
few years. If China wants to maintain high-speed economic growth in the ensuing 
period, it should first rely on the optimal allocation of capital, encouraging the 
efficient use of machinery and equipment, to increase the marginal output of the 
existing labour force. Second, China should rely on continuous innovation to move 
closer to the global technological frontier. To realise these two goals, the efficient 
allocation of resources in China’s financial system is crucial. More specifically, can 
finance be allocated to enterprises with high efficiency and real productivity and to 
those early projects with innovative potential to support their development?
As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, after 2008, the efficiency of credit in 
China declined significantly. One important reason for this is that those inefficient 
enterprises are receiving large amounts of funds. This constrains investment and 
innovation in the healthy and efficient enterprises and inhibits new enterprises from 
entering the industry. Furthermore, the phenomenon of ‘finance does not support 
entities’ has become more serious and, ultimately, has led to the inefficiency of the 
economy.
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On the other hand, China’s overall debt ratio has been rising continually; as a result, 
the pressure for deleveraging is increasing. Should the economy be deleveraged 
and, if so, how should we do it? Based on analysis of a dataset containing nearly 
4 million above-scale Chinese industrial enterprises during the period 1998–2013, 
we attempted to provide some preliminary evidence to answer these questions. 
We focused on the following two issues.
First, the overall debt ratio of nonfinancial enterprises in China is at a high level, 
but where is the leveraging exactly? We find that most industrial enterprises were 
significantly deleveraged during the 16-year period, while only a small number of 
large, state-owned and listed enterprises increased their leveraging. Second, is the 
change in the debt ratio supported by the economic fundamentals? For this question, 
we first examine the changes in some key characteristics of the sample enterprises and 
find that the overall decline in the debt ratio is consistent with significant changes 
in certain characteristics, including an increase in operational risk and profitability, 
as well as a decline in the proportion of tangible assets. We  further find in the 
regression analysis that the determination of the debt ratio in private enterprises 
basically accords with the findings in the Western literature; in contrast, SOEs are 
including fewer ‘market-oriented’ factors in their financial decision-making.
As for whether to deleverage and how to deleverage in China, our research is still 
preliminary. Nevertheless, the results and analysis in this chapter indicate that 
a  complete answer should include at least two parts. First, for enterprises whose 
financial decision-making is consistent with the principle of marketisation (mainly 
private enterprises), sufficient capital supply should be ensured so the economic 
fundamentals support these enterprises obtaining adequate funds. Second, as 
for another group of enterprises, whose leveraging determinants contain more 
‘nonmarket’ factors (mainly SOEs), funding ‘transfusions’ for such inefficient 
objects should be suspended, so that new loans can be allocated to the most efficient 
enterprises. Based on these results, we also have two specific suggestions for real 
implementation.
First, China’s high rate of leveraging is a structural issue, with a large amount of 
debt concentrated in a few enterprises. In this case, a general and unified monetary 
policy—whether it is tight or loose—can be inefficient, and may even increase the 
severity of existing mismatches. The problem is not whether monetary policy should 
be loosened or tightened; rather, the transmission of monetary policy in China’s 
financial system is seriously biased: credits are not allocated to those ‘healthy’ 
enterprises that need capital urgently. Therefore, effective policies must gradually 
correct the inefficiency of existing financial intermediaries, especially the allocation 
of funds in the banking system, and weaken the power of non-marketisation.
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Second, for those SOEs that are inefficient and in deficit, debt is a ‘stock’, but new 
loans are ‘flows’, which should not be used to solve the stock problem. Paying off 
old debts with new loans can only lead to a rapid accumulation of total liabilities. 
According to the estimations from Wang and Zhong (2016), in 2015, between 
RMB1.5 trillion (US$240 billion) and RMB2 trillion (US$320 billion) of total 
new debt was used to repay previous interest expenses, which is equivalent to around 
10 per cent of total new credit in that year. We suggest the problem of debt as stock 
should be settled by, for example, selling a portion of state-owned assets to repay 
debt, while restructuring the enterprises in deficit to enhance their capability.
For those enterprises with negative net assets, in particular, shutting down, 
suspending, merging or transforming them will increase the value of total state-
owned assets rather than devaluing them. The point of selling assets is, in fact, to 
identify opportunities in the market to make full use of these assets. If these assets 
can be fully utilised, it will benefit the entire economy. With the current high debt 
ratio in China, new credit is a particularly valuable resource that needs to be used 
wisely and cautiously. Moreover, the allocation efficiency of incremental credits is 
directly related to China’s medium and long-term potential economic growth.
To summarise, the high levels of leveraging in China are a structural issue that 
require ‘structural’ policies to be resolved. On the one hand, deleveraging is not right 
for most enterprises, but it is for inefficient areas, especially a few thousand highly 
leveraged firms. The main battlefield for deleveraging is the state-owned sector, 
especially inefficient and large enterprises, which usually have severe overcapacity. 
Thus, the Chinese Government should promote market-oriented reform of SOEs 
as well as a policy of ‘shutting down, suspending, merging and transforming’ firms 
to realise the goal of ‘distinct property rights, well-defined power and responsibility, 
separation of government and enterprises, and scientific management’, as proposed 
by the Third Plenary Session of the Fourteenth Central Committee more than two 
decades ago.
On the other hand, it is equally important to increase leveraging in efficient areas; 
efficient private enterprises should receive more support via new credit. For that, 
market-oriented reform of commercial banks and other financial intermediaries in 
China needs to be promoted further, so that valuable credit resources can be allocated 
to those enterprises with real productivity and sufficient returns on capital. In sum, the 
core aim of deleveraging is to keep deepening the reform of the state-owned sector so 
that new power and vitality can be generated for China’s economic growth.
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4. A structural investigation of the 
Chinese economy with a hybrid 
monetary policy rule
Jiao Wang and Ran Li1
Introduction
Since about 2010, China has been experiencing a gradual and persistent slowdown 
in gross domestic product (GDP) growth, from an average of 10 per cent over 
the 30 years to 2010 to the latest figure, 6.6 per cent in 2018, making the latter 
the slowest growth rate for three decades. Chinese President Xi Jinping described 
this as the ‘new normal’ for the Chinese economy in May 2014. The slowing of 
China’s economic growth has attracted a great deal of attention from policymakers 
and scholars. The release of the official data on GDP growth often makes headline 
news around the world. The seemingly persistent trend of the economic slowdown 
triggered worries and speculation about further slowing, and even economic collapse, 
in the future.2 Given the increasingly important role the Chinese economy plays in 
the global supply chain and, in particular, in supporting demand for commodities 
and many intermediate goods from a number of resource-intensive economies 
including Australia, it is crucial to gain a better understanding of the causes of 
China’s economic slowdown.3 
What are the sources of China’s economic slowdown since 2010? Researchers’ answers 
to this question are diverse. From an international perspective, Eichengreen et al. 
(2012) show that rapidly growing economies slow significantly when their per capita 
incomes reach about US$17,000 in year-2005 constant international purchasing 
power parity (PPP) prices—a level China has recently reached. Their empirical 
1 We are grateful to Ippei Fujiwara, Yiping Huang, Adrian Pagan, Peter Drysdale, Paul Kitney, Ligang Song, Shiro 
Armstrong and two anonymous reviewers for their useful suggestions and comments at various stages of this 
work. We are also thankful for all the comments and questions received at the Australian Conference of 
Economists at the Queensland University of Technology and a seminar at the Reserve Bank of Australia. 
All errors are those of the authors. Jiao Wang is grateful for the financial support of the University of Melbourne 
Early Career Researcher (ECR) Grant Themis Agreement Number 603760.
2 A separate but related issue to the release of GDP data is the reliability of the numbers released by the National 
Bureau of Statistics of China. Some argue that the official numbers might have overestimated economic growth, 
which, if true, would make the slowdown even larger. See, for example, Fernald et al. (2013) and Chen et al. 
(2019) for arguments for and against, respectively, the reliability of the official data. 
3 Cashin et al. (2017) estimated that a 1 per cent permanent negative GDP shock in China could lead to 
a 0.23 percentage point growth loss in the short run and a surge in global financial market volatility. This could 
translate into a fall in world economic output of 0.29 per cent overall. 
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evidence from a sample including industrial and developing and emerging market 
economies shows that the fall in the productivity growth is the primary contributor 
to the economic growth slowdown, while the fall in the growth of labour share and 
capital investment play much smaller roles. The growth rate of human capital, on 
the other hand, even increased a little, so plays a positive role to economic growth 
(Eichengreen et al. 2012: 52–3). Cai and Lu (2013) estimate China’s average annual 
growth potential to be 7.2 per cent over the Twelfth Five-Year Plan period and 
6.1 per cent over the Thirteenth Five-Year Plan period, and highlight the diminishing 
demographic dividend as a result of the shrinking working-age population, which 
was a driver of China’s rapid growth before 2010. From a business cycle perspective, 
there are studies that suggest that the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) was somewhat, 
if not solely, responsible for accelerating the slowdown process. For example, 
Gilchrist et al. (2009) argue that there is an evident cyclical component to Chinese 
growth rate dynamics and the observed slowdown since 2010 could be a temporary 
phenomenon tightly connected with the downswing phase of this cycle. 
In this chapter, we aim to contribute to the discussion by conducting a structural 
investigation of the Chinese economy to better understand the sources of business 
fluctuations in China, especially fluctuations in output. There is, however, one puzzle 
that needs to be solved before we can proceed with the structural investigation. That 
is the unidentified rule governing China’s monetary policy. 
According to the Law of the People’s Republic of China on the People’s Bank of 
China, ‘the objective of the monetary policy shall be to maintain stability of the 
value of the currency and thereby promote economic growth’. The People’s Bank 
of China (PBC) is by no means an inflation-targeting central bank, like many 
other modern central banks, and its objectives extend far beyond price stability. 
As former PBC governor Xiaochuan Zhou has said, China’s monetary policy has 
the following objectives: maintaining price stability, promoting economic growth, 
supporting employment and achieving a balance-of-payments equilibrium (Zhou 
2016). In addition, the 2017 PBC Work Conference called for monetary policy to 
achieve a balance between economic growth, economic reform, economic structure, 
household welfare and financial stability (McMahon et al. 2018). Nevertheless, 
there is no consensus on the form of policy rules the PBC has been employing, 
let alone whether such rules can achieve their objectives.
Without a well-defined monetary policy rule, it will be difficult to accurately model 
China’s macroeconomy. The transmission mechanism of a monetary policy shock to 
the economy is uncertain and the effects will be difficult to predict for the central 
bank. What is the PBC’s monetary policy rule? Has the rule changed over time? 
What do the data say about the monetary policy rules in practice? What are the main 
sources of business fluctuations in the Chinese economy given what we know about 
the monetary policy rules? These are the questions this chapter aims to address.
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To this end, we extend a standard new Keynesian dynamic stochastic general 
equilibrium (DSGE) model with financial friction shocks and investment-specific 
technology shocks to model the Chinese economy. The financial friction mechanism 
is of the type introduced by Bernanke et al. (1999) to model market imperfections 
in the financial sector. The investment-specific technology shock was suggested 
and developed by Greenwood et al. (1988, 1997) as a viable alternative to neutral 
technology shocks as sources of business cycles. Studies by Kaihatsu and Kurozumi 
(2014) and Justiniano et al. (2011) find that the financial friction shock and the 
investment-specific technology shock are important sources of business fluctuations 
in the United States. There are a number of studies applying DSGE models to 
the Chinese economy—for example, Xu and Chen (2009), Mehrotra et al. (2013), 
Yuan and Feng (2014) and Zhang et al. (2014). None of these studies has explicitly 
taken into account financial friction or shocks to investment.4 It is reasonable to 
expect that these factors are significant drivers of China’s business fluctuations.
We propose a hybrid form of monetary policy rule for the extended model. Past 
studies of China’s monetary policy tend to make a choice between Taylor-type rules 
and quantity rules that have been used in studies of advanced economies.5 For 
example, Zhang (2009) argues that a Taylor-type rule is likely to be more effective 
than a quantity-type rule in managing the economy. Liu and Zhang (2010) show 
that both rules outperform a single rule in a four-equation new Keynesian model.6 
Since there is no consensus on the specific form of the policy rules, we incorporate 
a general monetary policy rule that encompasses the pure Taylor-type or quantity-
type rules for estimations, and let the estimated results using real-time data show 
which rule best represents China’s monetary policy rule. 
The main findings of the chapter are as follows. First, the PBC employed a hybrid 
monetary policy rule during the period 2001–17, during which the policy rate was 
adjusted in response to the inflation rate, output, output growth as well as the growth 
of real money in the economy. This finding sheds light on the functional form of the 
real monetary policy in operation during the sample period, even though there has 
been no consensus on what the rule is. Furthermore, the estimations for the possible 
breaking point of the rule before and after 2009 show clear existence of a change 
in weight of the quantity component of the monetary policy rule, which could 
4 Yuan et al. (2011) and Kang and Gong (2014) incorporate financial friction shocks, but not investment-specific 
technology shocks in their models.
5 A quantity rule for monetary policy is a rule that sets the level or growth rate of money supply in the economy, 
it is so named because monetary policy directly controls the quantity of money in the economy. A Taylor-type 
rule for monetary policy is a rule that sets the nominal interest rate of the economy. It is a price rule as it sets the 
price of money, the interest rate on risk-free deposits, and it is a variant of the original Taylor rule, proposed by 
Taylor (1993).
6 Note that Liu and Zhang (2010) use the concept of a ‘hybrid rule’ in their study, which means that the central 
bank uses both the quantity rule and the Taylor rule to conduct monetary policy. Because of the small scale of 
their model, this is mathematically solvable.
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be explained by the large increase in base money due to the significant fiscal and 
monetary stimulus after the GFC led the PBC to be more reactive to fluctuations in 
real money growth in the economy after 2009. 
Second, the main sources of business fluctuations in output and consumption 
growth rates are neutral technology shocks and preference shocks, while fluctuations 
in investment and loans are driven primarily by investment-specific technology 
shocks and net-worth shocks. The structural investigation of China’s business cycle 
shows the important contribution investment-specific technology shocks make to 
fluctuations in the financial sector. These investment-specific technology shocks 
differ from the nationwide neutral technology development shocks in affecting the 
economy and should be taken into account when examining economic fluctuations. 
Third, while the consistently positive net-worth shocks explain the steady growth 
of investment, the negative neutral technology shocks have been the main 
contributor to the slowing of China’s GDP growth since about 2010. This finding 
contributes to discussions of the GDP growth slowdown since that time, which has 
drawn huge attention from policymakers and researchers in China and among its 
trading partners. The finding supports the view that this phase of the slowdown is 
arising from a structural change in the nation’s productivity, rather than a cyclical 
fluctuation, and policies that favour reform and industrial upgrading to address the 
change should be given higher priority at the leadership level. 
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. Section two constructs the 
model, section three proceeds with the estimation, section four reports and discusses 
the results, while the concluding remarks are made in section five.
The model
The model is very close to that of Kaihastu and Kurozumi (2014), except for the 
central bank’s behaviour. In this section, we will describe the behaviour of each 
agent in the economy in detail while presenting only a few mathematical equations. 
For details of system equations and derivations of optimal conditions, please see the 
working paper version of this chapter (Li and Wang 2018). 
There are households comprising worker and entrepreneur members, financial 
intermediaries, intermediate-goods firms, consumption-goods firms, investment-
goods firms, capital-goods firms and the central bank in the economy. The financial 
accelerator mechanism of Bernanke et al. (1999) is employed in the financial sector. 
The economy is subject to both technology shocks and financial shocks.
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The representative household comprises a continuum of members normalised 
to unity. A proportion of members are workers, denoted by m ∈ [0,1], and the 
rest are entrepreneurs. All members are assumed to pool their consumption and 
make joint consumption-saving decisions. The representative household’s utility 
function consists of aggregate consumption with external habit formation—that 
is, previous aggregate consumption enters the utility function as an external inertia 
to the current consumption level, which smooths the effect of consumption on the 
utility of the representative households. Real money balance and labour efforts enter 
the utility function as standard in the DSGE model literature. The representative 
household consumes, works and saves via the financial intermediaries, which will be 
introduced shortly, receives dividends from firms that they own and pays taxes to the 
government. They also receive money transfers from the central bank in each period. 
Workers—the designated proportion of household members—receive wages for 
working for production firms. The labour market is monopolistically competitive—
that is, firms pay a markup above the base wage that measures the marginal 
productivity of workers. In the meantime, we assume that wages adjust sluggishly, 
according to a Calvo (1983) adjustment rule. In each period, a fraction of 1 - ξm ∈ 
(0,1) of workers are able to reoptimise their wages, while the wages of the remaining 
fraction, ξm, of workers are set by indexation to past inflation as well as the steady-
state balanced growth rate, z*. 
Entrepreneurs—the remaining household members—enter period t with net 
worth, Nt–1, left from the previous period and obtain a loan, Lt–1, from financial 
intermediaries. They purchase capital, Kt–1, from capital-goods firms at a given 
price, Qt–1, and choose the capital utilisation rate, µt. They then provide rental 
capital services to intermediate-goods firms and sell the rest of their capital back 
to capital-goods firms. After repaying their loan to the financial intermediary, 
a fraction, 1 – ηt ∈ (0,1), of entrepreneurs become workers, while the remaining, 
ηt, survive into the next period. This assumption is to ensure the relative population 
size of workers and entrepreneurs remains constant over time.
The loan rate, , consists of a deposit rate and the external finance (EF) 
premium, in the spirit of Bernanke et al. (1999) as Equation 4.1.
Equation 4.1
It shows that the loan rate is increasing with the leverage ratio and decreasing with 
the net worth of the debtor. 
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The intermediate-goods firms and consumption-goods firms follow the standard 
assumption and settings in DSGE models. Briefly, each intermediate-goods 
firm produces output according to nationwide technology with capital rented 
from entrepreneurs and the labour efforts of workers. The output is then sold in 
a monopolistically competitive market to consumption-goods firms. The price 
of the intermediate goods is again subject to the Calvo (1983) adjustment rule. 
Consumption-goods firms bundle the intermediate goods without cost into the 
final consumption goods for the households to consume. The price of the final 
goods is the consumer price index (CPI). 
There are two other types of firms in the economy that are involved in capital-related 
production: investment-goods firms and capital-goods firms. The former convert 
one unit of consumption goods into differentiated investment goods according 
to an investment-specific technology, Ψt, which is a different technology from 
the intermediate-goods production technology, Zt. The capital-goods firm takes the 
price of the investment goods and chooses an optimal combination of investment 
goods from all the investment-goods firms. 
The central bank in the model is assumed to conduct monetary policy according to 
the rule proposed in Equation 4.2.
Equation 4.2
This functional form consists of a linear combination of the part related to real money 
demand from the household, represented by the bracket associated with W and 
the part related to a typical Taylor rule, represented by the bracket associated with 
(1 – W ), and an exogenous shock, . Setting the monetary policy rule in the above 
form allows us to feed the model with real-time Chinese data to obtain estimates of 
W. If W = 1, the above rule collapses to the condition describing the optimal demand 
for real money supply, which then determines the interest rate given mt. If W = 0, the 
above rule reduces to a typical Taylor-type rule with the interest rate responding to 
inflation and economic output. Finally, if 0 < W < 1, the rule tells us that the policy 
rate responds to real money as well as inflation and economic output. We call the rule 
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in this case a  ‘hybrid rule’. To close the model, we need another condition for the 
money supply in the economy. We follow Christiano et al. (2005) and define money 
growth following an AR(1) process, as in Equation 4.3.
Equation 4.3
 and  
Estimation
We adopt a Bayesian likelihood approach from Kaihastu and Kurozumi (2014) 
with 12 Chinese quarterly time series: output, consumption, investment, labour 
(hours worked), the real wage, the price of consumption goods, the relative price of 
investment goods, the monetary policy rate, the loan rate, real loans, real net worth 
and real money balances. The data are obtained from the CEIC China Premium 
Database and the sample period is 2001–17 at quarterly frequency. Details of the 
sources of these data series are in the working paper version of this chapter (Li and 
Wang 2018). 
Before taking the model to the estimation, a detrending of equilibrium conditions is 
needed since we allow for non-stationary technology in the economy. The stationary 
system is then log-linearised around its deterministic steady state with a capital 
utilisation rate of unity. We follow Smets and Wouters (2007) and Kaihastu and 
Kurozumi (2014) and use the Kalman filter to evaluate the likelihood function 
for the log-linear system and apply the Metropolis–Hastings algorithm to generate 
draws from the posterior distribution of model parameters.7 
There are two sets of parameters: one to be estimated and the other calibrated to 
avoid any identification issues. To save space here, we do not present the table 
with calibration. The prior distribution of the 49 parameters to be estimated and 
the posterior estimates are reported in Table A4.1. Detailed discussions about the 
calibrated values and choices of prior distributions are in the working paper version 
of this chapter (Li and Wang 2018). 
7 Our estimation is done using Dynare (Adjemian et al. 2011). In each estimation, 200,000 draws were generated, 
the first half of which were discarded. The scale factor for the jumping distribution in the Metropolis–Hastings 
algorithm was adjusted so that an acceptance rate of about 24 per cent was obtained.
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Results
In this section, we present the results in three main parts. The first part reports 
the statistics of the posterior mean estimates of parameters over the sample period 
2001Q1 – 2017Q4. A possible change of policy rule is also considered in this 
part. The second part of the section presents variance decompositions of output, 
consumption, investment and loans based on the estimated model. Both forecast 
error variance decompositions and historical decompositions are reported. Through 
this exercise, we are able to answer some fundamental questions about the main 
sources of economic fluctuations in China. The final part presents some discussions 
of the results. 
Estimates of monetary policy rule
The first row of Table A4.1 reports the posterior mean of W and the 90 per cent 
confidence interval. Over the full sample period, W is estimated to be 0.0911 and 
is statistically significant from zero. Given the estimated value, the monetary policy 
rule in Equation 4.1 is indeed a hybrid rule. Over the past decade or more, the 
PBC conducted monetary policy by adjusting the policy rate according to the real 
money level, inflation rate, output level and output growth in the economy with 
assigned weights. Other macroeconomic conditions were subsequently pinned 
down through the interest rate channel in equilibrium. This finding could serve as 
a benchmark approach for estimating China’s monetary policy rules as macro and 
financial conditions in China evolve over time. 
We also conduct subsample estimations searching for possible policy rule changes. 
During the sample period, there was a breakdown of the global financial system, 
which might have caused some policy changes in the PBC. Recently, PBC officials 
have made several public speeches discussing the necessity of reforming monetary 
policy towards more price tool–based practices. We set 2009Q1 as the potential 
change point and estimate the model over the two subsamples. The results are 
reported in Tables A4.2 and A4.3. They show that the mean estimates of W are 
statistically and significantly different from each other before and after the breaking 
point in 2009Q1. Specifically, the posterior mean of W before 2009Q1 is equal to 
0.0859, while after 2009Q1, it increases to 0.2466—both of which are statistically 
different from zero.8 
This finding deserves some discussion. The different weights attached to the quantity 
part of the monetary policy rule before and after 2009 indicate that the GFC had 
a measurable impact on China’s monetary policy. Despite the public speeches by 
8 As a sensitivity check, we also use 2008Q1 and 2007Q1 as a potential breaking point for subsample estimations, 
and we obtain similar results to those using 2009Q1 as the breaking point. 
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PBC officials about moving towards more price tool–based practices, the actual 
monetary policy rule still places more weight on the quantity movements of real 
money balance in the economy. This is very likely considering the large fiscal 
and monetary stimulus that was put in place after the GFC. The PBC was aware 
of the increase in the money base in the economy and responded to a larger extent 
to the quantity component of the policy rule, everything else being equal, after the 
onset of the financial crisis. 
Variance decompositions
Given the estimated monetary policy rule in the previous subsection, we can 
proceed with the investigation of the business cycle fluctuations in the Chinese 
economy in the period 2001–17. To see what accounts for the fluctuations in the 
key macroeconomic variables, we present the forecast error decompositions of the 
variances of output, consumption, investment and loans in Table A4.4 and historical 
decompositions of output and investment in Figures A4.1 and A4.2 based on the 
estimated model.
Table A4.4 shows the relative contribution of each shock to the variations in output 
growth, consumption growth, investment growth and real loan growth at forecast 
horizons T = 8, 32 quarters, evaluated at the posterior mean estimates of parameters. 
The main source of the output fluctuation is the exogenous demand shock. The next 
two important sources are the neutral technology shock and the preference shock. 
The investment-specific technology shock makes a small but increasing contribution 
to the output fluctuation from short-term (6 per cent) to long-term (11 per cent) 
horizons. The remainder of the shocks are negligible. The preference shock is the 
dominant source of the fluctuation in consumption, making up nearly 70 per cent 
of the variation. The neutral technology shock is the secondary source, while the 
remaining shocks all play minor roles. Half of the variation in investment growth 
is explained by the investment-specific shock, while 26 per cent is explained by 
the net-worth shock in the short run. The investment-specific shock becomes even 
more prominent in the long run (61 per cent). The intermediate-goods markup 
also plays a small role in affecting investment activities. The investment-specific and 
net-worth shocks also play a primary and secondary role, respectively, in explaining 
the fluctuations in real loans. The shock to the marginal efficiency of investment 
contributes marginally to the loan variation.
The results above reveal the main sources of business fluctuation in China. The real 
sectors—that is, consumption-goods sectors—are driven primarily by the neutral 
technology, preference and external demand shocks, while the financial sectors are 
dominated by the investment-specific technology and net-worth shocks.
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To get a closer look at the fundamentals of business fluctuations in China, we 
present the historical decompositions of the percentage point deviations of output 
and investment from their respective steady states in Figures A4.1 and A4.2. 
Figure A4.1 shows a steadily decreasing trend of output growth from about 2011, 
with the neutral technology shock as the main negative contributor. This suggests 
that a  structural break in neutral technological development—from consistently 
positive in 2001–07 to consistently negative in 2010–17—has been the primary 
driver of the slowing of China’s GDP growth since 2010 that we discussed at the 
beginning of the chapter. There is a drastic fall in output growth from about mid-
2008 to early 2009 in Figure A4.1. This corresponds to the onset of the GFC. The 
sudden meltdown of the global financial system and then of the real economy may 
affect technology and production through trade and financial channels.
Figure A4.2 shows that investment growth is, on average, positive and the net-
worth shock is the primary positive contributor. Investment-specific technology 
is another key factor, but its contribution is volatile. This means that growth in 
investment is driven by the positive valuation of net worth while the volatility of 
investment is driven by its own technological development. Looking forward, we 
should be cautious about whether these valuation effects on net worth can continue 
and carefully monitor the evolution of investment activities.
Figures A4.1 and A4.2 together bring us another perspective on China’s growth 
story: investment was steadily growing while economic growth showed clear signs 
of slowing over the past decade.
Discussions 
Before closing this section, we would like to discuss the usefulness of the extended 
DSGE model we have used in this chapter and policy implications based on 
the results obtained. First, financial friction is indispensable in the model. We 
incorporate financial intermediaries and financial friction into the model as we 
expect them to be important sources of business fluctuations in China, as they are 
in the United States. The posterior mean estimation of the elasticity of the external 
finance premium (that is, μ in Table A4.1) shows that this premium equation is 
statistically significant in the model. The important role of the net-worth shock in 
explaining investment fluctuations also proves this point.
Second, we specify neutral technology and investment-specific technology as two 
types of technology for the consumption-goods sector and investment-goods sector. 
As demonstrated in the previous section, neutral technology is one of the main 
drivers of output growth fluctuations, while investment-specific technology and 
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net-worth technology are the main drivers of investment activities. Without the 
specification of the two types of technologies, we would obtain misleading results of 
the main sources of business fluctuations in China.
Third, a hybrid monetary policy rule is obtained by constructing a generalised 
form of rule without imposing ex ante model restrictions and employing a Bayesian 
estimation strategy using real Chinese data. This approach can serve as a benchmark 
for future researchers to estimate China’s monetary policy rule as macroeconomic 
and financial conditions evolve over time.
Last but not the least, the finding that negative development in neutral technology 
since about 2010 contributed to output variation provides important policy 
implications. As discussed in the introduction of the chapter, there are numerous 
explanations about the recent economic output slowdown without any consensus 
on the fundamental factors. Our result is supportive of the argument that it is 
mainly the technological slowdown that contributed to output fluctuations. Policies 
supporting technological innovations and industrial upgrading are then favourable 
in addressing such negative technological development. The ‘new normal’ of the 
Chinese economy would be sustainable if the future economic growth is supported 
by new industries and innovations in new and upgraded technology.
Conclusions
Policymakers and scholars are increasingly concerned with the recent economic 
slowdown in China. Our findings show that negative neutral technology 
development is what has caused this output fluctuation. After more than 
30 years of driving high-speed economic development, the growth potential of 
neutral technological advancement has shown a clear sign of slowing. This has 
the important policy implication of encouraging technological innovation and 
industrial upgrading in China. 
We construct a rich DSGE model in this chapter for the structural investigation 
of the Chinese economy. The results show that it captures important features of 
the economy that have not been found in previous studies using a simple model. 
Importantly, we find that China’s monetary policy rule is a hybrid one. China’s 
central bank conducts monetary policy by adjusting the policy rate in response to 
inflation, output conditions and real money growth. The policy rule changed after 
about 2009 towards placing more weight on responding to movements in the real 
money balance compared with before 2009. This suggests the quantity of money is 
strongly affecting monetary policy practices. 
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The variance decompositions of the key variables show the relative importance 
of various shocks in explaining the fluctuations of those variables. Specifically, 
financial friction shocks are indispensable sources of investment fluctuation. 
Neutral technology development was a consistently positive contributor to output 
growth during the period 2001–07 and became a negative contributor after 2010. 
This finding provides further evidence of the sources of the GDP slowdown in 
China since about 2010, pointing out that technological development has played 
a significant role in dragging down the pace of productivity growth. Future work on 
the causes of business fluctuations in China and China’s monetary policy rule can 
draw on the results in this chapter.
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Appendix A
Table A4.1 Prior and posterior distributions of parameters – full sample
Prior mean Post mean 90% HPD interval Prior Pstdev
alpha 0.500 0.0911 0.0179 0.1686 unif 0.2887
Csigma 2.000 0.8737 0.5647 1.1324 gamma 0.3750
Ctheta 0.700 0.5582 0.4176 0.6862 beta 0.1000
cchi 2.000 2.6598 1.5509 3.7217 gamma 0.7500
czeta 4.000 3.3357 2.2265 4.5573 gamma 1.5000
ctau 0.220 0.3155 0.1080 0.5033 gamma 0.1000
cphi 0.250 0.0531 0.0052 0.0986 beta 0.1250
calpha 0.600 0.1440 0.0860 0.2020 beta 0.1000
gammaw 0.500 0.2471 0.1017 0.3878 beta 0.1500
xiw 0.500 0.6422 0.5621 0.7186 beta 0.1000
gammap 0.500 0.3213 0.1461 0.4882 beta 0.1500
xip 0.500 0.8075 0.7412 0.8664 beta 0.1000
phir 0.750 0.7664 0.6873 0.8412 beta 0.1000
phipi 1.500 1.7688 1.3955 2.1307 gamma 0.2500
phiy 0.125 0.0440 0.0201 0.0681 gamma 0.0500
phidy 0.125 0.0579 0.0267 0.0869 gamma 0.0500
zstarss 1.163 1.2187 1.0790 1.3613 gamma 0.1000
psiss 0.077 0.0672 0.0144 0.1195 gamma 0.0400
hss 0.000 –0.1304 –2.4195 2.3909 norm 2.0000
piss 0.272 0.2660 0.1459 0.3955 gamma 0.1000
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Prior mean Post mean 90% HPD interval Prior Pstdev
rnss 1.030 1.1060 0.9655 1.2442 gamma 0.1000
eta 0.973 0.9552 0.9276 0.9838 beta 0.0200
nkss 0.500 0.6077 0.5089 0.7027 beta 0.0700
cmu 0.070 0.0203 0.0141 0.0271 gamma 0.0200
ress 1.242 1.2177 1.1374 1.2929 gamma 0.0500
rho_b 0.500 0.7916 0.6060 0.9558 beta 0.2000
rho_g 0.500 0.9707 0.9470 0.9944 beta 0.2000
rho_w 0.500 0.2055 0.0349 0.3726 beta 0.2000
rho_p 0.500 0.9039 0.8407 0.9774 beta 0.2000
rho_i 0.500 0.8897 0.8323 0.9448 beta 0.2000
rho_r 0.500 0.2256 0.0632 0.3813 beta 0.2000
rho_z 0.500 0.1307 0.0295 0.2226 beta 0.2000
rho_psi 0.500 0.9568 0.9249 0.9909 beta 0.2000
rho_nu 0.500 0.9850 0.9774 0.9924 beta 0.2000
rho_mu 0.500 0.5413 0.4254 0.6784 beta 0.2000
rho_eta 0.500 0.8246 0.7015 0.9634 beta 0.2000
rho_mg 0.500 0.3782 0.1867 0.5541 beta 0.2000
e_b 0.500 2.8286 1.5204 3.8269 invg Inf
e_g 0.500 0.8964 0.7581 1.0319 invg Inf
e_w 0.500 0.4458 0.3527 0.5515 invg Inf
e_p 0.500 0.1624 0.1037 0.2165 invg Inf
e_i 0.500 1.1037 0.9333 1.2754 invg Inf
e_r 0.500 0.1287 0.1088 0.1467 invg Inf
e_z 0.500 1.7636 1.4635 2.0584 invg Inf
e_psi 0.500 0.3763 0.2735 0.4741 invg Inf
e_nu 0.500 4.1778 3.3739 4.9908 invg Inf
e_mu 0.500 0.2854 0.2462 0.3230 invg Inf
e_eta 0.500 0.8999 0.5881 1.2119 invg Inf
e_mg 0.500 0.5839 0.5022 0.6575 invg Inf
Note: Alpha is the weight on quantity rule.
Table A4.2 Prior and posterior distributions of parameters – subsample: 
before 2009Q1
Prior mean Post mean 90% HPD interval Prior Pstdev
alpha 0.500 0.0859 0.0005 0.1753 unif 0.2887
csigma 2.000 1.3525 0.8765 1.7459 gamma 0.3750
ctheta 0.700 0.5852 0.4222 0.8257 beta 0.1000
cchi 2.000 2.4886 1.1941 3.6389 gamma 0.7500
czeta 4.000 1.9989 0.6985 3.3205 gamma 1.5000
The Chinese Economic Transformation
84
Prior mean Post mean 90% HPD interval Prior Pstdev
ctau 0.220 0.2622 0.0583 0.4580 gamma 0.1000
cphi 0.250 0.0471 0.0092 0.0847 beta 0.1250
calpha 0.600 0.3066 0.1694 0.4440 beta 0.1000
gammaw 0.500 0.2939 0.1110 0.4658 beta 0.1500
xiw 0.500 0.6172 0.5352 0.7205 beta 0.1000
gammap 0.500 0.3015 0.1326 0.4820 beta 0.1500
xip 0.500 0.7693 0.7071 0.8405 beta 0.1000
phir 0.750 0.6478 0.5332 0.7714 beta 0.1000
phipi 1.500 1.9313 1.5072 2.3432 gamma 0.2500
phiy 0.125 0.0430 0.0195 0.0683 gamma 0.0500
phidy 0.125 0.0963 0.0491 0.1404 gamma 0.0500
zstarss 1.163 1.2358 1.0650 1.3767 gamma 0.1000
psiss 0.077 0.0730 0.0163 0.1248 gamma 0.0400
hss 0.000 1.4090 –1.1566 4.3397 norm 2.0000
piss 0.272 0.3744 0.1941 0.5288 gamma 0.1000
rnss 1.030 1.0595 0.9096 1.2015 gamma 0.1000
eta 0.973 0.9717 0.9504 0.9917 beta 0.0200
nkss 0.500 0.4947 0.3934 0.5836 beta 0.0700
cmu 0.070 0.0224 0.0142 0.0317 gamma 0.0200
ress 1.242 1.2320 1.1524 1.3114 gamma 0.0500
rho_b 0.500 0.6454 0.3053 0.9043 beta 0.2000
rho_g 0.500 0.8943 0.8312 0.9641 beta 0.2000
rho_w 0.500 0.3522 0.0732 0.6039 beta 0.2000
rho_p 0.500 0.8405 0.7321 0.9461 beta 0.2000
rho_i 0.500 0.7362 0.5906 0.9162 beta 0.2000
rho_r 0.500 0.4865 0.2962 0.7321 beta 0.2000
rho_z 0.500 0.1716 0.0348 0.2960 beta 0.2000
rho_psi 0.500 0.9431 0.9056 0.9854 beta 0.2000
rho_nu 0.500 0.9747 0.9545 0.9960 beta 0.2000
rho_mu 0.500 0.8114 0.7099 0.9071 beta 0.2000
rho_eta 0.500 0.7650 0.6124 0.9208 beta 0.2000
rho_mg 0.500 0.2410 0.0441 0.4254 beta 0.2000
e_b 0.500 6.0075 2.3428 11.7735 invg Inf
e_g 0.500 1.2548 0.8911 1.6161 invg Inf
e_w 0.500 0.5312 0.3542 0.7339 invg Inf
e_p 0.500 0.2457 0.1294 0.3331 invg Inf
e_i 0.500 0.8898 0.6847 1.1021 invg Inf
e_r 0.500 0.1507 0.1230 0.1822 invg Inf
e_z 0.500 2.1435 1.6746 2.6424 invg Inf
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Prior mean Post mean 90% HPD interval Prior Pstdev
e_psi 0.500 0.4347 0.2928 0.5719 invg Inf
e_nu 0.500 3.4362 2.1762 4.4342 invg Inf
e_mu 0.500 0.1793 0.1365 0.2183 invg Inf
e_eta 0.500 1.2113 0.7844 1.6362 invg Inf
e_mg 0.500 0.4336 0.3271 0.5388 invg Inf
Note: Alpha is the weight on quantity rule.
Table A4.3 Prior and posterior distributions of parameters – subsample: 
after 2009Q1
Prior mean Post mean 90% HPD interval Prior Pstdev
alpha 0.500 0.2466 0.0046 0.5121 unif 0.2887
csigma 2.000 1.0819 0.7355 1.3970 gamma 0.3750
ctheta 0.700 0.6755 0.5693 0.7927 beta 0.1000
cchi 2.000 2.2995 1.3164 3.3768 gamma 0.7500
czeta 4.000 4.8390 3.2622 6.4291 gamma 1.5000
ctau 0.220 0.2482 0.0801 0.4042 gamma 0.1000
cphi 0.250 0.1240 0.0181 0.2228 beta 0.1250
calpha 0.600 0.1712 0.1142 0.2296 beta 0.1000
gammaw 0.500 0.4677 0.2475 0.6837 beta 0.1500
xiw 0.500 0.6025 0.4935 0.7156 beta 0.1000
gammap 0.500 0.5818 0.3744 0.7944 beta 0.1500
xip 0.500 0.8019 0.7269 0.8755 beta 0.1000
phir 0.750 0.8010 0.6807 0.9109 beta 0.1000
phipi 1.500 1.6664 1.2879 2.0263 gamma 0.2500
phiy 0.125 0.0794 0.0267 0.1376 gamma 0.0500
phidy 0.125 0.1161 0.0576 0.1709 gamma 0.0500
zstarss 1.163 1.1451 1.0167 1.2853 gamma 0.1000
psiss 0.077 0.0763 0.0176 0.1353 gamma 0.0400
hss 0.000 –2.3959 –4.5247 –0.1487 norm 2.0000
piss 0.272 0.2334 0.1023 0.3559 gamma 0.1000
rnss 1.030 1.1051 0.9671 1.2318 gamma 0.1000
eta 0.973 0.9292 0.8976 0.9599 beta 0.0200
nkss 0.500 0.5809 0.4934 0.6743 beta 0.0700
cmu 0.070 0.0336 0.0223 0.0446 gamma 0.0200
ress 1.242 1.2259 1.1388 1.3026 gamma 0.0500
rho_b 0.500 0.3179 0.0456 0.5699 beta 0.2000
rho_g 0.500 0.9493 0.9213 0.9821 beta 0.2000
rho_w 0.500 0.2446 0.0481 0.4495 beta 0.2000
rho_p 0.500 0.8293 0.6927 0.9755 beta 0.2000
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Prior mean Post mean 90% HPD interval Prior Pstdev
rho_i 0.500 0.8467 0.7585 0.9440 beta 0.2000
rho_r 0.500 0.4587 0.1000 0.8045 beta 0.2000
rho_z 0.500 0.1655 0.0381 0.2872 beta 0.2000
rho_psi 0.500 0.9619 0.9374 0.9900 beta 0.2000
rho_nu 0.500 0.9659 0.9472 0.9853 beta 0.2000
rho_mu 0.500 0.2073 0.0559 0.3554 beta 0.2000
rho_eta 0.500 0.5218 0.2850 0.7456 beta 0.2000
rho_mg 0.500 0.3737 0.1227 0.6500 beta 0.2000
e_b 0.500 1.8163 0.8817 2.7888 invg Inf
e_g 0.500 0.7046 0.5510 0.8704 invg Inf
e_w 0.500 0.3571 0.2584 0.4449 invg Inf
e_p 0.500 0.1899 0.1141 0.2564 invg Inf
e_i 0.500 1.2825 0.9970 1.5376 invg Inf
e_r 0.500 0.1086 0.0855 0.1322 invg Inf
e_z 0.500 1.7497 1.2774 2.2522 invg Inf
e_psi 0.500 0.2778 0.1801 0.3815 invg Inf
e_nu 0.500 3.4748 2.6189 4.3040 invg Inf
e_mu 0.500 0.3267 0.2609 0.3989 invg Inf
e_eta 0.500 0.8334 0.5687 1.1040 invg Inf
e_mg 0.500 0.7029 0.5697 0.8478 invg Inf
Note: Alpha is the weight on quantity rule.
Table A4.4 Forecast error decompositions of the variances of output, 
consumption, investment and loans
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Figure A4.1 Historical decompositions of output
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Figure A4.2 Historical decompositions of investment
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5. Off-farm employment in rural China 
and the hukou system
Yuhan Zhao, Moyu Chen and Yu Sheng1
Over the past four decades, China has implemented a series of institutional and 
market-oriented reforms that have resulted in an integration of the rural and urban 
labour markets and substantially increased off-farm employment. In 1999–2000, 
only about 10 per cent of rural households in China were involved in off-farm 
work, while, by 2007–08, that share had risen to 22 per cent (Wang et al. 2017). 
The increase in off-farm employment has not only provided additional labour 
supply to support the industrialisation and urbanisation processes in China, 
but also facilitated the transformation and development of rural China through 
strengthening the rural non-agricultural sector. Between 1978 and 2015, real GDP 
per capita in China increased by 16.7 times, with 44 per cent of this coming from 
labour force reallocation from agriculture to non-agricultural sectors (Cai 2018).
Although non-agricultural sector growth and off-farm employment have significantly 
contributed to China’s economic development, such activities have long been 
restricted by various institutional arrangements. The household registration system 
(hukou), initially established in the late 1950s, was designed to support urban 
development. However, as the rural and urban economies became more integrated 
over time, it became a barrier, restricting rural labour from working in urban areas. 
Under this system, China’s population was divided into ‘agricultural’ and ‘non-
agricultural’ sectors. As the system is not only a population registration system, but 
also a comprehensive policy system bundled with other institutional arrangements, 
it is believed to be one of the most important policies in preventing rural-to-urban 
migration and off-farm employment in the non-agricultural sector (Cai 2018). 
To date, there have been many studies examining the impact of the household 
registration system on rural-to-urban migration and its economic and social 
consequences (Meng and Zhang 2010). Some studies suggest that rural and urban 
integration should be achieved under the constraint of the hukou system, since it 
gives privileges to urban residents to become rich first, which enlarges urban–rural 
income inequality and thus provides ongoing incentives for rural labour to move 
into cities (Lu and Chen 2004; Liu 2011). In contrast, other studies argue that 
the hukou system hinders rural-to-urban migration and reallocation of rural labour 
1 The authors acknowledge financial support from the State Natural Sciences Foundation (No. 71873005 and 
No. 71742002); ATMAC (43643) Chinese Academy of Engineering (2018-ZD-07-1 and 2018-ZD-07-06-1); 
and the Data Centre for Management Science, PKU-NSFC (2018KEY06). All errors are the authors’.
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(Seeborg et al. 2000; Démurger et al. 2009; Meng 2012). Although no consensus 
has been reached on the role of the hukou system on off-farm employment, gradual 
reforms have been made since 1984. While the hukou system’s discrimination in the 
rights and privileges to off-farm employment and residence in rural areas has been 
gradually relaxed, discrimination relating to wages/incomes, job division, returns on 
education capital and social welfare protection for rural labourers working in urban 
areas remains (Seeborg et al. 2000; Démurger et al. 2009; Meng 2012).
The existing literature provides useful insights on the impact of the hukou system 
on rural-to-urban migration (Chan and Zhang 1999; Wan and Li 2013). Most of 
these studies, however, focus on the employment and wage status of rural migrants 
in urban China, and suffer from serious selection bias. This is because the majority 
of off-farm employment occurs in the non-agricultural sector of rural areas (who 
are not classified as rural migrants), and there is still a large amount of off-farm 
labour working in urban areas but not living there. Without properly accounting for 
this rural labour, the impact of the hukou system will not be adequately measured. 
In addition, although many empirical studies have been conducted, most use either 
pooled cross-sectional data or short-term panel data, which do not reflect the long-
term changes in the hukou system and its potential impact on off-farm employment 
over the past 40 years. 
This chapter investigates the evolution of the hukou system at the provincial level 
between 1981 and 2013, and examines its impact on off-farm employment in 
rural China from an empirical perspective. Off-farm employment is defined as rural 
labour (those holding rural hukou) who have worked in non-agricultural sectors in 
rural or urban areas, including rural-to-urban migrants, rural labourers working 
in  rural non-agricultural sectors and rural labourers working in urban areas but 
living in rural areas. 
The remainder of the study is structured as follows. Section two reviews China’s hukou 
reforms before and after the reform and opening-up period, which began in 1978, 
along with relevant research on hukou policies and non-agricultural employment in 
the country. Section three constructs the empirical models and describes the data 
sources. Section four presents the empirical results, as well as the interpretation, 
while section five concludes the study.
Hukou system reforms and off-farm employment 
in China
Separate urban and rural household registration systems have been in place 
since the National People’s Republic of China Registration Regulations were 
promulgated in 1958. The system has been changing over time alongside economic 
and institutional reforms. Taking the reform and opening-up policies that began 
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in 1978 as a watershed, China’s household registration system has experienced 
two major phases: before 1978 and after 1978. Before 1978, China’s household 
registration system was rooted in a logical structure of ‘family-birth-identity-order-
control-distribution’ (Lu 2002). Consequently, not only was there a need for rural 
labourers to complete a range of formalities (such as approval, certification and the 
payment of fees) to undertake off-farm employment, but also, rural workers faced 
significant restrictions on work and risks of detention. The strictness of the system 
distorted the allocation of labour resources and widened the gap between urban and 
rural economic development. The hukou system has gradually changed since 1978, 
when institutional and marketisation reforms were first implemented. In particular, 
after the mid-1990s, the government carried out a series of reforms to relax the 
hukou system, which allowed more rural migrants to work in urban areas (Song and 
Li 2014). 
Although significant progress has been made by the central and local governments 
over the past four decades, the segregation of the rural and urban labour markets 
has continued. Incomplete reforms of the hukou system are regarded as one of the 
most important factors preventing the integration of the rural and urban labour 
markets by restricting off-farm labourers from gaining equal rights with their urban 
counterparts in access to basic public services, such as compulsory education for 
children, personal social insurance, minimum living security, housing and so on. 
There are two types of restriction policies in place: one restricts equal rights to 
employment and the other restricts equal rights to social welfare. 
Given the importance of this issue, many studies have been conducted to analyse 
the impact of hukou reforms on rural-to-urban migration and off-farm employment 
in China over past decades. Four groups of related studies are summarised below.
The first group of literature explores the impact of hukou reforms on employment 
opportunities for off-farm labour. Before 1978, the hukou system severely 
restricted the occupational choice and work location of rural labour (Lu 2002). 
An extreme example of this was the campaign to send ‘intellectual’ urban 
youth to the countryside. Under this government-authorised anti-urbanisation 
movement, 18 million 16–20-year-olds migrated from urban to rural areas in the 
period 1962–78 (Bernstein and Olsen 2009; Kinnan et al. 2015). Since 1978, 
reforms to the hukou system have reduced the constraints on labour mobility, and 
a massive rural labour force has engaged in non-agricultural employment. However, 
compared with urban workers, rural migrant or off-farm workers are concentrated 
in the low-skill market, and face various discriminations (Meng and Zhang 2001; 
Li and Gu 2011; Démurger et al. 2012; Afridi et al. 2015).
The second group of research discusses the impact of the hukou system on rural 
labour’s income levels. The post-reform era has witnessed a significant rise in the real 
wages of the rural population. However, compared with the urban labour force, rural 
labourers’ wages are generally subject to discrimination because of the phenomenon 
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of ‘different compensation for equal work’ (Knight et al. 1999; Dong and Bowles 
2002; Démurger et al. 2009; Li and Gu 2011; Meng 2012). Meng and Zhang 
(2001) applied survey data for urban households from the Population Research 
Institute of Shanghai’s Academy of Social Sciences for 1995–96 and found that 
household registration discrimination affected wages by 50 per cent, regardless of 
the difference in rural and urban labour distribution, and it influenced wages within 
the same industry as much as 82 per cent. Wang and Cai (2005) uses data from the 
fifth national census in 2000 to examine the impact of the household registration 
system on rural labour and found that, in the same occupation, it accounted for 
39 per cent wage differences between rural and urban workers. However, Knight 
and Yueh (2004) argue that career conversion can significantly increase the income 
of rural labourers compared with urban residents. It is worth noting that the current 
research comparing wage differences between urban and rural labour is based more 
on the comparison of unit hourly wages than on the comparison of disposable 
income. Excluding personal income tax will seriously underestimate the degree of 
discrimination against migrant workers. Overall, although the income level of rural 
labour has increased since the hukou reforms, there is still notable income inequality 
between urban and rural labour.
The third group of literature focuses on how the hukou system influences the spatial 
migration of rural labour’s employment. Dividing the labour market into urban 
and rural markets, non-agricultural employment and agricultural labour transfers 
can be achieved only at the margin (Cai 2018). Geographically, with the hukou 
reforms, rural labour transfers have been concentrated mainly in eastern China, 
followed by the central and western regions (NBS 2018). Moreover, after taking 
into account city size by using panel data from 123 major cities in China from 
2000 to 2013, Yang (2017) finds that the hukou reforms in large cities did not 
attract labour inflows, but instead prompted labour outflows, which is a result of the 
relatively strict administrative constraints. The settlement threshold and household 
registration constraints of major cities in the eastern region were higher than those 
in the central and western regions, so that a massive amount of rural labour was 
transferred into the central and western regions.
The fourth group of studies contributes evidence of how hukou reform affects the 
social security and welfare of the rural labour force. The hukou system has created 
separate urban and rural social security systems and deepened the unfairness of such 
welfare in terms of the social insurance level, educational opportunities and housing 
inequality (Hertel and Zhai 2006; Sun et al. 2011; Tombe and Zhu 2019). Since 
the gradual relaxation of the family registration system, the opportunity for rural 
labour to settle in urban areas and obtain equal access to social security has increased 
(Meng 2000; Song 2014; Garriga et al. 2017; Chen and Yuan 2018).
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In sum, most studies find that hukou (although it has been relaxed in the post-reform 
period) is still playing an important role in negatively affecting rural-to-urban 
migration. However, these studies focus mainly on the impact in urban areas, which 
leaves room for us to re-examine this issue from the perspective of rural areas.
Empirical model specification
Although rural-to-urban migration is influenced by the situations in both rural and 
urban areas, decision-making about migration is made mainly in the rural areas 
from which rural migrants originate. In this sense, it is essential to examine the 
impact of the hukou policies on the off-farm employment of rural labour, and one 
can start by looking at rural households. 
Following previous literature such as Meng and Zhang (2001) and Démurger 
et al. (2009), we assume that the choice of off-farm employment by rural labour is 
a function of the hukou restriction policies (Equation 5.1). 
Equation 5.1
𝑌𝑌"#$ = 𝛼𝛼' + 𝛽𝛽*𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻"#$ + 𝛽𝛽-𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻"#$ + 𝛾𝛾*𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎"#$ + 𝛾𝛾-𝑀𝑀𝑎𝑎𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀"#$ + 𝛾𝛾6𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑀𝑀"#$ + 𝛾𝛾9𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚"#$
+ 𝛾𝛾<𝑎𝑎𝑀𝑀𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎"#$ + 𝛾𝛾=𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑚𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑎𝑙𝑙"#$ + 𝛾𝛾A𝑇𝑇$ + 𝛾𝛾C𝐷𝐷" + 𝛾𝛾E𝐷𝐷# + 𝜀𝜀"#$	
In this equation, Yhrt denotes the share of off-farm employment in total household 
labour of rural household h in region r at time t. HPhrt and HShrt denote the two types 
of household restriction policies in urban areas that could affect the choice of rural 
households’ off-farm employment, respectively: the employment-related restriction 
policy and the settlement-related restriction policy. We distinguish between the two 
restriction policies because we expect they may impose different impacts.
The two variables, HPhrt and HShrt, deserve further explanation, as they are the 
most important dependent variables in our study. First, to measure the change 
in employment-related restriction policies faced by rural farming households, we 
collect all migrant employment-related policy in the urban areas of each province 
and categorise them into three groups according to their level of restriction. A score 
of 1–3 is assigned to each group of policies, with 1 representing the most restrictive 
policy and 3 representing the least restrictive policy.2 Second, how the household 
restriction policies in urban areas will affect rural labourers’ choice of off-farm 
employment usually depends on where they are going for off-farm employment. 
To  reflect this point, we need to consider the distance from the home village of 
2 Please refer to Appendix 5.1 for a more detailed definition of the employment restriction and settlement 
restriction policies in each province and how we allocate the scores between different types of migration 
restriction policies. 
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the rural labourer to the capital city of each province. Third, the probability of 
rural labourers going to a particular city for off-farm employment is also important. 
According to China Centre for Agricultural Policy’s (CCAP) farm household survey, 
more than 80 per cent of rural labourers choose to work off-farm within the same 
province in which they live. Thus, it is not appropriate for us to give the same weights 
within a province and between provinces. Consequently, we use the proportion of 
rural labourers in the same village moving for off-farm employment within and 









In this equation, HPpt is the comprehensive employment-related restriction policy 
indicator faced by rural labour in province p at time t. HP–pt are the scores for 
the employment-related restriction policy in urban areas of other province –p at 
time t. Distrpt and Distr–pt denote the distance between the sample village and the 
capital city of province p, with p and –p representing within and between provinces, 
respectively. MigShr_inprovince and MigShr_outprovince denote the proportion of 
off-farm employment within province p, and between provinces –p. 










In this equation, HSpt and HS–pt represents the settlement-related restriction policies, 
while other notations are the same as in Equation 5.2.
In addition to the household restriction policies, there are many other factors 
affecting rural labourers’ choice of off-farm employment. If we do not account for 
them in Equation 5.1, we will generate a significant measurement problem. In our 
study, we categorise those control variables into three groups and include them in 
Equation 5.1.
The first group of control variables includes the logarithm of urban–rural income 
differences, ln_WageGaphrt, which is calculated by taking a ratio of the per capita 
income of households at the farm level to the per capita disposable income of 28 
capital cities across the country in the form of Equation 5.4. 






In this equation, rural_wagehrt is the per capita income of households at the farm 
level. It should be noted that the per capita income for years other than the year 
of sampling (2000, 2008 and 2013) is imputed based on the per capita income of 
the province’s rural population by using data from the China Statistics Yearbooks 
(NBS various years[a]) and China Rural Statistical Yearbooks (NBS various years[b]), 
while keeping the rural consumer price index (CPI) conversion in 2000 constant 
values. urban_wagehrt refers to the per capita disposable income of 28 capital cities 
across the country. To be specific, applying the data from the statistical yearbooks 
while keeping the rural CPI conversion in 2000 constant prices, urban_wagehrt 












The second group of control variables captures the characteristics of a rural 
household, which include agehrt as the average age of all labour in each sampled 
farm household; Marryhrt, which is the number of married persons per household as 
a percentage of the total number of persons per household; lbrhrt refers to the ratio 
of the labour population aged 16 to 65 in the household to the total population of 
the household; and manhrt denotes the proportion of males in the total population 
of the household. 
The third group of control variables describes family agricultural production features: 
areahrt refers to the total land area operated by each farm household. 
In addition to the above three groups of control variables, we also control the 
household-specific effects and the time-specific effects, by using the dummy 
variables, to reduce the impact of omitted variables. Specifically, Dh is a vector of 
rural household and location characteristics that are consistent over time, and Tt is 
a dummy variable to control the influence of macroeconomic conditions in each 
year on the off-farm employment of rural labour. 
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To effectively estimate Equation 5.1, we need to deal with two potential econometric 
problems. First, the two variables used to capture the employment-related restriction 
and the settlement-related restriction could be highly correlated and thus may 
generate the problem of multicollinearity. To deal with this, we use the ratio of 
the employment-related restriction variable over the settlement-related restriction 
variable, 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻#$% 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻#$%	, to replace HShrt. The estimated coefficient in front of the newly 
created variable will capture the difference in impact between the employment-related 
restriction relative to the settlement-related restriction. Second, the estimation of 
Equation 5.1 using the ordinary least squares (OLS) regression method may suffer 
from the omitted variable problem, since there are many other household-level or 
region-level factors affecting rural labourers’ choice of off-farm employment that 
are not well reflected in our model specification. To deal with this problem, we 
adopt the panel data fixed effect model to estimate Equation 5.1. We acknowledge 
that this treatment may only help with reducing the omitted variable problem by 
eliminating those time-invariant factors so we use the time dummy to account for 
time-variant factors.
Finally, it is widely believed that hukou policies may generate different impacts on 
the different types of off-farm employment choice. In particular, part-time off-
farm employment is unlikely to be affected by the settlement-related restriction, 
in theory. To capture this impact, we distinguish between two types of off-farm 
employment by using different dependent variables—namely, the ratios of full-time 
off-farm employment and part-time off-farm employment. Based on Equation 5.1, 
these two equations can be written as Equations 5.6 and 5.7.
Equation 5.6
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙_𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂*+,
= 𝛼𝛼/ + 𝛽𝛽2𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻*+, + 𝛽𝛽5
𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻*+,
𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻*+, + 𝛾𝛾2𝑂𝑂𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎*+, + 𝛾𝛾5𝑀𝑀𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑀𝑀*+, + 𝛾𝛾<𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑂𝑂*+,
+ 𝛾𝛾>𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑙𝑙*+, + 𝛾𝛾?𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑎𝑎𝑂𝑂*+, + 𝛾𝛾@𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑂𝑂𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑂𝑂𝑙𝑙*+, + 𝛾𝛾D𝑇𝑇, + 𝛾𝛾F𝐷𝐷* + 𝛾𝛾H𝐷𝐷+ + 𝜀𝜀*+,	
Equation 5.7
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙_𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹*+,
= 𝛼𝛼/ + 𝛽𝛽2𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻*+, + 𝛽𝛽5
𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻*+,
𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻*+, + 𝛾𝛾2𝐹𝐹𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎*+, + 𝛾𝛾5𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀*+, + 𝛾𝛾<𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐹𝐹*+,
+ 𝛾𝛾>𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑙𝑙*+, + 𝛾𝛾?𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑎𝑎𝐹𝐹*+, + 𝛾𝛾@𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐹𝐹𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑙𝑙𝐹𝐹𝑙𝑙*+, + 𝛾𝛾D𝑇𝑇, + 𝛾𝛾F𝐷𝐷* + 𝛾𝛾H𝐷𝐷+ + 𝜀𝜀*+,	
In Equation 5.6, ln_OffFarmhrt refers to off-farm employment, estimated by using 
a ratio of off-farm employment to total population at the household farm level. 
Similarly, in Equation 5.7, ln_FOffFarmhrt denotes full-time off-farm employment, 
measured by the proportion of full-time off-farm employment in the total labour at 
the household farm level. The employment-related restriction and the settlement-
related restriction are defined by two variables, HPhrt and 
𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻#$%
𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻#$%	, with the latter 
concerning a multicollinearity between two categories of policies. 
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Based on Equations 5.6 and 5.7, we propose testing the following three hypotheses. 
First, a positive (negative) coefficient in front of HPhrt and 
𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻#$%
𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻#$%	 may imply 
that the relaxation of the hukou policy in urban areas (or a higher score for 
the comprehensive household registration policy indicator) will tend to increase the 
willingness of rural labour to undertake off-farm employment, and vice versa. 
Second, a positive and significant coefficient in front of 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻#$% 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻#$%	 implies that 
the settlement restriction is likely to impose a stronger impact on rural labour’s 
off-farm employment choice. Third, when we distinguish between part-time and 
full-time off-farm employment, we can show how the relaxation of the household 
registration policies may affect rural labour’s choice between the two types of off-
farm employment.
Data sources and descriptive statistics
Data used in this study mainly come from two sources: microlevel farm household 
survey data collected by the Agricultural Policy Research Centre of the Chinese 
Academy of Sciences and the Peking University; and the province-level official 
statistics from various sources. These data are used mainly to measure the hukou 
system changes faced by rural labour and the rural–urban income gap. Both sets of 
data span the period from 1981 to 2013. 
The CCAP farm household survey is a three-wave repetitive field survey conducted 
in 2000, 2008 and 2013. According to the ranking of the provincial per capita 
industrial output value, the survey used a multistage stratified sampling method to 
randomly select 30 counties, 60 villages and 1,200 farmers in six provinces in the 
major agricultural regions of China (that is, Hebei, Shaanxi, Liaoning, Zhejiang, 
Sichuan and Hubei). Figure 5.1 illustrates the geographical distribution of those 
sample regions.
The survey collects information including the characteristics of rural households, 
land usage, input usage, output of agricultural production, off-farm employment of 
each household member and their income, in six provinces. Among these, off-farm 
employment is divided into current employment status and off-farm employment 
history. Except for the households that could not be tracked due to uncontrollable 
reasons such as natural disasters, a total of 1,063 sample households were successfully 
tracked in the third phase. This chapter formed 33 years of balanced panel data 
from 1981 to 2013 (see Appendix 5.2 for more detailed information on the 
sampled farms).
Using the farm survey data, we first define rural labour’s off-farm employment using 
each person’s current employment status and their off-farm employment history. 
Specifically, according to the definition of off-farm employment by Brauw et al. 
(2002), we split part-time off-farm employment (which is defined as engaging 
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in agricultural production and having off-farm income) from full-time off-farm 
employment (which is defined as being isolated from agricultural production, 
having no farming income and being fully engaged in non-agricultural industries). 
In addition, we have defined another eight variables: the employment-related 
household registration policy, the settlement-related household registration policy, 
the mean age of the household, the proportion of married people per household, 
the share of the labour force per household, the share of male agricultural labour per 
household, land area per household and the rural–urban wage gap. 
Figure 5.1 Geographical distribution of our sample farms, 2000, 2008 and 2015
Source: Summarised by the authors based on survey data.
Figure 5.2 shows the changing trend in the average proportion of off-farm 
employment in total rural labour at the household level between 1981 and 2013, 
while Figure 5.3 describes the relative proportion of part-time off-farm employment 
to that of full-time off-farm employment. Between 1981 and 2013, the proportion 
of off-farm employment in total rural labour increased from about 10 per cent to 
more than 60 per cent. Moreover, when we split full-time from part-time off-farm 
employment, the relative proportion of full-time off-farm employment to part-time 
off-farm employment increased over time, suggesting that the increase of off-farm 
employment comes mainly from the increase in full-time off-farm employment. 
It is notable that there are two ‘cliffs’ that appear at the junction of the three phases 
(in 2000 and 2008, respectively) of the trend in both Figure 5.2 and Figure 5.3. 
This is mainly due to the errors in farmers’ recollection of their employment history, 
which does not affect the estimation of the overall trend of off-farm employment.
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Figure 5.2 Change in relative proportion of off-farm employment in China, 
1981–2013
Note: Although there are ‘cliffs’ in 2000 and 2008 in our time-series data due to the unreliable nature 
of recalled data, they do not affect our results. To test this, a robustness check has been made in 
Appendix 5.3, in which two dummy variables have been controlled in the regressions, and the results 
are consistent with our findings. 
Source: Authors’ estimations using CCAP farm survey data.
Figure 5.3 Part-time versus full-time off-farm employment, 1981–2013
Note: For the ‘cliffs’ in 2000 and 2008, please refer to the note under Figure 5.2.
Source: Authors’ estimations using CCAP farm survey data. 
The Chinese Economic Transformation
100
It is widely believed that there are two important factors that may affect the choice of 
off-farm employment of rural labourers: the rural–urban wage gap and the household 
registration system. Before we conduct an analysis of the causal relationship, it is 
useful to look at the apparent relationship between these two factors and the average 
proportion of off-farm employment of rural labour at the farm level. As shown 
in Figures 5.4 and 5.5, the average proportion of off-farm employment has been 
increasing with the increasing rural–urban wage gap, as well as the relaxation over 
time of the hukou restrictions. This implies that further relaxing hukou restrictions is 
likely to increase the probability of rural labourers choosing off-farm employment. 
Although the visual relationship is informative, we need more thorough regression 
analysis to examine our hypotheses.
Panel (A) Household registration policy versus part-time non-agricultural employment
Panel (B) Household registration restrictions versus full-time non-agricultural employment
Figure 5.4 The apparent relationship between household registration 
restrictions and average off-farm employment
Source: Authors’ estimations using CCAP farm survey data.
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Figure 5.5 The apparent relationship between the urban–rural income gap 
and average off-farm employment
Source: Authors’ estimations using CCAP farm survey data.
Finally, for other control variables, Table 5.1 provides some descriptive statistics on 
how they have changed over time between the three survey years: 2000, 2008 and 
2013. Overall, it shows that a rise in the average scores of both categories of policies 
indicates the gradual relaxation of hukou policies, which is in accordance with the 
reform procedure. It is also notable that the degree of employment-related restrictions 
is relaxed more quickly than that of settlement-related restrictions. Since the wage 
variable is measured by the rural–urban income ratio, the increase in the mean of 
the wage variable, from 0.63 in 2000 to 0.31 in 2013, reveals an expansion in the 
urban–rural income gap over that time. The change in land area shows a decline from 
6.34 mu to 5.61 mu across periods. The rise in the share of the labour force from 
53.81 per cent to 56.92 per cent may facilitate non-agricultural employment. 
Table 5.1 Descriptive statistics of key variables, 2000, 2008 and 2013
Year 1981–2013 2000 2008 2013
Variable Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Share of agricultural labour (%) 69.41 35.94 63.25 36.60 44.20 36.67 40.79 39.41 
Share of part-time off-farm labour (%) 17.04 28.00 21.34 31.37 23.80 31.62 20.49 30.76 
Share of full-time off-farm labour (%) 13.55 27.29 15.41 27.19 32.00 34.62 38.72 38.67 
Employment-related household 
registration policy
0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.03 
Settlement-related household 
registration policy
0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 
Mean age of the household (year) 29.35 9.61 30.68 7.50 37.33 8.20 39.71 8.44 
Share of married family members (%) 72.51 21.90 73.31 22.19 69.99 21.46 77.83 17.21 
Share of labour force (%) 53.87 24.76 53.81 21.23 55.71 25.01 56.92 27.30 
Share of male agricultural labour (%) 50.18 16.25 49.92 16.97 50.14 16.94 49.31 17.31 
Land area (mu) 6.22 9.78 6.34 7.55 6.31 14.88 5.61 6.89 
Ratio of rural–urban income (%) 0.62 2.02 0.63 1.71 0.40 2.01 0.31 1.17 
Observations 35,079 1,063 1,063 1,063
Source: Authors’ estimations using CCAP farm survey data.
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Empirical results: Impact of the hukou system 
on off-farm employment 
The essential question we seek to answer is what are the impacts of the hukou policy 
on the off-farm employment of rural labour? To answer this question, we apply the 
panel data to estimate Equations 5.6 and 5.7 so as to quantify the impact of the 
employment-related and settlement-related policies, respectively, on the off-farm 
employment of rural labour. The estimation results obtained by using the OLS 
regression and the panel data regression with fixed effects are presented in Table 5.2. 
Table 5.2 Regression results
















HPhrt 0.378*** 0.440*** 0.305*** 0.393*** 0.050*** 0.011
(0.015) (0.006) (0.013) (0.005) (0.014) (0.017)
𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻#$%
𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻#$%	
0.254*** 0.276*** 0.157*** 0.188*** 0.084*** 0.060**
(0.022) (0.009) (0.019) (0.007) (0.024) (0.025)
agehrt –0.000* –0.000 –0.000 –0.000*** 0.000*** 0.005***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Marryhrt –0.003*** –0.002*** –0.001** –0.000*** –0.002*** –0.002***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
lbrhrt 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.000 –0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
manhrt 0.000 0.001*** 0.000 0.001*** –0.000 –0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
lnWageGaphrt 0.002 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.004*** 0.005*** 0.005***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
areahrt 0.000 0.000 –0.000 –0.000* 0.001* 0.001**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant 1.634*** 1.878*** 1.167*** 1.508*** 0.407*** 0.187**
(0.132) (0.093) (0.065) (0.024) (0.065) (0.087)
Observations 33,355 33,355 33,355 33,355 33,355 33,355
Number of 
hhcode
1,011 1,011 1,011 1,011 1,011 1,011
R-squared 0.275 0.275 0.049
*** p < 0.01 statistically significant at the 10 per cent level 
** p < 0.05 statistically significant at the 5 per cent level
* p < 0.1 statistically significant at 1 per cent level
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
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First, using the average proportion of off-farm employment in total labour at the 
farm household level, we examine the impact of the employment-related restriction 
policy and the settlement-related restriction policy on rural labour’s choice of off-
farm employment. Controlling household characteristics, the estimated coefficients 
in front of the employment-related restriction policy based on the panel regression 
with the household fixed effects is positive and significant at the 1 per cent level. 
This implies that the relaxation of the employment-related restriction policy 
positively contributes to an increase in the proportion of rural labour choosing 
off-farm employment. Moreover, the coefficients in front of the ratio between the 
settlement-related restriction policy and the employment-related restriction policy 
are also positive and significant at the 1 per cent level. This implies that relaxing the 
settlement-related restriction policy is likely to generate a larger impact on the off-
farm choice of rural labour than relaxing the employment-related restriction policy. 
Second, we further use the average proportion of full-time off-farm employment 
in total labour at the farm household level as the dependent variable and redo 
the exercise. As is shown in Table 5.2 (Columns 3 and 4), the impacts of both the 
employment-related restriction policy and the settlement-related restriction policy 
on the off-farm employment of rural labour are close to those obtained for total off-
farm employment. The estimated coefficients in front of the employment-related 
restriction policy and the settlement-related restriction policy are positive and 
significant at the 1 per cent level. In addition, when compared with those estimates 
when the dependent variable is the proportion of part-time off-farm employment in 
total labour, the estimated impact seems to increase. This implies that the household 
restriction policies are likely to affect the full-time off-farm employment choices of 
rural labour much more than their part-time choices. 
Third, although relaxing both the employment-related restriction policy and 
the settlement-related restriction policy will tend to increase average off-farm 
employment of rural labour at the farm level, the impact of the settlement restriction 
policy is more relevant to the increase of off-farm employment. According to 
the estimates in Table 5.2, in the scenario of the average proportion of off-farm 
employment (Columns 1 and 2), the positive and statistically significant coefficients 
in front of 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻#$% 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻#$%	 imply that the impact of the settlement-related restriction 
policy is 25.4 per cent to 27.6 per cent higher than that of the employment-related 
restriction policy. Meanwhile, in the scenario of the average proportion of full-time 
off-farm employment (Columns 3 and 4), the positive and statistically significant 
coefficients in front of 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻#$% 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻#$%	indicate that the impact of the settlement-related 
restriction policy is 15.7 per cent to 18.8 per cent higher than the employment-
related restriction policy.
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As for control variables, a positive coefficient in front of the rural–urban wage gap, 
which implies that the rural–urban wage gap is one of the most important factors 
affecting the choice of off-farm employment. Comparing the estimates based on 
Equations 5.6 and 5.7, the coefficients in front of the wage gap when the dependent 
variable is the average proportion of full-time off-farm employment are greater 
than those in the case where the average proportion of off-farm employment in 
total labour is the dependent variable. This indicates that the wage gap is likely 
to exert more influence on full-time off-farm employment. The negative and 
statistically significant coefficients in front of the average age of a household indicate 
that average age negatively impacts on off-farm employment. The proportion of 
those married in the total population at the farm household level affects off-farm 
employment negatively and significantly based on Columns 1–4 in Table 5.2. 
Moreover, a positive and statistically significant coefficient in front of the share of 
the labour force in the total population at the farm household level implies that, 
with an increase in the share of the labour force, the average proportion of off-farm 
employment will increase as well. In addition, as is shown in Table 5.2, the positive 
and statistically significant coefficients in front of the average proportion of males in 
the total population at the farm household level imply that households with a higher 
proportion of males are more likely to participate in off-farm employment.
Concluding remarks
This chapter investigates the impact of household registration policies in urban 
areas on the off-farm employment of rural labour by using household-level data 
for the period 1981–2013. The study makes three main contributions. First, we 
construct a panel dataset of off-farm employment at the household level spanning 
1981 to 2013, which allows us to examine the long-term effects of the hukou system 
on the off-farm employment of rural labour. Second, we compile a comprehensive 
indicator to capture the trans-temporal and cross-regional changes in the hukou 
system throughout the whole post-reform period and the potential impacts of policy 
reforms. Third, instead of conducting analysis from the perspective of urban areas, 
we concentrate on the rural side and attempt to investigate the behaviour of farm 
households under hukou reforms.
We show that the off-farm employment of rural labour tends to increase with 
the relaxation of hukou policies throughout the whole post-reform period, when 
the rural–urban wage gap and other farm household level characteristics are well 
controlled. In particular, when splitting full-time off-farm employment from part-
time off-farm employment, we show that full-time off-farm employment is more 
likely to be restricted by the settlement-related policy. This implies that institutional 
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barriers related to the hukou system are still important barriers to the integration of 
rural and urban labour markets. Further reforms are required to relax this system so 
as to facilitate rural-to-urban migration.
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Appendix 5.1 The household registration policy 
classification and score method
Based on the history of hukou reforms since 1958, we summarise all migrant policies 
in the urban areas of 28 provinces—excluding Tibet, Xinjiang, Gansu, Hong Kong, 
Macau and Taiwan—in each period of reform, and we find that employment-related 
and settlement-related restriction policies are essential administrative drivers of off-
farm employment. Therefore, the hukou system referred to in this chapter is divided 
into two categories: the employment-related and settlement-related restriction 
policies. Each category is further divided into three groups, according to the level 
of restriction. A score of 1–3 is assigned to each policy group, with 1 representing 
the most restrictive policy and 3 representing the least restrictive policy. If the hukou 
system of a province in that year conforms to Category A, it will receive 1 point; if it 
conforms to Category B, it will receive 2 points; and if it conforms to Category C, 
it will be given 3 points. Since we define the category based on the quantified extent 
to which the hukou system evolves over time and is consistent between provinces, 
it allows us to make a quantitative comparison (although the method is simple). 
Table  A5.1 provides the detailed definitions of the employment restriction and 
settlement restriction policies and scores for the two types of household registration 
systems in 28 provinces from 1981 to 2013. 
Table A5.1 Household registration policy classification and score method
Level of policy 
relaxation
Employment-related policy Settlement-related policy Score of 
policy 
effects
A Rural labourers are allowed 
to work outside household 
registration areas, but there 
are restrictions on the types of 
work, and the ‘Mobile Personnel 
Employment Permit’ and 
‘Mobile Personnel Employment 
Card’ are required.
Rural labourers are allowed to register 
a residence permit if they are living 
legally and stably in this city; are 
employed legally and stably in this 
city and have been participating in 
the city’s employee social insurance 
scheme for six months; are staying 
with relatives with local household 
registration; or have been studying for 
more than six months, etc.
1
B Rural labourers are allowed to 
work outside the household 
registration area, there are 
no restrictions on the types 
of work, but a temporary 
residence permit is needed. 
The temporary residence permit 
requires workers to have a 
permanent place of residence 
(including a lease) and legal 
work. Basically, rural labourers 
cannot share the civil rights of 
urban residents.
If the holder of a residence permit 
continues to live in the same place 
and pays social insurance premiums 
for five years, has a stable occupation 
and meets the family planning policy, 
his or her children receive preschool 
education and compulsory education 
the same as permanent resident 
students.
2
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Level of policy 
relaxation
Employment-related policy Settlement-related policy Score of 
policy 
effects
C Temporary residence permit 
processing only requires 
resident ID card or other valid 
identification certificate. After 
processing, rural labourers 
can directly enjoy some citizen 
rights.
Rural workers with their spouses, 
unmarried children and parents living 
together are allowed to apply for 
registration of permanent residence if 
they are employed legally and stably 
for more than a year in a small or 
medium-sized city, have a legal and 
stable residence (including a lease) 
and participate in a social insurance 
scheme for a certain number of years.
3
Note: Two categories of the household registration policy are summarised according to the national 
household registration system policy from 1958 to the present, combined with the provincial household 
registration policy of 1981–2018 in 28 provinces, excluding Tibet, Xinjiang, Gansu, Hong Kong, Macau 
and Taiwan.
Appendix 5.2 The distribution of sample farms: 
2008 and 2013
Table A5.2 summarises the distribution of sample farms in the second and third 
phases (2000 and 2008, respectively) of the CCAP farm household surveys.
Table A5.2 The distribution of sample farms, 2008 and 2013
Province Number of 
sample farms
2008 2013
Field survey Telephone survey Field survey Telephone survey
Nation 1,063 999 64 972 91
Hebei 177 173 4 173 4
Shaanxi 192 175 17 180 12
Liaoning 192 184 8 168 24
Zhejiang 180 177 13 153 27
Sichuan 150 147 3 143 7
Hubei 172 153 19 155 17
Source: Summarised by authors using CCAP farm survey data.
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Appendix 5.3 Robustness check for the cliffs 
in 2000 and 2008
Table A5.3 Regression results incorporating dummy variables for 2000 and 2008









HPhrt 0.356*** 0.420*** 0.292*** 0.382***
(0.031) (0.024) (0.033) (0.028)
𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻#$%
𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻#$%	
0.250*** 0.270*** 0.164*** 0.192***
(0.033) (0.031) (0.030) (0.030)
agehrt 0.000 –0.000 –0.000 –0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Marryhrt –0.003*** –0.003*** –0.000** –0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
lbrhrt 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
manhrt 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001*
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
lnWageGaphrt 0.002 0.003 –0.004** –0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
areahrt 0.000 0.000 –0.000 –0.000
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
dum_2000_2008 0.036*** 0.039*** 0.005 0.009
(0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008)
dum_2008_2013 0.066*** 0.046*** 0.072*** 0.047***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.008)
Constant 1.568*** 1.821*** 1.103*** 1.456***
(0.131) (0.096) (0.150) (0.115)
Observations 33,355 33,355 33,355 33,355
Number of hhcode 1,011 1,011 1,011 1,011
R-squared 0.278 0.277
*** p < 0.01 statistically significant at the 10 per cent level
** p < 0.05 statistically significant at the 5 per cent level
* p < 0.1 statistically significant at the 1 per cent level
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
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6. Nonstandard employment: Global 
vision and evidence from China’s urban 
labour market
Yongjie Wang
Nonstandard forms of employment have become a feature of contemporary labour 
markets around the world (ILO 2016). The growth of nonstandard employment 
(NSE) was noticed as early as the 1970s in developed economies such as Europe, the 
United States and Australia (Allan 2000; Kalleberg 2000; Adams and Deakin 2014). 
In Asia, there was also evidence of the development of NSE, the proportion of which 
increased from 17 per cent to 34 per cent from 1986 to 2008 in Japan, and from 
27.4 per cent to 34.3 per cent from 2002 to 2011 in South Korea (Korea Labour 
Institute 2011; Asano et al. 2013, both cited in Cooke and Brown 2015). In recent 
years, new jobs and new forms of employment have tended to be more flexible 
and nonstandard. For example, in Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) countries, more than half of all jobs created since 1995 were 
nonstandard jobs and NSE accounted for about one-third of total employment in 
2013 (OECD 2015). In Europe, the majority of new forms of employment generated 
since 2000 are nonstandard jobs, such as employee sharing, casual work, mobile 
work based on information and communication technology (ICT), portfolio work 
and crowd employment (Eurofound 2015). In the literature on NSE, it is explained 
as firms’ strategies to save costs, attain flexibility and screen candidates for regular 
positions, and, at the structural level, it has been attributed to an expansion of the 
service sector, the availability of new technologies and labour market deregulation 
(Allan 2000; Houseman 2001; Bosch 2004; George and Chattopadhyay 2015). 
Some studies have described the growth of NSE as a response to strict labour laws 
and labour market regulations (Schömann et al. 1998; Adams and Deakin 2014; 
Cooke and Brown 2015; Aleksynska and Berg 2016).
NSE has also become an important feature of China’s labour market. Nonstandard 
forms of employment—such as those based on ecommerce and virtual platforms 
and tasks—have become widespread and an important source of employment 
growth in China. In 2017, there were almost 7.2 million labourers employed in the 
shared economy (economic activities involving online services and transactions), 
accounting for 9.7 per cent of newly created jobs in China’s urban labour market 
(Information Centre of the State Council and Internet Society of China 2018). 
In its people’s wellbeing policy framework, the Chinese Government has given high 
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priority to employment and pursued a proactive employment policy, supporting the 
development of flexible and new forms of employment (see Xi 2017; State Council 
of the People’s Republic of China 2019). 
Nevertheless, NSE is still a relatively new topic within both academic and policy 
debates in China. So far, there have been few studies of NSE in China. Some studies 
have investigated new forms of employment (Yang and Wang 2018; Yang et al. 2018; 
Zhang 2018) or have described NSE or nonstandard features of labour relations 
in China at a conceptual level (Dong 2008; Li 2011; Ma et al. 2011; Yang and 
Ma 2014; Qian 2018). There is limited knowledge of China’s NSE, its proportion 
and characteristics. The aim of this chapter is to draw more academic attention to 
the growth of NSE in China. Studying China’s NSE is timely, particularly in an 
era when forms of employment are becoming more diverse and flexible, and the 
Chinese Government is supporting the growth of new forms of employment to 
promote employment growth. A major dilemma accompanying the growth of NSE 
is how to adapt to and regulate NSE and build a more inclusive and integrated 
labour market. This is also a global challenge, since standard employment was the 
norm in past decades and the basis of labour market regulations (Kalleberg 2000). 
Given the juridical dimension of standard employment, its labourers not only earn 
regular wages, but also gain access to employment protection and social insurance, 
whereas NSE tends to be more precarious (Kalleberg 2003; Eichhorst and Tobsch 
2014; Adams and Deakin 2014). 
Based on its significance and the complexity and precarious nature of NSE, it 
is important to treat it as a separate employment category and produce targeted 
policies to adapt to the growth of NSE in China. To explore NSE in China, this 
chapter will address three questions: What is NSE from the global perspective and 
in terms of China’s background? What are the scale and characteristics of NSE in 
China? Who are the people most likely to engage in NSE? This study draws on 
data from the China Urban Labour Survey (CULS) conducted in 2016. The policy 
implications of this study are summarised in the final section. 
What is nonstandard employment?
Before discussing NSE in China, it is necessary to define NSE at the conceptual level. 
The term NSE has been used interchangeably with ‘nontraditional employment’, 
‘irregular employment’, ‘atypical employment’ and ‘nonregular employment’. 
When used to highlight its precarious and inferior status, NSE is also often labelled 
‘precarious employment’, ‘marginal employment’ or ‘alternative employment’, 
despite the fact the scope of NSE is much wider than these last terms. This section 
reviews definitions of NSE by both academic and international organisations. 
6. Nonstandard employment
115
According to an earlier and widely cited definition of NSE, workers in the sector 
have limited temporal, physical and administrative attachment to organisations—
unlike workers in standard employment, who have fixed working hours, indefinite 
employment contracts and work at a fixed location, under the direct supervision 
and administrative control of their employer (Pfeffer and Baron 1988). Standard 
employment relationships refer to 
a stable, socially protected, dependent, full-time job … the basic conditions of which 
(working time, pay and social transfers) are regulated to a minimum level by collective 
agreement or by labour and/or social security law. (Bosch 1986, cited in Bosch 2004) 
Kalleberg (2009) maintains that, in a standard employment relationship, workers 
are assumed to work full-time for a particular employer at the employer’s 
workplace, often progressing up the job ladder within internal labour markets. 
Adams and Deakin (2014) underscored the economic and juridical dimensions to 
distinguish between standard and nonstandard employment. Standard employment 
relationships provide labourers with access not just to income, but also to insurance 
against labour market risks, while NSE is associated with precariousness (Adams and 
Deakin 2014).
In reports on NSE released by international organisations, it is usually defined 
as a part-time, multiparty employment relationship and temporary work that 
deviates from a full-time, employer–employee bilateral employment relationship 
and indefinite labour contracts (Eurofound 2015; OECD 2015; ILO 2016). 
The International Labour Organization (ILO) defines NSE as work that falls outside 
the realm of standard employment relationships that are full-time, indefinite and part 
of a subordinate relationship between an employee and an employer (ILO 2016). 
If standard employment is defined as occurring at a set place of work outside the 
home, an even broader scope of tasks falls under NSE, including telework and remote 
work (ILO 2016). According to Eurofound (2015), NSE falls into one or more of 
the following categories: relationships between employers and employees that are 
different from the established one-to-one employment relationship; the provision of 
work on a discontinuous or intermittent basis or for very limited periods, rather than 
on a continuous or regular basis; and networking and cooperation arrangements 
between self-employed individuals. 
There are common characteristics or essential dimensions of NSE across different 
contexts, manifested in the temporal, economic, juridical and employment 
relationship dimensions. Based on a review of definitions of NSE, the following 
characteristics of NSE are underlined. First, in the temporal dimension, NSE is 
distinguished by its working hours and the length of the employment relationship 
or labour contract. Standard employment refers to full-time employment on 
a regular, stable and continuing basis, whereas NSE refers to part-time employment 
or full-time work based on temporary or intermittent arrangements. Second, in the 
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economic dimension, although employees in standard employment are paid 
regularly—usually on a biweekly or monthly basis—and have the right to 
a minimum wage, NSE workers are paid based on workload or tasks and may 
incur market risk. Third, in the juridical dimension, standard employment 
is based on the conclusion of legal labour contracts, be they written or verbal, 
depending on labour contract regulations in different countries. A standard 
employment relationship is legally and socially protected via employment 
protection, social insurance and the protection of employees’ legal rights. Forth, 
standard employment is based on a direct and bilateral employment relationship 
between an employer and an employee. Multiparty employment relationships, 
such as labour dispatches or employee sharing, which involve three or more 
parties, are not standard employment arrangements. In addition to thresholds 
in the temporal, economic, juridical and labour relationship dimensions, NSE 
also includes a  physical dimension and sometimes relies on the support of 
ICT—for example, mobile phones and personal computers—which may change 
work patterns and the nature of work relationships (Adams and Deakin 2014; 
Eurofound 2015). 
Defining NSE in China
Even though there are general principles of NSE, as discussed above, in practice, 
there are multiple and emerging forms of this kind of employment. There is no 
official definition of NSE that could be applied across all contexts. Instead, there 
are variations of NSE across different economic contexts, legislative frameworks and 
labour market regulations. As noted by Bosch (2004), different legal and welfare 
regimes and variations in countries’ welfare regimes might change the meaning of 
standard employment and NSE. In considering the employment characteristics and 
labour market regulations of China, this chapter defines standard employment in 
China as full-time work based on legal, written and stable labour contracts, be they 
fixed-term or indefinite, and direct bilateral employment relationships between an 
employer and an employee. The essential difference of this definition from that 
of the ILO is defining full-time fixed-term employment as standard. According 
to the ILO’s classification, fixed-term employment is categorised as temporary 
employment, and is therefore considered as NSE.1 Such a classification does not 
apply to the Chinese context. In China, full-time employment based on fixed-term 
labour contracts (excluding labour dispatches) should be considered as standard 
employment for two reasons. 
1 According to the ILO (2016), there are four major types of NSE: temporary employment, part-time and 
on-call work, multiparty employment relationships and disguised employment/dependent self-employment. 
The category of temporary employment comprises employment based on fixed-term contracts, project or task-
based contracts and seasonal and casual work, including daily work.
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First, fixed-term employment is a mainstream and standard form of employment 
in China. The ILO categorises fixed-term employment as NSE, primarily because 
non-fixed-term employment is a prevalent employment arrangement in developed 
economies. Among OECD countries, the proportion of non-fixed-term employment 
is very high. The proportion of NSE in some OECD countries—including Australia, 
the United Kingdom, Norway, Denmark and another nine countries—was above 
90 per cent in 2011 and 2012, whereas fixed-term employment is a non-mainstream 
form of employment (OECD 2014). In China, fixed-term employment is more 
prevalent. Drawing on data from the CULS for 2010, Wang (2013) finds that, in 
urban China, the proportion of non-fixed-term (indefinite) employment among 
migrant labourers and local urban labourers was 19.93 per cent and 44.58 per cent, 
respectively, whereas that of fixed-term employment was 75.36 per cent and 
53.48 per cent, respectively (Wang 2013). This means that fixed-term employment 
is a common and standard employment arrangement in China. 
Second, under current labour market regulations in China, workers under both 
fixed-term employment and non-fixed-term employment are subject to the same 
strict protections and have equal labour rights. According to China’s Labour 
Contract Law, enacted in 2008, the establishment of a labour relationship between 
an employer and an employee occurs at the conclusion of a written labour contract.2 
The establishment of a labour relationship based on fixed-term and non-fixed-term 
contracts serves multiple purposes, including the provision of social protection, 
employment and income security, safe and healthy workplaces, equality of access, 
and so on (Rubery 2015; ILO 2016). Although China’s Labour Contract Law also 
regulates three special employment arrangements—that is, collective contracts, 
labour dispatches and part-time employment—fixed-term and non-fixed-term 
employment are considered standard forms of employment. The strict labour market 
regulations regarding the conclusion of a labour contract, restrictions on the dismissal 
of workers, labour rights protection and identification of relevant responsibilities 
mainly target fixed-term and non-fixed-term employment groups. Du (2014) drew 
on the OECD’s framework to investigate the level of protection and strictness of 
labour market regulations, examining regulations regarding the conclusion of labour 
contracts, requisite terms and content of labour contracts and regulations regarding 
the dismissal of workers and termination of a labour contract. Du (2014) found 
the framework of China’s contemporary labour market regulations provides high-
level employment and social protections, achieving a score of 3.3—higher than the 
average level of OECD countries (2.3). This means that, compared with developed 
economies, China’s labour market regulations provide even stricter employment and 
legal protections. Based on this reality and its labour market regulations, fixed-term 
employment should be categorised as standard in China. 
2 Labour Contract Law of the People’s Republic of China, available from: www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2009-
02/20/content_1471106.htm. 
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Given the above argument, this chapter defines standard employment and NSE 
in China according to the status of labour contracts. Standard employment refers 
to full-time employment based on non-fixed-term and fixed-term labour contracts 
(excluding labour dispatches) and employment of those who work for central and 
local governments and other jobs in the public sector. Employment falling outside the 
above realm should be categorised as NSE, such as part-time employment, multiparty 
employment relationships, temporary employment (project or task-based contracts, 
seasonal and casual work), platform or virtual employment and self-employment. 
Data and sample
This study draws on data obtained from the CULS conducted by the Institute of 
Population and Labour Economics at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. 
So far, four rounds of CULS have been conducted. This study draws on the latest 
data, from the fourth round of the survey, in 2016. It was conducted in six provincial 
capital cities: Shanghai, Guangzhou, Fuzhou, Wuhan, Shenyang and Xi’an. It is 
a household-level survey covering labourers’ education levels, employment status, 
previous experience, social protection status, skills, training and other personal 
information. A probability proportional to size (PPS) sampling method was utilised 
to select the samples. 
This chapter focuses on working-age labourers—that is, those who are currently 
employed and are aged above 16 years. A study sample of 7,439 individuals was 
selected, including 1,044 respondents from Shenyang City, 1,335 respondents from 
Shanghai, 1,229 from Fuzhou, 1,254 from Wuhan, 1,478 from Guangzhou and 
1,099 from Xi’an. Among the valid study sample, 57.59 per cent of respondents 
were male and 42.41 per cent were female. As for residence status, 63.15 per cent of 
respondents were local urban residents and 36.85 per cent were rural migrants. In 
terms of hukou (household registration) status, 25.83 per cent of respondents had 
rural hukou, while 74.17 per cent had urban hukou. The average age of the study 
sample was 39.04 years, and the average years of schooling among respondents were 
12.88. The proportion of those married was 82.88 per cent, while the unmarried 




Measurement and scale of NSE in China
In measuring the scale of NSE in China, this study categorises full-time employment 
based on non-fixed-term employment contracts and fixed-term contracts (excluding 
labour dispatches) as standard employment, including civil servants in central and 
local governments and those who are employed in other areas of the public and 
private sectors. Employment falling outside the above realm was taken as NSE. 
Drawing on the CULS data, this study finds that the proportion of NSE among the 
six cities investigated in 2016 was 34.95 per cent, indicating that NSE has become 
an important feature of the labour market in China (Wang 2018). The result also 
reflects a significant regional gap. The proportion of NSE was highest in Wuhan 
City (43.9 per cent), while in Shenyang it was 43.29 per cent, 40.39 per cent in 
Guangzhou, 38.18 per cent in Xi’an and 34.39 per cent in Fuzhou. The lowest 
proportion of NSE was in Shanghai, at 22.73 per cent. 
Characteristics of NSE in China
As indicated in the literature on NSE, this form of employment is often associated 
with precariousness. NSE workers tend to experience wage penalties, poor working 
conditions, long working hours, few training opportunities and a lack of labour 
rights and social security protections (Allan 2000; Cooke and Brown 2015). Due 
to limited temporal, physical and administrative attachments to organisations, 
NSE workers have weaker attachment to their employers, which may affect their 
behaviour and performance and may undermine organisational aims (Allan 2000; 
George and Chattopadhyay 2015). Based on the CULS data, NSE in China 
demonstrates the following characteristics: low levels of job satisfaction, low 
wage levels, high levels of overtime, low social insurance coverage and inadequate 
income protections (Wang 2018). 
First, NSE workers tend to have lower levels of job satisfaction. As shown in 
Table 6.1, when asked about the degree of satisfaction with their current job, the 
proportion of NSE respondents who were very unsatisfied or unsatisfied with their 
employment was 0.91 per cent and 11.02 per cent, respectively—much higher than 
that for labourers in standard employment, which was 0.42 per cent and 5.8 per cent, 
respectively. The proportion of NSE labourers who were satisfied or very satisfied 
with their employment was 44.22 per cent and 4.41 per cent, respectively, which 
was lower than that of labourers in standard employment, which was 57.01 per cent 
and 6.74 per cent, respectively. 
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Second, NSE labourers have lower incomes. The average monthly income of NSE 
workers was RMB4,806.76 (US$716), which was RMB1,492.16 lower than that of 
standard workers. The average monthly income of NSE workers was 76.31 per cent 
of that of standard employees. The average hourly income of NSE workers was 
RMB23.34 (about US$16)—65.71 per cent of that of standard workers (Table 6.1). 
Third, working overtime is common among labourers in NSE. The survey data show 
that urban labourers tend to work long hours—an average of 47.29 hours per week, 
which is much higher than the 40 hours per week standard regulated by the Chinese 
Government.3 NSE workers put in even longer hours, 54.95 per  week—11.74 
hours more than labourers in standard employment. With 40 hours per week the 
standard as regulated by the Chinese Government, the proportion of NSE labourers 
who worked overtime was 71.32 per cent, while that of employees in standard 
employment was only 29.52 per cent (Table 6.1).
Table 6.1 Comparison of standard employment and NSE
Overall (1) Standard 
employment (2)
NSE (3) (3) – (2)
Level of job satisfaction (%)
Very unsatisfied 0.59 0.42 0.91 0.49
Unsatisfied 7.65 5.80 11.02 5.22
Neither good nor bad 33.36 30.04 39.43 9.39
Satisfied 52.49 57.01 44.22 –12.79
Very satisfied 5.92 6.74 4.41 –2.33
Work compensation and hours
Monthly income (RMB) 5,781.04 6,298.92 4,806.76 –1,492.16
Hourly income (RMB) 31.29 35.52 23.34 –12.18
Average working hours (per week) 47.29 43.21 54.95 11.74
Proportion of overtime work (%) 45.57 29.52 71.32 41.80
Coverage of social insurance (%)
Pension 71.43 90.41 36.09 –54.32
Basic medical insurance 69.46 88.77 33.50 –55.27
Unemployment insurance 59.15 79.45 21.38 –58.07
Industrial injury insurance 58.87 78.87 21.66 –57.21
Maternity insurance 52.32 71.02 17.52 –53.50
Source: IPLE-CASS (2016).
3 According to regulations on working hours released by the State Council of China in 1994, the regular working 
hours of a full-time employee are 8 hours per day and 40 hours per week (MoHRSS 1994). 
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Fourth, social insurance coverage among NSE workers is lower than that among 
workers in standard employment. The proportion of employees in standard 
employment who were covered by a basic pension was 90.41 per cent, while that 
of NSE employees was only 36.09 per cent. The coverage rates for basic medical 
insurance, unemployment insurance, industrial injury insurance and maternity 
insurance for NSE workers were 55.27 per cent, 58.07 per cent, 57.21 per cent and 
53.5 per cent lower, respectively, than those of labourers in standard employment, as 
shown in Table 6.1. The low level of social security coverage is a major area requiring 
change to improve the status of NSE workers.
Fifth, the proportion of labour union members is lower among NSE labourers. 
The proportion of labour union members in standard employment was 33 per cent, 
while that of NSE workers was only 3.68 per cent—implying a low level of 
representation of NSE workers in such organisations. The proportion of labour 
union members among workers in standard employment varied across cities, and 
was highest in Shenyang City, at 58.03 per cent, and lowest in Guangzhou, at 
21.19 per cent. As shown in Table 6.2, the proportion of labour union members 
among NSE labourers was much lower. In spite of the differences between cities, 
the average proportion of labour union members among those in NSE was only 
3.68  per  cent. Even in Wuhan, where the proportion of labour union members 
among NSE workers was the highest, it was only 6.15 per cent. The low proportion 
of NSE workers in labour unions is not conducive to improving the bargaining 
power of those workers. Measures should be taken to increase the proportion of 
labour union membership among NSE employees, to strengthen the diversity 
of labour unions and include representatives of part-time and dispatch workers in 
labour unions. 
Table 6.2 Proportion of labour union members in standard employment 
and NSE (per cent)
City Standard employment NSE Overall
Shenyang 58.03 5.17 35.15
Shanghai 32.97 4.24 26.44
Fuzhou 33.66 5.40 23.95
Wuhan 31.63 6.15 20.45
Guangzhou 21.19 0.47 12.82
Xi’an 35.43 3.85 23.37
Overall 33.00 3.68 22.75
Source: IPLE-CASS (2016).
Sixth, among the six cities investigated, the proportion of NSE labourers whose 
wage was lower than the local minimum standard (7.25 per cent) was higher than 
that of workers in standard employment (2.42 per cent) (Table 6.3). 
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Table 6.3 Proportion of labourers earning less than the local minimum 
wage (per cent)
City Standard employment NSE Overall
Shenyang 5.26 8.20 6.53
Shanghai 2.41 6.14 3.25
Fuzhou 0.61 2.23 1.17
Wuhan 3.63 11.83 7.20
Guangzhou 1.07 5.96 3.02
Xi’an 1.74 5.46 3.17
Overall 2.42 7.25 4.10
Source: IPLE-CASS (2016).
Who are the workers most likely to engage 
in NSE in China? 
According to reports from the ILO (2016) and OECD (2015), women, young workers, 
migrants and those with a low level of educational achievement are most likely to 
engage in NSE. There are multiple reasons behind the choices of NSE workers. For 
example, women choose NSE to fit in around their care tasks, while migrant workers 
choose NSE primarily because of their poor human capital, poor linguistic capability, 
poor professional networks or weak bargaining power (OECD 2015; ILO 2016). 
This chapter finds that, in China’s urban labour market, the proportions of 
senior workers, males, migrant labourers and those with low levels of educational 
achievement were higher among NSE workers. First, the proportion of senior-age 
workers is higher among NSE than among standard workers. Drawing on the CULS 
(IPLE-CASS 2016), the average age of standard workers was 38.35 years, while that 
of NSE workers was 40.33 years. As shown in Table 6.4, in terms of age distribution, 
the proportion of workers over the age of 35 among NSE workers is higher than 
that among workers in standard employment. In particular, for those aged between 
45 and 54, the proportion in standard employment was 21.86 per cent, while that 
in NSE was 28.03 per cent. 
Second, the proportion of men in NSE was higher than that of women. The survey 
data show that 57.22 per cent of nonstandard employees were men while 
42.78 per cent were women. However, gender distribution in NSE was similar 
to that in standard employment. The proportion of men in standard employment 
(57.78 per cent) was also higher than that of women (42.22 per cent). The regression 
analysis shows that gender had no significant impact on the possibility of engaging 
in NSE (Table 6.6).
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Table 6.4 Worker age distribution in standard employment and NSE (per cent)
Age Standard employment NSE Overall
16–24 5.13 5.98 5.43
25–34 36.24 26.44 32.81
35–44 29.90 30.96 30.27
45–54 21.86 28.03 24.02
55 and above 6.88 8.59 7.47
Overall 100.00 100.00 100.00
Source: IPLE-CASS (2016).
Third, labourers with a low level of educational attainment accounted for a higher 
proportion of labourers in NSE. Data analysis shows the average years of schooling 
among all workers were 12.88. The average years of schooling among standard 
employees were 13.97, while among NSE labourers it was only 10.85. As indicated 
in Table 6.5, 77.87 per cent of NSE labourers had achieved high school education 
or below, which was much higher than the proportion of those in standard 
employment (37.24 per cent). The proportion of labourers with tertiary education 
(college level and above) among NSE labourers was only 22.14 per cent, while that 
among standard employment labourers was 62.75 per cent (Table 6.5).
Table 6.5 Education distribution of standard employment and NSE labourers 
(per cent)
Education level Standard employment NSE Overall
Primary school 1.73 9.07 4.29
Junior high school 11.96 39.71 21.65
Senior high school or 
technical secondary school
23.55 29.09 25.48
College 23.02 12.52 19.36
Undergraduate 33.66 9.31 25.16
Masters degree and above 6.07 0.31 4.06
Overall 100.00 100.00 100.00
Source: IPLE-CASS (2016).
Fourth, the proportion of NSE workers with rural hukou was higher than those with 
urban hukou. The survey data show that the proportion of workers with rural hukou 
in standard employment was 16.17 per cent, while that in NSE was 43.81 per cent. 
From the regression analysis results shown in Table 6.6, if other conditions are the 
same and we control the variables of type of employer, industrial sector and city, the 
following trends are observed. First, the lower the level of educational achievement, 
the higher is the possibility of labourers engaging in NSE. The probability of engaging 
in NSE increased by 4.52 per cent for each one-year reduction of schooling. Second, 
with the increase in workers’ age, the probability of engaging in NSE increased by 
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0.21 per cent. Third, the possibility of engaging in NSE among unmarried labourers 
was 8.38 per cent higher than among married labourers. Fourth, gender did not 
have an evident effect on the probability of engaging in NSE. Finally, hukou status 
also impacted on the probability of labourers engaging in NSE. If other conditions 
were the same, the probability of labourers with rural hukou engaging in NSE was 
8.85 per cent higher than that of urban hukou holders. 
Given the characteristics of labourers who are more likely to engage in NSE, 
targeted policies and actions are required to broaden the employment opportunities 
and improve the job quality of those with lower levels of educational achievement, 
those who are older and unmarried and workers holding rural hukou. 
Table 6.6 Factors influencing labourers’ participation in NSE (probit model)
Dependent variable: Whether or not to engage in NSE 
(Yes = 1) (marginal effects)
Coefficient Standard error
Gender (male = 1) –0.0053 0.0166
Years of schooling –0.0452*** 0.0030
Age 0.0021** 0.0010
Marital status (married = 1) –0.0838*** 0.0232
Hukou status (rural hukou = 1) 0.0885*** 0.0216




*** significant at 1 per cent
** significant at 5 per cent
* significant at 10 per cent
Source: IPLE-CASS (2016).
Conclusion
This study has three major findings, which fill existing knowledge gaps regarding 
NSE in China and provide evidence for policymakers considering further strategies 
to adapt to and regulate the growth of NSE in China. First, the proportion of NSE 
in China’s urban labour market was 34.95 per cent, demonstrating the significance 
of this form of employment in China. The result also reflects a significant regional 
gap. The proportion of NSE in advanced regions, such as Shanghai, which leads 
in realising economic transformation and upgrading, was lower than that in other 
cities. Second, NSE in China demonstrated the following characteristics: low 
levels of job satisfaction, low wages, high levels of overtime, low social insurance 
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coverage and poor wage protection. Third, in China’s urban labour market, the 
proportions of senior-age workers, males, migrants and those with low levels of 
educational achievement were higher among NSE workers, and workers with these 
characteristics were more likely to engage in NSE. 
Based on these findings, three key issues are highlighted to deal with the growth 
of NSE in China. First, NSE should be treated as a separate employment category 
in the design of employment policy and labour market regulations. Although in 
recent years there has been significant progress, current employment policies and 
protections mainly target labourers in standard employment, whereas NSE labourers 
are not subject to employment protection under contemporary labour laws and 
market regulations. There is still no legal reference for the management of NSE and 
the protection of the rights of NSE labourers. 
Second, job quality assessment and improvement should be emphasised. Compared 
with standard employment, in NSE, job quality tends to be lower, characterised by 
low job satisfaction, low wages, high levels of overtime, low social insurance coverage, 
poor protection of wage rights and interests, and so on. Measures are required to 
assess and monitor job quality in terms of working hours, wages and social insurance 
coverage. Regular evaluation and monitoring should be carried out to determine the 
trends in NSE and form more dynamic monitoring. Multiple measures are required, 
including legislation, the justice system and labour supervision. Nevertheless, due 
to the large scale of NSE and its multiple forms, such activities will incur high 
management costs. How to achieve a balance between improving job quality and 
promoting employment growth also needs careful consideration. 
Third, targeted policies and actions are required to broaden the employment choices 
for those who are most likely to engage in NSE. It is also necessary to take measures 
to strengthen the collective bargaining power of NSE workers by enhancing labour 
union membership at all levels, improving the representation of organisations and 
absorbing nonstandard workers into labour unions. 
There are also a few limitations of this study. Due to the complex and heterogeneous 
nature of NSE and its emerging forms with the development of new technology, 
measuring NSE is difficult. The definition of NSE may vary across different contexts 
or with modifications in the legal framework within one country. The limited 
availability of data on NSE (Barrientos 2011) is a global challenge to the study of 
NSE trends. This chapter provides an overview of NSE in China based on evidence 
from China’s urban labour market; nevertheless, multiple sources of data are needed 
for future studies to observe the trends of NSE in China. 
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7. E-commerce development 
in rural China
Sherry Tao Kong
General introduction of e-commerce in China
Against the backdrop of its remarkable economic progress, China has seen rapid 
development in the application of information and communication technology 
(ICT). With the provision of extensive telecommunication infrastructure, China is 
digitalising rapidly. As a direct result of the expansion of digital networks, the rate 
of internet penetration in China has been increasing steadily, currently approaching 
60 per cent of the total Chinese population. Given China’s population size, this 
signifies a huge market of consumers, many of whom are ready to embrace the 
digital world in an enthusiastic and innovative manner. China therefore provides 
uniquely fertile ground for experiments with and commercialisation of digital 
business models. 
There has been remarkable growth in digitalisation over the past decade. From 2007 
to 2016, the rate of internet penetration in China increased from 16 per cent to 
53.2  per cent overall, surging from 26 per cent to 69.1 per cent in urban areas 
and from 7.4 per cent to 33.1 per cent in rural areas (China Internet Network 
Information Center 2017). Along with greater internet penetration in China, the 
number of internet users increased at an average pace of nearly 20 per cent per 
annum for at least a decade after 2006. By 2018, the total number of internet 
users in China reached 828.5 million and broadband networks had connected 
378 million households, of which 87.5 per cent were using optical fibre. Alongside 
this remarkable digitalisation process, a defining feature of Chinese internet users 
is their utilisation of mobile devices. By mid-2018, 788 million Chinese were 
using mobile devices to access the internet, accounting for 98.3 per cent of all 
internet users. 
Along with the rapid expansion and upgrading of internet infrastructure, as well as 
the formation of the enormous internet user population, the digital economy has 
become an increasingly important part of China’s economic landscape. Based on the 
2018 China’s Internet Industry Report (iResearch Global 2018), the gross value of 
the digital economy reached RMB27.2 trillion in 2017, accounting for 32.9 per cent 
of national gross domestic product (GDP)—2.6 percentage points higher than in 
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2016.1 Moreover, it is particularly noteworthy that the digital economy contributed 
approximately 55 per cent of overall GDP growth, serving as a powerful engine of 
growth and encouraging a range of socioeconomic developments in China. 
E-commerce constitutes a considerable part of the digital economy. Admittedly, 
China was not an early starter in e-commerce development compared with other 
countries. The very first online transaction in China was completed in April 1998 
and growth during the subsequent decade was slow (Cao and Zhang 2009). The 
take-off in China’s e-commerce came in 2008 when it exhibited exponential growth. 
Over the course of the subsequent decade, the total transaction value of e-commerce 
achieved a remarkable tenfold growth, from RMB3.14 trillion to RMB31.63 trillion 
(Xinhua News Agency 2019). Today, China has become a leading force in the global 
digital economy. The country is home to 42 per cent of global e-commerce and its 
total annual e-commerce transaction value is greater than that of France, Germany, 
Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States combined (Wang et al. 2017).
During the same period, the annual transaction value of online retail grew sharply. 
In 2008, online accounted for only 1.3 per cent of total retail sales in China. This 
share was considerably lower than that in the United States (3.72 per cent) and the 
United Kingdom (4.5 per cent). However, this modest position quickly became 
history. The total value of online sales in China reached RMB1.89 trillion in 
2013—a more than tenfold rise from the modest RMB130 billion in 2008. China, 
for the first time, surpassed the United States and became the largest e-commerce 
market in the world (China E-commerce Research Centre 2016)—a position that 
has since been further consolidated. In 2016, China’s total value of online sales rose 
to RMB5.33 trillion, accounting for 14.9 per cent of the country’s total retail sales. 
By 2018, the annual online retail sales value reached a staggering RMB9 trillion. 
In the meantime, the population of online business owners grew from 7.9 million 
in 2008 to 50 million in 2016. Regardless of the measure one uses, China is by far 
the world’s largest online retail market.
It is not simply the astounding economic value or the remarkable growth rates 
that make e-commerce development in China a topic worthy of discussion. 
More importantly, as a form of business activity, e-commerce provides exciting 
opportunities for job creation, increasing household incomes and skill formation. 
In particular, e-commerce, especially online retail sales, has sparked hopes about its 
potential benefits for more inclusive rural development.
1 During its presidency of the G20 in 2016, China supported global efforts to define the digital economy within 
the G20 Digital Economy Development and Cooperation Initiative. That initiative defined the digital economy 
as ‘a broad range of activities that include using digitalised information and knowledge as the key factor of 
production, modern information networks as an important activity space, and the effective use of ICT as an 
important driver of productivity growth and economic structure optimisation’.
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Traditionally, retail businesses attached a great deal of importance to their physical 
establishment—a precondition for development. For example, a shopfront is required 
to display goods for sale and advertise services provided; bank branches or ATMs are 
required to enable payments and process financial transactions. Such development 
preconditions generally left rural areas in a less advantageous position compared with 
cities. However, the same need not apply in the context of e-commerce. In contrast 
to the traditional offline business model, e-commerce is arguably location-neutral; 
as long as there is internet access and logistical systems are in place, rural areas are 
not immediately disadvantaged because of a lower level of general development. 
Because of this, e-commerce seems to be able to offer a more level playing field 
for rural areas to catch up with urban levels of development. As a result, there is 
much hope that the digital economy—in particular, e-commerce—can serve as an 
effective vehicle to generate growth, alleviate poverty, reduce inequality and improve 
various dimensions of social development in rural China. 
However, while e-commerce in rural China holds much exciting potential, in 
practice, the actual level of e-commerce remains seriously underdeveloped in rural 
areas compared with cities. Over the past decade, despite an increase in the number 
of internet users in rural China—from 23.11 million in 2006 to 201 million 
in 2016—the value of online sales in rural China grew only modestly, reaching 
RMB353 million in 2015 and RMB482 million in 2016. Based on data from the 
Ministry of Commerce, rural online retailing increased by 39.1 per cent in 2017. 
The total value of online sales of agricultural products reached RMB243.7 billion—
increasing by 53.3 per cent. By the end of 2017, the number of online stores being 
run from rural areas was 9.86 million—an increase of 20.7 per cent. 
However, it remains to be investigated whether, and to what extent, rural e-commerce 
can realise its promise of delivering prosperity and reducing inequality. Against the 
backdrop of the general development of e-commerce in China, this chapter focuses 
on the important area of development of rural e-commerce, particularly that of 
‘Taobao villages’ (administrative villages where both the aggregate transaction value 
of e-commerce and the total number of online businesses registered in the village 
have reached a certain threshold). In addition, by considering the related research 
findings and national- and subnational-level policies, we provide some initial 
thoughts on the impacts of rural e-commerce development and the policies required 
to unleash the potential of the digital economy. 
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E-commerce development in rural China 
and related research
General assessment of the extant literature
Rural e-commerce essentially means using the internet to purchase products from 
and sell goods to rural areas. The possibility of engaging the rural population in both 
production and consumption brings great development potential. Indeed, as early 
as 1984, the International Telecommunication Union proposed eradicating poverty 
through developing telecommunications infrastructure. A number of academic 
studies also demonstrated that the application of ICT had significant effects on 
education, poverty reduction and employment opportunities (Sumanjeet 2009).
In the case of China, it is generally accepted that the development of rural 
e-commerce is improving both local economies and household livelihoods, especially 
by providing opportunities for the economic advancement of people living in rural 
and remote areas (Lin et al. 2016). The belief that poverty alleviation can be achieved 
through the development of rural e-commerce is widely held, to the extent that the 
Chinese Government and organisations such as the World Bank have engaged in 
the active promotion of rural e-commerce. In the meantime, while the value of 
rural online sales accounts for only a small fraction of the total in China, rural 
areas are widely seen as a great untapped market. Moreover, in anticipation of the 
gradual saturation of online markets in urban areas, a large number of e-commerce 
enterprises have begun expanding their businesses into rural markets. As such, the 
opportunities for rural e-commerce development have become apparent and have 
been enthusiastically embraced by both the private sector and the government. 
Recent studies such as Liu et al. (2018) provide valuable overview and analysis on 
the development of rural e-commerce.
While from a business perspective the importance of rural e-commerce may be more 
than obvious, research on the actual impact of rural e-commerce remains limited. 
Furthermore, existing studies often rely on anecdotal evidence or are based on 
analyses conducted by enterprises within the industry.
In contrast, formal studies based on reliable microlevel data are rare, with a small 
number of exceptions, including, notably, Couture et al. (2018) and Fan et al. 
(2018). This probably has much to do with the fact that online sales data are 
too often available only from the platform on which the transactions take place. 
Consequently, although a sizeable body of case studies has been produced by scholars 
and commentators, academically rigorous research on China’s rural e-commerce 
remains scarce. 
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Moreover, when assessing the actual impact of rural e-commerce development, the 
findings are revealing. As one of the only few academic studies that investigates 
this topic, Couture et al. (2018) found that rural e-commerce resulted in 
stronger consumption-side effects as e-commerce terminals offered lower prices, 
greater convenience and increased product variety. For households, gains in 
household purchasing power were strongest for durable products. However, rural 
e-commerce was found to have no significant effects on the local economy and 
fewer pro-competition effects on local retail prices. Furthermore, production-side 
effects are less immediate: in the absence of complementary interventions—such as 
business training, access to credit or targeted online promotions—few production-
side effects are likely to materialise for the average rural marketplace in the short to 
medium runs. 
The above results demonstrate that realisation of the promise of e-commerce for 
rural development is not automatic. Reliable internet access, trustworthy digital 
transaction methods and convenient parcel delivery and logistics services are necessary 
but insufficient conditions to realise the promise of e-commerce in less-developed 
areas. The development of e-commerce in rural areas requires a combination of 
grassroots organic growth and supportive government policies. 
In sum, when entrepreneurship encounters conducive conditions, rural e-commerce 
flourishes. 
An important area of rural e-commerce 
development: Taobao villages
Taobao villages are a powerful example of the development of rural e-commerce in 
China. The official definition of a Taobao village is an administrative village where 
the total annual value of e-commerce transactions—or gross merchandise volume 
(GMV)—is no less than RMB10 million (approximately, A$2 million) and there 
are at least 100 active online stores or a minimum of 10 per cent of local households 
are operating online stores (AliResearch 2016). In short, a Taobao village is a cluster 
of e-commerce businesses operating in a rural area. 
Such villages are called ‘Taobao’ because the statistics used to calculate the GMV 
of online retailing are taken from Taobao.com as the primary marketplace. 
Taobao.com and the associated Tmall.com—both provided by the Alibaba Group 
Holding Limited—are the largest e-commerce platforms on which to buy and sell 
products online. In 2014, Taobao and Tmall accounted for 81.5 per cent of the 
total value of GMV in China. As the e-commerce market expands at a staggering 
pace, competition between various online platforms has become increasingly 
heated. Despite strong rivalry from JD.com and others, Alibaba remains by far 
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the largest e-commerce platform provider, accounting for 58.2 per cent of market 
share in 2018—more than three times larger than the next player, JD.com. As 
a result, the development of Taobao villages illustrates the general patterns of 
growth of rural e-commerce. 
The first Taobao village was officially approved by Alibaba in 2009 and, by 2013, the 
number of such villages slowly climbed to 20. What followed then was mindboggling: 
within a year, the total number of Taobao villages increased to 212—a tenfold growth. 
In addition, for the first time, 17 Taobao townships emerged. These are townships 
formed by the congregation of at least three Taobao villages. As is shown in Table 
7.1, during the period 2014–18, the number of Taobao villages and townships grew 
dramatically, along with rapid overall expansion of e-commerce in China. In these 
Taobao villages, the number of active online stores also increased, from 70,000 in 
2014 to 660,000 in 2018. 
Table 7.1 Number of Taobao villages and Taobao townships
  2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Taobao village Total number 212 778 1,311 2,118 3,202
Growth rate (%) 267 69 62 51
Taobao township Total number 17 71 135 242 363
Growth rate (%) 318 90 79 50
Source: Nanjing University Space Planning Research Centre and Ali New Village Research Centre 
(2018).
While it is easy to be impressed by these figures, it is important to put them into 
perspective. There were 671,729 administrative villages in China in 2016; only 
0.2 per cent of them qualified as Taobao villages. Taobao villages account for only 
a tiny fraction of villages in China as a whole, and so there remains room for further 
growth of rural e-commerce. With that in mind, it is now useful to extend our study 
beyond the impressive rates of growth of Taobao villages and distil a number of 
distinctive patterns that have emerged, particularly over the past five years. 
First, the number of provinces with Taobao villages expanded from seven in 2012 
(Zhejiang, Guangdong, Jiangsu, Shandong, Fujian, Hebei and Jiangxi) to 24 by 
2017, including remote and economically underdeveloped provinces such as 
Guizhou, Shaanxi, Ningxia and two ethnic autonomous regions, Xinjiang and 
Guangxi. To some extent, this shows the vitality and reach of e-commerce. At the 
same time, the greatest increase in Taobao villages was in areas where they first 
took root, such as Zhejiang, Guangdong, Jiangsu and Shandong provinces. In stark 
contrast, the increase in the number of Taobao villages in the other provinces has 
been slow and, in some places, even negative. For example, there were two Taobao 
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villages in Yunnan Province in 2015, but this was reduced to one in 2016 and 2017. 
This growth pattern seems to suggest that the development of rural e-commerce 
reinforces early advantages and builds on successful initial conditions. 
Second—not dissimilar to other aspects of China’s economic development—the 
distribution of Taobao villages exhibits clear regional disparities. Taobao villages are 
highly concentrated in the eastern coastal region, whereas only a small number are 
scattered across other regions. In fact, more than 90 per cent of Taobao villages are 
located in the east, which is also where the fastest growth is observed compared 
with the rest of China. In contrast, other regions are lagging far behind, with the 
central region leading the west and north-east by a small margin. Within the eastern 
region, the provincial distribution is also uneven. The number of Taobao villages in 
Zhejiang Province is 1,172, accounting for just over one-third of the total number 
of Taobao villages in the whole country. 
While it is probably unsurprising that the distribution and growth patterns reveal 
clear regional disparities, this is a particularly interesting angle from which to assess 
the relationship between the development of the digital economy and that of the 
traditional economy. Theoretically, e-commerce should be free of geographical 
limitations, as it operates on the internet and does not depend on any physical 
presence like traditional brick-and-mortar businesses. However, Taobao villages are 
clearly clustered in the coastal region, where the economy is generally more developed 
compared with the rest of the country. This seems to imply that the development 
of e-commerce is not decoupled from the real economy or the traditional sectors.
Third, the formation and growth processes of Taobao villages can reveal the impact 
of important laws governing rural e-commerce development. The first generation 
of Taobao villages all had fairly humble beginnings. They initially appeared on 
the periphery of cites where residents with relatively low socioeconomic status 
concentrated. These Taobao storeowners were resourceful and adventurous enough, 
but the types of products sold were mainly low-cost manufacturing goods targeted 
at low-income consumers. 
Many case studies show that the identification of popular products by one or two 
individuals heralds the subsequent proliferation of online businesses within their 
community. Diffusion of information and knowledge is particularly effective 
and rapid within these ‘acquaintance societies’ in rural villages at the city fringes. 
Inspired by successful examples, more people find ways to take advantage of the 
available conditions to drive online sales. For example, some will discover that 
existing industrial production in nearby areas offers low-cost products; some find 
that, by moving deeper into rural areas, they can access more labour and greater 
production and warehousing space at lower costs. The logistics industries attracted 
by the expansion of e-commerce into rural areas effectively address the issue of 
the ‘last mile’ of parcel delivery. Combined with the powerful market integration 
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enabled by online platforms that allow sellers to access the entire national market, 
reliable shipping services in turn provide further impetus to the growth of rural 
e-commerce.
In sum, through the lens of the development of Taobao villages, one can see how 
the traditional rural economy is undergoing digitalisation. As business clusters, 
Taobao villages are able to take advantage of existing industries, such as processing 
and manufacturing, and stimulate upgrading and further development of new 
sectors, such as logistics and e-commerce services. In this process, job opportunities 
are created, income levels are improved and the wider local community benefits. 
However, despite their internet origins, the formation and subsequent growth 
of Taobao villages do not seem to be entirely independent of traditional sectors 
and the prevailing socioeconomic conditions. As always, there seems to be a set 
of preconditions. Nevertheless, rural e-commerce clearly offers innovative and 
proven business models that allow third-party online business platforms to work 
productively in a rural setting, creating fresh opportunities for the upgrading of the 
rural economy and better integration into wider markets. 
Government policies
The extraordinary development of rural e-commerce in China is a product of the 
great vitality of e-commerce as a business model, the vast and underserved domestic 
demand, the rapid progress of digital technology—particularly the development 
of digital finance—and a range of other factors. However, it is arguable that this 
extraordinary development would not have occurred had the government not played 
a highly supportive and facilitating role. The rest of this section briefly reviews 
national and subnational policies.
National policies
At the national level, policies related to rural e-commerce development can be 
traced back as far as 2001 when the State Council issued the ‘Framework for 
the Technological Development of Agriculture (2001–2010)’,2 which stressed the 
need to develop agricultural information technology. In response, the Ministry of 
Agriculture issued the tenth Five-Year Plan (2001–05), outlining national policies 
for agricultural and rural economic development.3 Consistent with the State 
Council’s framework, this plan emphasised the acceleration of the building of rural 
economic information systems, the establishment of comprehensive information 
2 The State Council issued the official document in April 2001.
3 The document was issued by the Ministry of Agriculture in July 2001. 
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networks for agriculture and the further expansion and completion of information 
networks for the marketing of agricultural products. In the same year, both 
the Ministry of Technology and the Ministry of Finance issued plans to promote the 
development of information networks in rural areas. These policies set the scene for 
many subsequent policies focused on promoting the development of agricultural 
information networks. Many other national-level organisations also responded with 
specific policies to promote agricultural development through informatisation. 
In 2006, the ‘No. 1 Central Document’ that outlined the annual strategic 
priorities for the country made clear the agenda for the development of rural 
informatisation. This was immediately followed by the release of the National 
Strategy of Informatisation (2006–20), in which specific goals were announced for 
the development of internet coverage and information services and systems to serve 
the rural population and agriculture. It is fair to say the central government attached 
great importance to rural informatisation and, in response, various line ministries 
and institutions crafted a wide range of policies to achieve this goal. 
Between 2006 and 2013, the national government set a policy agenda that laid out 
the necessary foundations for rural e-commerce to take root in China, including 
building and improving the logistics industry, encouraging traditional businesses 
to engage in online operations, improving the e-commerce environment and 
developing related service industries. In 2007, the central policymaking agency, the 
National Development and Reform Commission and the Information Office of the 
State Council jointly issued the first national plan for e-commerce development, 
the ‘E-Commerce 11th Five-Year Plan’. This plan identified two focal points for 
development: promoting the coverage and intensity of e-commerce applications 
and strengthening the development of e-commerce service industries. In addition, 
a supportive environment, more technical innovation, effective rules and regulations 
as well as education and public promotion were identified as four important areas to 
lend fundamental support to e-commerce development. It is also worth mentioning 
the Broadband China Strategy and Implementation Plan announced by the State 
Council in 2013. It charted a clear technical path, schedule and milestones as well 
as supportive measures, which were combined with an additional series of policies 
aimed at improving e-commerce credit systems and electronic payment processes 
as well as transaction security, allowing rural e-commerce development to gather 
further momentum. 
Over the past five years, rural e-commerce has become increasingly important. 
In  2014,  the expansion of e-commerce to the countryside was set as a national 
policy priority in its own right to promote rural economic development, alleviate 
rural poverty and reduce rural–urban economic disparity. In early 2015, the 
Poverty Alleviation Office of the State Council listed ‘Poverty Alleviation through 
E-Commerce’ as one of the key projects for targeted poverty reduction. Given 
that China set eradicating poverty by 2020 as a national goal, it is evident the 
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central government has great expectations for rural e-commerce as an effective 
means of income generation in economically backward areas. The degree of policy 
significance attached to rural e-commerce was even more pronounced in 2017 
when, for the first time, the ‘No. 1 Central Document’ dedicated an entire section 
to accelerating the development of rural e-commerce. Subsequently, in the ‘Opinion 
on the Implementation of the Rural Revitalisation Strategy’ of 2018, the central 
government outlined a clear plan for the implementation of rural e-commerce 
development, which indicated that e-commerce was expected to play a major role 
in promoting rural socioeconomic development, eradicating rural poverty and 
revitalising the countryside. 
Local policies
At the subnational level, most of the policies that actively promote the development 
of rural e-commerce were crafted and implemented over the past five years. This 
is in line with the greater importance placed on rural e-commerce by the central 
government. The State Council’s ‘Opinion on Further Developing E-Commerce 
and Fostering New Driving Forces of the Economy’ provided the defining impetus 
for subnational—particularly county-level—governments to devise specific policies 
to promote local e-commerce development. 
While policies rolled out by county-level governments vary from one locality to 
another, a central element is their compatibility with the existing conditions and their 
clear focus on rural e-commerce development. We use Wuyi county as an example 
to illustrate the range of policies that can be devised by county governments. Wuyi is 
a small, typical rural county in central Zhejiang Province that has traditionally relied 
on agriculture. Due to its mountainous location, transportation infrastructure was 
underdeveloped and the county was economically backward and poverty-stricken. 
However, the development of rural e-commerce has turned it into a successful 
example of how this sort of development can promote growth and help transform 
the countryside. In 2018, six new Taobao villages and one new Taobao township 
emerged, and the GMV of Wuyi exceeded RMB11.6 billion—a 30 per cent increase. 
Over the years, the Wuyi County Government has issued a wide range of policies 
that can be summarised into four areas. First, a designated organisation was 
established with a full-time staff and authority to craft and implement e-commerce 
policies. Second, the county government invited independent consultants to 
draft a five-year plan for the development of Wuyi’s e-commerce. The expertise of 
independent professionals provided valuable guidance over the strategies for and 
direction of e-commerce development. Third, the county government offered 
a range of supports for e-commerce startups. For example, it allocated RMB15 
million as an annual grant to fund e-commerce activities, while an e-commerce 
service centre and association and e-commerce industrial parks were established to 
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lend support to online businesses. Fourth, the county government mobilised the 
media and organised public events to popularise the idea of e-commerce, promote 
entrepreneurs and create a favourable environment for related innovation. 
In addition, the Wuyi County Government built up a coordinated service mechanism, 
including township and village-level governments, so e-commerce businesses can 
receive support at all stages of development. For instance, one county-level logistics 
centre is in Wuyi and an additional 18 township-level branches and 398 village-
level service stations have spread to all corners of the county, forming a network to 
facilitate the operation of e-commerce. 
To take advantage of the positive spillover effects and economies of scale, Wuyi 
has made significant efforts to foster the creation of Taobao villages. The county 
government first identified promising projects in particular villages and provided 
facilities, such as incubators, to help them take shape. Successful individuals would 
then inspire others to emulate them and become involved in rural e-commerce. For 
example, Louwang was the first Taobao village in Wuyi county. It was started by one 
individual, selling electronic tools online. With the support of the local e-commerce 
office, the business expanded and a large number of villagers and returned migrants 
began to participate in other e-commerce activities, bringing genuine returns to the 
community. In 2018, the total value of online retailing in Louwang amounted to 
RMB200 million and the average annual villagers’ income reached RMB30,000. 
Louwang village has since been recognised as one of the top 10 specialised Taobao 
villages in Zhejiang Province. 
Implications
Since the mid-2000s, China has experienced exceptional growth in rural 
e-commence and has established a rich digital ecosystem, expanding beyond just a 
few large companies. The development of rural e-commerce—by accessing highly 
integrated markets via online platforms—is expected to bring significant economic 
advantages, not least inclusive growth, poverty alleviation and inequality reduction. 
Motivated by such desirable potential, the Chinese Government not only allowed 
space for digital companies to experiment, but also introduced a wide range of 
policies and projects to improve the country’s internet infrastructure to promote the 
development of e-commerce. Today, China has become a significant investor in and 
consumer of digital technologies. 
One area with important policy implications for other developing countries is the 
role of rural e-commerce as an effective tool to combat poverty. Since 2014, 756 
counties have been recognised by the national government as model counties for their 
introduction of e-commerce into the countryside. Among these, 60 per cent (499) 
are rated poverty-stricken counties by national standards. By 2017, 832 nationally 
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declared poverty-stricken counties had engaged in e-commerce and the transaction 
value increased by 52.1 per cent, totalling RMB120.8 billion. However, despite the 
exciting development of e-commerce in rural China, numerous challenges remain 
before its potential to address rural poverty is fully realised. 
To start with, there are different causes of poverty—for example, unfavourable 
geography, underdeveloped infrastructure or lack of labour and human capital. A 
common feature of such areas is weak business infrastructure, which manifests itself 
in a number of ways, all of which translate into concrete obstacles to the development 
of e-commerce. For example, many of these areas are endowed with high-quality 
agricultural products; however, their production is often uncoordinated and output 
is subject to much uncertainty due to weather and other factors, and is therefore 
unstable. Due to their remote location, these types of poverty-stricken areas face 
exceedingly high transportation and warehousing costs and low-quality internet 
services. Statistics show that the cost of logistics is at least four times higher for villages 
in western China than for those in the coastal region. Another important factor is 
human capital. Most talent is attracted to economically developed areas, where they 
can enjoy higher incomes. Poorer areas therefore routinely experience a shortage of 
skilled labour to operate online businesses and related services. The  relatively low 
levels of education in these areas also make training less effective. The absence of 
expertise in branding, marketing and retail limits sales. Consequently, the income 
effects and positive externalities of e-commerce do not automatically lead to a 
reduction in poverty. 
To better unleash the potential of e-commerce, a number of policy implications can be 
drawn from the development experiences so far. First, leadership and accountability 
are important. As the experience of Wuyi county demonstrates, the formation of a 
designated governmental body like its e-commerce development office—with full-
time staff and appropriate authority and funding support—is key to e-commerce 
policymaking and development. Second, it seems the first-mover effects are critical 
in the expansion of e-commerce. The example provided by successful individuals is 
powerful and can inspire others. Therefore, it is useful to identify a small number 
of promising projects and focus limited resources on fostering these projects. 
Third, logistics, warehousing, transport and internet connectivity are particularly 
important for underdeveloped rural areas. Only by effectively reducing the costs of 
trade can the benefits of access to the entire domestic market through online trading 
platforms be realised. Lastly, for the above three areas to work, training, education 
and funding support are needed. In this regard, governments at all levels will need 
to be decisive and innovative in crafting policies to address the shortage of talent and 
funding for rural e-commerce development. 
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8. Innovation of Chinese listed 
enterprises: Evaluation and policies1
Zhongyu Ma, Huiqing Gao, Weihua Yin and Zhichao Wen
At the end of 2012, the report of the eighteenth National Congress of the 
Communist Party of China proposed that, by 2020, China would become one of 
the most innovative countries in the world. This was the first time such a goal had 
been set since China’s period of reform and opening-up began; it was also the first 
time in the thousands of years of China’s history.
Over the years, the Chinese Government has carried out reforms designed to 
delegate power to enterprises, streamline administration and optimise government 
services, to promote large-scale entrepreneurship and encourage cultural and 
educational innovation. As a result, an atmosphere of innovation has taken hold in 
Chinese society; the innovation system has been continuously improved, levels of 
innovation have been growing and new modes of business have emerged. According 
to the 2018 Global Innovation Index, published by the World Intellectual Property 
Organization (WIPO), Cornell University and other institutions, mainland China 
has moved up five positions to seventeenth place since 2017. This is the first time 
mainland China has featured in the top 20—signalling that it is becoming one of 
the world’s most innovative economies.
Behind the rapid improvement of China’s overall innovative competency is the 
improvement of the innovative competency of Chinese companies, with listed 
companies the main force of company innovation and development. With the help 
of ‘big data’ technology, China has built a system to evaluate technological and 
model innovation competency, which is the first integrated system anywhere that 
integrates technological and model innovation competency in one index. The results 
of the evaluation show that, although China’s national innovation competency is 
ranked among the top 20 in the world, Chinese listed companies are generally 
in the preliminary stages of innovation and development, and the potential for 
future progress is great.
It can be foreseen that, with the continuous implementation of innovation-driven 
strategies, Chinese companies will gradually become the main body driving 
innovation, and the national science and technological innovation system will 
be greatly improved. In addition, the goal of China becoming one of the most 
innovative countries in the world by 2030, as well as establishing a world-class 
innovation centre by 2050, can be achieved.
1  Based on the data of listed enterprises in 2017.
The Chinese Economic Transformation
144
Theories and methods
Drawing on previous theoretical findings and considering the characteristics 
of innovation, we propose a method to establish the first index evaluation system 
for listed companies’ technological and model innovation competency.
Relevant theories of evaluation of listed 
companies’ innovation
Two basic theories
Theory of innovation ecology
According to theory, a sound innovation ecosystem should include the following 
components. First, a broad awareness and culture of innovation in the society, strict 
property rights and an intellectual property protection system, transparent business 
rules, fair market order and a complete mechanism for talent flow. Second, it must 
provide resources for education, scientific research, talent and capital to meet the 
needs of innovative companies. Third, it must produce a mechanism that promotes 
effective and integrative development of policies, production, learning and research, 
as well as advancing the role of the government and the market in resource allocation, 
accelerating industrialisation of scientific and technological achievements and 
maximising the realisation of economic and social benefits. Fourth, the government 
must pay close attention to innovation in economic development and, according to 
the needs at different stages of innovation and development, carry out policymaking 
and strategic planning to effectively promote innovation.
Theory of innovation competency
The innovation competency of companies is their ability to achieve innovation, 
improvement and advancement in all aspects of production and operation. 
It comprises the following six competencies:
1. Innovation input competency, which refers to the quantity and quality 
of the resources invested in a company’s innovation activities, which is, 
in turn, the  basis of that company’s innovation activities. According to the 
internationally accepted method, company innovation input is divided into 
research and development (R&D) input and non–R&D input.
2. Innovation of R&D competency, which is a key factor influencing a company’s 
innovation, including its competency of R&D in terms of creating new 
technology and new products.
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3. Market innovation competency—that is, any innovative activity must ultimately 
be recognised by the market and be commercialised, so that all innovation 
input can be transformed into real economic and social benefits. This includes 
the competence to marketise new products and to adopt new technologies to 
transform existing markets.
4. Organisational innovation competency, which mainly includes the innovation 
competencies of the organisational system and function, the organisational 
management system and its rules and regulations.
5. Innovation of motivation competency, which helps stimulate a company’s 
desire for innovation and encourages it to make this a reality. This competency 
can encourage employees to take the initiative and be forward-looking in their 
approach to innovation.
6. Innovation output competency, which refers to the capability to reduce 
costs, create markets and generate revenue through technological innovation, 
demonstrating the economic benefits and technological advances brought 
by such innovation.
Two basic forms of innovation
The term ‘technological innovation’ in this chapter refers to innovative activities 
in which new technologies are researched and developed; these technologies are 
directly utilised to establish new processes and produce new products. The term 
‘model innovation’ refers to the innovative activities in which new models of 
production (excluding the establishment of new processes), organisational models 
and business models are researched and developed. Based on these definitions and 
the comparison of various international methods of innovation classification, we 
believe that almost all forms of innovation can be categorised as one of three types: 
1) technological innovation, 2) model innovation or 3) hybrid innovation, which 
combines the first two types of innovation.
Construction of an evaluation index for innovation 
competency of listed companies in China
Drawing on the above theories and the research findings of similar projects 
in China, this chapter is a response to the need to promote the innovation and 
development of Chinese listed companies. Moreover, this chapter establishes, with 
the support of big data technology, the first evaluation index for Chinese listed 
companies’ technological and model innovation. The research data mainly comes 
from three sources: the Wind Database (innovation inputs and innovation outputs), 
the Guotaian Database (technological innovation patent) and data mining from 
annual reports and announcements of listed companies (innovation environment, 
technological innovation, model innovation).
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Composition of the index
The innovation index system of Chinese listed companies consists of five major 
sectors: the innovation environment, innovation inputs, technological innovation, 
model innovation and innovation outputs. It should be noted that in this framework, 
technological innovation and model innovation are regarded as the intermediate 
processes between innovation input and innovation output.
Table 8.1 Index system of technological and model innovation competency 
of listed companies
Primary indicator Secondary indicator
Innovation environment Industry–university–research innovation alliance
Innovative culture
Innovation incentive mechanism
Innovation inputs R&D investment quantity and intensity
Number and proportion of R&D personnel
Government funding for innovation
Technological innovation Number of patents (including application and authorisation)
Technological innovation awards
New product quantity and proportion
Model innovation Innovative organisation
New marketing and new business




The system consists of five primary indicators: innovation environment, innovation 
inputs, technological innovation, model innovation and innovation outputs 
(Table  8.1). First, all secondary indicators of one primary indicator are non-
dimensionalised. The value of the secondary indicators and their associated weights 
are calculated according to the weighted average formula to obtain a score for 
the primary indicator. The score for each primary indicator is then weighted and 
averaged again to obtain an overall score for the index.
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Evaluation of innovation competency of listed 
companies in China
Among industries in China, the most active and competitive companies are 
domestic listed companies. Therefore, evaluation of the innovation competency of 
listed companies in China can provide a good picture of the structural distribution 
and overall trend of China’s innovation competency.
Overall analysis of innovation competency
Innovation competency of listed companies is generally low
China’s securities market has long been oriented towards finance, and there is 
no effective incentive mechanism for company innovation and development. 
In addition, the lag in the reform of the securities market system has seen many 
internet innovation companies, represented by ‘BAT’,2 target overseas markets. 
The innovation competency of listed companies in China is generally weak and the 
total innovation competency score in the index is currently 43.94 (Table 8.2).
Most listed companies in China are in the preliminary stage 
of innovation and development
The innovation and development of listed companies in China reveal a development 
trend of ‘relatively high input and relatively low output’.
Table 8.2 Innovation competency index of listed companies in China, 2017















Overall 43.94 53.42 45.8 40.77 39.09 40.61
The scores for the technological innovation index, model innovation index and 
innovation output index of listed companies in China are significantly smaller than 
that of the innovation input index, which has a twofold importance: first, most 
of the listed companies in China are still in the preliminary stages of innovation, 
marked by high inputs, and only a few companies have entered the later innovation 
stage marked by high benefits. Second, there is a relatively low conversion efficiency 
of China’s listed companies’ innovation inputs. In the future, as China increases 
innovation inputs, it must also pay more attention to increasing the conversion 
efficiency of these inputs.
2 ‘BAT’ is the acronym formed by the names of the three major Chinese internet companies: Baidu, Alibaba 
and Tencent.
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Analysis of innovation competency according to region
Innovation activities of listed companies in China are highly 
concentrated in the east
The regional distribution of China’s top 500 companies in terms of innovation 
competency shows there are more innovative companies in the east and fewer in 
the west of the country. Among the top 500 companies, more than 80 per cent 
are in the east. The numbers of listed companies in the central, western and north-
eastern regions account for 11.4 per cent, 6.2 per cent and 2 per cent, respectively, 





Figure 8.1 Distribution of top 500 listed enterprises for innovation capability 
in China, 2017
Source: Authors’ calculation.
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Spatial distribution of innovation competency by municipality 
and province takes a gradient descent 
The provinces and municipalities with a total innovation competency score of 
63 or above are identified as the ‘first echelon’ (Table 8.3). Those in the first echelon 
have strong innovation competency and include Beijing, Guangdong Province, 
Zhejiang Province, Shanghai, Jiangsu Province, Fujian Province and Shandong 
Province.
The provinces and municipalities with a total innovation competency score of 53–63 
form the ‘second echelon’, and their innovation competency is relatively strong. The 
second echelon includes 14 provinces and municipalities: Sichuan Province, Hubei 
Province, Anhui Province, Henan Province, Hunan Province, Liaoning Province, 
Tianjin, Hebei Province, Chongqing, Shaanxi Province, Jiangxi Province, Guizhou 
Province, Jilin Province and Yunnan Province.
The provinces and municipalities with a total innovation competency score of 
53 or less  are  identified as the ‘third echelon’, and their innovation competency is 
relatively weak. The third echelon includes 10 provinces and municipalities: Xinjiang 
Uygur Autonomous Region, Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region, Heilongjiang 
Province, Gansu Province, Shanxi Province, Hainan Province, Inner Mongolia 
Autonomous Region, Tibet Autonomous Region, Qinghai Province and Ningxia 
Hui Autonomous Region.
The gradient distribution makes it obvious that innovation competency follows 
a  descending pattern from eastern China to the central and then the western 
regions. All provinces and municipalities in the first echelon are in eastern China. 
The majority of places in the second echelon are in the central region, while in 
the third echelon—except for Hainan Province and Heilongjiang Province—all 
provinces and municipalities are in the west.
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Analysis of innovation competency according to industry
High-tech manufacturing industries and modern service industries 
have strong innovation competency, and traditional industries 
have relatively weaker innovation competency
According to the comparative analysis of the overall index of innovation competency, 
industries with a higher total innovation competency index are mainly high-tech 
manufacturing and modern service industries (Table 8.4). Industries with lower 
innovation competency are mainly traditional manufacturing and traditional 
service industries. The innovation competency scores of high-tech manufacturing 
and modern service industries are 48.52 and 48.56, respectively.
Innovation competency scores for traditional manufacturing and service industries 
are 41.96 and 37.07, respectively, which are 6.56 and 11.49 points less than the 
high-tech manufacturing and modern service industries, respectively.
Service industries focus on model innovation and manufacturing 
industries focus on technological innovation
Innovation in service industries is dominated by model innovation. The score for 
the model innovation index of service industries is 3.74 points higher than the 
technological innovation score. The scores for model innovation for information 
transfer, software and information technology services, culture, sports and 
entertainment, leasing and commercial services, finance and board and lodging 
services are 6 points higher than the scores for the technological innovation index.
Innovation in manufacturing industries is dominated by technological innovation. 
The technological innovation index score for manufacturing is 5.17 points higher 
than the model innovation score. The technological innovation index scores for the 
comprehensive utilisation of waste resources, processing of timber, manufacturing 
of wood, bamboo, rattan, palm and straw products, smelting, rolling and pressing of 
ferrous metals and smelting, rolling and pressing of nonferrous metals are 10 points 
higher than their model innovation scores.
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Conclusions
Chinese company innovation is still in the early stage 
of development
The process of company innovation and development consists of an early high-
input stage and a late high-yield stage. At the end of 2017, China’s strategy for 
innovation-driven development had been in operation for only five years, and the 
innovation and development of Chinese companies remain in the early stages. The 
innovation competency of listed companies is generally low, which is in line with 
the general trend of innovation and development. The evaluation results show 
that, with the implementation of the innovation-driven strategy, the continuous 
promotion of the government’s reforms to delegate power, streamline administration 
and optimise government services and to promote large-scale entrepreneurship 
and innovation have led to significant improvements in the external environment 
for the innovation and development of Chinese companies. This has laid a robust 
foundation for the sustainable and sound development of company innovation.
It should be noted that the level of innovation and development of Chinese 
companies is due mainly to a small number of leading companies, while the 
innovation competency of most listed companies can, and should, be improved. 
A favourable pattern in which leading companies help smaller ones so as to achieve 
coordinated development has not yet been established.
Distribution of China’s listed companies according to 
innovation competency follows a gradient descent 
This study shows that, compared with the traditional factor-driven economy, 
an innovation-driven economy can lead to a concentration of resources. China’s 
eastern region has the advantage of many resources—such as talent, capital, 
culture, internationalisation, reform and opening-up—and has become an area of 
concentration for Chinese company innovation and development. Among the top 
500 innovative companies, those in the east account for 80 per cent of the total, with 
44.6 per cent in Guangdong and Beijing alone. Guangdong and Beijing have assumed 
leading positions in company innovation and development on a national scale.
At the same time, the central region has become the main area for industrial transfer 
from the east and is strongly influenced by innovation activities in the eastern 
region. The central region has relatively good resources in terms of talent, capital and 
culture, and its innovation competency is ranked second in the country. In contrast, 
the mid-west and north-east regions have relatively few innovative resources, and 
therefore overall company innovation competency is weak.
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Active innovation in high-tech manufacturing and 
modern service industries
Company innovation activities are often carried out based on new technologies and 
models of operation. In recent years, to accelerate the upgrading and transformation 
of China’s industrial structure, the central government has implemented a number of 
supporting policies that have effectively promoted the innovation and development 
of China’s high-tech manufacturing industries and modern service industries. 
Among these industries, information transfer, software and information technology 
services, the manufacturing of computers, communication equipment and other 
electronic equipment, the manufacturing of electrical machinery and equipment, 
the manufacturing of special equipment and pharmaceutical manufacturing have 
become the five major innovative industries.
Comments on innovation policies for firms 
in China
In China, the rudiments of capitalism were already evident as long ago as the Song 
Dynasty. In the Ming Dynasty, there was a large-scale coal industry, which included 
exploration for and utilisation of natural gases, and a rather advanced iron and steel 
industry, which had already solved technical problems around the casting of iron and 
steel that Europeans were not able to figure out until the nineteenth century. However, 
the Industrial Revolution did not take place in China. The key reason was the long-
term suppression of Chinese entrepreneurs’ innovative spirit throughout history. 
In September 2017, the State Council issued a policy document entitled ‘Opinions 
Regarding Making a Healthy Growing Environment for Entrepreneurs, Spreading 
Excellent Entrepreneurial Spirit and Better Exercising Entrepreneurs’ Roles’. The 
chairman of the board of Alibaba Group noted that this document marked ‘a great 
leap forward in thinking since 2,000 years ago in China’ (Sina Technology 2017). 
This document and the gradual introduction of relevant supporting policies will 
undoubtedly shape China’s future development.
To encourage enterprise innovation, the Chinese Government has over the years 
issued hundreds of relevant policies, with the number reaching the tens of thousands 
when coupled with policies introduced by local governments. These policies can be 
grouped into the following categories:
1. Increasing efforts to protect intellectual property and establish and perfect the 
legal system governing intellectual property.
2. Promoting reforms to delegate power, streamline administration and optimise 
government services, and build a market environment in which entrepreneurs 
can compete fairly. Propelling the system of negative listing of market access 
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and guaranteeing that all kinds of market subjects can legally and equally 
enter industries, fields and services outside the negative list. Opposing local 
protectionism, revising local regulations that hinder fair competition and 
establishing a unified market that allows the free flow of production factors. 
3. Encouraging local governments to be bold and establishing a mechanism that 
tolerates mistakes and is adventurous.
4. Promoting close cooperation between universities, research institutes and 
enterprises, integrating three-party resources, improving innovation capacities 
and increasing the conversion efficiency of technological achievements.
5. Establishing and perfecting service platform systems that support entrepreneurial 
innovation. There are more than 5,500 maker spaces in China, along with more 
than 4,000 high-tech business incubators and over 970 innovation and startup 
platforms built by central government enterprises.
6. Some 120 innovation and startup model bases have been established. Through 
exploration and practise, successes can be promoted nationwide.
7. Boosting the construction of an innovation mechanism that involves cooperation 
between large, medium and small enterprises. Through an industry chain, these 
enterprises can co-establish innovation platforms, open innovation resources 
and engage in cooperative innovation activities.
8. Increasing efforts to support innovation-based enterprises in terms of finance 
and taxation policies and offering favourable fiscal terms to these enterprises. 
9. Broadening the direct financing channels of innovation-based enterprises, 
and prioritising bond issues, financing and public offerings of medium and 
small tech enterprises.
As can be seen, to effectively promote the innovative development of enterprises, 
the Chinese Government has not only offered innovation-based enterprises taxation 
and financial support, but also introduced a series of supportive legal, social and 
administrative policies. These efforts have yielded remarkable results. 
Based on various local surveys, there are two major flaws in the policies aimed at 
encouraging entrepreneurial innovation in China. The first is that some policies 
have not yet been fully formulated, such as the imperfect system of intellectual 
property protection. And the second is that some policies are not completely 
implemented due to various interruptions. These problems are bound to occur in 
the development process of a transitional country. Along with the continual and 
thorough implementation of innovation-driven strategies, these problems will 
gradually be effectively alleviated or resolved. 
With the perfecting of the policy system that supports entrepreneurial innovation, 
Chinese enterprises will move from the early innovation stage of high investment 
to the late stage of high yields. This is the main reason the innovation of Chinese 
enterprises enjoys a rosy prospect.
The Chinese Economic Transformation
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9. The effects of financial sector 
opening on financial constraints 
in China
Liqing Zhang, Yan Zhang and Zhixiao Dong
As the threat of a Sino–US trade war continues, China has made new moves towards 
financial services liberalisation.1 In his speech to the seventeenth Boao Forum in 
April 2018, Chinese President Xi Jinping announced a plan to further liberalise 
China’s financial markets. The Governor of the People’s Bank of China, Gang Yi, 
promulgated details of policies to open up the financial services sector, including 
removal of restrictions on foreign ownership of banks and asset management 
companies. China is determined to liberalise its financial services sector at this 
critical stage in its broader opening-up and domestic reforms. 
There is considerable evidence that financial constraints are a key impediment 
to investment and the efficiency and growth of firms (Stein 2003; Li and Huang 
2015). This is particularly important in developing countries such as China, where 
imperfections in capital markets remain. Financial constraints can arise from various 
sources. The literature identifies information asymmetries and agency problems 
as the most important factors influencing the allocation of financial resources to 
firms. Our chapter revisits the relationship between financial service liberalisation 
and financial constraints in China. We aim to investigate whether the financial 
constraints on Chinese firms have eased with financial sector liberalisation and 
through what channels financial sector openness has an impact.
Empirical studies of the effects of financial sector opening on developing countries 
have produced ambiguous results and are therefore not helpful in providing any 
clear policy guidelines. A transitional economy such as China’s inherits from its 
previous central-planning phase a repressed financial system in which active 
directed credit programs channelled funds at a subsidised price to large state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs). Financial sector opening and the entry of foreign financial 
institutions—aimed at phasing out these practices—are expected to lead to more 
efficient allocation of funds to business. 
1 There are two aspects of financial liberalisation: financial sector opening and financial market liberalisation. 
In  this chapter, we focus only on financial sector, which includes the banking services, insurance and 
securities sectors.
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Our chapter first reviews the policies of China’s financial sector opening. And, by 
using a foreign direct investment (FDI) restrictiveness index as an exogenous policy 
measure of China’s financial services sector and a Chinese regional input–output 
table, we calculate China’s financial sector opening with variations according to 
region, industry and year. By using the panel data for listed firms for 2010–15, 
four indices are used to measure China’s firm-level financial constraints through 
internal and external finance channels. We then examine how financial liberalisation 
in China alleviates the financing constraints on Chinese firms.
We find that financial sector opening can significantly reduce the financial constraints 
on enterprises, mainly through external financing—especially bank credit. Opening 
of the financial sector will encourage enterprises to substitute trade credits with bank 
credits and upgrade their financing structure. By examining heterogeneity effects 
according to firm ownership and return on assets (ROA), we find that financial sector 
opening can eliminate financial discrimination and promote financing efficiency. 
Financial sector opening is most conducive to alleviating the financial constraints 
on private and profitable enterprises. The mechanisms of financial sector opening 
affect financial constraints mainly through collateral channels and by eliminating 
information asymmetry between financial institutions and listed enterprises. 
Section two of this chapter provides a brief literature review. Section three reviews 
the impact of China’s financial sector opening on the bank, insurance and security 
sectors. Measures of China’s financial constraints are contained in section four, while 
sections five and six present and discuss the empirical results, before the final section 
provides a conclusion.
Literature review
Financial sector opening is an important step in the liberalisation of financial 
services—which usually refers to the process by which the operation of a country’s 
financial services sector and the allocation of financial resources gradually cast off 
government regulation and open up to market determination. Williamson and Mahar 
(1998) define the scope of financial liberalisation in six aspects: relaxing financial 
regulations, eliminating loan controls, providing free access to financial services, 
respecting financial institution autonomy, bank privatisation and liberalisation 
of international capital flows. In an ideal market without friction, enterprises can 
choose between internal and external financing without any difference in impact. 
The investment behaviour of an enterprise will not be restricted by its financial 
status and will be related only to its investment needs.
However, in the real economy, due to information asymmetry and principal–
agent problems, financial markets are not completely efficient. Financing costs 
vary considerably, according to whether internal or external financing is chosen. 
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Fazzari et al. (1988) define the difference between external financing costs and 
internal financing costs as the financial constraints on a business. Financial sector 
liberalisation—especially the entry of foreign banking—could reduce information 
asymmetries, promote the market-oriented operation of financial institutions, 
improve financing efficiency and ease firms’ financial constraints.
More empirical research investigates the effects of financial services liberalisation 
on financial constraints, but the results are still not consistent. Some research finds 
positive and significant effects from financial liberalisation on the alleviation of 
firms’ financial constraints, such as Harris et al. (1994), Love (2003), Beck et al. 
(2005), Naeem and Li (2019) and Zhang and Zheng (2019). Early work was 
conducted by Harris et al. (1994), who empirically studied the relationship between 
financial liberalisation and financial constraints in Indonesia from 1981 to 1988. 
They compared conditions before and after financial liberalisation in Indonesia and 
found the external financial costs decreased and financial constraints improved. Love 
(2003) uses Euler’s equation and structural equations to investigate the determinants 
of financial constraints and finds that, after controlling other factors—such as scale 
effects, business cycles and the legal environment—financial liberalisation reduces 
enterprises’ financial constraints. Bekaert et al. (2005) show that liberalisation of 
the stock market will promote real economic growth by 1 per cent per year. Beck 
et al. (2005) find that financial liberalisation has much bigger effects on small firms, 
and financial liberalisation will alleviate financial constraints due to the institutional 
environment, such as laws and levels of corruption. Naeem and Li (2019) argue 
that financial sector reform can alleviate financial constraints and improve 
investment efficiency. Zhang and Zheng (2019) argue that financial constraints 
have significant impacts on innovation and the effects are stronger for non-SOEs 
and foreign-owned enterprises.
Some research—most of which focuses on developing countries—produces results 
with negative or heterogeneous effects. Haramillo et al. (1996) use panel data of 
manufacturing companies for the period 1983–88 in Ecuador and find that the 
country’s financial reforms have no effects on the financial constraints of domestic 
companies. The imperfect development of capital markets has a greater impact on 
small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), but less impact on large enterprises. 
Laeven (2003) shows that financial liberalisation does not reduce financial constraints 
for large firms, and only reduces financial constraints on SMEs in 13 developing 
countries. According to Dell’Ariccia and Marquez (2004), financial liberalisation 
has intensified competition among banks, which has led to a continuous reduction 
in lending rates, making it easier for companies to obtain funds. But this has also 
increased the systemic risk of the entire economy. Koo and Maeng (2005) show 
that, although financial liberalisation can alleviate the financial constraints on 
South Korean companies, it mainly benefits SMEs. For large enterprises, financial 
liberalisation has not brought much improvement.
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Some research has investigated the characteristics of China’s financial markets. 
External (indirect) financing and banking finance are the main financing channels in 
China. Historically in China’s banking sector, all banks were state-owned and credit 
was more inclined to go to SOEs. Non-SOEs face more serious financial constraints 
than their state-owned counterparts. According to Batra et al. (2003), although 
China has the largest banking system in the world, private companies face bigger 
financial constraints than SOEs. Huang (2005) also shows that financial constraints 
are among the biggest hindrance to the development of private companies. After 
its accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001, China accelerated 
its financial liberalisation, gradually liberalising the local currency business of 
foreign banks on the mainland. Lin (2011) uses China’s WTO accession policies to 
investigate the effects on financial constraints and finds that, on average, the entry 
of foreign banks had no significant impact on financial constraints, while different 
types of enterprises were affected differently and those with higher profitability and 
higher ROA as well as private firms were more likely to obtain loans. 
Other studies have tried to explore the effects of financial opening on the performance 
of banks and enterprises. Berger et al. (2009) collected China’s bank data for the 
period 1994–2003 and found that Chinese state-owned banks were less efficient 
than foreign banks. The entry of foreign banks had a positive and significant effect, 
enhancing the efficiency of Chinese domestic banks. Huang (2005) also used this 
policy shock in the banking sector and a difference-in-differences method to study 
its impacts on total factor productivity (TFP). The final regression results show that 
the entry of foreign banks increased the TFP of all enterprises by 2.03 per cent. 
However, the entry of foreign banks reduced the TFP of SOEs and collective 
enterprises and increased the TFP of private enterprises. Meanwhile, Lai et al. (2016) 
find the entry of foreign banks in a certain region had no significant impact on the 
aggregate productivity of that region; companies in that region that relied more on 
financial support in the production process would be better developed. The impact 
of foreign banks on domestic enterprises comes more through the improvement 
of technological upgrading, rather than through efficiency enhancement of the 
redistribution of resources in the region. 
China’s financial sector opening
Financial sector opening has played a very important role in the development of the 
domestic economy and the efficient allocation of production factors. China entered 
the WTO in 2001. The establishment of the China (Shanghai) Pilot Free-Trade 
Zone in 2013 was another key node of China’s financial service liberalisation. With 
2001 and 2013 as the dividing years, we introduce China’s financial sector opening 
policies in two stages after 2001. 
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Development stage (2001–13)
China’s entry to the WTO was a landmark event in bringing China into the 
global economy. It adopted a model of gradual opening and made corresponding 
commitments within the WTO to liberalise its financial institutions such as banks 
and the securities and insurance sectors. 
WTO commitments
Bank services sector
China made a commitment that immediately on its accession to the WTO it would 
allow foreign banks to conduct foreign currency business without any limitations on 
market access or national treatment. Within two years of China’s accession, foreign 
banks were able to conduct domestic currency business with Chinese enterprises, 
subject to certain geographical restrictions. After entry into the WTO in 2001, China 
committed to a five-year phase-in period for foreign banking services. Specifically, 
China would cancel the geographical restrictions on foreign banks gradually over 
five years. The geographical restrictions on Shanghai, Shenzhen, Tianjin and Dalian 
were lifted in 2001, followed later in the same year by those on Guangzhou, Zhuhai, 
Qingdao, Nanjing and Wuhan. The geographical restrictions on Kunming, Beijing 
and Xiamen were lifted before 2003, as were those on Shantou, Ningbo, Shenyang 
and Xi’an the following year. Within five years of China’s accession, foreign banks 
were able to conduct domestic currency business with Chinese enterprises and 
individuals, and all geographical restrictions were lifted (Tables 9.1 and 9.2).
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Foreign financial leasing corporations will be permitted to provide financial leasing 
services at the same time as domestic corporations
1 Unbound except for the following: Provision and transfer of financial information, financial data 
processing and related software by suppliers of other financial services; advisory, intermediation and 
other auxiliary financial services on all activities listed in subparagraphs (a) through (k), including credit 
reference and analysis, investment and portfolio research and advice, advice on acquisitions and on 
corporate restructuring and strategy.
Source: WTO (n.d.).
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Table 9.2 China’s WTO commitments on banking services II
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006




































































Three years of business operation in China and being profitable for two 
consecutive years prior to the application; otherwise, none.
Licensing criteria for 
establishing a subsidiary
Total assets of more than US$10 billion at the end of the year prior 
to filing the application.
Licensing criteria for 
establishing a branch
Total assets of more than US$20 billion at the end of the year prior 
to filing the application.
Licensing criteria for 
establishing a Chinese–
foreign joint bank or a 
Chinese–foreign joint 
finance company
Total assets of more than US$10 billion at the end of the year prior 
to filing the application.
Source: WTO (n.d.).
Insurance services sector
China has also gradually liberalised its insurance sector. According to China’s 
WTO commitment on insurance services, foreign non–life insurance providers are 
permitted to set up a branch or a joint venture in China and may hold a 51 per cent 
equity share of that. Within two years of China’s WTO accession, foreign non–
life insurance providers were permitted to establish whole ownership of a joint 
venture. On accession, large-scale insurance and reinsurance for commercial risk, 
international marine, aviation and transport and joint ventures with foreign equity 
of no more than 50 per cent were permitted; within three years of accession, foreign 
equity shares could increase to 51 per cent; and, within five years of accession, 
wholly foreign-owned subsidiaries were permitted.
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The geographical restrictions on foreign insurance companies were also phased out. 
Relative to the open stage of the banking industry, liberalisation of the insurance 
sector has been relatively brief. In 2003, China released the geographical restrictions 
on Shanghai, Dalian, Shenzhen and Foshan, and, in 2004, on another 10  cities 
(Beijing, Chengdu, Chongqing, Fuzhou, Suzhou, Xiamen, Ningbo, Shenyang, 
Wuhan and Tianjin). All geographical restrictions on foreign insurance companies 
were lifted before 2005 (Tables 9.3 and 9.4).
Table 9.3 China’s WTO commitments on insurance services I
Cross-border supply Consumption 
abroad
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1 None, except for: Foreign insurance institutions shall not engage in the statutory insurance business; 
on accession, a 20 per cent cession of all lines of primary risk for non-life, personal accident and health 
insurance businesses with an appointed Chinese reinsurance company shall be required; one year after 
accession, 15 per cent shall be required; two years after accession, 10 per cent shall be required; and 
three years after accession, 5 per cent shall be required; and four years after accession, no compulsory 
cession shall be required.
Source: WTO (n.d.).






Foreign insurers allowed to 
establish as a branch or as a 
joint venture with 51 per cent 
foreign ownership
Foreign insurers allowed to establish 
as a wholly owned subsidiary
Life 
insurance
Foreign insurers allowed 50 per cent ownership in a joint venture with 
the partner of their choice
Insurance 
brokerage
Joint venture with foreign 
equity of no more than 50 per 
cent allowed
Joint venture with foreign equity 
of 51 per cent allowed
Geographic 
coverage
2003: Shanghai, Guangzhou, 

















Provide ‘master policy’ 
insurance/insurance of large-
scale commercial risk
Provide the full range of non-life 




Provide individual (not group) 
insurance to foreigners and 
Chinese citizens
Provide health insurance, group 
insurance and pension/annuities 
insurance to foreigners and Chinese 
citizens
Reinsurance Provide reinsurance services for life and non-life insurance as a 
branch, joint venture or wholly foreign-owned subsidiary, without 




Investor shall be a foreign insurance company established for more than 30 years 
and a WTO member; shall have had a representative office for two consecutive 
years in China; shall have total assets of more than US$5 billion at the end of the 
year prior to application, except for insurance brokers. 
Total assets requirement 2002: more 
than US$400 
million
2003: more than 
US$300 million




China’s WTO commitments on the securities sector relate mainly to limitations 
on market access: joint ventures are allowed to manage investment funds, but their 
stakes cannot exceed 33 per cent, relaxing three years after accession (Table 9.5).
Table 9.5 China’s WTO commitments on securities
Limitations on market access
Cross-border supply Unbound except for the following: Foreign securities institutions may 
engage directly (without a Chinese intermediary) in B-shares business
Consumption abroad None
Commercial presence Unbound, except for the following: On accession, representative 
offices of foreign securities institutions in China may become ‘special 
members’ of all Chinese stock exchanges
On accession, foreign service suppliers will be permitted to establish 
joint ventures with foreign investment up to 33 per cent to conduct 
domestic securities investment fund management
Within three years of China’s accession, foreign investment shall be 
increased to 49 per cent
Within three years of accession, foreign securities institutions will be 
permitted to establish joint ventures, with foreign minority ownership 
not exceeding one-third, to engage (without a Chinese intermediary) 
in underwriting A shares and in underwriting and trading B and H 
shares as well as government and corporate debt, and launching 
of funds
Criteria for authorisation to deal in China’s financial industry are solely 
prudential (that is, containing no economic needs test or quantitative 
limits on licences)
Presence of natural persons Unbound except as indicated in horizontal commitments
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Relevant policies after WTO accession
Since entering the WTO, China has accelerated the pace of reform in its financial 
sector to comply with its accession commitments, implementing active liberalisation 
policies in the areas of banking, insurance and securities. 
Banking services sector
In line with its WTO commitments on the banking services sector, China published 
its ‘Regulations of the People’s Republic of China on the Administration of Foreign-
Funded Financial Institutions (Amended)’ in December 2001. The geographical and 
customer restrictions on foreign-funded banks’ handling of foreign exchange business 
were cancelled. Foreign banks are allowed to operate foreign exchange business for 
Chinese companies and Chinese residents and also local currency business in four 
cities: Shanghai, Shenzhen, Tianjin and Dalian.
In January 2002, ‘The Rules for Implementing the Regulations of the People’s 
Republic of China on the Administration of Foreign Financial Institutions 
(Amended)’ were published, and in December of the same year, renminbi business 
was opened to foreign banks in five cities: Guangzhou, Qingdao, Zhuhai, Nanjing 
and Wuhan. In December 2003, ‘The Regulations on Equity Investment of 
Foreign Financial Institutions in Chinese Financial Institutions’ was promulgated, 
allowing foreign banks to operate in local currency business in four cities—Jinan, 
Fuzhou, Chengdu and Chongqing—and operate renminbi business for domestic 
enterprises in areas where renminbi business has been opened for local currency 
business. The state-owned commercial banks in China also started to reform their 
shareholding system in the same year.
In 2004 and 2005, foreign banks were allowed to operate local currency business 
in Kunming, Beijing, Xiamen, Shenyang, Xi’an, Shantou, Ningbo, Harbin, 
Changchun, Lanzhou, Yinchuan and Nanning. On 27 October 2005, China 
Construction Bank Corporation was listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. 
Subsequently, the Bank of China and the Industrial and Commercial Bank of 
China were also listed. Finally, in 2006, with the promulgation of the ‘Regulations 
on the Administration of Foreign-Funded Banks’ and their implementation rules, 
the geographical and nonprudential restrictions on foreign investment essentially 
disappeared, the banking sector achieved comprehensive liberalisation and WTO 
commitments were successfully completed.
China continued to maintain an open attitude and expand the operating scope for 
foreign banks. In June 2007, foreign corporate banks with qualifications to operate 
renminbi retail business were allowed to issue bank cards satisfying the Chinese 
bank card business and technical standards, and enjoying the same treatment as 
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Chinese banks. In December 2008, foreign banks were allowed to trade on the 
interbank bond market and underwrite financial bonds and nonfinancial corporate 
debt financing instruments, but they were required to report to the local banking 
regulatory bureau. In June 2010, the ‘Notice on the Relevant Matters Concerning 
the Establishment of Sub-Branches of Foreign-Funded Banks in Cities and Counties 
with High Density of Foreign-Oriented Enterprises’ was issued, allowing foreign-
invested banks to set up branches in the qualifying cities and counties. After China’s 
WTO accession in 2001, the speed of liberalisation for foreign banks improved 
significantly. However, development slowed with the impact of the Global Financial 
Crisis in 2008. As shown in Table 9.6, the number of foreign banks in China is 
constantly expanding.
Table 9.6 Development of foreign banks in China
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Number of 
foreign banks
192 211 254 312 274 311 338 360 387 412
Total assets of 
foreign banks 
(RMB billion)
4,159 5,823 7,155 9,279 12,525 13,448 13,492 17,423 21,535 23,804
Note: The data series starts in 2003 as this is the year the China Banking Regulatory Commission 
began to provide detailed statistics on foreign banks in China.
Source: CBRC (various years).
Insurance services sector
Under China’s WTO accession commitments, the transition period for the 
insurance services sector was only three years, which was shorter than that for 
the banking sector. At the same time as China entered the WTO, in December 
2001, the ‘Regulations of the People’s Republic of China on the Administration 
of Foreign-Invested Insurance Companies’ were announced by the State Council. 
China’s insurance sector has since entered a new era of comprehensive reform and 
liberalisation.
On 11 December 2004, China liberalised the operations of foreign-invested 
insurance companies, allowing foreign life insurance companies to provide health 
insurance, group insurance and pension/annuity insurance business, and cancelling 
geographical restrictions on the establishment of foreign-invested insurance 
institutions. The proportion of foreign equity in insurance brokerage companies 
can now exceed 51 per cent. 
In the life insurance sector, foreign ownership is restricted to a maximum of 
50  per  cent. Apart from the market entry restrictions on non–life insurance 
businesses, the geographical restrictions and business scope have been gradually 
liberalised after China’s accession to WTO, the ratio of statutory reinsurance will 
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be reduced by 5 per cent every year until cancelled. The insurance sector was the 
first of the financial sectors to liberalise. Since 2005, except for foreign ownership 
restrictions (to a maximum of 50 per cent), foreign insurance companies have 
enjoyed national treatment basically. In 2012, China and the United States signed the 
‘Joint Statement on Strengthening Sino–US Economic Relations’, which liberalised 
compulsory liability insurance for motor vehicle accidents and has already surpassed 
China’s WTO commitments.
After China entered the WTO, its insurance services sector experienced stable 
and rapid development (Table 9.7). The proportion of foreign capital in China’s 
insurance sector has remained about 5 per cent.
Table 9.7 Development of foreign insurance companies
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Number of head offices 40 41 43 48 52 53 51 52
Number of provincial 
branches
47 67 90 117 150 168 360 212
Source: NBS (various years[a]).
Security services sector
After China’s accession to the WTO, the representative office of a foreign securities 
institution in China could apply for special membership of Chinese stock exchanges. 
Foreign-invested institutions were allowed to set up joint venture securities companies 
and foreign securities institutions could directly engage in B-share transactions.
In July 2002, the ‘Rules for the Establishment of Foreign-Funded Securities 
Companies’ were implemented to clarify the conditions and procedures for the 
establishment of foreign-invested securities companies and to stipulate the scope 
of their business. The rules stipulated that ‘the proportion of shares held by foreign 
shareholders (the proportion of equity held by a shared securities company) should 
not exceed one-third’. In 2012, the maximum limit on foreign capital in joint 
venture securities companies was increased to 49 per cent.
In October 2002, the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) promulgated 
the ‘Measures for the Administration of the Acquisition of Listed Companies’ and 
the ‘Measures for the Administration of Information Disclosure of Shareholders’ 
Changes in Listed Companies’. Foreign-invested companies were allowed to 
participate in the merger and acquisition of listed companies. In November 2002, 
the CSRC and the People’s Bank of China jointly promulgated the ‘Interim 
Measures for the Administration of Domestic Securities Investment by Qualified 
Foreign Institutional Investors’, introducing qualified foreign institutional investors 
(QFII) into the Chinese securities market, taking effect in July 2003. The first QFII, 
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UBS Securities Asia Limited, placed an order to buy four A shares, marking the 
first step for foreign investment to enter the Chinese A-share market. In June 2007, 
the CSRC issued the ‘Pilot Measures for the Administration of Overseas Securities 
Investment by Qualified Domestic Institutional Investors’ and related notices. 
In 2011, the Renminbi Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors (RQFII) scheme 
was launched, based on the QFII scheme.
Accelerated stage (2013 – today)
The establishment of the China (Shanghai) Pilot Free-Trade Zone in 2013 was not 
only an important measure in the liberalisation of the financial services sector, but 
also indicated that China’s service industry had entered a new stage. 
Banking services sector
In September 2014, the ‘Implementation Measures for Administrative Licensing of 
Foreign-Invested Banks’ were promulgated, unifying the market access standards 
for Chinese and foreign banks. In addition, the regulations requiring foreign banks 
to apply to establish branches one at a time were cancelled, and the minimum 
requirements for working capital for a sub-branch were cancelled. In November 
2014, the ‘Regulations on the Administration of Foreign-Invested Banks’ were 
amended to allow foreign banks, Sino–foreign joint venture banks and foreign bank 
branches to engage in bond trading on the interbank market in accordance with the 
business scope approved by the China Banking Regulatory Commission.
In July 2017, the ‘Measures for Administrative Licensing of Chinese Commercial 
Banks’ were revised, further relaxing the threshold for foreign banks to invest in 
Chinese banks. On 24 February 2018, the ‘Measures for Administrative Licensing of 
Foreign-Invested Banks (Revised)’ stipulated that the procedures for the establishment 
and mergers of sub-branches shall be reviewed, and only the approval of the opening 
of branches shall be retained. On the same day, the ‘Measures for Administrative 
Licensing of Foreign-Funded Banks (Revised)’ stipulated that ‘foreign-invested legal 
banks and joint venture banks in China may invest in Chinese financial institutions’, 
abolishing the relevant restrictions in the 2003 measures. As shown in Table 9.8, after 
2013, the number of foreign-invested banks continued to grow.
Table 9.8 Development of foreign banks, 2013–17
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Number of foreign banks 419 437 464 475 483
Total assets of foreign 
banks (RMB billion)
25,577 27,921 26,820 29,286 32,438
Source: CBRC (various years).
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Insurance services sector
In September 2013, the Shanghai Free-Trade Zone was officially listed and the 
China Pacific Insurance (Group) and Public Insurance became the first enterprises 
to settle in the new zone. In September 2014, Shanghai Life Insurance received 
approval from the China Insurance Regulatory Commission to raise funds. There 
are plans to expand the foreign currency policy and other businesses in the free-trade 
zone in future.
Shanghai Life Insurance was the first national insurance company approved after 
the promulgation of the ‘Opinions of the State Council on Accelerating the 
Development of the Modern Insurance Services Industry’. It was also the first legal 
personal finance institution registered in the Shanghai Free-Trade Zone. On 30 May 
2018, the ‘Regulations on the Administration of Foreign-Invested Insurance 
Companies (Draft for Comment)’ were proposed, stipulating that the maximum 
for foreign-invested shares in joint venture life insurance companies should be 
increased to 51 per cent, relaxing the stipulation in the 2004 ‘Foreign Investment 
Insurance Company Regulations’ that ‘the proportion of foreign-invested shares in 
joint venture life insurance companies must not exceed 50 per cent’.
After 2013, the number and assets of foreign-invested insurance companies 
continued to grow, but the scale of foreign-invested companies remained relatively 
stable (Table 9.9). 
Table 9.9 Number of Sino–foreign joint venture insurance institutions, 2013–17
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Number of head offices 55 57 57 57 57
Provincial branches 224 276 304 327 354
Total assets of foreign-
invested insurance companies 
(RMB100 m)
82,886.95 101,591.47 123,597.76 153,764.66 169,377.32
Source: NBS (various years[a]).
Securities services sector
In May 2014, the State Council issued the ‘Opinions on Further Promoting the 
Healthy Development of the Capital Market’, which outlined the overall plan for 
cross-border investment and financing, liberalisation of the securities and futures 
sectors and strengthening of cross-border supervision and coordination. On 28 April 
2018, the ‘Administrative Measures for Foreign-Invested Securities Companies’ 
provided new regulations for foreign-invested securities companies, deleting the 
shareholder requirements that the proportion of foreign-owned shares not exceed 
China’s WTO commitments, and stipulating that the restriction of foreign-invested 
shares to 51 per cent would be relaxed in three years.
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Measures of financial sector opening
FDI regulatory restrictiveness index
The FDI regulatory restrictiveness index (FDIR index) gauges the restrictiveness 
of a country’s FDI rules by looking at the four main types of restrictions on FDI: 
1) foreign equity limitations; 2) discriminatory screening or approval mechanisms; 
3) restrictions on the employment of foreigners as key personnel; and 4) other 
operational restrictions—for example, restrictions on branching, capital repatriation 
or landownership by foreign-owned enterprises. Restrictions are evaluated on 
a scale from 0 (open) to 1 (closed). Financial sector opening was measured based 
on this index, covering financial sectors and three subsectors of banking, insurance 
and securities. The FDI index is drawn from the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD) database.
As shown in Figure 9.1, China’s total FDI index and financial services FDIR index 
decreased over time, indicating that China was continuing to liberalise its markets. 
After joining the WTO in 2001, China accelerated its opening-up. After 2013, the 
FDIR index began to decline rapidly, while the financial services sector declined 
relatively slowly. This shows that China has maintained a relatively cautious attitude 
towards the liberalisation of financial services. Although China is constantly 
promoting its opening to the world, it still has a large gap compared with the average 
openness of OECD countries, as shown in Figure 9.2.
Figure 9.1 FDI restrictiveness index of China
Source: OECD (n.d.).
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Figure 9.2 FDI restrictiveness index in financial services, 2017
Source: OECD (n.d.).
China’s financial sector opening index
The FDIR index can only measure China’s financial sector openness over time, but 
financial liberalisation could have different effects on firms in different locations and 
different sectors. So, utilising China’s regional input–output table (for 2012, published 
by the National Bureau of Statistics), we calculate the financial services input ratio 
(αcr) for 42 industries in 31 provinces in China. The financial services input ratio 
(αcr) is the financial services input divided by the total intermediate inputs. China’s 
financial sector openness is calculated in Equation 9.1.
Equation 9.1
FLcrt = αcr*(1 – FDIRt)
FL is financial sector openness. The larger the FL index, the more open is the 
financial sector in that industry in that region.
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Financial constraints in China
Measures of financial constraints
First, from the perspective of business operations, companies with good business 
conditions generally have greater cash flow, meaning a considerable proportion of 
projects could be financed through the company’s internal finance. At the same 
time, companies with good business practices have lower credit risk and less chance 
of defaulting. Wang and Lu (2018) uses corporate cash flow indicators to measure 
financial constraints, with the method (operating profit + depreciation)/total assets. 
The greater the cash flow, the greater is the amount of financing the company can 
obtain through its own operations, and the lower is the financial constraint the 
enterprise suffers. Han and Wang (2012) use the operating cash flow as an indicator 
to measure the internal financial constraints on enterprises. The higher the net profit 
of enterprises, the stronger is their internal financing ability and the fewer financial 
constraints they encounter. 
Besides internal finance, external finance is an important way for enterprises to 
obtain finance. The interest paid can reflect the external financing situation of the 
enterprise. Altman et al. (1977) believe the interest coverage ratio can be used as 
an indicator of corporate liquidity and corporate financial information, and can 
be used to measure the financial constraints on an enterprise. The formula for 
calculating the interest coverage ratio is the enterprise’s earnings before interest 
and tax/interest expense. Li and Yu (2013) use the logarithm of corporate interest 
payments as an indicator to measure corporate financial constraints. The greater the 
interest expenses, the lower are the financial constraints.
Banks are not the only source of external financing for Chinese companies. Informal 
financing, such as trade (commercial) credit, is an important source of financing 
for most companies. Enterprises in the upstream supply chain can increase their 
accounts payable by using their strong market position and provide financial support 
for the development and operation of the company. Wang (2012) finds commercial 
credit is an important channel through which Chinese export enterprises can obtain 
external financing. This measure is (accounts payable/current sales). The higher the 
indicator, the lower are the financial constraints suffered by the company.
Many scholars estimate the financial constraints on enterprises by constructing 
a series of indices. Kaplan and Zingales (1997), Cleary (1999) and Whited and Wu 
(2006) constructed indices called KZ, ZFC and WW, respectively. The common 
feature of these indices is that they contain more information from enterprises and 
are more comprehensive than the single measure of financial constraints. However, 
the selection of some variables in the process of construction includes qualitative 
and quantitative information on corporate financial constraints, which are easily 
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influenced by personal subjectivity, producing measurement errors. Hadlock and 
Pierce (2010) cast serious doubt on the validity of the KZ index as a measure of 
financial constraints, while offering mixed evidence on the validity of other common 
measures of such constraints. They also find that firm size and age are particularly 
useful predictors of financial constraint levels, and propose a measure of financial 
constraints called the ‘SA index’ based solely on these firm characteristics.
Measures of financial constraints in China
According to the literature above, our chapter uses the following four indicators 
to measure the financial constraints on Chinese listed companies. 
Financial constraint 1: Internal financing
Figure 9.3 Internal financing of Chinese listed companies, 2010–15
Source: Calculated by the authors.
Internal financing refers mainly to a company’s own funds and the accumulation 
of funds in the production and operating processes. In the long run, enterprises 
can obtain internal financing by improving their operational efficiency, which is 
a fundamental of guaranteeing the source of production. We use the ratio of net 
operating cash flow (NOCF) to total assets (TA) to measure the internal financing 
of enterprises. As can be seen from Figure 9.3, internal financing is greatly affected 
by the business conditions of the enterprise, and there was significant fluctuation 
during the period 2010–15.
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Financial constraint 2: External financing
Figure 9.4 External financing of Chinese listed companies, 2010–15
Source: Calculated by the authors.
We follow Li and Yu (2013) by using the logarithm of interest expenses as an 
indicator to measure external financial constraints. The more interest payments 
a company makes, the greater is its external financing support and the lower are 
the external financial constraints. The level of interest payments made by Chinese 
companies significantly increased after 2010 (see Figure 9.4). This shows that the 
number of funds obtained by Chinese listed companies through external financing 
channels has increased.
Financial constraint 3: Trade credit
We use trade credit (accounts payable/operating income) as another measure of the 
external financial constraints on enterprises. The accounts payable of the enterprise 
refer to the debt caused by time inconsistencies between obtaining materials and 
paying for goods. The larger the indicator, the higher is the amount of finance the 
company can obtain from its partner companies. By using the money of its partner 
companies, an enterprise can alleviate its own financial constraints. To eliminate 
differences in company size from the measurement indicators, we divide the accounts 
payable by the company’s operating income.
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Figure 9.5 Trade credit of Chinese listed companies, 2010–15
Source: Calculated by the authors. 
As can be seen from Figure 9.5, from 2010 to 2015, the average proportion of 
accounts payable in the current year’s sales was 0.25. In 2011, the highest value was 
0.415, and in 2012, the lowest value was 0.19—indicating a significant downward 
trend. On the one hand, this shows that the market environment in China has 
improved and the problem of arrears between enterprises has gradually eased. 
On the other hand, in Chinese listed companies, the role of trade credit in erasing 
corporate financial constraints continues to decrease.
Financial constraint 4: SA index
Finally, we chose the SA index followed by Wu and Huang (2017) as an indicator 
of financial constraints. Compared with a single financial indicator, index-based 
indicators use more information to measure the financial constraints on enterprises. 
The formula for calculating the SA index is Equation 9.2.
Equation 9.2
SA = –0.737size + 0.043size2 – 0.04age
Size=ln (total assets/1,000,000) and age represents the company’s listing period. 
The result calculated by SA is negative. The greater the absolute value of SA, the 
more serious are the financial constraints faced by the company. 




This chapter studies the average effects of China’s financial sector opening on 
financial constraints. We estimate the following linear regressions (Equation 9.3).
Equation 9.3
In this equation, i, c, j and t represent firm, region, industry and year, respectively. 
The dependent variable is a firm-level financial constraint. The baseline regression 
uses four measures of financial constraints as the dependent variables. FL is the 
financial sector opening index, as denoted before. Here, we want to look at the direct 
impact of financial sector opening, so we control only for firm fixed effects, αi, 
which absorb any unobserved time-invariant firm effects; δt is year fixed effects and 
Xicjt controls for time-varying firm-level variables such as firm size and profitability. 
The average impact of financial sector opening is captured by β1. If β1 is negative, 
financial sector opening has improved the financial constraints in China.
Data 
Data for Chinese firms listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets are 
obtained from the China Stock Market & Accounting Research Database. 
Following the literature, financial firms are excluded from the sample; we Winsorize 
the variables at the first and ninety-ninth percentile of their distribution to eliminate 
the effect of extreme values. The sample period for the whole dataset is 2010–15, 
with the number of firm observations ranging from 1,838 (in 2010) to 2,601 
(in 2015). The data report detailed financial information on enterprises and their 
ownership type, location and industry code. FDI restrictiveness index is from the 
OECD database. The industry classification has been coordinated with that of 
China’s input–output table for 2012, according to the two-digit industry division 
standards of the CSRC in 2006. Table 9.10 provides some summary statistics for the 
key variables scaled by capital stock.
Table 9.10 Summary of listed company indicators
Variable No. Mean SD Min. Max.
Account/operating income 14,000.00 0.25 3.90 0.00 419.95
Log of fixed assets 14,000.00 19.98 1.79 7.59 27.32
Ownership 14,000.00 0.73 0.44 0.00 1.00
SA index 13,000.00 3.44 0.28 2.74 4.16
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Variable No. Mean SD Min. Max.
NOCF/TA 13,000.00 0.04 0.08 –1.28 0.88
ln(interest) 12,000.00 16.75 2.26 2.37 21.65
ln_size 13,000.00 21.88 1.20 19.24 25.81
ROA 13,000.00 0.04 0.10 –2.07 8.44
Survey 14,000.00 0.64 0.48 0.00 1.00
FL 14,000.00 0.03 0.05 0.00 0.30
Empirical results
This chapter aims to investigate the effects of financial sector opening on financial 
constraints in China. Using measures of financial constraints, we can identify 
the channels through which FL could improve firms’ financial constraints. The 
estimation results for Equation 9.3 are shown in Table 9.11. Financial sector opening 
can significantly reduce the SA index as shown in Column (4), but the internal 
financing situation of enterprises is not significantly affected by FL, as shown in 
Column (2). FL also enhances external financing through bank credits, which are 
measured by the interest expense, as in Column (2). FL has significant, negative 
effects on trade credit in Column (3), which means FL could provide more formal 
financing channels for financial institutions and will substitute informal finance 
with trade credit. 













FL –0.3275 18.2239** –15.8121* –6.2624***
(0.6391) (9.0205) (8.8590) (0.3044)
ln_size –0.0044** 1.1307*** 0.0015 0.0517***
(0.0020) (0.0302) (0.0288) (0.0010)
ROA 0.0540*** –0.6218*** 0.5961*** 0.0097***
(0.0074) (0.1183) (0.1074) (0.0037)
Constant 0.1391*** –8.7081*** 0.5711 2.3880***
(0.0467) (0.6878) (0.6570) (0.0226)
Firm fixed effect YES YES YES YES
Year fixed effect YES YES YES YES
Observations 12,739 11,763 13,179 13,181
R-squared 0.4647 0.8743 0.4094 0.9898
FC = financial constraint
*** p < 0.01 ** p < 0.05 * p < 0.1
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses.
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Robustness checks
This chapter examines firms’ heterogeneity by ownership type and ROA. Financial 
sector opening could reduce information asymmetry, promote the market-oriented 
operation of financial institutions, improve financing efficiency and ease firms’ 
financial constraints. We then try to investigate two channels by which FL alleviates 
financial constraints—through collateral and information asymmetry.
First, we investigate whether FL will have a heterogeneous effect according to firm 
ownership. We generate an ownership dummy with non-SOEs as 1 and SOEs 
as 0. We then introduce the interaction terms of FL and the ownership dummy 
in our baseline specification. The results in Table 9.12 show that FL has stronger 
effects for private firms for bank loans, and FL could also improve private firms’ 
financial structure, with the substitution of informal trade credit. With the opening 
of China’s financial sector, the degree of Mercerization of the finance sector has 
been continuously accelerating. The decision-making of financial institutions no 
longer follows the ownership attributes of the company as a single indicator. With 
competition from foreign financial institutions, domestic financial banks and 
institutions could learn how to increase the efficiency of their loans. Private firms 
with higher productivity and better performance could then be targeted by foreign 
and domestic banks. 










Ownership*FL 1.4413 40.4255*** –54.9765***
(0.9457) (13.4688) (12.9541)
ln_size –0.0046** 1.1276*** 0.0070
(0.0020) (0.0302) (0.0288)
ROA 0.0539*** –0.6231*** 0.5957***
(0.0074) (0.1183) (0.1073)
Constant 0.1159*** –8.6411*** 0.7353
(0.0449) (0.6630) (0.6325)
Firm fixed effect YES YES YES
Year fixed effect YES YES YES
Observations 12,739 11,763 13,179
R-squared 0.4648 0.8744 0.4102
FC = financial constraint
*** p < 0.01 ** p < 0.05 * p < 0.1
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses.
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Second, we investigate the heterogeneous effects of ROA. The return rate of the 
project is one of the most important indicators for investors. We use ROA to 
represent the profitability of the company: the higher the ROA, the stronger is the 
business capability. We then also introduce the interaction term of ROA with FL. 
The results in Table 9.13 show financial sector opening has stronger effects for firms 
with better operating performance and eases financial constraints through both 
bank credit and trade credit. China’s financial sectors have become more and more 
market-oriented, and companies with better operating performance could have 
received more external financing support. Companies with higher profit have better 
expected returns and could raise funds more easily through external financing.







ROA*FL 0.4681 8.4049* 51.7222***
(0.2910) (4.4884) (4.1156)
ln_size –0.0045** 1.1352*** 0.0003
(0.0020) (0.0302) (0.0286)
ROA 0.0359*** –0.9095*** –1.3590***
(0.0135) (0.1959) (0.1885)
Constant 0.1316*** –8.2808*** 0.1854
(0.0438) (0.6510) (0.6147)
Firm fixed effect YES YES YES
Year fixed effect YES YES YES
Observations 12,739 11,763 13,179
R-squared 0.4648 0.8743 0.4179
*** p < 0.01 ** p < 0.05 * p < 0.1
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses.
Third, we try to explore the mechanisms of FL on financial constraints. A company’s 
fixed-asset investment plays an important role in that company’s development. 
On the one hand, fixed-asset investment is accompanied by an expansion of scale, 
updating of production equipment and an increase in productivity. In a market-
oriented environment, productivity improvement is conducive to enterprises 
obtaining greater profits and improving their internal financing capacity. On the 
other hand, in the process of external financing, fixed assets can be used as collateral 
to reduce the default risk of corporate borrowing and improve the probability of 
successful financing. We use the logarithm of fixed assets as an indicator of the 
collateral status of an enterprise, and introduce the interaction term of fixed assets 
to FL. The results in Table 9.14 show that all the coefficients of the interaction term 
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are positive and significant. With the opening of the financial sector, a company 
with much collateral can effectively alleviate its financial constraints through both 
internal and external channels.







Collateral*FL 0.0522*** 0.9257*** –1.1998***
(0.0150) (0.2188) (0.2076)
ROA 0.0537*** 0.6081*** 0.5989***
(0.0074) (0.1182) (0.1073)
ln_size –0.0059*** 1.1066*** 0.0339
(0.0021) (0.0309) (0.0295)
Constant 0.1335*** –8.1821*** 0.0835
(0.0440) (0.6540) (0.6214)
Firm fixed effect YES YES YES
Year fixed effect YES YES YES
Observations 12,737 11,761 13,177
R-squared 0.4653 0.8745 0.4111
*** p < 0.01 ** p < 0.05 * p < 0.1
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses.
Fourth, we try to investigate channels of information asymmetry, which is one of 
the main causes of financial constraints on enterprises. Financial institutions cannot 
clearly understand the operating situation of those demanding capital (enterprises), 
which causes a huge gap between the cost of internal financing and the cost of external 
financing. It is important for financial institutions to investigate listed companies 
to eliminate information asymmetry between these institutions and enterprises. 
By  surveying listed companies, financial institutions can verify the publicly 
disclosed information of those companies, and also have direct communication with 
the company’s managers, eliminating barriers to information-sharing. We generate 
a dummy variable with the unit of whether the listed companies have been surveyed 
by financial institutions (such as banks and insurance and securities institutions), 
and  0 otherwise. The results in Table 9.15 show that a company surveyed by 
a financial institution is more likely to receive financial support from a bank and 
less likely to rely on credit finance. Surveys by financial institutions could well solve 
the problem of information asymmetry between enterprises and those institutions 
and alleviate the financial constraints on enterprises. We have not, however, found 
significant effects of financial opening on internal financing. 
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Survey*FL 0.0242 0.1067** –2.3075***
(0.0459) (0.0468) (0.6348)
ln_size –0.0046** –0.0306*** 0.0087
(0.0020) (0.0021) (0.0289)
ROA 0.0539*** –0.0587*** 0.5965***
(0.0074) (0.0079) (0.1073)
Constant 0.1329*** 0.8758*** –0.0135
(0.0440) (0.0458) (0.6211)
Firm fixed effect YES YES YES
Year fixed effect YES YES YES
Observations 12,739 13,181 13,179
R-squared 0.4647 0.8658 0.4100
*** p < 0.01 ** p < 0.05 * p < 0.1
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses.
Last but not least, we change another measure of financial sector opening in our 
robustness checks. According to the policy summary in section three, China has 
gradually liberalised its banking sector since its entry to the WTO in 2001. The 
Chinese Government agreed to remove restrictions on foreign banks’ local currency 
business in a number of cities every year during the first five years after accession 
(2001–06), with no restrictions on foreign banks anywhere in the country beyond 
that. This step-by-step deregulation of foreign banking provides a suitable policy 
experiment for analysing the effects of banking sector liberalisation on financial 
constraints. Following Lin (2011), we use a dummy variable, FBLct, indicating the 
timing and geographic variation of foreign bank entry into local currency business 
with firms in a particular city. For example, in the City of Beijing, FBLc;2004 = 0 
and FBankc;2005 = FBankc;2006 = 1, since Beijing opened to foreign bank entry 
at the end of 2004.
The model specification is Equation 9.4.
Equation 9.4
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In this robustness test, we use Chinese firm-level data from the Annual Survey 
of Industrial Enterprises for1998 to 2007, conducted by the National Bureau of 
Statistics of China (NBS various years[b]). This dataset covers all state-owned and 
non-state-owned industrial firms with more than RMB5 million in revenue. The 
regression results are shown in Table 9.16. We find that banking liberalisation 
alleviates financial constraints by improving both bank credit and trade credit for 
private firms, while the ratio of bank credit to trade credit also increases. This is 
consistent with our previous results, and shows that banking liberalisation upgrades 
the financing structure by substitution of trade credit with more bank credit.











FL*Ownership 0.165*** 0.0953*** 0.0482***
(0.00536) (0.00384) (0.00699)
ln_size 0.626*** 0.470*** 0.140***
(0.00308) (0.00234) (0.00407)
Constant 1.647*** 4.290*** –2.610***
(0.0181) (0.0136) (0.0241)
Observations 1,038,451 1,433,281 967,787
R-squared 0.849 0.842 0.752
Firm fixed effect YES YES YES
Year fixed effect YES YES YES
FC = financial constraint
*** p < 0.01 ** p  < 0.05 * p< 0.1
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses.
Conclusions
This chapter investigates the effects of China’s financial sector opening on financial 
constraints on Chinese listed firms. We first systematically review the policies on 
China’s financial sector opening and set up a relatively exogenous policy measure 
based on the OECD’s FDI restrictiveness index. Then, based on the latest panel data 
for listed firms for the period 2010–15, we calculate four indices to measure China’s 
firm-level financial constraints through internal and external financing channels. 
We find that China’s financial sector opening alleviates financial constraints and 
upgrades the financing structure for China’s listed firms. Financial openness also 
eliminates ownership discrimination and promotes financing efficiency, alleviating 
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the financial constraints on private and profitable enterprises. The mechanisms of 
the effects of financial sector opening on financial constraints occur mainly through 
collateral channels and the elimination of information asymmetry.
This chapter has some important policy implications. On the one hand, China’s 
financial sector opening could alleviate financial constraints and upgrade the 
financing structure. On the other hand, policymakers should be aware that once 
they open their financial services trade to foreign competition, they may also invite 
more capital flows into their economies, which will bring greater competition to 
domestic financial institutions and tend to render the existing capital control regime 
less effective. As China is expected to accelerate its financial services liberalisation, the 
impact on financial markets and capital flows will become substantial, which implies 
that China’s capital controls will become more porous in the future. Therefore, the 
pace of China’s capital account liberalisation will proceed faster than expected. 
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10. Financing support schemes for 
SMEs in China: Benefits, costs and 
selected policy issues
Qin Gou and Yiping Huang
Until the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) in 2008, China had achieved 9.75 per cent 
annual GDP growth since its economic reforms began in 1978, making it one of 
the fastest-growing economies in the world—sometimes described as the ‘China 
miracle’ (Lin et al. 1996). Small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) played an 
important role in that economic growth. According to the National Bureau of 
Statistics of China (NBS), 99.6 per cent of enterprises in China were SMEs at the 
end of 2005 and they accounted for 59 per cent of GDP, 60 per cent of total sales, 
48.2 per cent of taxes paid and about 75 per cent of employment in urban areas 
(Shen et al. 2009). Since 2008, the Chinese economy has switched to a slower 
lane of economic growth (Huang et al. 2013; Zhang and Gou 2016). To promote 
economic growth and create more job opportunities, the sound development of 
SMEs is vital. But, in contrast to their contribution to economic growth, SMEs’ 
difficulty in obtaining external financing from formal financial institutions is widely 
recognised (Allen et al. 2005; Chong et al. 2013; Gou et al. 2018).
In fact, the major external source of SMEs’ financing is bank loans (Beck et al. 
2008), but the problems of information asymmetry, moral hazard and adverse 
selection that typically plague lending (Stiglitz and Weiss 1981) affect SMEs most 
severely. And this seems to be even more true in China, where, according to the 
World Bank’s Investment Climate Survey in 2012, 49.1 per cent of surveyed SMEs 
were credit rationed (Gou et al. 2018). A lack of appropriate financing channels and 
credit unavailability have become the main hurdles for the development of SMEs 
(Bai et al. 2006; Shen et al. 2009; Du et al. 2012).
The Chinese Government has long recognised the problem and even raised it to 
the national development agenda, resulting in the Law of the People’s Republic 
of China on Promotion of Small and Medium-sized Enterprises in 2003 and 
amendments to this law in 2018. This law was enacted to improve the business 
environment for SMEs, promoting their sound development, creating more 
job opportunities and promoting entrepreneurship and innovation. One of the 
important amendments to this law in 2018 was to place separate emphasis on 
support from the financial sector—which had been included with fiscal funding 
supports in the original version of the law—to meet the demands of the SMEs and 
better match their financial structure.
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A set of specific financing support schemes for the banking sector was authorised. 
Among them, the China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) implemented 
a  policy in 2008 aimed at increasing credit support to SMEs, which is usually 
referred to as the ‘double no-lower-than’ policy. This policy required that the growth 
rate of SME loans should not be lower than the growth rate of the total loans 
and the increase of SME loans should not be lower than that in the previous year. 
This policy was dynamically adjusted by relaxing the requirements in 2011 and 
tightening them again in 2015.
In light of SMEs’ financing problems and the policy implications, this chapter aims 
to analyse whether the financing support scheme for SMEs in China has effectively 
promoted banks’ credit allocation to SMEs. Specifically, we focus on the impact of 
the policy that assesses banks’ SME loans since 2008, based on bank branch–level 
survey data from China. Following the CBRC’s regulations on SME loans, more 
banks began to evaluate the loans to SMEs internally, to meet the new regulations. 
This provides us with the possibility of event studies on how the SME financing 
support policy affects banks’ decisions on loans to SMEs.
In regard to lending to SMEs, small banks have a comparative advantage while 
large banks tend to favour transaction-based lending to non-SMEs. This is because 
small banks tend to interact much more personally with their borrowers, are able to 
utilise more soft information and provide more relationship loans to SMEs (Berger 
et al. 2002). The ‘small bank advantage’ hypothesis is supported by many empirical 
studies (Berger and Udell 1995, 1996; Peek and Rosengren 1998; Cole et al. 1999).
However, China’s banking sector is still dominated by large banks—in particular, 
the four largest state-owned banks, known as the ‘big four’: Bank of China, 
China Construction Bank, the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China and 
the Agricultural Bank of China. With the implementation of China’s reform 
and opening-up policies in 1978, other types of banks were set up, including 
regional banks (which, in large part, are owned by local governments), rural credit 
cooperatives and joint-stock banks that have comparatively low levels of government 
ownership and have progressively increased their market share (Allen et al. 2012). 
In November 2013, the Third Plenary Session of the eighteenth Central Committee 
of the Communist Party of China allowed qualified private capital to establish 
financial institutions, such as small and medium-sized banks; five banks entirely 
funded by private capital were given the green light by authorities in 2014. However, 
domination by the large state-owned commercial banks continues and the entry of 
new players is still extremely limited. According to the CBRC, in 2017, the asset 
share of the largest commercial banks was still 36.8 per cent, the national equity 
banks held 17.8 per cent and rural and city commercial banks held 25.6 per cent.
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Therefore, one concern about the above CBRC policy is that it may bring costs to 
the large banks as they are disadvantaged in lending to SMEs. In this chapter, we 
investigate the influence of the policy on banks of different size. More importantly, 
we investigate whether this policy brings costs for banks in terms of credit risk and 
reduced profits.
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows: section two describes the sources 
of the data used in our empirical analysis and presents some summary statistics; 
sections three to five present the results of how financing schemes affect banks’ 
credit allocation to SMEs, banks’ credit risk and their profits, respectively. Section six 
summarises and section seven provides conclusions. 
Bank-level statistics of SME financing schemes
Data source
The data used in this study are from the Financial Ecological Environment Survey 
(FEES), conducted by the research group of the National School of Development 
at Peking University in 2014. The survey is retrospective, with most of the variables 
covering the period 2005–13. Fourteen provinces were selected from the survey 
on the basis of their economic development and geographical location: Zhejiang, 
Jiangsu, Guangdong, Fujian and Shandong to represent provinces in the more 
developed eastern coastal region; Hubei, Jilin, Hunan and Jiangxi to represent 
the central provinces; and Shaanxi, Sichuan, Chongqing, Guizhou and Ningxia 
Autonomous Region for western China.
Our data cover county-level districts (hereafter referred to as counties) in both rural 
and urban areas, which greatly reduces the possibility of selection bias and justifies 
the representativeness of the data (Shen et al. 2009). The final survey sample covers 
90 counties—47 rural and 43 urban counties—according to the standard county 
codes provided by the NBS.
The survey covered 892 financial institutions in the 90 sampled counties, belonging 
to 185 legal institutions. Among them, there are 315 branch offices of the four big 
state-owned commercial banks (a share of 38.7 per cent). There are 84 branches 
of the Postal Savings Bank of China, 160 branches of the national joint-stock 
commercial banks, 105 city commercial banks, 141 rural financial institutions 
(including rural commercial banks, rural credit cooperatives and rural banks) and 
10 branches of foreign banks. The survey covered all types of banking institutions in 
China. The sample distribution of the institutions is shown in Table 10.1.
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Table 10.1 Sample distribution by institution
Type of institution Number Share (%)
Big four state-owned banks 315 38.70
Equity banks 160 19.60
Postal savings banks 84 10.30
City commercial banks 105 12.90
Rural commercial banks 50 6.10
Rural credit cooperatives 44 5.40
Village banks 47 5.80
Foreign banks 10 1.20
Total 815 100.00
Source: Authors’ calculations using FEES.
The survey data are rich in detail, containing not only detailed financial 
information, such as balance sheet and bank credit outcomes, but also nonfinancial 
variables, such as evaluations of the SME loans ratio and basic information about 
financial institutions.
The data provide us with information on whether and when an institution started 
to evaluate its share of SME loans, the specific requirements and whether the 
branch met those requirements. Excluding financial institutions that did not report 
information on SME loan evaluations, we obtain a panel dataset spanning 2005 to 
2013, for 756 institutions.
Summary statistics of SME financing schemes 
at bank level
The key variable of this study is whether and when a bank begins to implement 
evaluation of SME loan shares. Table 10.2 provides an illustration of the evaluation 
of SME loan shares for the surveyed institutions. In total, 446 of the total 756 
financial institutions surveyed implemented an evaluation of SME loan shares during 
our sample period (see Column 1 in Table 10.2), accounting for 58.99 per  cent 
(Column 2 in Table 10.2).
Among the institutions that implemented such an evaluation, only 34 (7.62 per cent) 
provided the SME loan evaluation before 2008, with the majority (92.38 per cent) 
beginning to adopt this evaluation in 2008 or after (see Column 3 in Table 10.2). 
Since 2008, there have been 68 institutions, on average, adopting this evaluation 
each year, with a peak in 2010 of 103 institutions. The data also show that the initial 
year of evaluation of SME loans was centred on the period between 2008 and 2014. 
This is mainly due to the exogenous shock of the new CBRC regulations from 2008. 
During our sample period (2005–13), 438 branches implemented the evaluation of 
SME loans, accounting for 57.94 per cent of the total sample.
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Table 10.2 Number of branches starting to evaluate SME loans, by year




Share of branches 
adopting evaluation (100%)
(3)
Share of initial 
year (100%)
1986 1 0.13 0.22
1990 1 0.13 0.22
2001 1 0.13 0.22
2002 1 0.13 0.22
2003 2 0.26 0.45
2004 1 0.13 0.22
2005 6 0.79 1.35
2006 4 0.53 0.90
2007 17 2.25 3.81
2008 28 2.25 6.28
2009 49 3.70 10.99
2010 103 6.48 23.09
2011 80 13.62 17.94
2012 92 10.58 20.63
2013 59 12.17 13.23
2014 1 7.80 0.22
Before 2008 34 4.50 7.62
After 2007 412 54.49 92.38
Total 446 58.99 100
Source: Authors’ calculation using FEES.
In terms of the different categories of commercial banks, the proportion of domestic 
commercial banks adopting evaluation of SME loans is much higher than that of 
foreign banks (see Table 10.3). The ratios of the city commercial banks, the big four 
state-owned banks and rural commercial banks are significantly higher than the 
sample average, while those of rural credit cooperatives and postal savings banks are 
significantly below the sample average.
For those institutions that evaluate SME loans, the requirements on the SME loans 
share are obviously different, as shown in Figure 10.1. The share of SME loans is 
required to be above or close to 50 per cent for village banks, foreign banks, city 
commercial banks and rural commercial banks, while it is required to be about 
30 per cent for equity banks, rural credit cooperatives, the big four state-owned 
banks and postal savings banks. 
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2008–13 Total Total 
sample
Ratio (%) Rank
Big four state-owned banks 24 170 194 297 65.32 2
Equity banks 5 74 79 142 55.63 5
Postal savings banks 4 28 32 80 40 6
City commercial banks 1 67 68 97 70.10 1
Rural commercial banks 29 29 45 64.44 3
Rural credit cooperatives 14 14 40 35 7
Village banks 27 27 45 60 4
Foreign banks 2 2 10 20 8


















Figure 10.1 The lower bound requirement for SME loan shares for reformed 
branches (per cent)
Source: Authors’ calculations using FEES.
Since the evaluation on SME loan shares was introduced, the proportion of branches 
that do not meet the evaluation requirements has significantly decreased across all 
institutions—from 90.71 per cent to 46.38 per cent, on average, as indicated in the 
last row of Table 10.4. This reduction is almost 40 per cent for all types of institutions, 
except for the postal savings banks. The postal savings banks managed a reduction 
of only 24.2 per cent, while they had the highest proportion of branches among the 
domestic banks falling short of the evaluation requirements both before and after 
evaluations began. Overall, Table 10.4 indicates that the evaluation of SME loan 
shares has a strong effect in increasing SME loans, while it was challenging for the 
postal savings banks to meet the evaluation requirements during our sample period.
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Table 10.4 The proportion of branches not meeting the evaluation 
requirements for SME loan shares, by institution





Big four state-owned banks 81.63 41.88 39.75 7
Equity banks 97.79 51.90 45.89 2
Postal savings banks 99.20 75.00 24.20 8
City commercial banks 91.55 45.93 45.62 3
Rural commercial banks 85.99 43.96 42.03 5
Rural credit cooperatives 87.64 38.82 48.82 1
Village banks 97.95 52.38 45.57 4
Foreign banks 100.00 60.00 40.00 6
Total 90.71 46.38 44.33
Source: Authors’ calculations using FEES.
In summary, there are differences in whether and when different types of financial 
institutions implemented evaluations of SME loan shares. The staggered adoption 
of the evaluations provides rich variation with which to identify its effects on SME 
loans as well as on other bank lending outcomes.
Do SME financing schemes increase loans 
to SMEs?
Empirical model specification
We begin our analysis by examining whether the evaluation of SME loan shares 
effectively increases lending to SMEs. To identify the effect of SME financing 
schemes on the origination of bank loans to SMEs, we employ a difference-in-
differences (DID) strategy and compare a group of financial institutions before and 
after they adopted the evaluations with those institutions that had not yet adopted 
it during the same period. Thus, the baseline empirical specification is given by 
Equation 10.1.
Equation 10.1
0 1 2_ it it it i t itSME loan Evaluation Xb b b n t e= + + + + +  
In this equation, i, c and t indicate bank, county and year, respectively. 
The independent variable SME_loanict represents banks loans to SMEs indexed by 
two variables: the growth rate of SME loans (GSME) and the share of SME loans 
(SME). Evaluationit is the regressor of interest, standing for the incentive design of 
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bank i in year t. Specifically, Evaluationit = Treatmenti• Postit, where Treatmenti = 1 
if bank i carried out the SME scheme during the sample period, and 0 otherwise. 
Postit = 1 is a post-treatment indictor, taking a value of 1 if t ≥ tc0, where tc0 is the 
year bank i implements the evaluation, and 0 otherwise. 
Xit represents other important bank-level variables that may affect banks’ loan 
allocations. In the baseline model, we include bank size, indexed by the logarithm 
of total assets (Lnassets). The bank fixed effects (vi) capture all the time-invariant 
bank characteristics that might influence the outcome of interest. Year fixed effects 
(τt) control for nationwide shocks in a particular year that are likely to have affected 
all banks in a similar manner. εit is the error term. To address the potential serial 
correlation and heteroskedasticity, we cluster the standard errors at the county level. 
Detailed variable definitions and descriptive statistics are presented in Table 10.5.
This strategy identifies how the evaluations of SME loans affect bank loans to SMEs, 
controlling for other important influencing variables and time and bank-invariant 
effects. The coefficient ß1 is our DID estimate of the effect of interest. 
Table 10.5 Variable definitions and summary statistics
Variable Definition Obs Mean SD p50 Min. Max.
GSME Growth rate of SME 
loans (%)
2,233 0.101 0.2279 0 –1 1.189
SME SME loan share (%) 2,981 71.530 37.0740 95.700 0 100.000
NPLR Nonperforming loans 
ratio (%)
1,691 2.576 4.6790 0.632 0 26.130
Lnasset Logarithm of total 
assets
2,981 12.118 1.2280 12.054 5.995 16.750
ROA Return over total assets 2,981 0.019 0.0260 0.018 –0.364 0.857
NII Net interest rate 
income over total loan 
outstanding
2,880 0.075 0.3320 0.048 –1.365 10.530
For the banks that implemented the evaluation of SME loan shares in 2005 and 
previous years, it is impossible to obtain the comparison data for the pre-treatment 
period. For the banks that implemented evaluations in 2013, it is impossible to 
obtain the comparison data for the post-treatment period. We therefore remove 
these banks to allow at least one year before and one year after the evaluation 
adoption, as required by the DID method.
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Empirical results
Table 10.6 reports the baseline results of the impact of the evaluation of SME 
loans on banks’ credit allocation to SMEs. Column (1) shows the results of how 
implementing the evaluation impacts the growth rate of SME loans and it shows 
an insignificant effect. Column (3) examines the impacts of the evaluation on the 
share of SME loans in total loans outstanding, and the effect of the evaluation is 
still insignificant. Therefore, on average, it seems that the evaluation is ineffective in 
enhancing banks’ loan originations to SMEs.
Table 10.6 Impacts of evaluation of SME loans: Total effect
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables Growth rate of SME loans Share of SME loans
Evaluation 0.1160 0.1073 1.6334 1.1839
(0.0990) (0.1349) (1.0258) (1.2918)
L.SME –0.0259*** –0.0280*** 0.5258*** 0.4957***
(0.0029) (0.0037) (0.0178) (0.0214)
lnasset 0.0003 –0.0136 –1.1115 –0.5041
(0.1393) (0.1986) (1.3093) (1.6527)
Year effect YES NO YES NO
Institute*Year NO YES NO YES
Province*Year NO YES NO YES
Branch FE YES YES YES YES
Constant YES YES YES YES
Observations 2,227 1,776 2,451 1,992
R-squared 0.2420 0.3461 0.9033 0.9104
*** p < 0.01 ** p < 0.05 * p < 0.1
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses.
Source: Authors’ estimations.
One concern with the above models might be that some local credit demand shocks 
and institutional credit supply shocks (such as policy and technology shocks) might 
coincide with the banks’ adoption of the evaluation. To account for this and other 
similar concerns, in Columns (2) and (4), we modify the model by including 
an interacted year with province fixed effects and an interacted year with legal 
institutional fixed effects. This specification controls for all time variations within 
those provinces and within those legal institutions. In such a specification, one 
compares the growth rate of SME loans and SME loan shares of a bank adopting 
evaluation with a bank of the same legal institution not adopting it in the same 
province and in the same year. As a result, we exploit the intraprovincial and intra-
legal institutional variations between treated and non-treated branches. To the 
extent that local shocks affect all banks at a provincial level and internal shocks 
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affect all branches of the same legal institution, such shocks are differenced out in 
our specification. Columns (2) and (4) indicate an insignificant impact from the 
evaluation on both the growth rate of SME loans and the share of SME loans. 
As elaborated in the previous section, before implementing the evaluation, some 
banks had already met the requirements, although most had not. Banks that met 
the requirements before implementing the evaluation did not need to increase their 
loans to SMEs following implementation. Therefore, the estimations in Table 10.6 
may underestimate the effect of evaluation as they mix all the treated banks in the 
same way. In this regard, we modify the model by distinguishing between the initial 
conditions of banks in terms of whether they meet the evaluation requirements. 
The results for how implementing evaluation of SME loan shares affects the growth 
rate of SME loans are presented in Table 10.7 and the impacts on the shares of SME 
loans are presented in Table 10.8.
In the first columns of Table 10.7, we include the interaction of the variable 
Evaluation with the lag term of the share of SME loans (L.SME). This shows 
a  significantly positive effect of the evaluation and a significantly negative effect 
of its interaction with the lag term of the share of SME loans. This indicates that 
implementing the evaluation increases the growth rate of SME loans, while this 
effect weakens as the initial share of SME loans increases. The results imply that 
the initial conditions when implementing evaluation are important in determining 
its overall effectiveness. As the initial SME loans share is low, the effect of the 
evaluation in enhancing loans to SMEs is strong. The results are robust in the model 
of Column (2), as shocks from the region and legal institutions are controlled.
Furthermore, we identify whether the initial SME loans share meets the evaluation 
requirements and construct a dummy variable, below, to indicate the initial 
conditions. If the initial SME loans share is below the evaluation requirement, 
below equals 1 and we call these ‘constrained’ banks; otherwise, it equals 0, and 
these banks are ‘unconstrained’. We then include both the variable below and its 
interaction with the evaluation in Column (3). The results indicate significantly 
positive effects from both the interaction term and the variable of initial conditions 
(L.Below), and positive but insignificant effects of the variable Evaluation. For the 
unconstrained banks, the evaluation has no significant effect on the growth rate of 
SME loans. For the constrained banks, the effect of the evaluation is determined by 
both the coefficients of Evaluation and the interaction term (Evaluation*L.Below). 
The overall effect of evaluation for these banks is significant, around 0.37 per cent, 
which implies that, after evaluation, the growth rate of SME loans increases by 
0.37 per cent, on average. As the sample mean of the growth rate is 0.101 per cent, 
this overall effect of 0.37 per cent is comparably very strong. The modified model 
specification in Column (4) does not affect the qualitative nature of our results other 
than a slightly increased overall effect for the constrained banks.
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Table 10.7 Impacts of evaluation on the growth rate of SME loans
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables Growth rate of SME loans
Evaluation 0.6204*** 0.6384** 0.0453 0.0472









Lnasset 0.0366 0.0096 0.0038 –0.0201
(0.1398) (0.1986) (0.1413) (0.1163)
Year effect YES NO YES NO
Institute*Year NO YES NO YES
Province*Year NO YES NO YES
Branch FE YES YES YES YES
Constant YES YES YES YES
Observations 2,227 1,776 2,227 1,776
R-squared 0.2448 0.3485 0.2226 0.3309
Overall effect when below 0.3729** 0.4113***
Standard error 0.1653 0.0761
*** p < 0.01 ** p < 0.05 * p < 0.1
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses.
Source: Authors’ estimations.
In Table 10.8, we investigate how the evaluation affects banks’ shares of SME 
loans. Results in the first two columns show robust evidence that the evaluation 
significantly increases the share of banks’ SME loans, and this effect is stronger for 
banks with higher initial shares of SME loans. In Columns (3) and (4), the coefficient 
of Evaluation is significantly negative while the interaction term (Evaluation*L.
Below) is significantly positive. This reveals that, for banks with an initial share of 
SME loans above the requirement, their share of SME loans falls significantly—by 
more than 4 per cent. But for banks with an initial share of SME loans below the 
requirement, the share of SME loans increases by more than 6 per cent.
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Table 10.8 Impacts of evaluation on the share of SME loans
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Share of SME loans
Evaluation 10.5757*** 6.8199*** –4.5368*** –4.2711***









Lnasset –0.8912 –0.6454 0.1271 –1.1991
(1.2990) (1.6482) (1.3871) (2.9591)
Year effect YES NO YES NO
Institute*Year NO YES NO YES
Province*Year NO YES NO YES
Branch FE YES YES YES YES
Constant YES YES YES YES
Observations 2,451 1,992 2,805 2,248
R-squared 0.9050 0.9110 0.8589 0.8788
Overall effect when below 7.1783*** 6.08407**
Standard error 1.5988 2.4405
*** p < 0.01 ** p < 0.05 * p < 0.1
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. 
Source: Authors’ estimations.
In Table 10.9, we further check the effects of the evaluation on banks of different 
size. We classify the big four state-owned banks and the national equity banks as 
large banks and the remainder as small banks. Results in Table 10.9 show that the 
evaluation has no effect on the unconstrained small banks while it significantly 
decreases the share of SME loans for the unconstrained large banks. For the 
constrained banks, the evaluation significantly increased the share of SME loans 
for both small and large banks, with a slightly larger effect for small banks than 
for larger banks. These results indicate that the evaluation effectively promotes the 
constrained banks to allocate more loans to SMEs.
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Table 10.9 Impacts of evaluation on the share of SME loans, by bank size
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Share of SME loans
Small banks Large banks Small banks Large banks
Evaluation –0.9499 –4.6540*** 1.0763 –4.9057***
(1.9064) (1.6226) (1.8447) (1.6550)
Evaluation*L.Below 8.7482*** 10.7829*** 6.9654* 10.4752***
(2.6435) (2.1694) (3.9017) (2.7140)
L.Below –5.8593*** –21.6008*** –3.2827 –22.1151***
(2.2509) (2.3042) (3.6485) (3.9876)
lnasset 5.8558*** –1.7280 9.4113* –0.8208
(2.2316) (1.6415) (5.3561) (3.3182)
Year effect YES YES NO NO
Institute*Year NO NO YES YES
Province*Year NO NO YES YES
Branch FE YES YES YES YES
Constant YES YES YES YES
Observations 732 1,903 755 1,926
R-squared 0.8698 0.8666 0.8959 0.8885
Overall effect when below 7.7983*** 6.1288*** 8.041733** 5.5696**
Standard error 2.3436 1.8528 3.901827 2.372877
*** p < 0.01 ** p < 0.05 * p < 0.1
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. 
Combining the results in Tables 10.7–10.9, we find that implementing evaluation 
of SME loans has increased banks’ loan originations to SMEs, especially for 
banks that have low shares of SME loans. In this regard, the evaluation is effective 
and beneficial.
How do SME financing schemes affect banks’ 
credit risk?
So far, we have shown that evaluation of SME loans effectively increases the number 
of loans to SMEs. But usually more serious information asymmetry between 
banks and SMEs results in higher credit risk for SME loans (Stiglitz and Weiss 
1981). To assess the overall influence of this evaluation of SME loans on banks, 
we go further to investigate the impact of the evaluation on banks’ credit risk in 
Equation 10.2, with the DID strategy.





* .it it it
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In Equation 10.2, credit risk is measured by NPLR, following Zhang et al. (2016) 
and subject to data availability. We control bank size, the SME loan ratio, time-
invariant fixed effects and bank-invariant fixed effects. The baseline results are 
presented in Table 10.10. 
The results in Column (1) show a significant and negative effect of Evaluation on 
the NPLR, and the interaction term (Evaluation*L.Below) is robustly significant 
and positive. These results indicate that, for banks with an initial share of SME 
loans at or above the requirements (unconstrained banks), the evaluation decreases 
their NPLR. 
However, these results imply that for banks with an initial share of SME loans 
below  the evaluation requirement (constrained banks), their NPLR increases 
by 0.23 per cent (–1.0971 per cent + 1.3265 per cent) following the evaluation. 
This overall effect is not significant. Results are robust, as we control for regional and 
legal institutional shocks in Column (2). 
We believe there is a competition effect between the unconstrained and constrained 
banks, which may help explain the above findings. The unconstrained banks face 
no pressure to increase their SME loans and have the space to increase non-SME 
loans. Meanwhile, restrained by both the regulated requirements for SME loans 
and lending capacity, the constrained banks move partly to the SME loans market, 
which increases competition in that market and decreases competition in the non-
SME loans market. The reduction of competition in the non-SME loans market 
facilitates the unconstrained banks decreasing their NPLR. The constrained banks 
struggle to expand their loans to SMEs, which puts them into the more competitive 
and higher-risk SME market.
In Columns (3) and (4) of Table 10.10, we further check the heterogeneous 
effect of the evaluation on credit risk for small and large banks. Results indicate 
significantly negative effects of Evaluation and positive effects of the interaction 
term (Evaluation*L.Below) for both small banks and large banks, except that the 
coefficient of Evaluation is insignificant for small banks.
For the unconstrained banks, the evaluation has no significant effect on small 
banks’ NPLR, while it significantly decreases the NPLR of large banks. For 
the constrained large banks, the overall effect of the evaluation on NPLR is 
0.18 per cent (1.4123 per cent – 1.2370 per cent) but is insignificant. However, 
it is significant and about 2.1 per cent (2.2593 per cent – 0.1726 per cent) for 
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the constrained small banks. These findings imply that the SME loans requirement 
significantly exacerbates the credit risk of constrained small banks while it improves 
the credit quality of unconstrained large banks.
There are two possible interpretations that may help explain the above results. On the 
one hand, there is another competition effect, which is between small banks and large 
banks. Although small banks usually have a greater advantage in providing loans to 
SMEs (Berger and Udell 2006), they suffer from more severe competition from large 
banks after the policy shock. Under the policy shocks of the CBRC’s regulations 
on SME loans, large banks start to compete more in the SME loans market, which 
crowds out some high-quality SMEs to large banks from small banks and then 
worsens the credit quality for small banks. On the other hand, large banks have greater 
diversification opportunities and higher levels of management of credit risk.









Whole sample Whole sample Small bank Large bank
Evaluation –1.0971** –1.3347*** –0.1726 –1.2370*
(0.5236) (0.2770) (0.1109) (0.5979)
Evaluation*L.Below 1.3265* 1.4569*** 2.2593*** 1.4123*
(0.7162) (0.3924) (0.4128) (0.7065)
L.Below –0.7779 –1.3898*** –2.2313*** –1.0286
(0.7902) (0.2297) (0.0109) (0.5856)
SME 0.0136 0.0102 –0.0063 0.0157
(0.0099) (0.0082) (0.0042) (0.0124)
lnasset –0.9489 0.6479 –2.6830 1.2713
(0.8013) (0.7671) (2.6271) (1.1394)
Year YES NO NO NO
Institute*Year NO YES YES NO
Province*Year NO YES YES NO
Branch FE YES YES YES YES
Observations 1,800 1,800 468 1,361
R-squared 0.6255 0.9246 0.9972 0.7981
Overall effect when below 0.2295 0.1222 2.0867*** 0.1753 
Standard error 0.4139 0.2209 0.3464 0.1753 
*** p < 0.01 ** p < 0.05 * p < 0.1
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. 
Source: Authors’ estimations.
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To combine results in the previous section, our findings highlight that the evaluation 
of SME loans is a double-edged sword for the constrained banks: although it pushes 
these banks to expand their SME loans, it also brings higher credit risk to small 
banks. Banks that increase their loans to SMEs incur a cost by bearing more credit 
risk, especially small banks.
How do SME financing schemes affect 
banks’ profits?
To complete the picture, we also check how the evaluation of SME loans affects 
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We measure banks’ profits with two variables: net interest rate income over total 
loans outstanding (NII) and the return on assets (ROA). The former variable 
indicates banks’ profitability on the business of deposits and loans, and the latter 
represents banks’ overall profitability.
Table 10.11 reports the impacts of the evaluation on net interest income and returns 
over bank assets. The results of Columns (1) and (2) show that the coefficient 
of Evaluation is significantly positive and the coefficient of the interaction term 
(Evaluation*L.Below) is significantly negative. These results imply that, for 
unconstrained banks, the evaluation improves their net interest income. For banks 
that are constrained by the evaluation requirements, the evaluation has an overall 
negative influence on their net interest income, but it is not significant. 
For Columns (3) and (4), results are similar. While evaluation increases the return 
on assets for unconstrained banks, it has a negative but insignificant impact on the 
constrained banks that fell short of the requirements before the evaluation.
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Evaluation 0.0097*** 0.0057*** 0.0040*** 0.0045***
(0.0033) (0.0018) (0.0011) (0.0010)
Evaluation*L.Below –0.0161*** –0.0097* –0.0056*** –0.0047***
(0.0047) (0.0051) (0.0014) (0.0017)
L.Below 0.0111*** 0.0091** 0.0039*** 0.0033***
(0.0032) (0.0045) (0.0011) (0.0006)
Lnasset 0.0017 0.0003 –0.0018 –0.0041**
(0.0060) (0.0057) (0.0015) (0.0017)
Year YES NO YES NO
Institute*Year NO YES NO YES
Province*Year NO YES NO YES
Branch FE YES YES YES YES
Observations 3,348 2,716 3,517 2,875
R-squared 0.7597 0.8097 0.7157 0.7865
Overall effect when below –0.0064 –0.004 –0.0016 –0.0003
Standard error 0.0040 0.0044 0.0010 0.0012
*** p < 0.01 ** p < 0.05 * p < 0.1
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. 
Source: Authors’ estimations.
We then go through the different effects of the evaluation on the profitability of 
small and large banks in Table 10.12. Interestingly, we find that the evaluation 
significantly increases profits for unconstrained large banks, while it has no effect on 
unconstrained small banks. This also relates to the two competition effects between 
constrained and unconstrained banks and between constrained small and constrained 
large banks. The unconstrained large banks improve their profitability as they do 
not have to compete for SME loans, but they enjoy less competitive non-SME 
loans. For the unconstrained small banks, they face more severe competition in the 
SME loans market and meanwhile have more space to provide services to non-SME 
loans. Therefore, the overall effect of the evaluation on these small unconstrained 
banks is ambiguous, and it is insignificant in our sample.
For constrained banks, the evaluation decreases net interest income for both 
the  small  and the large banks, while it decreases the return on assets for small 
banks only.
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Small bank Big bank Small bank Big bank
Evaluation 0.0028 0.0043** 0.0002 0.0039***
(0.0025) (0.0016) (0.0013) (0.0009)
Evaluation*L.Below –0.0091** –0.0094*** –0.0032* –0.0050***
(0.0045) (0.0015) (0.0019) (0.0014)
L.Below 0.0068** 0.0141*** 0.0005 0.0029***
(0.0032) (0.0020) (0.0016) (0.0009)
Lnasset 0.0071 0.0091 0.0044 –0.0056**
(0.0047) (0.0055) (0.0032) (0.0020)
Institute*Year YES YES YES YES
Province*Year YES YES YES YES
Branch FE YES YES YES YES
Observations 711 1,756 673 1,615
R-squared 0.8001 0.7334 0.7243 0.7337
Overall effect when below –0.0054* –0.0050* –0.0030* –0.0011 
Standard error 0.0031 0.002746 0.0018 0.0012
*** p < 0.01 ** p < 0.05 * p < 0.1
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. 
Source: Authors’ estimations.
Benefits and costs of SME financing schemes: 
A summary
In the previous three sections, we investigate the impacts of the evaluation of banks’ 
SME loans on their lending outcomes, including banks’ shares of SME loans, credit 
risk and profits. We summarise these effects in Table 10.13 and analyse them in the 
benefit and cost framework. 
The expected benefit of the evaluation of the SME loans is to effectively increase the 
number of loans to SMEs, as the evaluation aims to boost bank loans to SMEs. But 
from this perspective, the overall benefit is uncertain, because the evaluation has the 
opposite impact on the initially unconstrained and constrained banks. It effectively 
increases the share of SME loans for the constrained banks, which initially fell short of 
the evaluation requirements, while it decreases that share for the unconstrained banks, 
which initially exceeded the requirements (see the first two rows of Column (1)). For 
banks of different size, the impacts are also different: the evaluation increases the share 
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of SME loans for both constrained small and constrained large banks, but it decreases 
the share only for constrained large banks. Thus, overall, the evaluation increases the 
SME loans for small banks but the impact is unclear for large banks as a whole. 
The evaluation also has some spillover effects on banks’ credit risk and profits. 
The evaluation significantly increased the credit risk for the constrained small 
banks, while it decreased the credit risk for the unconstrained large banks (see the 
third and fourth rows of Table 10.13). While the evaluation increased profits for 
unconstrained large banks, it decreased profits for both small constrained and large 
constrained banks.
Overall, the evaluation has different influences for banks with different initial 
conditions regarding SME loans and banks of different size. For the constrained 
small banks, the evaluation increased their SME loans while raising some costs 
by increasing their credit risk and decreasing their profits. For the unconstrained 
small banks, there are no significant effects. For the constrained large banks, the 
evaluation increased their share of SME loans, but decreased their net interest 
income. The evaluation benefits the unconstrained large banks by decreasing their 
credit risk and improving their profits.
Table 10.13 The effect of evaluation of SME loans on banks’ lending outcomes








1 SME loans Unconstrained Decrease No Decrease
2 Constrained Increase Increase Increase
3 Credit risk Unconstrained Decrease No Decrease
4 Constrained No Increase No
5 Profits-NII Unconstrained Increase No Increase
6 Constrained No Decrease Decrease
7 Profits-ROA Unconstrained Increase No Increase
8 Constrained No Decrease No
Note: ‘Decrease’ and ‘Increase’ indicate that the evaluation significantly decreases and increases, 
respectively, the lending outcomes separately, and ‘No’ indicates that the evaluation has no significant 
impact on lending outcomes.
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Conclusion and policy implications
The sound development of SMEs in China is of primary importance for promoting 
economic growth, job creation and innovation. A lack of appropriate financing 
channels and credit unavailability are the main hurdles for the development of SMEs. 
The Chinese Government has authorised a set of schemes to solve the financing 
problems of SMEs. Yet, to date, there has been little evidence of the effectiveness of 
these schemes in increasing the number of loans to SMEs. The literature is similarly 
quiet on the cost to the banks of these financing schemes.
In this chapter, we investigate the benefits and costs of one of these financing 
schemes in China, which was initiated by the CBRC in 2008 to force commercial 
banks to meet certain requirements on SME loans. Based on a unique county 
branch–level survey dataset, our empirical analysis finds that the evaluation policy 
has different influences on banks with different initial conditions regarding SME 
loans and banks of different size. Although the evaluation policy increases lending to 
SMEs for banks that initially fell short of the requirements, it decreases SME loans 
for banks that initially exceeded the requirements. The overall benefit of this policy 
in terms of increasing SME loans depends on the distribution of the constrained 
and unconstrained banks. In regard to the cost, the evaluation increases credit risk 
and decreases the profits for constrained small banks, and it decreases net interest 
income for constrained large banks.
The empirical findings in this chapter have important policy implications. Based 
on our findings, financing support schemes for SMEs bring both benefits and 
costs for banks. One of the notable problems of this SME financing scheme is that 
it increases the credit risk of small banks and decreases their profits. To fix this 
problem, the government needs to introduce policies to fundamentally improve the 
business, financial and innovation environments and the service system for SMEs. 
The efficient enforcement of the 2018 amendments to the law on the promotion of 
SMEs is an important and necessary step.
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11. Modelling the economic impact 
of the Sino–US trade dispute: 
A global perspective
Deborah H.Y. Tan and Chen Chen1
Introduction
The global economy works best when goods, services, people and ideas flow freely 
across administrative boundaries. The current prosperity we all enjoy is due, in no 
small part, to the benefits of international trade, which unlocks the positive benefits 
of national and regional comparative advantage. The position of our employer, BHP, 
on this point is clear.
Quoting directly from the six-monthly update that BHP publishes with its financial 
results: 
While we stress that an increase in trade protection alone is not a recessionary level 
shock for the global economy, it is an exceedingly unhelpful starting point for the 
pursuit of broad based growth across regions, expenditure drivers and industries. 
That observation highlights the importance of continued advocacy for free trade 
and open markets by corporations, governments and civil society … As the true 
economic costs of trade protection are progressively recognised by global consumers, 
we anticipate a popular mandate for a more open international trading environment 
will eventually emerge. (McKay 2019)
Exactly how large might those costs be and what can be done to mitigate them? 
That is what this chapter is about.
The current trade dispute between the United States and China stems from the 
Trump administration’s long-held commitment to adopt a tougher stance against 
China to change what it regards as unfair trade practices. These practices are, in the 
administration’s view, the reason for the US trade deficit with China. At a deeper 
level, the trade dispute can also be seen as a surface manifestation of the emerging 
superpower rivalry between the United States and China. 
At the time of writing, talks between US and Chinese trade negotiators are under 
way and have gained traction in recent months. However, it is difficult to foresee the 
final outcome of the negotiations—or, indeed, if there will be an end or whether this 
1 The authors thank Warwick McKibbin, Larry Liu and Huw McKay for helpful suggestions on an earlier draft.
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issue is best seen as a continuum. Therefore, rather than presenting a single set of 
results, we have instead prepared a number of different scenarios, of varying intensity 
and duration, with varying counterpolicies in play, to capture the range of potential 
outcomes for the US, Chinese and global economies in the coming decade. 
The scenarios have been simulated in the G-cubed multicountry model. A key 
reference for this chapter is McKibbin and Stoeckel (2017), who use the G-cubed 
model to simulate the effects of a range of multilateral trade war scenarios.
Our conclusion is that a trade war will, unsurprisingly, leave both the Chinese and 
the American people less prosperous than they would otherwise have been. Our 
definition of a full-blown Sino–US trade war will be costly for both countries and 
could reduce the size of both economies by 0.5 per cent, on average, over the next 
decade. While the impact on China is initially greater due to China’s higher trade 
exposure, the cost to the United States increases over time. However, bystander 
countries stand to gain, at the margin, from the diversion of activity, with market 
share gains in both China and the United States for the likes of Germany, Japan and 
South Korea. It also appears to be strongly in China’s interests to resolve the dispute 
through negotiation, while simultaneously pursuing a set of sensible countercyclical 
policies to cushion the Chinese domestic economy in the near to medium terms.
The economic priorities of President Trump 
and President Xi
President Donald Trump’s major economic policy priorities have been to raise economic 
growth and create jobs by boosting investment. The levers used to do this have been 
lowering taxes (especially corporate taxes) and reducing regulation, while providing 
protection for US manufacturing by raising tariffs and renegotiating trade agreements. 
This platform has had mixed success, both legislatively and in terms of economic 
outcomes. The biggest legislative achievement to date—the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, signed 
into law in December 2017—is arguably the most sweeping overhaul of the US tax 
system in more than 30 years. The tax package lifted growth above potential in 2018, 
and we estimate that it will continue to support investment, employment and wages 
above a counterfactual baseline for a half-decade or so. However, it is not self-financing 
and the Joint Committee on Taxation (2017) argues it will add an extra US$1.1 trillion 
to the budget deficit over 10 years. The boost to domestic demand relative to that of 
the United States’ trading partners also suggests that the US trade balance will worsen, 
running counter to the administration’s efforts to reduce the nation’s trade deficit.
On trade, President Trump has been able to use national security provisions in trade 
legislation to expedite measures, rather than seeking congressional approval. The basic 
line from the administration is that the large bilateral trade deficits the United States 
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runs with its major partners are a sign that US exporters are being treated unfairly and 
that these partners should be buying more American exports. While China has not 
been alone in receiving US criticism on trade,2 China has arguably been the primary 
target. This has also extended beyond the bilateral relationship to shape US dealings 
with other nations. For instance, the new US–Mexico–Canada Agreement to replace 
the North American Free Trade Agreement includes a ‘poison pill’ provision allowing 
the United States to veto Canada’s and Mexico’s choices of other trading partners, and 
appears to be a clear effort to single out China. 
While US policymaking has grown more nationalistic under the current 
administration, China is pursuing a broader long-run economic growth strategy 
and a more influential role regionally. The Chinese authorities continue to view 
economic growth as a key priority under the guidance of the thirteenth Five-Year 
Plan, which aims to double China’s per capita income by 2020. At the same time, 
reforms have been promoted to a similar level of importance over the past five years 
as the maturing economy is confronted with various structural issues, mainly in 
the areas of industrial capacity, financial risk and the environment. Over the past 
five years, the Chinese Government has navigated a gradual growth slowdown 
alongside the implementation of various supply-side structural reforms. China has 
also pursued some unilateral trade reforms while negotiations with the United States 
have been proceeding, such as lower tariffs on cars, and it also passed a new foreign 
investment law at the most recent National People’s Congress.
China’s long-run goal to become a ‘modernised and prosperous economy’ by the 
mid-twenty-first century has also catalysed the pursuit of industrial policies that 
would drive its sizeable manufacturing sector (currently low to middle in terms of 
value added) up the value chain. ‘Made in China 2025’ is a well-known government-
backed industrial policy focused on advancing China’s manufacturing sector 
into a technological superpower and targeting key sectors such as information, 
communication and telecommunication, machinery and equipment and industrial 
materials. More broadly, China has been growing in influence in the Asia-Pacific 
over the past few years through establishing closer bilateral economic linkages. The 
Belt and Road Initiative, for instance, has become the backbone of the incumbent 
administration’s foreign policies. The establishment of the Beijing-headquartered 
Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank highlighted China’s commitment to play 
a  serious role in terms of providing support for regional economic development. 
The  sum of these moves presents a clear strategy to move China up the value 
chain while increasing China’s role in international governance, particularly in the 
development financing sphere.
2 Elsewhere, President Trump has threatened to impose tariffs of up to 25 per cent on European car imports if he 
is unable to reach a deal with the bloc following findings from the US Commerce Department in February this 
year. Also, steel and aluminium tariffs have been global in nature, with only a few exemptions offered, and with 
countries in the Americas the most heavily impacted.
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State of play on trade negotiations
Concerns about Chinese trade practices, the treatment of foreign companies in China 
and questions about intellectual property rights protection are not new. According to 
the US Trade Representative (2019) and European Commission (European Chamber 
of Commerce 2018), many policymakers believe the Chinese Government has not 
met all its World Trade Organization (WTO) accession commitments. Claims 
include ‘unfair’ support for Chinese domestic companies, alleged forced technology 
transfers and denial of market access to international competitors. The American 
Chamber of Commerce in Shanghai (2017) notes significant barriers to entry in 
five key industries: financial services, information and communications technology, 
health care, agriculture and the automotive industry. Meltzer and Shenai (2019) 
and Hass and Balin (2019) from The Brookings Institution also observe that China’s 
ambition to become a technology superpower has caused bipartisan consternation in 
the United States, centred on whether China would use industrial policy to provide, 
once again, ‘unfair’ support to domestic players. The rapid escalation in tensions in 
recent months has built on the foundations created by these perceptions. 
From China’s point of view, the US merchandise trade deficit reflects a number 
of structural factors. First, the current trade deficit is a reflection of the low level of 
US national savings, across the public and private sectors. The dollar’s role as the 
global vehicle funding currency also necessitates the provision of US dollar liquidity 
through perpetual trade deficits—also known as the Triffin dilemma. Finally, the 
comparative advantage of Chinese goods production and the redistribution and 
fragmentation of the global supply chain have led to major shifts in the country of 
origin of products American consumers buy, both from established brands and in 
terms of increases in indigenous Chinese firms’ market share. 
Tensions between the world’s two largest economies have escalated rapidly following 
the US decision to impose tariffs on steel and aluminium imports in March 2018. 
Figure 11.1 provides a timeline of developments to date. So far, the United States 
has imposed duties on more than half of its imports of Chinese goods and China has 
retaliated with tariffs on more than 70 per cent of its imports of US goods. Between 
30 November and 1 December 2018, a ‘truce’ agreement was reached between both 
countries at the G20 summit in Buenos Aires. As part of the temporary ceasefire, 
the United States agreed to postpone raising tariffs from 1 January 2019 and set 
a 90-day time frame for the two sides to make progress on key structural issues. 
On 24 February, President Trump decided to postpone the implementation of the 
more punitive tariffs that were due to come into effect on 1 March. At the time 
of writing, in early April 2019, talks are still under way between US and Chinese 
trade negotiators. While both governments have been keen to point out the highly 
productive nature of their talks, it remains to be seen whether substantive progress 
has truly been made.
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Figure 11.1 Sino–US trade developments timeline
Source: BHP analysis.
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It is difficult to foresee the final outcome of the negotiations and what the United 
States might expect from China in exchange for either continued suspension of 
increased tariffs or removal of those tariffs that are in place. Other questions—such 
as those relating to industrial policy, market access and intellectual property—will 
also need to be resolved. In the unlikely event that negotiations fail completely, the 
United States has the upper hand in both the breadth and the volume of tariffs that 
it could impose, while China is unable to match like for like given its lower level of 
imports from the United States (Figure 11.2). Although China has insisted it does 
not wish to escalate the dispute, there are other policy tools the Chinese leadership 




















Figure 11.2 Trade policy actions from the United States and China
Source: BHP analysis.
To assess the range of impacts of the conflict, we use a set of scenarios to capture 
three possible outcomes of the Sino–US trade dispute. At the time of writing, two 
scenarios have been overtaken by the pace of events. Taking the outcomes of the 
first set of scenarios into account, we then examine the impact of three Chinese 
policy countermeasures. Some of these countervailing measures have already been 
implemented, while others may yet be adopted. 
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The model
The policy choices of the United States and China have a strong influence on their 
own domestic economies, each other’s trade performance as well as the economic 
opportunities faced by their other trading partners. Protectionism increases operating 
costs for firms in import destination markets, reduces the purchasing power of 
consumers, reduces the rate of return on capital and leads to lower investment. 
Employment falls as businesses downsize and slack in the labour market depresses 
wages and spending. A full-blown Sino–US trade war will certainly be costly for 
both countries. Meanwhile, bystander countries such as Germany and Japan stand 
to gain from the diversion of activity. While Chinese stimulus policies could stabilise 
the economy in the near term, that would be at the expense of a higher fiscal deficit 
and the need for consolidation in the future.
To capture all of these influences and interactions, we have used the comprehensive 
dynamic global model originally developed by McKibbin and Wilcoxen (1999, 
2013). The G-cubed model incorporates all of these interactions in a dynamic 
and global setting, with sectoral detail. The version used in this chapter is outlined 
in more detail in McKibbin and Stoeckel (2017). Specifically, the model version 
used here has six sectors (energy, mining, agriculture, manufacturing durables, 
manufacturing nondurables and services) plus a capital goods–producing sector and 
17 countries/regions, as set out in Table 11.1. Each region’s central bank is assumed 
to adjust short-term nominal interest rates following the Henderson–McKibbin–
Taylor rule,3 as set out in Henderson and McKibbin (1993) and Taylor (1993). 
In this model version, all central banks, with the exception of China’s, target inflation 
and GDP growth. Compared to most central banks, the People’s Bank of China 
has several policy targets, including price stability, economic growth, employment, 
balance of payments, financial markets reform and liberalisation (Zhou 2016). 
China’s central bank targets inflation, GDP growth and the nominal exchange rate. 
In the first set of scenarios, the US and Chinese central banks automatically respond 
to macroeconomic outcomes according to the monetary rule. In the second set of 
scenarios, the Chinese central bank cuts short-term interest rates independently and 
subsequently responds to macroeconomic outcomes following the monetary rule. 
As for fiscal policy, government spending here is assumed to be exogenous and the 
government collects taxes to service its debt interests.
3 The nominal interest rate set by the central bank should respond to divergences of actual inflation from target 
inflation and of actual economic output from potential economic output.
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G-cubed features businesses that are forward looking in their investment and 
spending decisions, which are made based on current and past rates of return and 
future expected rates of return. Here, we expect businesses to invest less given 
expectations of lower returns in the future due to the imposition of tariffs. As such, 
it is an ideal tool with which to assess the potential impacts of these wideranging 
trade policies on the global economy.





Rest of euro area Latin America
Canada Other emerging economies
Australia Eastern Europe and former Soviet Union
South Korea OPEC
Rest of advanced economies
OPEC = Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries
Literature review
Over the past year, there has been increased attention on the potential adverse 
economic impacts of a trade war. The scope of these studies varies to a substantial 
degree and depends on the countries that are involved in the scenario analyses 
as well  as  the assumptions in general. A global trade war has far more negative 
repercussions, whereas a bilateral trade war leads to leakages to third countries. 
The  upside to our analysis is that we have realistically focused on the two 
countries involved. In addition, we have included a suite of possible Chinese policy 
responses in a full-escalation scenario. 
McKibbin and Stoeckel (2017) used the G-cubed model to simulate the effects of 
a range of multilateral trade war scenarios. They find that tariffs imposed by the 
United States on all imports from all countries would leave all countries and regions 
worse off. The United States itself is also worse off under this scenario, with GDP 
falling by 0.3 per cent in the first year, and the impact on China is three times 
larger, at –0.9 per cent. In a global trade war, all countries are worse off—some more 
than others due to their trade exposure. The losses to China, Germany and other 
countries in Asia are some three times larger than for the United States.
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Freund et al. (2018) from the World Bank used a computable general equilibrium 
model and considered three scenarios, all of which included mutual tariffs between 
the United States and China, with the third scenario including a decline in investor 
confidence. The authors find that third-party countries benefit from trade diversion 
when the two trading partners impose tariff surcharges. But, when investor 
confidence is shaken, these gains are more than offset for all regions by negative 
income effects. In this scenario, income losses range between 0.9 per cent for South 
Asia and 1.7 per cent for Europe and Central Asia. The biggest declines in incomes 
are recorded by China and the United States—up to 3.5 per cent and 1.6 per cent, 
respectively. The sectors most affected include agriculture, chemicals and transport 
equipment in the United States, and electronic equipment, machinery and other 
manufacturing in China.
Li et al. (2018) used a multicountry global general equilibrium model to simulate the 
effects of possible Sino–US trade wars, including both tariff and nontariff measures. 
The authors find that the United States can gain under unilateral sanctions measures 
on China, but it will lose if China takes retaliatory measures. Under a mutual trade 
war, China will lose more than the United States. Additionally, trade wars between 
China and the United States will hurt most countries and the world, especially in 
terms of GDP and manufacturing employment.
The trade war scenario analysis by the European Central Bank (ECB) is published as 
part of their economic bulletin dating from September 2018. By using the model of 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) as well as their own global model, the ECB 
assesses both the trade and the confidence channels by which the economy might be 
impacted by the current trade war. The study examines a global trade war in which 
the United States imposes tariffs on all imports and all trading partners reciprocate 
these protectionist US measures. This explains the relatively higher impact on the US 
economy compared with China, as the latter can benefit from substitution effects. 
Furthermore, the study assumes that the trade tensions will ease going forward and 
will last for only two years. 
Simulations
The first set of scenarios assesses the impact of three different outcomes of the trade 
dispute, excluding any Chinese policy response. The tariff shocks are assumed 
to be permanent. The second set considers the impact of three different Chinese 
policy responses in the event of a bilateral trade war. Table 11.3 summarises the key 
assumptions in each scenario.
The first set of scenarios is chosen to reflect the observed evolution of the trade 
dispute as well as a plausible intensification. Our first scenario, ‘Symbolic retaliation’, 
mirrors the first tit for tat between the United States and China in March 2018 after 
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President Trump invoked Section 232 of the Trade Act (1962) and imposed tariffs of 
25 per cent on steel and 10 per cent on aluminium imports. We find this scenario to 
have a largely neutral impact on long-term growth prospects. The second scenario, 
‘Escalated tensions’, mirrors the tit for tat between the United States and China in 
July–August 2018, following the findings of the Section 301 investigation under 
the Trade Act (1974). The US Trade Representative then targeted US$50 billion 
of imported Chinese products that were deemed instrumental in helping China 
achieve its goals of becoming a global leader in the advanced technology sector, 
prompting China to retaliate like for like. In September 2018, the United States 
imposed a further 10 per cent tariff on an additional US$200 billion of Chinese 
imports, with China responding with 5–10 per cent tariffs on an additional US$60 
billion of US imports. Prior to the truce achieved at the G20 meeting in December 
2018, a further escalation of the dispute was a distinct possibility. As such, we assume 
the worst-case scenario of a bilateral trade war in our third scenario, ‘Trade war’. 
The trade shocks in the simulations are designed to be close to the announced 
policies but will not capture the precise measures. With this caveat in mind, we 
compare the impact of each simulation against a baseline before the United States 
and China openly engaged in tit for tat. Given the six-sector setting in the G-cubed 
model, we convert the industry-specific tariffs to an aggregate rate that can be 
applied to the entire sector, based on the industry’s share in that sector. We use 2016 
bilateral import data from the World Integrated Trade Solution Trade Stats database 
to estimate the industry shares. We then apply the industry weights to the new 
tariffs and arrive at a sector-wide tariff rate.
A more detailed description of the three scenarios is as follows. 
Symbolic retaliation
In March 2018, US metals importers faced higher duties following the imposition 
of tariffs on steel and aluminium (25 per cent and 10 per cent, respectively) sourced 
from several countries. China retaliated by raising duties (ranging from 15 per cent 
to 25 per cent) on its imports of US food, animal products and metal articles. 
In this simulation, we apply a sector-wide average tariff on US imports of Chinese 
durable manufacturing goods to reflect the higher levies on the metals industry. 
We also apply a sector-wide average tariff on Chinese imports of US nondurable 
manufacturing, agricultural, fishing and hunting and durable manufacturing goods 
to reflect higher levies on the affected industries. 
Escalated tensions
In July 2018, the US administration imposed 25 per cent tariffs on US$50 billion 
of Chinese goods, covering industrial, transport and medical products. China 
retaliated with 25 per cent tariffs on US$50 billion of US goods, including soybeans, 
automobiles and aircraft. In this simulation, the sector-wide incremental tariff 
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rate on US imports of Chinese durable manufacturing goods is revised to include 
new levies on machinery and equipment, transportation and other miscellaneous 
manufactured articles. For China, the sector-wide tariffs on US agricultural, fishing 
and hunting, durable manufacturing and nondurable manufacturing goods are also 
updated to reflect the new levies on agricultural products, transport equipment and 
chemicals and plastics. 
Trade war
In a fully fledged trade war, the United States and China are assumed to raise tariffs 
on all bilateral imports. In this simulation, we apply 25 per cent tariffs on all sectors. 
In 2018, China rolled out several supportive measures in response to not only 
a weaker external outlook arising from trade tensions, but also the slowing domestic 
economy (Table 11.2). In the second set of scenarios, we assess the efficacy of 
a package of Chinese policy responses in the event of a trade war against the same 
pre-dispute baseline. In the first scenario, ‘Drip irrigation’, the policy shocks are 
designed to be similar to the announced stimulus but will not fully capture the 
precise measures. In the second scenario, ‘Pump priming’, we assume the Chinese 
authorities provide much more aggressive policy support to shore up short-term 
growth. In the third scenario, ‘Sell-off’, we hypothesise that China counters US 
aggression through other nontariff means—namely, through a sell-off of its 
substantial holdings of US Treasuries. 
Table 11.2 Chinese policy package in 2018
Date announced Policy measures
March 2018 China announced import tariff cuts focused on consumer goods—
e.g. automobiles, pharmaceuticals.
May 2018 A value-added tax cut (1 per cent) applied to manufacturing, transport 
and construction firms.
April, June, October 2018 The central bank cumulatively lowered commercial banks’ required 
reserve ratio from 17 per cent to 14.5 per cent. The interbank offered 
rate was lowered by approximately 25 basis points since Q2 2018, 
partly as a result of a round of required-rate-of-return cuts, as well as 
proactive market operations by the People’s Bank of China through 
its mid-term lending facility and reverse repurchase.
October 2018 Individual tax threshold raised to RMB5,000 from RMB3,500, as well as 
policies on income tax deductions. Effective from January 2019.
November 2018 Chinese authorities increased export tax rebates on about 400, mainly 
capital, goods.
Source: MoFCOM, BHP analysis.
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Drip irrigation
This simulation captures major policies implemented in 2018 to stabilise 
the economy.  Between March and October, the Chinese authorities lowered 
the required reserve ratio on three occasions (in April, July and October). Although 
the People’s Bank of China did not engage in an outright reduction in the policy 
rate, the interbank offer rate—or what we would interpret as the shadow rate—
fell by 25 basis points over the same period in response to the liquidity injection. 
Accordingly, we reduce the short-term interest rate to reflect monetary easing. 
We also lower the personal income tax rate at the margin to reflect the increase in 
the tax-free personal income band. We also use a tax credit to proxy the package 
of tax rebates, tariff cuts and sales tax reductions offered to firms in durable and 
nondurable manufacturing. 
Pump priming
In this simulation, the tax shocks are unchanged from the first simulation; however, 
monetary policy easing is assumed to be more aggressive (in our case, the cut 
to short-term interest rates is doubled). Government spending is also increased to 
reflect higher future expenditures on indigenous research and development to meet 
the authorities’ long-term strategic objectives. 
Sell-off
In this simulation, the tax and monetary policy shocks are unchanged from the 
first simulation. In addition, we assume that Chinese authorities withdraw their 
capital from the US Government bond market and redeploy this capital in 
domestic investment and other parts of the world. Presently, China’s holdings 
of US Treasuries  (worth US$1 trillion) is equivalent to about 5 per cent of US 
nominal GDP. The shock is set up such that the United States will face a capital 
outflow equivalent to 5 per cent of GDP over the next 20 years—that is, a loss 
of 0.25 per cent of GDP per year. This $1 trillion from the United States is then 
reallocated to the rest of the world in proportion to GDP. 
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Model results: Scenario set 1
In the first set of simulations, we assess the impact of three different trade outcomes 
relative to a benchmark before the trade dispute. In the most benign of the three 
simulations, ‘Symbolic retaliation’, GDP deviates only slightly from the baseline 
(Figure 11.3, Exhibits 5–1). In the ‘Escalated tensions’ simulation, US and Chinese 
GDP fall by 0.2 per cent and 0.3 per cent, respectively, over the next decade. In the 
worst-case scenario, ‘Trade war’, both US and Chinese GDP decline by 0.5 per 
cent on average over the next 10 years. The initial impact on China is greater than 
that on the United States across all scenarios due to China’s higher trade exposure. 
However, the cost to the United States becomes larger over time. On the other 
hand, third countries such as Germany and Japan will benefit from rising exports as 
activity is diverted away from the combatants. This is a positive for GDP in these 
countries (Figure 11.3, Exhibit 2) and, to some extent, this cushions the overall 
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Exhibit 6 Imports of Chinese durable manufacturing 
goods from key trading partners
Figure 11.3 Impact of trade tensions
Source: BHP analysis based on G-cubed model.
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Sectors facing protectionism will lose out, with durable manufacturing taking the 
biggest hit. This is a key sector targeted explicitly by both governments and accounts 
for the bulk of bilateral imports. The impact on China’s durable manufacturing will 
also be much larger relative to the United States, due to the sector’s bigger relative 
trade exposure (Figure 11.3, Exhibit 3). Tariffs increase the price of imported capital 
goods and lower firm profits and rates of return on investment. While an increase in 
tariffs may encourage a switch from foreign to domestic goods, the higher operating 
costs and lower returns on investment actually outweigh the benefits of an extra 
boost to domestic demand. As a result, investment and output fall in the United 
States and China, with a greater impact on China. The short to medium-term 
impact is greater on China but the difference narrows over time.
In the ‘Trade war’ scenario, wages could be –0.1 per cent and –1.5 per cent 
lower on average in the United States and China, respectively, over the next 
decade (Figure 11.3, Exhibit 4). The durable manufacturing sectors that are most 
impacted by the trade barriers will see the sharpest fall in employment. Businesses 
are expected to lower their demand for labour and wages will be driven down 
as they start to downsize operations. The slowdown in real activity dampens the 
effects of higher imported inflation. The United States and China are expected to 
see mildly higher inflation.
In China, the decline in return on capital discourages new investment and leads 
to an internal rebalancing in overall savings and investments. The sharp drop in 
investment could stem from reduced demand for imported raw materials and 
equipment. This change in the savings–investment balance leads to an improvement 
in China’s trade position (Figure 11.3, Exhibit 5). The renminbi is also expected to 
weaken in the medium term as China experiences a sharper capital outflow given 
a reduced domestic need for investment. The weaker renminbi in turn increases 
the competitiveness of Chinese exports and encourages demand from other trading 
partners, such as Germany and Japan, mitigating some of the overall decline in 
exports (Figure 11.3, Exhibit 6). In contrast, the US trade position deteriorates, 
reflecting a slight worsening of its savings–investment balance. The United States 
experiences a drop in investment demand and a bigger drop in domestic savings. 
The change in relative rates of return between the United States and China attracts 
some capital inflow into the United States, which supports a stronger US dollar 
through the medium term. The stronger dollar encourages more consumption and 
domestic savings falls, leading to a weaker trade position. The strength of the US 
dollar also reduces the export competitiveness of US goods and services. While we 
mainly discuss the changes to nominal exchange rates, the change to real exchange 
rates largely follows a similar profile given the limited inflationary impact.
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Model results: Scenario set 2
In the second set of scenarios, we assess the effectiveness of a range of Chinese policy 
responses in the event of a trade war. In all three scenarios, the policy stimulus buffers 
a negative trade shock and leads to a smaller decline in China’s medium-term output 
(Figure 11.4, Exhibit 1). Monetary easing lowers borrowing costs for domestic 
firms. Tax credits to the export-oriented manufacturing sector also increase after-
tax profits and rates of return on investment, making it more attractive to expand 
business operations in these sectors. The change in relative return on investment 
also results in some capital being drawn away from the United States. Indeed, in all 
three scenarios, the United States experiences a steeper decline in investment, but 
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China’s choice of policies also leads to differentiated outcomes in the short and 
medium terms. A stronger stimulus under ‘Pump priming’ lends the greatest support 
in the short term, but this comes at the expense of lower output in the longer term 
as higher government spending necessitates some form of fiscal consolidation in the 
future. While the ‘Sell-off’ scenario is slightly less effective at offsetting the near-term 
shocks, the Chinese economy benefits from increased domestic investment from 
a redeployment of Chinese capital (away from US Treasuries) and sees a stronger 
pickup in real activity over the longer term. 
From China’s perspective, the ‘Sell-off’ scenario is expected to be as effective as 
‘Pump  priming’ in cushioning the impact of a bilateral trade war over the next 
decade, with GDP expected to be 0.1 per cent lower on average over the next 10 years 
in both cases. This compares with an average decline in China’s GDP over the next 
decade by 0.5 per cent in a trade war and 0.2 per cent under the ‘Drip irrigation’ 
scenario. Over the next 10 years, US GDP is expected to decline by 0.5 per cent 
in a trade war and will worsen marginally with ‘Drip irrigation’ and ‘Pump priming’. 
Under the ‘Sell-off’ scenario, US GDP is expected to fall by 0.7 per cent. These 
outcomes show that such retaliatory measures can be quite limited in their capacity 
to inflict economic damage on the United States. The limited economic damage 
and the politically explosive nature of a sell-off appear to support the views of some 
Chinese policymakers.4 
Bystander countries such as Germany and Japan continue to benefit as trade activity 
and capital flows are diverted away from the combatants (Figure 11.4, Exhibit 2). 
However, ongoing EU–US trade talks have yet to make decisive progress and 
the threat of US auto tariffs remains tangible. If auto tariffs were to materialise, 
the boost to auto exporters from diverted trade is likely to fall significantly, with 
Japan experiencing a greater loss (compared with Germany) given its larger relative 
exposure to US final demand. In 2017, the United States imported US$40 billion 
worth of Japanese-made cars and US$20 billion worth of German-made cars. 
Figure 11.4, Exhibit 3 shows that countercyclical measures can mitigate some of the 
negative impacts on investment from a trade war. Specifically, the stimulus increases 
the after-tax return from investing in China and reduces the relative attractiveness of 
investing in the United States. The more expansionary the policy (‘Pump priming’ 
being the most aggressive), the better the investment outcome for China is. For the 
United States, the pullback in investment is the largest under the ‘Sell-off’ scenario. 
For decades, foreign purchases of US Government securities have subsidised the 
borrowing costs of the US Government, relative to what it would have had to pay if 
it only had access to US domestic savings. This has also driven down the borrowing 
costs of US corporations in domestic markets. Under the ‘Sell-off’ scenario, the 
4 Chinese ambassador Cui Tankai compared selling US Treasuries to playing with fire and thought the authorities 
in Beijing would not wish to cause any financial instability in global markets (Lee 2018).
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outflow of capital leads to a drop in the US dollar and a rise in long-term US bond 
yields and borrowing costs; these two mutually reinforcing forces are expected to 
weigh on investment sentiment.
The stimulus also cushions the impact on Chinese employment from a trade war 
(Figure 11.4, Exhibit 4). Chinese businesses are expected to lower their demand for 
labour as operations are downsized. The slowdown in activity is moderated, leading 
to a milder decline in Chinese wages. Under a highly expansionary stance (‘Pump 
priming’), wages could even rise as stronger government spending and investment 
activity bid up labour demand. In the United States, ‘Sell-off’ places the largest 
cap on US wage growth prospects in the medium term. These wage dynamics are 
expected to mirror investment decisions. 
While the stimulus is in itself inflationary, economic activity generally remains 
below potential in all three scenarios, so China experiences only mildly higher 
inflation. The size of the stimulus under the ‘Pump priming’ scenario imparts the 
strongest inflationary impulse in the early years. In the United States, ‘Sell-off’ has 
the largest impact on inflation. Specifically, the combined effect of lower demand 
for US Treasuries and a redirection of these capital flows towards other competitors 
leads to a depreciation in the US dollar relative to its major trading partners and the 
United States experiences higher imported inflation. 
The stimulus raises the relative rate of return of investing in China and attracts 
capital inflows, so even with outright monetary easing, the renminbi falls by less in 
all three scenarios (Figure 11.4, Exhibit 5). In ‘Sell-off’, recipients of Chinese capital 
see their exchange rates appreciate so this to some extent dampens the strength of the 
renminbi against its non-US trading partners. However, the renminbi strengthens 
relative to the US dollar. On a trade-weighted basis, the renminbi depreciates the 
least in ‘Pump priming’, under which overall demand for Chinese capital is the 
highest. Across the three scenarios, capital flight out of the United States in ‘Sell-off’ 
leads to the weakest outcome for the US dollar. 
The first set of scenarios showed that the drop in investment demand in China 
rebalances domestic savings and investment and leads to an improvement in 
China’s trade balance (Figure 11.4, Exhibit 6). With a policy stimulus and higher 
investment needs, however, the improvement in China’s trade balance will be 
reduced. In the case of ‘Pump priming’, the trade balance actually deteriorates as 
higher investment demand spurs capital inflows, which strengthen the renminbi. 
The stronger renminbi is expected to weaken the export competitiveness of Chinese 
goods and services. In ‘Sell-off’, demand for investment falls and capital flows 
out of the United States. Reduced support for the US dollar increases the export 
competitiveness of US goods and services and, taken together with lower demand 
for imports, moves the US trade position closer to balance. 
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Conclusion
A trade war is costly for both the United States and China. While the United 
States will impose a larger cost on China in the initial years, it will suffer a similar 
medium-term adverse impact on growth. While both countries have a strong 
incentive to avoid a trade war because of the economic consequences, there may be 
circumstances in which policymakers are willing to accept some economic pain to 
try to change the behaviour of the other party in the pursuit of long-term strategic 
interests.
From China’s perspective, while aggressive fiscal expansion appears to be an attractive 
policy option in the near term, by offering the most short-term relief, output in the 
longer term will be compromised. Further, a sharp increase in credit is inconsistent 
with China’s strategic focus on deleveraging. While a diversification of Chinese 
foreign assets through a redeployment of its US holdings appears to be an attractive 
strategy prima facie, given it does not compromise the government’s balance sheet 
or long-term prospects, the risks of further escalation makes it a strategy that one 
would not recommend. The Chinese Government, while occasionally adopting 
strong rhetoric, has consistently said it is committed to not escalating tensions, so 
such a provocative move appears relatively unlikely. However, it is wrong to say 
that China’s options for retaliation are solely related to matching tariffs should it 
be pushed into a very tight corner. All up, we think the current policy approach 
by the Chinese Government is a sensible and conservative option that cushions 
the economy adequately in the near to medium terms, while reducing the chances 
of international repercussions. 
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12. Inequality of opportunity and 
gender discrimination in China’s 
labour income
Jane Golley, Yixiao Zhou and Meiyan Wang
Income inequality has been a persistent feature of China’s rapid growth and 
development since the late 1970s. A vast literature has emerged to explain these 
inequalities along a number of dimensions, including regional and rural–urban 
disparities and intergenerational persistence in virtually all measures of ‘economic 
advantage’, be they per capita GDP, household income and wealth, individual 
earnings or educational attainment.1 While Deng Xiaoping famously justified these 
inequalities by arguing that some regions and people would need to become rich 
first before all could eventually prosper, he surely did not envisage, nor seek to 
justify, a gender divide in this argument—in which men would become rich first 
and women would only eventually prosper. Yet a growing body of evidence suggests 
that this gender divide not only exists, but also is widening.
A gender earnings gap has persisted in urban China throughout the reform period—
and has, in fact, grown since the mid-1990s—despite a narrowing of the gender gap 
in educational attainment in recent years, to the point where women now out-
educate men, on average.2 A wide literature has confirmed that most of the earnings 
gap is attributable to gender discrimination, rather than observable factors such as 
gender differences in human capital or occupational choices.3 In rural China, gaps 
in both education and earnings are even more substantial.4 Rozelle et  al. (2002) 
find that market reforms did little to affect the gender earnings gap in the rural 
economy, and they attribute much of the (relatively stable) gap between 1988 
and 1995 to ‘unexplained factors’ or wage discrimination. Meng (1998), while 
finding some reduction in wage discrimination in the most marketised sectors of 
Chinese rural industry in the mid-1980s, found that it still accounted for two-
thirds of the wage differential in these sectors, leading her to conclude that China’s 
1 We cannot do justice to this literature here. See Knight (2014) and Zhou and Song (2016) for recent overviews; 
Gustafsson et al. (2008) and Li et al. (2013) for comprehensive discussions across many dimensions; Kanbur 
and Zhang (2005) and Golley (2007) on regional inequalities; Sicular et al. (2007) on rural–urban inequalities; 
Piketty et al. (2017) on wealth inequality; and Golley and Kong (2018) on intergenerational inequalities in 
education.
2 For evidence, see Golley and Kong (2018); Li (2010); and Zhang and Chen (2014).
3 See, for example, Li et al. (2011); Wang and Cai (2008); and Zhang et al. (2008a).
4 See, for example, Hannum et al. (2009); Zhang et al. (2007); and Zhang et al. (2012).
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gender wage discrimination was much more serious than in other industrial and 
developing economies. We have found no evidence to suggest that the situation for 
rural Chinese women has improved since then.
Female participation in the labour market has deteriorated during the reform period 
as well, with, for example, the urban female labour force participation rate dropping 
to 57 per cent in 2009 from 78 per cent in 1988 (Zhang et al. 2008a). Cook and 
Dong (2011) attribute this to the intensified pressures on women arising from 
their dual responsibilities as (unpaid) family carers and income earners during the 
economic transition. Zhang et al. (2008b) concur on this point, demonstrating 
that the observed gender earnings gap is strongly related to family status, with 
married women and mothers facing the most significant disadvantages in the 
(urban) labour market. Liu et al. (2010) likewise demonstrate the reduction in 
employment probability and hours of paid work for Chinese women, with the 
most striking costs being imposed by caring for one’s parents-in-law, not one’s own 
parents. The costs of child and elder care imposed on China’s female labour force 
vary across urban, migrant and rural groups, but there is ample recent evidence that 
none of these groups is immune (Connelly et al. 2018; Ding et al. 2018; Song and 
Dong 2018). 
There is also evidence of a growing gender bias in the political realm. During the 
1980s and 1990s, women accounted for one-third of Communist Party members, 
while by 2017 they accounted for just one-quarter. Shu and Bian (2003) examine 
the importance of ‘political capital’—proxied by Communist Party membership—
as a determinant of the gender earnings gap. Noting that party members are more 
likely to be promoted and receive sponsorship for further education and training, 
they show that Communist Party membership was associated with earnings that 
were 6 per cent and 10 per cent higher for men and women, respectively, in 1995. 
However, the higher return for women did not reduce the earnings gap because 
of lower female membership numbers overall. Appleton et al. (2009) reveal an 
increasing wage reward for party membership—from 29 per cent in 1988 to 
33 per cent in 1999—despite their initial expectations that they would fall, as market 
forces became more dominant. These findings suggest that party membership still 
matters for earnings, and it matters in different ways for men and for women.
Against this background, this chapter sets out to explore the factors that have 
contributed to inequality of opportunity in China’s individual labour income, with 
a particular focus on gender. Inequality of opportunity is broadly defined as the 
component of overall inequality that can be explained by ‘circumstances’ beyond the 
control of an individual, as distinct from ‘efforts’ or choices that those individuals 
make. This distinction is crucial because, while inequality stemming from the latter 
can be justified as being fair and reasonable, inequality stemming from the former—
for example, being born male or female—cannot. We utilise the standard method 
in a burgeoning literature on inequality of opportunity to reveal that China’s 
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inequality of opportunity in labour income is alarmingly high. Furthermore, we 
show that gender is the number one determinant of unequal opportunities, ahead 
of socioeconomic, regional and urban–rural divides.
We complement this analysis with a more standard micro-level analysis of the 
underlying causes of gender earnings inequality. We use a standard Oaxaca–
Blinder decomposition, in which differences between male and female incomes are 
apportioned into differences between male and female coefficients (the ‘unexplained’ 
portion, broadly interpreted as gender discrimination) and differences between 
male and female characteristics (the ‘explained’ portion), which comprise the 
circumstance and effort variables used in the inequality of opportunity analysis.5 
This reveals that discrimination explains the dominant proportion of differences in 
average labour income between males and females, with gender differences in the 
rewards associated with marriage being the most significant contributing factor.
Inequality of opportunity, circumstances and effort
Background
The economic literature on ‘inequality of opportunity’ begins with the premise that 
the observed inequality in any particular economic outcome, or ‘advantage’, can 
be attributed to two components. The first component derives from the different 
circumstances in which individuals find themselves and over which they have no 
control—for example, their gender, place of birth or the socioeconomic status of 
their parents. The second derives from the different levels of effort that individuals 
may exert to influence a given outcome—for example, how hard they study, the 
occupation they choose or whether they choose to migrate or marry. This distinction 
is critical for assessing the extent to which equal opportunity does or does not prevail. 
Roemer (1993, 1998) defines equal opportunity as a situation in which the distribution 
of a given outcome is independent of circumstances—that is, all individuals who 
exert the same level of effort will achieve the same outcome, regardless of their 
circumstances. Partitioning the population into groups of people—or ‘types’—with 
identical circumstances and measuring the extent to which this condition is not 
satisfied provide one measure of inequality of opportunity. This involves suppressing 
‘intra-type’ inequality (the inequality that can be explained by variation within each 
type, attributed to variation in ‘effort’) and calculating the extent of ‘inter-type’ 
inequality based on the mean levels for each type as an absolute measure of inequality 
5 See Oaxaca (1973) and Blinder (1973), along with three examples of applications to China by Song et al. 
(2017), Su and Heshmati (2011) and Démurger et al. (2007).
The Chinese Economic Transformation
240
of opportunity. For comparability across different datasets and countries, it is more 
common to focus on the share of ‘inter-type’ inequality in overall inequality or the 
‘relative inequality of opportunity’ (IOR).
A variety of empirical methods has been used to estimate inequality of opportunity 
for  a wide range of outcomes, including household per capita income and 
consumption expenditure (as in Marrero and Rodríguez 2012); individual annual, 
monthly and long-run incomes (for example, by Bourguignon et al. 2007; Checchi 
et al. 2010; Björkland et al. 2012); educational attainment (as in the application to 
China in Golley and Kong 2016); and health outcomes (as in Jusot et al. 2013). 
Those focusing specifically on income inequality reveal significant variation in the 
share of inequality of opportunity in total income inequality (at both the household 
and the individual levels), ranging from close to one-third in Brazil and Guatemala 
(Ferreira and Gignoux 2011) to one-quarter for India (Singh 2012) and below 
5 per cent in Norway, Denmark, Finland, Germany, the Netherlands and Slovakia 
(Marrero and Rodríguez 2012).6 
While a number of different circumstances have been identified in these studies, 
a predominant set has emerged. These include father’s (or parents’) occupation 
and education; geographical location (region of birth, for single-country analyses; 
country of birth for cross-country ones); race, ethnicity or caste (in the case of India); 
and gender. Gender, however, has not been the primary focus in any of these works. 
Instead, for individual-level analyses, male-only samples tend to be used, with only 
a few exceptions. For example, Ferreira and Gignoux (2011) include gender as 
a circumstance in their analysis of individual labour earnings for five Latin American 
countries, and find that the share of overall inequality attributed to gender is small—
from just 0.2 per cent in Colombia to 5.8 per cent in Guatemala—with other family 
background circumstances being more important, particularly parental education 
and father’s occupation. De Barros et al. (2009) find a similar share for gender in 
the inequality of individual labour earnings in Mexico, at 3–4 per cent. Martinez et 
al. (2017) also use gender as a circumstance in their analysis of Australian individual 
income inequality between 2001 and 2013, revealing rising gender disparities over 
that period, but still a relatively small contribution of gender to overall income 
inequality, of less than 6 per cent (compared with more than 50 per cent for father’s 
occupation—the most important circumstance). These small contributions contrast 
starkly with the dominant role we find for gender in the empirical analysis for China 
that follows.
In these cited works, the role of ‘effort’ has been largely overlooked, with the 
predominant estimation method (explained further below) subsuming this into 
the error term. One notable exception is Bourguignon et al. (2007), a much-cited 
6 See Brunori et al. (2013) and Ferreira and Peragine (2015) for more comprehensive surveys of the methods used 
and results found. 
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paper that examines individual (male) real hourly earnings across seven birth cohorts 
in Brazil. Their analysis explicitly considers the relationship between circumstances 
(race, region of birth, parental schooling and father’s occupation) and three ‘effort’ 
variables—the individual’s own schooling attainment, a migration dummy and 
a  variable for labour market status—all of which are assumed to be determined, 
in turn, by circumstances. Despite some subsequent problems with the paper 
(conceded in a 2011 corrigendum), this paper was seminal in its attempt to identify 
both the direct effect of circumstances on earnings (or other outcomes) and the 
indirect effect as it operated through ‘effort’. 
Measuring inequality of opportunity
To formalise the ideas discussed above, we follow Roemer (1998) and begin with 
a finite population of individuals, i ∈ {1,…,N }, each of whom has achieved an 
economic outcome (in our case, annual labour earnings), yi, with distribution {yi}.
Earnings are assumed to be determined by a vector of circumstances, Ci, and a vector 
of efforts, Ei, which will be at least partially determined by circumstances, implying 
that yi = ƒ(Ci, Ei(Ci, vi), ui). The sample population can then be divided into ‘types’, 
which by definition contain individuals with identical circumstances. 
In principle, it is straightforward to calculate an absolute scalar measure of inequality 
of opportunity, IOA, by assigning to every individual the mean for their type 
(and  thereby suppressing all intra-type inequality) and measuring the inequality 
in the distribution of those means using an appropriate index of inequality. The 
associated relative measure, IOR, is then IOA as a share of total inequality. However, 
this simple nonparametric method requires a sample size far beyond what is 
available to us, or a significant reduction in the number of circumstances so as to 
limit the number of ‘types’—a trade-off we are not willing to make. Instead, we use 
the standard parametric method, explained at length in Bourguignon et al. (2007) 
and Ferreira and Gignoux (2011), and summarised here. 
We begin by approximating the relationship between earnings, circumstances and 
effort with the following structural forms (Equations 12.1 and 12.2). 
Equation 12.1
ln(yi) = a + bCi + cEi + ui
Equation 12.2
Ei = d + eCi + vi
Substituting Equation 12.2 into Equation 12.1 yields the reduced-form regression 
of Equation 12.3.




In Equation 12.3, α = a + cd, β = b + ce, ε = cvi + ui; y is labour earnings and C is 
a vector of discrete circumstance variables, which can be partitioned into ‘types’. 
Using the estimated coefficients, , and the actual values of circumstances, we 
construct a distribution, , where . By replacing each yi with its 
prediction, given the vector of circumstances (which is identical for all individuals 
of the same type), all intra-group inequality is eliminated, giving direct estimates of 
inequality of opportunity,  and , where  is an 
appropriate index of inequality. Following standard practice, we choose mean log 
deviation GE(0) as our inequality index.7
The vector of observed circumstances will only be a subset of all relevant circumstances 
that impact on individual earnings. As long as some unobserved circumstances 
are correlated with the observed circumstances (for example, IQ, which is almost 
certainly correlated with one’s father’s education and one’s own earnings, but is 
not observed in the data), the estimated  coefficients will be biased and cannot 
be interpreted as causal links between a given circumstance and the outcome. 
However, for the overall measure of inequality of opportunity, this is not important: 
adding more circumstance variables to the observed set would necessarily increase 
the estimates of IOA and IOR, implying that these are lower-bound estimates of 
the  ‘true’  inequality of opportunity that would be measured if all circumstance 
variables could be observed (Ferreira and Gignoux 2011). 
In addition to these overall measures, we are interested in the partial contributions 
of each of the circumstance variables. A number of papers have continued to use the 
method put forward by Bourguignon et al. (2007), despite their 2011 corrigendum 
in which they conceded the measure was flawed. We improve on this method by 
instead using a Shapley-value decomposition, which involves turning one variable 
(such as gender) ‘on’ or ‘off’ (for example, by setting at ‘male’ for all individuals) 
and assessing how the overall inequality measure varies accordingly. This method 
accounts for the well-known problem that inequality decompositions depend on 
the order in which inequality from a particular source is measured, and so uses 
a normalised average across all possible orderings for each source. That said, we 
recognise that these partial results should be treated with caution, given the biases 
already acknowledged above.
The above method suffices for calculating IOA and IOR, and for identifying a set of 
circumstances that contribute to these. While this has become the dominant focus 
in the literature, there is more to learn from including some observable efforts in 
7 For details on why this is the best measure, see Ferreira and Gignoux (2011).
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the modelling exercise, as done in the seminal paper by Bourguignon et al. (2007). 
Returning to the structural form presented in Equations 12.1 and 12.2, it is clear 
that an individual’s labour earnings depend on his or her circumstances through two 
distinct channels: a direct channel (reflected in the coefficients on each circumstance 
in Equation 12.1); and an indirect channel, via the effect of his or her circumstances 
on his or her effort in Equation 12.2. Bourguignon et al. (2007) attempted to 
separately estimate these direct and indirect effects in their application to male 
earnings in Brazil, but subsequently conceded their results were not statistically 
sound. While this means that Equations 12.1 and 12.2 cannot be used in the way 
originally intended, they are still useful for illustrating the complex link between 
circumstances and some identifiable ‘effort’ variables—and for demonstrating that 
these complex links work in different ways for different genders. 
Inequality of opportunity: Data and results
Data and baseline regressions
We use the third wave of the Survey of Chinese Women’s Social Status (2010), which 
is organised by the Women’s Studies Institute of China, with joint sponsorship 
from the All-China Women’s Federation and the National Bureau of Statistics of 
China. The complete database includes 29,694 observations from all 31 of China’s 
provinces, each of which contains information on a randomly selected adult and 
child within each household. We choose annual labour income (or earnings) as 
our outcome of interest, including in the sample all individuals aged between 
26 and 55 years of age with non-zero income. This yields a nationwide sample of 
15,974 individuals. Individuals are divided into six age cohorts (from 26–30-year-
olds through to 51–55-year-olds) to enable a comparison across those age groups 
(albeit not across time), which is the best available option for a single-country cross-
sectional dataset.8 
Drawing on the inequality of opportunity literature and the China-specific 
inequality literature cited above, we use the following set of circumstance variables 
for each of the six age cohorts: 
1. Gender: male or female (female excluded in regressions). 
2. Father’s education: illiterate, primary school, junior high school and above 
(illiterate excluded).
8 The first and second waves of the Survey of Chinese Women’s Social Status were completed in 1990 and 2000, 
respectively. If we are able to obtain these at a later stage, we will complement this work with analysis across two 
decades of reform.
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3. Father’s occupation: agriculture (including forestry and fisheries), low-skilled 
non-agriculture, high-skilled non-agriculture (agriculture excluded). 
4. Hukou (household registration) status at birth: rural or urban (rural excluded).9
5. Region: east, central and west (west excluded).10 
In combination, this implies that for each age cohort we are dealing with 108 types, 
in the ‘comfortable’ range of 72–108 types, according to Ferreira and Peragine 
(2015). For example, one type (a relatively ‘unlucky’ one, as it turns out) comprises 
rural females born in western China with illiterate fathers who work in agriculture. 
In the nationwide regressions for the entire sample, age cohorts are included as the 
sixth ‘circumstance’—as one clearly cannot choose the year in which they are born.
We draw on Bourguignon et al. (2007) and the data available in the survey, to 
propose the following five ‘effort’ variables:
1. Own education: a dummy variable for those who have attained junior high or 
below, or senior high school and above. 
2. Own occupation: a dummy variable representing those who work in the 
agricultural or non-agricultural sector.
3. Migration: a dummy variable for those who have ‘ever worked or ran a business 
in a town or city different from where your hukou is for more than half a year’ 
or who have ‘never migrated’.
4. Communist Party membership (dummy variable for yes or no). 
5. Marital status (married or not married, with the latter including people who 
have never married, are divorced or whose spouse has died).
One’s own education is included to reflect the fact that schooling above junior high 
has never been compulsory in China, and to some extent reflects an individual’s 
choice (although, as it turns out, a substantial part of that choice, or ‘effort’, is 
explained by one’s circumstances). Likewise, it is also a matter of choice, to some 
extent at least, to migrate and/or work in occupations outside the agricultural sector. 
Communist Party membership is included to reflect the effort required to gain such 
membership, which may relate to one’s political connections (guanxi), alongside the 
reasons identified by Shu and Bian (2003) and Appleton et al. (2009). The inclusion 
of marital status is in recognition of the fact that couples have interdependent 
9 The survey includes village, town, town–city and city; ‘rural’ is equated with ‘village’, while the others are all 
classified as ‘non-rural’.
10 We use the standard regional classifications for this. Ideally, we would have region of birth as this variable, but 
this is not available in the survey, so we use region identified at the time of the survey. While this is problematic 
in the sense that some people will have migrated since birth (a matter of choice, not circumstance), this only 
accounts for 9 per cent of the surveyed individuals. We considered this a reasonable sacrifice given the significant 
regional variations in levels of development across China and the standard practice of including ‘region’ as 
a circumstance in the comparable literature. 
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preferences that affect their household income decisions, in ways that often imply 
different employment choices for men and women, as shown in Zhang et al. (2008b) 
in the case of China.11 
Table 12.1 presents the summary statistics for the nationwide sample and the female 
and male subsamples. Nearly everything is consistent with expectations. In terms 
of circumstances, people born in urban areas in eastern China, who have more-
educated fathers in non-agricultural occupations out-earn those in relevant categories 
‘below’ them, and average earnings fall across the age range, consistent with higher 
average educational attainments among younger generations. One outlier is that 
average income in the western region is higher than in the centre—underpinned by 
higher female (but not male) income in the west. In terms of ‘effort’, higher levels of 
education, non-agricultural occupations, Communist Party membership and non-
migration are associated with higher income (because almost all migrants are from 
rural areas, where earnings are lower). Notably, marriage is associated with higher 
average income for men, but lower income for women—a point we return to below.
Table 12.1 Preliminary statistics: Labour income by gender, circumstance 
and ‘effort’
Nationwide Females Males Female/male 
ratio
Number of individuals 15,974 7,592 8,382
Mean labour income (RMB) 19,696 15,241 23,730 0.64
CIRCUMSTANCE VARIABLES
Father’s education 
Illiterate 12,877 8,658 16,374 0.53
Primary school 18,785 12,922 23,975 0.54
Junior high and above 26,090 22,435 29,732 0.75
Father’s occupation 
Agriculture, forestry and fishery 15,532 11,481 19,223 0.60
Low-skill non-agricultural 26,195 21,647 30,113 0.72
High-skill non-agricultural 30,760 23,864 37,407 0.64
Born in
Rural 16,843 12,220 21,070 0.58
Urban 26,512 22,583 29,992 0.75
Birth region
East 24,089 18,083 29,164 0.62
Central 15,149 11,056 18,994 0.58
West 16,432 14,550 18,277 0.80
11 We leave aside the (important) debate as to whether Becker’s (1974, 1976, 1991) view of these choices is 
credible or not (as made clear in Bergmann 1995; and Woolley 1996). For our purposes, it suffices to say that 
marriage has notably different associations with the earnings of women and men, as seen below.
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Nationwide Females Males Female/male 
ratio
Age cohorts
26–30 27,477 23,660 31,162 0.76
31–35 22,128 16,557 27,984 0.59
36–40 18,949 15,456 22,358 0.69
41–45 18,589 14,301 22,777 0.63
46–50 17,703 12,547 22,108 0.57
51–55 15,714 9,477 19,572 0.48
EFFORT VARIABLES
Own education
Junior high or below 13,531 9,372 17,662 0.53
Senior high school and above 29,029 25,296 31,966 0.79
Own occupation 
Agriculture, forestry and fishery 8,566 6,327 11,055 0.57
Non-agricultural 26,011 21,210 29,879 0.71
Political party 
No Communist Party 
membership
18,126 14,107 22,117 0.64
Communist Party member 28,577 24,506 30,722 0.80
Migration status
Ever migrated 18,387 10,779 24,161 0.45
Never migrated 19,818 15,618 23,686 0.66
Marital status
Married 19,543 14,867 23,828 0.62
Not married 21,235 19,294 22,800 0.85
Notes: Sample includes all surveyed individuals with non-zero labour income. ‘Non-agricultural low-skill 
occupations’ include craft and related trade workers, service and sales workers and clerical support. 
‘Non-agricultural high-skill occupations’ include professionals and managers. ‘Rural’ is equated with 
‘village’ and ‘urban’ with all other classifications: town, town–city and city. 
Sources: Survey of Chinese Women’s Social Status (2010) and authors’ calculations.
What is most striking in Table 12.1 is the gender difference, summarised by the 
female/male earnings ratios in the final column. Gender inequality exists for every 
circumstance and at both ends of the socioeconomic spectrum—although the ratios 
are noticeably lower at the lower end of the spectrum. Some of these disparities may 
reflect the fact that women work fewer hours, which, given different retirement 
ages, is certainly the case for the oldest cohort, which has the lowest female/
male earnings ratio of just 0.48. Another explanation is likely to be the different 
occupational structures for men and women—for example, 40 per cent of women 
work in agriculture, compared with 28 per cent of men (on which more below). But 
this is not the whole story. And even if it was, it would still point to inequality of 
opportunity in annual labour, which is an important story in its own right. 
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Table 12.2 presents the regression results for the nationwide sample, with Column 1 
including only the circumstance variables, as in Equation 12.3, and Column  2 
extending this to include the ‘effort’ variables as well, as in Equation 12.1. As seen 
in Column 1, being male is associated with labour earnings that are 0.54 log 
points higher than females.12 All coefficients take on their expected signs and 
relative magnitudes—for example, they are increasing with father’s education and 
occupation, with urban hukou status and from west to east. The age profile now 
exhibits the expected inverted-U shape (in contrast with the raw data). 
Table 12.2 Determinants of labour earnings: Circumstance and effort
Independent variables Equation 12.3 Equation 12.1 Equation 12.1 Equation 12.1
Circumstance variables Females Males
Male 0.54*** 0.44***
Father primary 0.22*** 0.11*** 0.11*** 0.12***
Father junior high and above 0.34*** 0.14*** 0.15*** 0.13***
Father low-skill non-agricultural 0.30*** 0.035 0.057* 0.017
Father high-skill non-agricultural 0.41*** 0.13*** 0.13*** 0.14***
Urban 0.35*** 0.058** 0.10*** 0.016
Central region 0.09*** 0.02*** -0.07*** 0.12***
Eastern region 0.42*** 0.29*** 0.18*** 0.40***
Age dummies YES YES YES YES
Effort variables
Non-agricultural occupation 0.76*** 0.79*** 0.72***
Senior high and above 0.38*** 0.44*** 0.31***
Communist Party membership 0.20*** 0.22*** 0.19***
Migration 0.092*** 0.023 0.14***
Married 0.16*** 0.065 0.26***
Constant 8.9*** 8.34*** 8.35*** 8.81***
Observations 15,974 15,974 7,592 8,382
Adjusted R2 0.248 0.400 0.392 0.337
* p < 0.05 ** p < 0.01 *** p < 0.005
Sources: Survey of Chinese Women’s Social Status (2010) and authors’ calculations.
As seen in Column 2, adding in the effort variables yields a considerable increase 
in the adjusted R-squared values, with the bulk of this increase coming from own 
occupation and own education, and only minor increases for Communist Party 
12 For the log-linear form, the difference between the excluded dummy, x (e.g. male), and the included one, y (e.g. 
female), is given by ln(x) – ln(y) = ln(x/y). If x differs from y by a factor of 1 + e, then ln(x/y) = ln(1 + e), which 
is approximately e, the percentage difference between x and y, but only when e is small. The exact percentage 
change is given by exp(e – 1), which for the example given here amounts to 75 per cent.
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membership, migration and marriage.13 Working in a non-agricultural occupation is 
associated with earnings that are 0.68 log points higher than working in agriculture, 
while having senior high school education or above is associated with a 0.35  log 
point  income boost. The coefficients on Communist Party membership and 
migration are positive and significant, but small. 
As expected, coefficients on many of the circumstances fall compared with those 
in Column 1—an indication of the correlations between these and the two key 
effort variables of own education and own occupation (although none is too high 
to suggest multicollinearity as a serious problem). For example, the coefficient on 
having a father with more than junior high education falls from 0.41 to 0.14 due to 
the correlation between this and one’s own education. Being male continues to have 
the highest positive association with income for the nationwide sample. 
Columns 3 and 4 present the results for the female and male subsamples, respectively. 
The substantial gender differences seen in Table 12.1 are confirmed even with all 
controls added. The adjusted R-squared for the female subsample is considerably 
higher than for men, and the same is true when only circumstances are included 
in the regression (not presented here for space reasons). This provides the first 
indication that women’s earnings are affected (that is, constrained) more by their 
circumstances than men’s. This is also suggested by the higher magnitudes of most 
coefficients in the female regressions—more than double that for men for being 
born ‘urban’ and with higher returns for having educated fathers working outside 
agriculture as well.
The rewards for women associated with putting in the ‘effort’ to leave agriculture, 
attain senior high education and gain Communist Party membership are all higher 
than for men, while migration and marriage offer no significant returns for women, 
but do for men. The key point is that all of these circumstance and effort variables 
matter, and they matter in different ways for the two genders. 
To calculate the inequality of opportunity in labour income, we focus on Equation 
12.3 using the method described above. We are also interested in how this varies 
across age cohorts, so we first present, in Table 12.3, the baseline results for each 
age cohort. This confirms the significance of being male for all cohorts, with higher 
coefficients for older cohorts. Given the cross-sectional nature of the data, it is 
impossible to say whether this is because of an improvement in gender biases in 
income for younger cohorts or a deterioration with age as the circumstance of being 
male culminates in higher rewards. 
13 In regressions adding these effort variables separately to the nationwide sample, the adjusted R-squared increases 
from 0.248 (Column 1, Table 12.2) to 0.367 for one’s own occupation; 0.310 for one’s own education; 0.272 
for Communist Party membership; 0.250 for marriage; and negligible for migration. 
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Table 12.3 ‘Circumstantial’ determinants of labour income by age cohort
Cohort 26–30 31–35 36–40 41–45 46–50 51–55
Independent variables
Male 0.42*** 0.49*** 0.51*** 0.51*** 0.61*** 0.69***
Father primary 0.21** 0.28*** 0.24*** 0.24*** 0.18*** 0.22***
Father junior high and above 0.33*** 0.45*** 0.40*** 0.40*** 0.29*** 0.21**
Father low-skill non-agricultural 0.46*** 0.35*** 0.28*** 0.28*** 0.16** 0.27***
Father high-skill non-agricultural 0.61*** 0.44*** 0.46*** 0.46*** 0.34*** 0.34***
Urban 0.25*** 0.30*** 0.28*** 0.28*** 0.36*** 0.58***
Central region 0.04*** 0.11*** 0.10*** 0.10*** 0.10*** 0.09***
Eastern region 0.45*** 0.48*** 0.40*** 0.40*** 0.45*** 0.37***
Constant 8.97*** 8.96*** 8.89*** 8.89*** 8.83*** 8.43***
Observations 1,889 2,336 3,460 3,460 2,839 2,125
Adjusted R2 0.249 0.261 0.231 0.231 0.232 0.279
* p < 0.05 ** p < 0.01 *** p < 0.005
Sources: Survey of Chinese Women’s Social Status (2010) and authors’ calculations.
We use the regression results in Column 1 of Table 12.2 and all of Table 12.3 to 
calculate the inequality of opportunity in China’s labour income. These results are 
presented in Table 12.4. The top two rows provide scalar measures of inequality in 
labour income using GE(0) and the Gini coefficient, for the nationwide sample 
and for each cohort. Gini coefficients are included to stress the point that income 
inequality across this sample is undeniably high—above 0.5 in all but two of the age 
cohort subsamples. 
Table 12.4 Inequality of opportunity in labour income and decomposition 
by circumstance
All By birth cohort
26–30 31–35 36–40 41–45 46–50 51–55
Total inequality 
Mean log deviation (GE(0)) 0.55 0.70 0.50 0.46 0.52 0.51 0.62
Gini 0.53 0.59 0.51 0.55 0.52 0.51 0.56
Inequality of opportunity 
Absolute (IOA) 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.12 0.07 0.13 0.13
Relative (IOR) 0.25 0.20 0.28 0.26 0.14 0.25 0.21
Shapley-value decomposition (contribution to IOA, %)
Gender 28 30.0 34.2 22.6 38.0 37.9 32.4
Father education type 18 10.0 14.4 20.0 13.5 11.9 12.9
Father occupation type 18 31.3 22.7 22.8 17.7 13.1 16.0
Born rural or not 9 1.9 7.3 13.0 18.3 7.2 17.5
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All By birth cohort
26–30 31–35 36–40 41–45 46–50 51–55
Region 18 24.9 21.5 21.7 12.5 29.9 21.2
Age cohort 10
Sources: Survey of Chinese Women’s Social Status (2010) and authors’ calculations.
The IOR provides the best gauge in terms of international comparisons to assert 
the point that the share of inequality of opportunity in total inequality in China’s 
individual labour income is unquestionably high—with an IOR value of 0.25 
(or 25 per cent) for the nationwide sample, and with all cohort-level IORs above 
0.2, with just one exception. This in itself is a major concern. But what is even 
more worrying are the Shapley-value decompositions, which reflect the partial 
contributions from each of the circumstances to the overall IOA (or IOR). These 
reveal that gender is the circumstance with the single largest contribution to 
inequality of opportunity in individual labour income, accounting for 28 per 
cent of the nationwide IOA (Column 1). This is followed by one’s region, father’s 
occupation, father’s education, birth cohort and being rural or urban, in that order. 
For four of the six birth cohorts, gender is the largest contributor to inequality of 
opportunity, peaking at 38 per cent for the 41–45-year-old cohort. It ranks second 
for the two remaining cohorts (ages 26–30 and 36–40)—below father’s occupation 
in both cases. Even if these calculations are biased by omitted variables—as they 
undoubtedly are—and reflect to some extent women’s ‘choices’ about labour 
market participation, occupations and hours worked, as well as other unobserved 
characteristics that make men and women different, we argue that this finding 
should be taken seriously and investigated further.
One way of pushing the importance of gender further is to consider the relationship 
between each ‘effort’ variable and circumstances and how these differ across the 
male and female subsamples. Table 12.5 presents the results of probit regressions for 
each of the binary effort variables conditioned on the set of circumstance variables, 
as in Equation 12.2. Nearly all coefficients take on their expected signs and relative 
magnitudes. For example, as seen in Columns 1 and 2 for all three panels, individuals 
with more educated fathers in non-agricultural occupations are likely to be more 
educated and work in non-agricultural occupations themselves. Columns 4 and 5 of 
Panel A reveal that men are more likely to migrate but less likely to be married than 
women (reflecting the unbalanced sex ratio). Critically, the pseudo R-squared values 
are highest for the own education and own occupation regressions in Columns 1 
and 2, and both of these are higher for the female subsample (in Panel B) than the 
male subsample (in Panel C), underpinned by larger magnitudes on just about all 
coefficients in the female subsample regressions. This indicates that circumstances 
matter more for women, not only directly (in that they are essentially penalised for 
their gender), but also indirectly, through their effect on prominent and identifiable 
forms of ‘effort’.
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Male 0.20*** 0.28*** 0.37*** 0.14*** –0.063*
Father primary 0.33*** 0.20*** 0.24*** 0.013 0.16***
Father junior high and above 0.75*** 0.35*** 0.48*** –0.11* 0.15***
Father low-skill non-agricultural 0.49*** 1.15*** 0.12*** –0.25*** –0.14***
Father high-skill non-agricultural 0.71*** 0.78*** 0.30*** –0.22*** –0.068
Urban 0.74*** 1.25*** 0.20*** –0.87*** –0.38***
Central region 0.11** 0.21*** 0.11 0.05*** 0.199
Eastern region 0.19*** 0.49*** 0.091** –0.16*** 0.13***
Observations 15,974 15,974 15,974 15,974 15,974
Pseudo R2 0.214 0.280 0.059 0.097 0.062
Panel B: Female
Father primary 0.32*** 0.28*** 0.27*** 0.071 0.082
Father junior high and above 0.77*** 0.44*** 0.52*** –0.064 0.026
Father low-skill non-agricultural 0.63*** 1.07*** 0.22*** –0.27*** –0.21***
Father high-skill non-agricultural 0.75*** 0.76*** 0.30*** –0.29** –0.099
Urban 0.87*** 1.30*** 0.34*** –0.81*** –0.48***
Central region 0.05** 0.15*** 0.027 0.13*** 0.16**
Eastern region 0.16*** 0.53*** 0.082 –0.16** –0.0046
Observations 7,592 7,592 7,592 7,592 7,592
Pseudo R2 0.269 0.303 0.072 0.099 0.071
Panel C: Male
Father primary 0.35*** 0.13*** 0.24*** –0.030 0.21***
Father junior high and above 0.73*** 0.27*** 0.46*** –0.14* 0.25***
Father low-skill non-agricultural 0.38*** 1.25*** 0.052 –0.23*** –0.087
Father high-skill non-agricultural 0.68*** 0.81*** 0.31*** –0.17 –0.030
Urban 0.62*** 1.20*** 0.093* –0.91*** –0.33***
Central region 0.15 0.27*** 0.17 –0.03** 0.227
Eastern region 0.21*** 0.46*** 0.099* –0.17*** 0.24***
Observations 8,382 8,382 8,382 8,382 8,382
Pseudo R2 0.172 0.256 0.037 0.097 0.075
*** p < 0.01 ** p < 0.05 * p < 0.1
Sources: Survey of Chinese Women’s Social Status (2010) and authors’ calculations.
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From inequality of opportunity to gender 
discrimination
To further analyse the underlying causes of gender income inequality, we apply an 
Oaxaca–Blinder decomposition to the estimate of Equation 12.1, which is essentially 
an extended Mincer-type equation in which the combined set of circumstance and 
‘effort’ variables comprises the individual characteristics that determine one’s own 
income.14 This apportions differences between male and female labour incomes 
into two parts: first, the differences between the male and female coefficients in 
two separate regressions for the male and female subsamples (as seen in the last two 
columns of Table 12.2 for the nationwide sample),15 which form the ‘unexplained’ 
portion, used as a proxy for gender discrimination; and second, differences between 
male and female characteristics (the ‘explained’ portion), such as different levels of 
educational attainment. 
Specifically, the gender earnings gap is the difference between average male income 
and average female income (Equation 12.4).
Equation 12.4
In Equation 12.4, γm is the vector of coefficients in Equation 12.1 for the male-only 
sample and γf  is that for the female-only sample,
16  
and .
This decomposition corresponds to an evaluation of what the observed male/female 
income gap would be under the following conditions:
1. If men and women share the same sociodemographic characteristics (that of men 
in Equation 12.1), D is the pure difference-in-coefficients (or discrimination) 
effect.
2. If men and women face the same remuneration structure (that of women in 
Equation 12.1), E is the pure difference-in-characteristics effect.
14 The approach taken here is similar to that in Démurger et al. (2007). 
15 A slight difference is that the regressions used for this decomposition categorise an individual’s occupation 
to be consistent with those for father’s occupation. This is because there are too few urban people working in 
agriculture (the dummy chosen for own occupation in Table 12.2). The more refined set of categories here is 
thus required for the urban and rural analyses, which adds an important dimension to our story, as seen below.
16 γm and γf correspond to the coefficients a, b and c in Equation 12.1 for the male-only sample and the female-
only sample, respectively.
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We further decompose both the pure discrimination effect, D, and the pure 
difference-in-characteristics effect, E, into contributions from each of the variables 
included in the regressions for the nationwide sample (as seen in Table 12.2), as well 
as for the urban and rural subsamples.17 
Table 12.6 presents the decomposition results. The first point to make is that 
discrimination—that is, income differences stemming from differences in coefficients 
rather than characteristics—explains the dominant proportion of the nationwide 
gender gap, accounting for 86.8 per cent of the (log) income differential, with the 
remaining 14.6 per cent attributed to differences in characteristics. For the latter, 
the shares attributable to individual variables reveal dominant contributions from 
men’s higher average levels of education and greater likelihood of being employed 
in non-agricultural occupations. In terms of the discrimination, one’s marital status 
is associated with significantly higher income for males than females (accounting 
for 37.8 per cent of the discrimination effect, respectively), while differences in the 
returns to education and non-agricultural employment actually work in women’s 
favour (with shares of –8.1 and –11.9 per cent, respectively). 
Table 12.6 Oaxaca–Blinder decomposition of gender labour income differential
Nationwide Urban Rural
Observed Ln labour income
Men 9.59 9.95 9.44
Women 9.06 9.66 8.82
Differential 0.53 0.29 0.62
Decomposition shares (%)
Difference in characteristics 14.6 –13.6 19.1
Discrimination 86.8 109.3 84.6
Share in difference-in-characteristics effect (%)
Age –16.9*** 25.2 –7.9***
Own education 25.0*** 24.0 24.5***
Own occupation 70.3*** 56.3** 69.2***
Migration 0.6 0.0 0.0
Married –0.9 –3.5 –1.4
Communist Party membership 16.8*** –19.5*** 11.4***
Region 8.4** –9.8 5.7**
Father’s education –4.6** 22.1** –2.4*
Father’s occupation 0.04 4.4 –0.3
Born non-rural 0.7
17 For space reasons, we don’t report the urban and rural regression results used for these decompositions. They are 
available from the authors on request. 
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Nationwide Urban Rural
Share in discrimination effect (%)
Age –0.8 –0.1 –1
Own education –8.1** –10.6 -5.6**
Own occupation –11.9** –31.3 –8.5***
Migration 2.2** 2.0* 2.3*
Married 37.8*** –13.7 58.5***
Communist Party membership –0.6 0.5 –0.4
Region –15.9*** –10.4 –17.4***
Father’s education 0.3 –23.1 0.9
Father’s occupation –1.1 3.6 –0.6
Born non-rural –4.3
Constant 102.2*** 183.3*** 72.0***
Sources: Survey of Chinese Women’s Social Status (2010) and authors’ calculations.
The results in Columns 2 and 3 reveal significant variations between the sources of 
the gender income gap in the urban and rural subsamples. For example, for the urban 
sample discrimination in fact contributes over 100 per cent to the gender income 
gap, because the difference-in-characteristics effect is negative (at –11.9 per cent)—
that is, it reduces the gap. This reduction stems from the fact that, unlike in the rural 
and nationwide samples, urban women are more likely to be employed in highly 
skilled work and are more likely to have fathers with higher levels of education, 
so both these factors reduce the gender income gap.18 Meanwhile, unlike in rural 
China, the urban results indicate that one’s own education makes an insignificant 
contribution to the gap, reflecting the much closer average education levels across 
genders in urban areas.
Turning to the discrimination effect, the most striking differences are in the 
contributions from one’s own education and occupation, as well as marriage. 
In the urban subsample, none of these make a significant contribution, whereas in the 
rural subsample, one’s marital status increases the gap (accounting for 58.5 per cent 
of the discrimination effect), while occupational and educational ‘efforts’ work in 
women’s favour. 
18 Note that because the difference-in-characterstics’ share is negative in the urban sample, a positive share implies 
that the variable in question reduces the gap. All other positive shares in Table 12.6 imply the opposite: that the 
variable works in favour of men.
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The finding that marriage makes a positive contribution to the gender income 
gap nationwide stems from the fact that it is significantly and positively associated 
with male income, but not with female income, as seen in Columns 3 and 4 of 
Table 12.2. It turns out that this is driven entirely by the rural subsample (as the 
marriage coefficient is insignificant in the urban subsample analysis).19 
We can think of one reason why this might be the case. As our survey data reveals, 
76 per cent of married males in rural China state that they never or rarely cook, 
80 per cent never or rarely wash dishes, and 82 per cent never or rarely do washing or 
cleaning. This suggests a relatively weak position of rural women in intra-household 
bargaining relating to the time allocation for housework. We are not suggesting that 
urban Chinese women are ‘taking it easy’ at home either (for example, 65 per cent 
of married urban males never or rarely cook). But the results here indicate that the 
problem is more significant in rural China—a topic for further research.  
Conclusions
This chapter has revealed that there is a serious lack of equal opportunity in the 
annual labour income of Chinese individuals. Unequal opportunities were shown to 
stem primarily from a substantial gender divide, but also from other circumstances 
that lie beyond an individual’s control, including their region, father’s occupation, 
father’s education, birth cohort and rural or urban hukou status. We stress that we 
have not attributed causality to any of these circumstances, and we concede that 
biases possibly exist in all of them, due to omitted variables. While this means the 
decomposition results also need to be treated with caution, there seems no doubt 
that China faces a serious problem in terms of its gender income gap—with the 
contribution of gender to inequality of opportunity exceeding those of any other 
country for which comparable analysis exists.
We also investigated the role of five identifiable ‘efforts’—one’s own education and 
occupation, Communist Party membership, and migration and marital status—
and demonstrated that an individual’s ‘efforts’ are to a certain extent determined, 
or constrained, by their circumstances, in ways that differ significantly for men and 
women in the survey sample. 
We took this analysis one step further by reinterpreting Equation 12.1 as an 
extended Mincer-type earnings equation and using Oaxaca–Blinder decompositions 
to understand the sources of the gender income gap at a more micro level. This 
revealed that discrimination—reflected in different coefficients on the male and 
female subsample regressions—dominated differences in characteristics, working 
19 As per footnote 17, the urban and rural regression results are available from the authors on request. 
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most strikingly against women in the rural sample, in terms of their income ‘returns’ 
to marriage. However, it is also clear that our explanation is far from complete; 
the contribution of the constant term significantly exceeded that of our observed 
variables, suggesting numerous other sources of gender discrimination in China’s 
labour markets that we have not captured here. 
In the meantime, the results presented in this chapter suggest a number of equal 
opportunity policies that could level the gender playing field in China in the 
foreseeable future. The fact that women’s income, as well as their education  and 
occupational choices, is more closely associated with their father’s education 
and occupational status than men’s suggests that it would be eminently reasonable 
for educational policies to specifically target girls from poor, rural families as 
a starting point for expanding their earnings opportunities later in life. Measures 
to assist young women to exit the agricultural sector and find off-farm employment 
would also likely improve their earnings potential in the future. Ongoing reforms 
to the hukou system of household registration to ensure that rural migrants are 
not discriminated against in urban areas, in terms of their access to jobs and social 
welfare and the pay cheques they receive, would also go some way towards equalising 
the opportunities they face with those of their urban counterparts.
Finally, the importance of marriage in the decompositions, and its different impact 
on the annual incomes of rural men and women in particular, points to the fact that 
China’s ‘gender discrimination’ begins in the home. The gender divide in household 
chores revealed in our survey (and elsewhere, as in Zhang et al. 2008b) is indicative 
of just one of the costs that Chinese married women bear disproportionately, and 
it is little wonder that their annual income suffers as a result. Efforts to improve 
childcare systems and grant paternity, as well as maternity, leave are two obvious equal 
opportunity policies that could make a small dent in this regard, especially in rural 
areas. Even more important would be a cultural shift towards equal contributions 
by men and women to chores within the household—a challenge that is far from 
unique to China, but rather a global fight worth fighting.
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13. What types of Chinese ODI 
activities are most prone to political 
intervention?
Bijun Wang and Xiao He
China’s outward direct investment (ODI) activities have increased rapidly. At the 
same time, Chinese enterprises are frequently encountering obstacles as they invest 
in overseas markets. Although investment liberalisation and promotion remain 
mainstream policies in overseas markets, more and more countries are strengthening 
their regulation of foreign investment.
This chapter studies Chinese ODI activities that encounter political obstacles in 
host countries. Above all, two concepts should be clarified. First, what does it 
mean to ‘encounter obstacles’? In this study, it means Chinese enterprises that have 
failed to complete their ODI projects for various reasons and it does not cover 
those that have completed their investment projects (even if their investment has 
proved a failure or incurred losses). Second, what are the ‘political factors’ in host 
countries? These are factors related to the activities of the host country government 
that can influence foreign investors, including national security reviews, changes of 
government, policy changes, nationalisation and government default.
Chinese enterprises should draw lessons from their overseas investment activities so 
that the high price they have paid can be transformed into precious lessons for the 
future. This chapter conducts theoretical analysis of the political influence of foreign 
investment on host countries and reactions to it. Meanwhile, based on 22 cases of 
attempts by Chinese enterprises to invest overseas that encountered political obstacles 
in the host country and 432 cases of Chinese enterprises successfully completing 
their overseas investment projects during the period 2005–15, the chapter attempts 
to conduct empirical analysis to reveal the important factors affecting Chinese ODI 
before putting forward solutions to the challenge.
Political influence of foreign direct investment 
on host countries and counter reactions
Foreign direct investment (FDI) activities are often politicised because they can 
have multiple impacts on the domestic politics of host countries. First, whether 
intended or not, investing countries may acquire the capability to menace the 
national security of host countries through ODI; moreover, the more complicated 
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the international environment of the host country, the more serious are the 
potential risks brought by ODI. Second, ODI can bring new rules and practices 
for corporate operation, which can trigger political debates regarding standards 
of ‘market behaviour’ in host countries. Third, ODI may also lead to structural 
changes in the incomes of various social groups in the host country, which 
impacts on their vested interests and reshapes their domestic political alliances 
(Kerner 2014). To sum up, since ODI can bring risks to national security and 
controversies about business standards and trigger changes in the incomes and 
political structures of host countries, the investing countries are likely to face 
political counterreactions to their investment activities.
ODI and national security
ODI can easily become intertwined with issues of national security, and may 
prompt direct political counterreactions through the host country’s review of 
national security. Although the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) has consistently tried to clearly define ‘national security’ 
and establish principles for its review—such as nondiscrimination, transparency and 
predictability, regulatory proportionality and accountability—the process of such 
reviews remains quite opaque (OECD 2009: 1–4). Although quite a few countries 
have set investment and industry thresholds to trigger national security reviews, the 
process involved remains covert and is subject almost entirely to the discretion of 
the relevant agencies in the host country (Kirchner 2012).
ODI can bring national security risks because of the differences in national policy 
goals between the investing and the host countries, and also because investing 
countries can take control of the strategic assets of host countries through direct 
investment in fields such as energy, telecommunications and infrastructure, and 
acquire the capability to prevent host countries from achieving their policy goals 
(Hemphill 2009). History shows such risks exist. In the 1970s, the oil-producing 
countries in the Middle East made use of the supply of oil to pressure Western 
countries to change their policies towards Israel. Such moves made the United 
States unprecedentedly cautious about the large amounts of FDI assets held by oil-
producing countries. It therefore established the Committee on Foreign Investment 
in the United States (CFIUS) in 1975 with a view to examine investment by 
members of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in 
the United States. After the 11 September 2001 terror attacks in the United States, 
Dubai Ports World made an attempt to purchase the Peninsular and Oriental Steam 
Navigation Company (P&O), prompting the US Government to strengthen its 
national security review mechanisms and clarify, on the appeal of the Congress, 
the definition of critical infrastructure; meanwhile, it also adopted the principle 
of reverse burden of proof in dealing with relevant matters. What is noteworthy 
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is that there is not a positive correlation between national security reviews and 
national policy differences. Developed countries can still use national security as an 
excuse to restrict investment in some major infrastructure areas by their allies even 
though they do not have obvious policy differences. For instance, the US Reagan 
administration stopped the purchase of Fairchild Semiconductor by Fujitsu in 1988, 
and Japan also made use of a similar mechanism to stop British companies entering 
its telecommunications industry (Watai 2013).
Scholars and international organisations that support liberalisation of direct 
global investment have been pushing for a transparent national security review 
mechanism. For instance, they want a clear definition of the scope of ‘sensitive 
industries’ and formulation of unified international review procedures. However, 
many governments, including the US Government, would like to maintain the 
current flexible security review mechanism. From the perspective of countries and 
enterprises that make ODI, there are two issues with the current national security 
review mechanism, which is dominated by the administrative departments of 
host countries: given its power of discretion, a government can make use of the 
mechanism to resist pressure from domestic vested interests; and it can also make 
use of the mechanism’s lack of transparency to serve those interest groups.
Conflict about market rules brought by ODI
Apart from the issue of national security, ODI flooding into host countries can also 
lead to the spread of the rules and conventions governing economic activity in the 
investing countries. If the host and parent countries are in different development 
phases or have divergent social structures and abide by different economic principles, 
there can be a conflict in the rules, which is especially evident between developing 
and developed countries.
Initially, developing countries are the ones most subject to the ‘rule shocks’ brought 
by ODI by foreign countries. Foreign enterprises operating in developing countries 
rely on their business prowess or their own governments to directly or indirectly 
exert pressure and demand changes to local systems. The laws, conventions and 
rules of the developing countries receiving ODI are often seen as a source of political 
risk to modern economic activities and those countries, therefore, are continually 
required to change their systems to the practices of Western countries or ‘raise their 
political system quality’ (Hayakawa et al. 2013). Despite such potential conflicts, 
developing countries remain attractive to ODI from developed countries; the 
developing countries, as recipients of ODI, in most cases will opt to accept ‘new 
rules’ to satisfy the demands of the capital-exporting countries (Blanton and Blanton 
2007). In recent years, the rapid growth of two-way investment among developing 
countries seems to indicate there is no absolute standard or environment that is 
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most attractive for ODI, but the narrower the institutional distance between two 
countries, the more favourable it is to carry out ODI (Bénassy-Quéré et al. 2007). 
The dominant position of the developed countries, however, means any rules they 
favour will be spread to the host country. 
However, as FDI by the emerging-market economies increases remarkably, 
developed countries have also started to face reverse ‘standard shocks’. On the one 
hand, in developing countries such as those in Africa, outward direct investors from 
emerging-market economies generally are more tolerant of local corruption or ‘bad 
governance’, which to an extent offsets the spread of standards favoured by the 
developed economies (Wood et al. 2014). On the other hand, multinationals from 
the emerging-market economies, led by China, have sought to acquire strategic 
resources all over the world (Lu et al. 2010), including in developed countries, which 
has aroused complaints about ‘nonmarket behaviour’. In the eyes of the developed 
countries, due to their different operational logic, emerging economies’ ODI has 
brought illegitimate competition pressures to enterprises in the host countries. 
A balance can be struck only by improving the existing rules for market competition 
and imposing restrictions on enterprises receiving state support.
Currently, to reduce the advantages of state support of some emerging-economy 
multinationals, developed countries have focused on achieving neutrality in the 
current stage of rules-based competition and have required the reduction or even 
elimination of the special treatment enjoyed by state-run and private enterprises 
(Capobianco and Christiansen 2011). In the eyes of the United States and European 
countries, the governments of the emerging economies, including the Chinese 
Government, not only provide multiple policy supports to their own businesses, 
they also give detailed directions for the overseas operations of those enterprises 
(Rosen and Hanemann 2013); therefore, rules must be made promptly to address 
such behaviour. In the negotiations relating to the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) 
and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), the European 
Union has expressed strong opposition to countries: 
inducing or ordering State-owned enterprises (SOEs) and enterprises granted special 
or exclusive rights or privileges (SERs) to engage in anti-competitive behavior, by 
taking regulatory measures favoring these companies, or by granting subsidies (or 
measures which have similar effects) to them. (European Commission Directorate-
General for Trade 2013)
The United States has also expressed its concern over the abnormal policy support 
given to, and the ‘uneconomic’ behaviour of, SOEs and private companies that obey 
state orders (US Chamber of Commerce and National Foreign Trade Council 2012).
Whether they receive or export ODI, developing countries must face the conflicts 
brought about by differing sets of rules, and they are often in a disadvantageous 
position. If, in the first phase of exporting ODI, developed countries aim to spread 
13. What types of Chinese ODI activities are most prone to political intervention?
267
free-trade principles and shape countries to be competitive in the international 
system by stressing the efficiency of multinationals and state capability in attracting 
foreign investment (Fougner 2006), they have undoubtedly engaged in a type 
of gaming that tilts the international economic and trade rules towards cutting 
direct linkages between the state and enterprises, thus eliminating the emerging 
economies’ advantage in exporting ODI and ensuring the continual spread of 
free-market principles.
Effects of ODI on distribution and 
domestic politics
Apart from conflicts over national security and rule-setting caused by differing 
economic models, the most direct effect of ODI is changing the income distribution 
of social groups in the host country. Such changes can also lead to a reshaping of 
domestic political unions in host countries. However, the academic circle is still 
divided over what political effects ODI can bring. Those with positive views of 
ODI believe it can significantly increase demand for labour in the host country 
and contribute to improvement in labour conditions. Local owners of capital, 
however, are likely to encounter rising costs and intensified market competition. 
Therefore, the more democratic a government is, the more positive will be that 
government’s attitude towards ODI (Pandya 2014). In contrast, those with 
a negative view of ODI hold that both horizontal ODI, targeting the market, and 
vertical FDI, targeting efficiency, or the comprehensive knowledge–capital model of 
ODI, may widen labour income gaps and worsen conditions for low-income groups 
(Lankhuizen 2014). In some extreme cases, ODI will not lead to a rise in wages for 
any labour groups and only local capital owners will benefit from such investment 
(Waldkirch 2010). In real-world politics, the ruling group also treats ODI activities 
differently. For instance, a pro-labour government may encourage ODI inflows that 
contribute to improvements in workers’ wellbeing, while a pro-capital government 
may encourage ODI inflows that will lower labour costs (Pinto and Pinto 2008). 
Therefore, the type of political obstacles ODI will encounter is closely related to 
redistribution in the host country.
Among the many ODI-related indicators, employment security is the one that 
has the biggest political appeal. However, existing studies are yet to prove whether 
ODI has a long-term and positive effect on employment security. Most researchers 
acknowledge that ODI enterprises generally have a competitive advantage and offer 
higher wages and more stable jobs, but they also stress that this does not necessarily 
mean there will be an increase in overall social wellbeing (Girma and Görg 2007), 
because the ODI inflows—especially those with an extensive margin—will have 
a negative effect on the employment of low-skilled workers in the recipient industry 
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(Bachmann et al. 2014). Moreover, not all foreign enterprises have a competitive 
edge. Some small-scale ODI that is made by private companies in non-export sectors 
can threaten employment security given the lack of local operational networks 
(Andrews et al. 2012). Research shows that vertical ODI that has acquired export 
enterprises is conducive to long-term employment security and overall employment 
rate growth (Bandick and Görg 2010).
Apart from employment security, income disparity is an equally important political 
factor. Horizontal comparisons show that the more advanced the technologies of 
the host country, the less significant will be the effect of ODI on domestic income 
disparity. This means ODI activities of the same nature will have different effects on 
income disparity in developed and developing countries. In developed countries, the 
effect of ODI on widening income disparity is often not very obvious, because in 
economically developed and technologically advanced countries, foreign enterprises 
generally play the role of technology receivers, not initiators; as a result, they will 
not significantly increase demand for skilled workers, nor will they cause income 
disparity (Bode and Nunnenkamp 2011). Such a characteristic is especially apparent 
in the United States. In the 1980s, Japan made large amounts of direct investment in 
the United States, but the investment did not promote industrial upgrading within 
the United States, nor did it help increase the incomes of highly skilled workers; on 
the contrary, it increased demand for low-skilled workers and widened income gaps 
(Blonigen and Slaughter 2001). 
Therefore, the effect of ODI on income distribution among different social groups 
in a host country mainly hinges on the nature of the ODI and the development level 
of the host country. Groups that have or are likely to see their interests affected will 
use existing political mechanisms to block the entry and operation of ODI. What 
needs to be stressed is that, for the United States, its leading role in technology 
actually provides a more favourable domestic political environment for the entry of 
ODI. On the one hand, ODI does not mean being more competitive and generally 
does not lead to significantly intensified competition in the domestic market; on the 
other hand, foreign investment in the United States is generally not efficiency-driven 
and seldom involves reduction in numbers of jobs or wages, and therefore does not 
pose a significant threat to the wellbeing of the local labour force. Therefore, the 
‘political’ challenges facing overseas direct investors in a developed economy such 
as the United States come mainly from their rivals in acquisitions and the federal 
government, not from local voters or state governments.
The above analysis points to the three main effects of ODI on the domestic politics 
of host countries and the subsequent backlash. In most cases, the business rivals of 
investors making ODI make use of the above factors and political environment to 
block the entry of competitive ODI. After sorting out the theoretical aspects of the 
issue, this chapter will carry out analysis using real cases.
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Case studies of China’s blocked ODI projects
The cases of blocked investment in this chapter are projects that have not been 
completed for political reasons in the host country. Few scholars and institutions have 
thoroughly investigated such projects carried out by Chinese investors and therefore 
this chapter collects a total of 22 cases from 2005 to 2015—including cases labelled 
‘withdraw’ in the BVD-Zephyr database; data dubbed ‘troubled transactions’ in 
the China Global Investment Tracker system of the American Enterprise Institute 
and the Heritage Foundation; and cases revealed by media outlets within China 
and abroad, such as Caixin, Reuters, Bloomberg, the Financial Times, the China 
Securities Journal, as well as information disclosure on the websites of the companies 
concerned (see Table 13.1). 
Table 13.1 Cases of blocked Chinese ODI projects
1 2005 China Minmetals Corporation’s bid to buy Canadian metals company Noranda
2 2005 The bid by China National Offshore Oil Corporation to buy US energy company Unocal
3 2008 Huawei’s bid to buy US-based 3COM
4 2009 Chinalco’s increase in investment in Australia-based Rio Tinto
5 2009 Northwest Non-Ferrous International Investment Company’s investment in US-based 
Firstgold Corp.
6 2009 PetroChina’s bid to buy Canada-based Verenex Energy, Inc.
7 2010 Huawei’s bid to buy the wireless equipment business of Motorola 
8 2010 Huawei’s bid to buy privately owned broadband internet software provider 2Wire
9 2010 Tangshan Caofeidian Investment Corporation’s investment in US-based EMCORE 
Corporation
10 2011 Huawei’s bid to buy 3Leaf Systems
11 2011 China Shenhua Energy Company Limited’s investment in Mongolia’s Tavan Tolgoi
12 2012 Chinalco’s bid to buy interests in Canada-based SouthGobi Resources Limited
13 2012 Zhongkun Investment Group’s tourism development project in Iceland
14 2013 China North Industries Group Corporation’s investment in a copper mining project 
in Myanmar
15 2014 China National Arts & Crafts Group Corporation’s bid to buy two platinum assets from 
South Africa’s Aquarius Platinum
16 2014 China Railway Group Limited’s investment in a railway connecting Kyaukpyu in 
Myanmar and Kunming in Yunnan Province
17 2015 Yantai Taihai Group Co. Ltd’s bid to buy Sheffield Forgemasters International
18 2015 Bid by Chinese consortium formed by GSR Ventures and Oak Investment Partners 
to buy Royal Philips NV’s LED business, Lumileds
19 2015 Tsinghua Unigroup Co. Ltd’s bid to acquire US chip storage giant Micron Technology, Inc.
20 2015 China Communications Construction’s Colombo Port City project in Sri Lanka
21 2015 Shanghai Pengxin Group Co. Ltd’s bid to buy Australian beef producer S. Kidman & Co.
22 2015 Cancellation of a successful bid by China Railway Construction Corporation Limited 
to build a high-speed railway in Mexico
Source: Compiled by the authors.
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Characteristics of blocked investment cases
Cases of blocked acquisitions have the following characteristics (see Table 13.2).
Table 13.2 Characteristics of the cases of China’s blocked ODI
No. Ratio 
(%)
Value ($m) Ratio 
(%)
Ownership
Private 8 36.36 7,590.15 11.90
State-owned 14 63.64 56,196.81 88.10
Industry
Agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry, fishery 1 4.55 250.00 0.39
Mining 9 40.91 47,979.01 75.22
Manufacturing 8 36.36 9,659.95 15.14
Among them: telecommunications equipment, 
computer and other electronic equipment 
manufacturing
5 22.73 6,324.50 9.92
Construction 3 13.64 5,890.00 9.23
Culture, sport and entertainment 1 4.55 8.00 0.01
Country
Developing 8 36.36 10,497.00 16.46
Mongolia 2 9.09 3,800.00 5.96
Myanmar 2 9.09 1,070.00 1.68
Mexico 1 4.55 3,700.00 5.80
Sri Lanka 1 4.55 1,430.00 2.24
Libya 1 4.55 460.00 0.72
South Africa 1 4.55 37.00 0.06
Developed 14 63.64 53,289.96 83.54
US 9 40.91 28,178.30 44.18
Australia 2 9.09 19,750.00 30.96
Canada 1 4.55 5,346.01 8.38
Iceland 1 4.55 8.00 0.01
UK 1 4.55 7.65 0.01
Source: Compiled by the authors.
First, they mainly involve SOEs. In the 22 cases in Table 13.1, 14 are SOEs, 
accounting for 64 per cent of the total cases; and the value of the deals involved 
in those 14 cases accounts for 88 per cent of the total value. Among the 14 SOEs, 
10 are centrally administered. There are eight private enterprises involved in the 
22 cases and four of the cases involve Chinese technology company Huawei—all in 
the United States: the company’s bid to buy 3COM in 2008; its bid to buy 2Wire, 
a private broadband internet software provider, in 2010; its bid to buy the wireless 
equipment business of Motorola in 2010; and its bid to buy 3Leaf in 2011. 
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Second, mining, telecommunications and construction are the main industries 
involved in the blocked investment cases. Of the total number of blocked 
investments, 41 per cent involve investment in mining, accounting for 75 per cent 
of the total value of the deals involved. They include two coalmining projects, two 
oil and gas projects and five projects in iron, aluminium, copper and goldmining. 
Telecommunications is the second most seriously affected industry, accounting for 
23 per cent of the total number of the blocked investments and 10 per cent of their 
total value. Moreover, three cases involve the construction industry, accounting for 
10 per cent of the total value of the 22 cases.
Third, most of the investment blocked (84 per cent) was in developed economies, 
especially the United States, where nine of the cases occurred, accounting for 
64 per cent of the total cases in developed economies and 53 per cent of their 
value. Apart from the United States, investment was blocked in developed 
economies including Australia, Canada, Iceland and the United Kingdom. China 
has encountered relatively fewer hurdles in developing markets, where cases 
of its investment being blocked account for 36 per cent of the total 22  cases 
and 16  per  cent of the total value. Among the cases of blocked investment 
in developing countries, two were in Mongolia and Myanmar, and one each in 
Mexico, Sri Lanka, Libya and South Africa.
Analysis of reasons for blocked investment
Analysis of the 22 cases involving Chinese ODI shows that national security, conflict 
over rules and distribution effects are the factors behind investment being blocked. 
Among these, national security is the most frequently cited factor and has been used 
to block investment in both developed and developing countries. Cases of blocked 
investment arising from conflicting market rules have occurred mainly in developed 
countries and are largely included in the scope of a national security review. In terms 
of distribution effects, Chinese investors encounter direct blocks arising from local 
political factors in developing countries, while in developed countries, the blocking 
often takes effect through a national security review. 
National security
As mentioned earlier, national security is quite a blurred concept and different 
countries may have different explanations and apply the concept in different 
manners. For CFIUS, national security includes four key factors. The first is crucial 
infrastructure, including agriculture and food, national defence industries, energy, 
public health and health care, banking and finance, water, chemical products, 
business facilities, dams, information technology, telecommunications, postal 
services and transportation. Second are key technologies, mainly those closely 
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related to national security. Third are key locations within the United States or areas 
close to key infrastructure. Fourth are enterprises and capital backed by foreign 
governments. The CFIUS categorisation is quite typical; in the cases of blocked 
Chinese investment, the second and the third factors can each constitute a reason 
for refusing the investment, while the first and fourth factors are often cited together.
Key technology
In Case No. 2 (Table 13.1), the China National Offshore Oil Corporation 
(CNOOC) proposed acquiring US-based oil company Unocal in 2005, which 
aroused strong opposition in US political circles. The US House of Representatives 
voted 398 to 15 to pass a resolution protesting against the deal and called on 
then president George W. Bush to review the bid under the CFIUS mechanism, 
citing threats to national security. The main concern was that Unocal’s advanced 
submarine surveying and mapping technology could be acquired by CNOOC 
to assist China’s submarine technology development. In Case No. 17, the 
Yantai Taihai Group Co. Ltd’s bid to buy Sheffield Forgemasters International 
was blocked by British authorities. Sheffield Forgemasters International forges 
precision components for manufacturing of military aircraft engines in Europe; 
it is also a supplier of heavy forging parts for the construction of surface ships in 
Europe. As a result, the United Kingdom was concerned that the transfer of the 
controlling shares of the company to a Chinese enterprise would ultimately lead 
to the disguised transfer of key military technology to China.
Geological locations
In Case No. 5, after the Northwest Non-Ferrous International Investment 
Company, which belongs to the Northwest Non-Ferrous Geological Survey Bureau, 
announced its planned investment in the US-based Firstgold Corp. in 2009, the 
CFIUS suggested the Chinese company drop its plan, citing some of Firstgold’s 
assets in the State of Nevada that are close to Naval Air Station Fallon, which is a 
‘key location’. Similarly, in Case No. 21, Shanghai Pengxin Group Co. Ltd’s bid to 
acquire a cattle farm was blocked by Australia’s Foreign Investment Review Board; 
an important reason for the blocking was that half of the property sits within the 
weapons testing range of the Woomera Prohibited Area in South Australia.
Sensitive industry and foreign government backing
In Case No. 2, the CNOOC sought to acquire US oil producer Unocal in 2005. 
On the one hand, Sino–US trade relations were soured by bilateral trade frictions 
and the United States had been pressuring China on issues such as renminbi 
appreciation and China’s fulfilment of its World Trade Organization (WTO) 
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commitments; on the other hand, the United States at that time attached utmost 
importance to energy security. As a result, CNOOC’s purchase plan triggered an 
explosion of concern among US politicians and Congress even voted to demand 
that the government investigate the real motives of the Chinese side in the bid. In 
Case No. 8, Huawei offered to purchase 2Wire, a US private broadband internet 
software provider, at a time when the United States and the international community 
attached great importance to internet security; meanwhile, there had been a series 
of accusations that China-based hackers had attacked government and corporate 
websites in other countries to steal crucial information. Yu Chengdong, then chief 
marketing officer of Huawei, told the media that Huawei had failed to grasp the 
opportunities in the North American markets at a time when political factors 
played a relatively small role in influencing corporate decisions. If it had grasped 
the opportunities at that time, he said, Huawei may have become a major supplier 
to the North American markets and it would have been much easier to solve the 
problems it faced (Southern Metropolis Daily 2011). In Case No. 10, Huawei 
did not encounter major technological challenges in its bid to purchase 3Lead, 
but the CFIUS ultimately suggested it withdraw its bid due to the company’s 
alleged links with the Chinese military. In Case No. 4, when Chinalco proposed 
increasing its investment in Rio Tinto, there were accusations that Chinalco was 
controlled by the Chinese Government and claims that ‘China should not be 
allowed to own Australia’. The Australian Government bowed to pressure and 
repeatedly postponed the approval of the bid. In the end, Rio Tinto unilaterally 
cancelled its agreement with Chinalco and announced the formation of an iron 
ore joint venture with BHP Billiton Limited (now BHP).
All in all, national security is a political concept and therefore any review of it is 
bound to be discriminatory. For instance, in Case No. 5, also situated close to Naval 
Air Station Fallon are the operations of other foreign mining companies—such as 
Canada’s Barrick Gold Corporation and Australia’s Rio Tinto—some of which are 
even closer to the station than Firstgold. In practice, there are no unified criteria for 
conducting national security reviews targeted at foreign investment and it is still up 
to the discretion of the relevant administrative departments in the host countries.
Apart from developed countries such as the United States, Canada and Australia, 
Chinese enterprises have also encountered investment blocks citing national 
security concerns in developing countries. In Case No. 6, PetroChina offered to 
purchase Verenex, a Canada-based energy company, whose business is mainly in 
Libya, with 86.3 per cent of its oil output belonging to the Libyan Government. 
However, the Libyan Government refused to approve the acquisition offer, citing 
concerns about ‘excessive control by China’. In Case No. 12, Chinalco planned 
to acquire some shares of the Canadian SouthGobi Resources, whose assets are 
mainly in Mongolia; the Mongolian authorities cancelled some of SouthGobi’s 
exploration and mining certificates, citing national security threats, and Chinalco 
was forced to withdraw the offer.
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Market rules
Currently, although developed countries have attached increasing importance to the 
‘market neutrality principle’, there has also been an increase in criticism of Chinese 
enterprises for enjoying certain privileges, although there are yet to be any cases of 
investment being blocked solely due to ‘competition advantage’. In contrast, suspicions 
that Chinese enterprises conduct ‘noncommercial activities’ are an important factor 
behind the blocking of the activities of Chinese enterprises abroad. For instance, 
in Case No. 2, in which the CNOOC offered to acquire Unocal, Case No. 4, in 
which Chinalco proposed increasing its investment in Rio Tinto, Case No.  8, in 
which Huawei offered to acquire 2Wire, and Case No. 10, in which Huawei offered 
to acquire 3Lead, national security was cited as the reason for the blocking of those 
deals. It is considered a national security issue because the governments and societies 
of those developed countries, such as the United States and Australia, suspect that 
Chinese enterprises carry out investment activities with noncommercial motives, such 
as influencing the foreign policy of host countries, making strategic arrangements and 
ensuring energy supply for China. Before the principle of competition neutrality—
including the principle of restricting the activities of SOEs and other privileged 
enterprises—plays a larger role in ODI reviews, it can be said that market rules have 
become part of the national security factor.
Distribution effect and domestic politics
China’s ODI, due to its huge scale, often has a major bearing on domestic industrial 
development and wealth distribution in developing countries, especially those small 
and mid-sized countries with problematic governance and serious social division, 
thus triggering fierce domestic political strife. In developed countries, China’s 
technology, market and branding-oriented investment activities generally will not 
have a significant impact on overall social interest distribution and the political 
landscape. Chinese enterprises will face blocking from a small number of local rivals 
whose interests are damaged by Chinese investment; these groups may make use 
of, or even manipulate, a special political agenda to block investment from China.
In developing countries, China’s ODI projects are often seen as offering political 
and economic support for the incumbent government and thus are prone to fierce 
backlash from opposition forces. China’s investment in Myanmar is a case in point. 
In Cases No. 14 and No. 16, the investment agreements signed by Chinese investors 
with the country’s military government were cancelled after the country initiated 
democratic reforms. In carrying out their investment activities, Chinese enterprises 
have prioritised winning support from host country governments and have failed 
to understand and attach importance to social changes and the appeals of ordinary 
citizens in the host country; as a result, there have been repeated protests organised 
by local people and political organisations against Chinese investment. In Case 
No. 20, China had a close relationship with the Mahinda Rajapaksa Government of 
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Sri Lanka, but after the country’s power shift, the government of the new President, 
Maithripala Sirisena, immediately announced the cancellation of the Colombo Port 
City project involving China Communications Construction Group and subjected 
it to an investment review. During the election process, Sirisena and the opposition 
party had argued that the interest rates on loans for the project were too high and the 
environment would be damaged; they also claimed that only Rajapaksa and a small 
group of people would benefit from the project. In Case No. 22, an international 
consortium led by the China Railway Construction Corporation Limited successfully 
won the bid to build a high-speed railway connecting Mexico City and Querétaro state 
in Mexico. However, three days later, the project was cancelled; one important reason 
offered was that the four companies cooperating with the Chinese enterprise were 
‘overly close’ to the ruling party, and the opposition party accused them of engaging 
in unfair deals. Conflicts arising from the distribution of benefits are not confined 
to developing countries. In Case No. 13, the Zhongkun Investment Group—at the 
invitation of the Government of Iceland—offered to acquire 300 square kilometres of 
land for tourism and ecological development. Due to partisan differences, however, 
the country’s internal affairs ministry rejected the deal, citing procedural problems.
In developed countries, Chinese enterprises may face competition from their 
local rivals, who often make use of election politics to thwart investment and 
acquisitions—as in Australia. There are two main political forces in Australia—
namely, the Australian Labor Party and the Liberal–National Party Coalition. The 
country holds general elections every three years. Such a tight election schedule 
means the ruling party must be especially mindful of public opinion, while dealing 
with criticisms from the opposition party. In Case No. 4, Chinalco’s competitor 
BHP is the second-largest mining group in the world; it is also one of the largest 
enterprises in Australia, having a great influence on Australian society. One former 
Australian government official said the country’s China policy was actually set by 
BHP (Garnaut 2009). BHP produced and made use of negative propaganda against 
Chinalco to play up the alleged threat the Chinese company posed to Australia’s 
national security, ultimately ensuring its deal to increase its investment in Rio Tinto 
was used by the opposition party to attack the government. The opposition party 
accused Chinalco of being backed by the Chinese Government, which it claimed 
had a close relationship with the ruling Labor Party. Under pressure, the Labor Party 
became very cautious in reviewing the deal to show that it had no inappropriate 
relationship with China. As a result, the approval of the Chinalco investment project 
was delayed and Rio Tinto turned to BHP to form a new joint venture.
Moreover, national security reviews in developed countries can easily be used 
by rivals of Chinese enterprises to set investment hurdles through politicising 
business competition. In Case No. 2, US congressman Richard Pombo put forward 
a resolution to suggest that approval of investment by Chinese enterprises in US 
oil companies should be postponed by at least 120 days. What is noteworthy is 
that Pombo represents the State of California, where CNOOC’s competitor in 
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the Unocal bid, Chevron, is headquartered. In addition, US telecommunications 
enterprises such as Cisco have played a role in blocking Huawei’s investments in the 
US market through lobbying of government.
Empirical analysis of factors behind 
blocked investment
After theoretical analysis and case studies in previous sections, this section uses the 
probit model to estimate the major influential factors in deciding whether the ODI 
of Chinese enterprises is blocked.
Data and variables
Analysis of the blocking of China’s ODI activities should include both ‘blocked’ 
(uncompleted investment) samples and ‘successful’ (completed investment) samples. 
The ‘blocked’ samples, as mentioned earlier, include 22 cases during the period 
2005–15. Meanwhile, the ‘successful’ samples include 432 investment projects. For 
information on these investment projects, we first check the list of approved ODI 
projects of China’s National Development and Reform Commission and retrieve 
basic information such as investment scale, the countries invested in and the targets 
of investment. Then, through corporate information disclosures and media reports, 
we sort out the projects with disclosed information on their investment scale and 
targets and which have Chinese investors holding more than 10 per cent of shares. 
We exclude a project if it involves a Chinese enterprise investing in another Chinese 
enterprise and is categorised as ‘return investment’—that is, the ultimate destination 
of the proposed investment is the Chinese mainland.
The empirical analysis of this chapter includes the following variables that may 
influence the blocking of investment.
i. State-owned enterprise. This is a virtual variable: 1 represents SOE; 
0  represents non-SOE. Enterprises and capital with government backing are 
prone to arousing the attention of authorities in the host country. For example, 
in its reviews, CFIUS targets whether: 1) a foreign government can substantially 
influence the enterprise concerned and order it to acquire US enterprises with 
key technologies; 2) a foreign government can provide targeted and overly 
generous incentives, such as grants, preferential loans and tax preferences. 
China’s SOEs have access to government policy and resource support and 
are prone to accusations of threatening the host country’s national security 
and jeopardising fair market competition; therefore, they are more likely to 
encounter hurdles to investing overseas.
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ii. Investment scale, with the unit being $1 million. The larger the investment 
scale, the greater is the probability that the project will have a bearing on local 
affairs in the host country; therefore, it is more likely the project will receive 
attention from the regulators, society and media of the host country.
iii. Political risk and institutional distance. This chapter complies with the 
existing documents and adopts the International Country Risk Guide political 
risk index, released by the Political Risk Service Group, to measure the political 
risks in host countries. The index is a qualitative variable, covering 12 aspects, 
such as political stability, military intervention in politics, internal and external 
conflicts, corruption, law and administrative efficiency. The bigger the value, 
the smaller is the political risk. As mentioned in the literature review in the 
second part of this chapter, no consensus has been reached on measuring the 
influence of political risks in the host country on China’s ODI. Apart from 
absolute institutional quality (here, this refers to political risks in the host 
country), the institutional distance between the parent and host countries may 
also play a role in whether the enterprise encounters hurdles in investing in the 
host country and therefore also becomes a variable, defined as the gap between 
the political risk index in the host country and that in China. 
iv. Bilateral political relations. The indicator of bilateral political relations in the 
Country-risk Rating of Overseas Investment from China report (Zhang and Wang 
2018), compiled by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, is adopted in this 
chapter. Good bilateral relations are conducive to the development of direct 
investment and serve as a lubricant for enterprises to invest and operate in host 
countries, thus lowering the negative impacts on international investment of 
the social and political risks in host countries. However, some studies also show 
that, given the existence of sunk costs, the worsening of international relations 
does not have a significant negative impact on the investment decision-making 
of multinationals (Davis and Meunier 2011). 
v. Natural resources. This indicator is calculated based on the trade-in-goods 
matrix data of the UN Conference on Trade and Development and measured 
by the aggregate fuel and mineral exports to GDP ratio in the host country. 
As the world’s factory and most populous country, China has a great demand 
for natural resources. One of the main driving forces of China’s ODI is 
accessing stable sources of raw materials. Resources, including minerals, coal 
and oil, are nonrenewable. Meanwhile, resource exploitation can easily cause 
environmental problems and lead to corruption, thus triggering complaints 
from local people. 
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vi. Patent. This refers to the indicator of resident applications per million population 
in the database of the World Intellectual Property Organization.1 Although it 
cannot fully reflect a country’s technological level, it can, to an extent, reflect 
a country’s technological research and development input–output level and its 
technological knowledge level. It is widely used in the literature as a measure 
of technological level. The acquisition of strategic assets, such as technology 
and brands, is conducive to improvement in the competitiveness of Chinese 
enterprises and helps them move higher in the value chain. ODI is an important 
way of achieving those goals. However, as Chinese enterprises increase their 
technology acquisition–oriented direct investment, host countries have become 
increasingly concerned about loss of key technologies.
vii. Invested industry. The blocking of ODI activities due to political factors may 
also be related to the nature of the invested industries. For instance, the French 
Monetary and Financial Code says that, in 11 specific industries, foreign 
investors in local enterprises should be subject to foreign investment review on 
the grounds of defending France’s public order, public safety or national defence 
interests (US GAO 2008). The US Foreign Investment and National Security Act 
of 2007 also lists several economic sectors that are categorised as ‘important 
infrastructure’. We mark industries based on the industrial classification 
and codes for national economic activities provided by the National Bureau 
of Statistics of China. According to Table 13.2, cases of blocked investment 
occur in agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry and fisheries, mining, 
telecommunications, construction, culture, sport and entertainment. We set 
those industries as virtual variables. If an industry is the invested industry, the 
variable is 1; otherwise, it is 0.
viii. Other controlled variables. These include economic growth in the host 
country, the distance between the capital cities of two countries and the year 
of investment.
Econometric model and regression results
Based on the above analysis, we estimate the influence of the above-mentioned factors 
on whether the ODI activities of Chinese enterprises are blocked. Since whether 
they are blocked is a discrete choice, the estimation equation can be expressed as the 
following probit model (Equation 13.1).
Equation 13.1
 Pr(FailureODIi =1 Xi ) =Ψ(Xiβ)
1 Country ownership of patents is based on the nationality of patent applicants.
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In Equation 13.1, the dependent variable denotes the possibility of the investment 
being blocked—that is, 1 if the investment is blocked and 0 if the investment is 
completed; i refers to the specific enterprise; X refers to the set of all explanatory 
variables; ß is the coefficient of the corresponding variable; and Ψ denotes the 
cumulative distribution function of standard normal distribution. Apart from 
the  probit model, we also use the linear probability model (LPM) to conduct 
regression analysis. In the LPM, the ordinary least squares (OLS) method is used to 
estimate the binary choice model; since it has some problems, it is not as accurate as 
the probit model.2 Here, the LPM regression is introduced to serve as the comparison 
of the probit model estimation. 
Table 13.3 provides the regression results of probit and LPM. It is found that the 
ownership of an enterprise is not the main factor behind its investment being 
blocked; however, the larger the investment scale is, the more probable it is that the 
investment will be blocked. Table 13.2 shows that most cases of blocked investment 
involve SOEs; however, regression results indicate that the ownership of an enterprise 
does not have a major impact on whether its investment will be blocked. This is 
because, in the sample interval, China’s ODI activities are carried out mainly by 
SOEs,3 which signifies that many SOEs have already completed their ODI. As a 
result, the variable of ‘SOE’ is not significant in the statistics. However, the variable 
of ‘investment scale’ passing the 1 per cent significance test is the main factor behind 
the blocking of investment by Chinese enterprises; more specifically, the larger the 
investment scale, the more probable it is that an enterprise’s ODI will be blocked. 
This may be because of the effect known as ‘a tall tree catches the wind’: projects 
of larger investment scale may attract more attention and become targets of attack. 
The political risks in the host country and institutional distance are not significant 
factors influencing whether an investment project will be blocked. However, 
the better the bilateral political relations, the less probable it is the investment 
of a Chinese enterprise will be blocked in the host country. Neither the 
absolute institutional indicator (political risk in host countries) nor the relative 
institutional indicator (institutional distance) is significant in the statistics. But 
the significance of the variable of ‘bilateral political relations’ is negative and it 
passes the 1 per cent significance test. It is found that good bilateral relations are 
conducive to the entry of Chinese enterprises into local markets and to reducing 
resistance to Chinese investment.
2 For example: 1) there is a linear relationship between the assumptive independent variable of LPM and the 
probability of Y = 1, although such relationships are often nonlinear; 2) the fitted value may be < 0 or > 1, but 
the probability value must be within a closed interval between 0 and 1; and 3) the disturbance term is subject 
to binary distribution, not normal distribution.
3 From 2006 to 2014, ODI by nonfinancial central SOEs accounted for 77 per cent of China’s total nonfinancial 
overseas investment stock.
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SOE 0.41 –0.00446 0.537 -0.00621 0.536 –0.00659
(0.43200) (0.02330) (0.47700) (0.02310) (0.47800) (0.02310)
Investment scale 0.000406*** 5.33e-05*** 0.000451*** 5.25e-05*** 0.000448*** 5.24e-05***
(0.00013) (0.00001) (0.00014) (0.00001) (0.00014) (0.00001)
Political risk 0.00667 –0.000213 –0.0199 –0.00164
(0.01840) (0.00105) (0.02430) (0.00129)




–6.681*** –0.275** –6.597*** –0.307*** –6.621*** –0.306***
(2.37100) (0.11100) (2.39000) (0.11500) (2.40100) (0.11500)
Natural resources 0.0131 0.000235 0.0132 0.000218
(0.03670) (0.00175) (0.03660) (0.00174)
Patent 0.262* 0.0124* 0.269* 0.0128*




2.080** 0.119* 2.745*** 0.127** 2.750*** 0.126**
(0.89200) (0.06060) (0.97800) (0.06030) (0.97700) (0.06030)
Mining 1.478*** 0.0408 1.862*** 0.0623** 1.870*** 0.0618**
(0.55900) (0.02720) (0.62900) (0.02950) (0.63300) (0.02920)
Construction 1.991** 0.485*** 2.085** 0.397*** 2.099** 0.399***
(0.79500) (0.08980) (0.98200) (0.09860) (0.98300) (0.09850)
Telecommunications 2.615*** 0.309*** 2.601*** 0.295*** 2.604*** 0.295***
(0.66100) (0.05270) (0.68200) (0.05250) (0.68200) (0.05250)
Economic growth -0.00834 0.00112 0.0272 0.003 0.032 0.00302
(0.06440) (0.00368) (0.07310) (0.00394) (0.07350) (0.00393)
Distance between 
two countries
0.139 0.0165 0.0825 0.0161 0.0836 0.0161
(0.30300) (0.01940) (0.31400) (0.01940) (0.31400) (0.01940)
Year of investment 0.222*** 0.00685** 0.207*** 0.00619* 0.224*** 0.00737**
(0.07990) (0.00325) (0.07740) (0.00326) (0.07680) (0.00327)
R2 0.5222 0.3246 0.5465 0.3079 0.5473 0.3083
*** p < 0.01 ** p < 0.05 * p < 0.1 
Notes: The standard errors of mean are in parentheses; R2 in the probit regression is pseudo R2; R2 in 
the LPM regression is adjusted R2.
Source: Authors’ regression analysis of relevant data using Stata econometric software. 
Whether a host country is rich in natural resources is not a significant factor behind 
blocked investment activities. But the higher the technological level of the host 
country, the more probable it is Chinese enterprises will have their investment 
blocked. The variable of ‘natural resources’ is positive, but not significant. 
The variable of ‘patent’ is also positive and passes the 10 per cent significance test. 
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This variable is an indicator of technological level; its result shows that the higher 
the technological level of the host country, the more probable it is that investment 
by Chinese enterprises in local markets will be blocked. This is a reflection of the fact 
that those host countries with a relatively high technological level are worried about 
Chinese enterprises ‘stealing’ their key technologies and weakening their economic 
competitive edge. As a result, these kinds of host countries have blocked the entry 
of more Chinese enterprises.
Some industries are more prone than others to encountering investment hurdles. 
The significance of the variable of ‘telecommunications’ is positive and it has passed 
the 1 per cent significance test in all regressions. The significance of the variables of 
‘agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry and fisheries’, ‘mining’ and ‘construction’ 
is also positive, but their significance falls remarkably, and some regressions have 
passed the 5 per cent significance test. This indicates that investment by Chinese 
enterprises in overseas telecommunications, agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry 
and fisheries, mining and construction industries is more likely to be blocked.
The significance of the coefficient of ‘year of investment’ is positive, which 
indicates that the probability of Chinese ODI being blocked in overseas markets 
has been rising in recent years.
Countermeasures and suggestions for coping 
with blocked ODI
The empirical analysis in this chapter shows that the larger the investment scale 
and the higher the technological level of the host country, the more probable it is 
that the investment by Chinese enterprises in overseas markets will be blocked; the 
better the bilateral relations, the smaller is the probability of Chinese enterprises 
encountering hurdles to investing in local markets. Moreover, investment 
by Chinese enterprises in certain industries—such as telecommunications, 
agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry and fisheries, mining and construction—
is more likely than others to be blocked. Based on the above analysis, we offer the 
following suggestions for reducing investment hurdles. 
First, investors should break up large-scale investment into several smaller investment 
programs to avoid attracting the attention of the host country government, 
community and media. Chinese enterprises generally lack experience in investing 
abroad and most do not know how to deal properly with local communities and 
media; they also lack transparency and are weak in terms of information disclosure, 
making it very difficult for the host country society to determine their investment 
motives and development philosophy. Therefore, Chinese enterprises should avoid 
making large-scale ODI; if they really need to carry out large-scale investment 
The Chinese Economic Transformation
282
programs, they should break these into smaller-scale programs and gradually 
increase investment in local enterprises; they should first become noncontrolling 
or minority-controlling shareholders of local enterprises or collaborate and share 
interests with local enterprises.
Second, Chinese enterprises should invest in industries with relatively easier 
review procedures and avoid directly entering sensitive industries—such as 
telecommunications, aerospace, energy and infrastructure—that raise concerns 
about national security, geopolitics and national competitiveness. Foreign 
enterprises may encounter intervention from the government of the host country 
when they enter these types of industries. Therefore, Chinese enterprises should try 
to avoid investing in crucial industries and sensitive sectors and should first enter 
industries with relatively easier review procedures; they should gradually increase 
their investment and establish a good reputation before they start acquiring local 
enterprises in sensitive industries so as to ease concerns among the government and 
public of the host country.
Third, Chinese enterprises should improve their protection of intellectual property 
rights and continually increase research and development (R&D) inputs in the 
host countries. In response to the concerns of host countries over the loss of key 
technologies, Chinese enterprises should attach importance to and enhance 
protection of the brands and intellectual property rights of the enterprises in which 
they invest and establish an insulation mechanism to ensure the security of business 
secrets and customer data. Meanwhile, Chinese enterprises should also provide 
support for the companies in which they invest so they can hire more R&D staff, 
improve their research facilities and increase R&D inputs and establish relevant 
mechanisms to maintain and strengthen the business’s independence, management 
stability and technological edge.
Fourth, Chinese enterprises should enhance strategic mutual trust with host 
countries and use political means to resolve political risks. Making their investment 
projects more mutually beneficial is the key to reducing the concerns of host country 
governments and the public. The key to expanding mutual benefits from investment 
in sensitive industries is enhancing the mutual trust between China and the host 
countries. It is the trust gap that has led to the repeated success of some interest 
groups in politicising the commercial projects of Chinese enterprises. Currently, 
whether in terms of investment scale or industrial penetration, China’s ODI has 
reached a stage of development at which better political relations are needed to 
clear the barriers to business investment; political relations should facilitate business 
cooperation and economic relations should no longer serve as the ballast for 
various types of bilateral relations. China should cooperate with other countries, 
especially developed countries, in traditional and nontraditional security areas to 
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acknowledge and resolve the security concerns of those countries instead of relying 
on the spillover effects of their economic and trade relations to make up for their 
inadequate cooperation in strategic areas.
Apart from the above suggestions, China can adopt clearer strategies in response to 
the political backlash triggered by its ODI activities.
First, Chinese enterprises should make more thorough preparations for coping with 
national security reviews; they should hire professionals and intermediaries to carry 
out thorough research and investigations, understand and abide by the host country’s 
legal system, regulatory framework and review procedures and prepare documents 
and emergency plans for going through the review procedure. Admittedly, the 
expansion of the national security concept and the increasing political factors in the 
process of national security reviews have become an entrenched trend and it is very 
difficult for enterprises to predict whether their investment will trigger a national 
security review in the host country. While host countries have increasingly used 
such tools to block investment by Chinese enterprises, the fact that the outcome 
of a national security review cannot be legally challenged means it is difficult 
for Chinese enterprises to respond to a review. However, since the Sani Group 
successfully brought a suit against a CFIUS decision, citing procedural injustice, 
Chinese enterprises may be able to use legal means to protect their interests if they 
fully understand the legal and political rules of the host countries.
Second, in coping with market rule conflicts, Chinese enterprises, especially SOEs, 
should improve their transparency in accordance with international standards, actively 
clarify their internal structure, their relationship with the Chinese Government, their 
investment goals and policies and their future development plans. Meanwhile, they 
should become more profit-oriented in making international investment decisions; 
while investing in sensitive and important industries, they should avoid offering 
unrealistically high prices or shouldering excessively high business risks regardless of 
their capital utilisation efficiency or the real costs of investment—behaviour that can 
easily arouse suspicion from the government and public of the host countries and 
doubts about whether Chinese enterprises are real market players or government 
affiliates. At the state level, China should actively contribute to the build-up of 
the system of international investment governance and actively participate in the 
establishment of international investment rules to create a favourable environment 
for Chinese enterprises investing abroad.
Last but not least, Chinese enterprises should build an image of being neutral 
and not politically oriented to better cope with the distribution effect and local 
politics of the host country and avoid being overly close to any one political force 
(especially the incumbent government). Meanwhile, before the launch of their 
investment projects, they should take into consideration the distribution effect 
in the host country and clarify it in project contracts to properly guarantee the 
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interests of different local groups. They should ensure their investment projects 
can serve the interests of local communities and pay special attention to the 
relative changes in benefits to different groups, providing more benefits to those 
who could be adversely affected by their projects. Moreover, Chinese enterprises 
should also thoroughly assess the possible reactions of local competitors and 
related interest groups, and establish and strengthen communication with local 
media and non-governmental and community organisations; and they should also 
focus on highlighting the mutually beneficial aspects of their cooperation with the 
local community to build favourable public relations.
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14. The impact of Chinese state capital 
during the iron ore boom
Luke Hurst1
China’s recent push into global markets has been supported by a large banking 
system, which is dominated by state-owned and state-shareholding banks, massive 
foreign exchange reserves2 and a managed exchange rate (Laurenceson 2008: 92; 
Song 2015: 200). But increasing the ability of Chinese investors to access state 
capital, to which foreign competitors do not have direct access, can affect the ability 
of non-Chinese competitors to compete for market access on commercial terms. 
To gain a better understanding of the impact of Chinese state capital and 
investment abroad on global markets, this chapter analyses the extent and impact 
of Chinese procurement activities in the global iron ore market during the iron 
ore boom from 2002 to 2012. 
The Chinese Government perceived the initial price boom following China’s 
demand shock as a signal that the ‘big three’ Asian market exporters—Rio Tinto, 
BHP Billiton and Vale—held, and were exploiting, market power. To break up the 
perceived dominance of the big three, the barriers to market entry for fringe iron ore 
producers needed to be reduced. 
To reduce these perceived barriers, the Chinese Government looked to support the 
development of fringe production and increase iron ore imports from Chinese-
invested resources. In 2011, Li Xinchuang, Deputy Secretary-General of China Iron 
and Steel Association, said: ‘China currently owns less than 10 per cent of imported 
iron ore. We should seek 50 per cent of ore from Chinese-invested overseas resources 
in the next five to 10 years’ (Zhang 2011).
To assess the impact of China’s international procurement strategies on the 
competitiveness of the iron ore market during the iron ore boom (2002–12), this 
chapter applies investment theory to a unique dataset of Chinese iron ore investment 
abroad. This chapter is structured as follows: first, it draws out Chinese iron ore 
procurement trends based on a unique dataset of 30 Chinese iron ore investments 
and 20 long-term contract (LTC) transactions; second, it outlines the extent of 
Chinese government support for overseas iron ore investment during this period; 
1 I am indebted to David Murphy, Shiro Armstrong, Peter Drysdale and Ligang Song for comments on drafts of 
this chapter.
2 In 2006, China surpassed Japan as the largest holder of foreign exchange reserves globally—of about US$1.3 
trillion at the end of June 2007 (Zheng and Yi 2007: 18).
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next, the data on Chinese international iron ore procurement are examined; after 
that, the chapter assesses the impact of Chinese state-backed procurement on iron 
ore market outcomes, specifically whether Chinese state support provides advantages 
for Chinese iron ore investors over the short and long runs, and how state support 
affected international competitors’ access to iron ore investments and supply. 
Overview of Chinese iron ore procurement
Before the collapse of the benchmarking system in 2009 (Humphries 2018), iron 
ore market access was generally secured through LTCs or vertical integration. 
The  choice  between LTCs and vertical integration was largely based on the 
ownership, location and internalisation advantages of investing, such as the buyer’s 
preference for ex ante contracting costs and ex post monitoring and negotiation costs 
associated with LTCs (Caves 2007: 16). 
Firms’ preferences for LTCs or vertical integration and the locations in which 
these different types of transactions take place provide insight into the motivation 
of buyers and the barriers they perceive in securing supplies. To analyse Chinese 
iron ore procurement following the recent demand shock, data were collected 
on a sample of 30 Chinese overseas iron ore investments and 20 LTC-only deals 
between 2002 and 2012; this is not a complete list but provides a representative 
sample of the publicly available information on Chinese iron ore procurement. 
The sample includes iron ore LTCs and investments (but not failed transactions, 
such as the 2009 Rio Tinto–Chinalco tie-up) from publicly available sources and 
the Intierra database.3 
Table 14.1 provides an overview of the 30 Chinese overseas iron ore investments 
undertaken between 2002 and 2012. The projects were worth a total of 
US$36.5  billion and were concentrated in the period after the Global Financial 
Crisis (GFC); US$26.4 billion of the investments took place between 2008 and 
2010 (72.2 per cent of the total value over the period 2002–12). 
The economies of scale required and the capital-intensive nature of iron ore 
projects mean there is often a long lag between investment and production. 
Figure 14.1 shows how the lag between investment and production may impact 
Chinese projects: less than 50 million tonnes per annum (Mt/a) was planned to 
reach production by 2012. By 2018, the reported planned output of the Chinese 
iron ore investment projects sampled was 315.2 Mt/a (planned output data 
were available for 16 of the 30 projects). For context, the Australian Bureau of 
Resources and Energy Economics (BREE 2019) reported that, in 2018, global 
iron ore exports were approximately 1.547 billion tonnes. 
3 www.intierra.com/ (accessed 1 March 2013).
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Table 14.1 Chinese overseas iron ore investment, 2002–12
Year No. of investments Total value (US$m) Average value (US$m)
2002 1 34.8 34.8
2003 0 0 0
2004 0 0 0
2005 0 0 0
2006 1 7,455.7 7,455.7
2007 1 2,154.9 2,154.9
2008 6* 17,522.6 2,920.4
2009 10 5,824.1 582.4
2010 5 3,004.5 600.9
2011 2 228.4 114.2
2012 4 275.7 68.9
Total 30 36,500.7 1,216.7
* Includes the successful US$14 billion Chinalco acquisition of 9 per cent of equity in Rio Tinto.









2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Figure 14.1 Potential supply increase from Chinese overseas iron ore 
investments, 2002–18 (Mt/a)
Sources: Intierra database; Wilson (2011: 269–70); Tex Report (2013).
Table 14.2 provides an overview of the 20 LTCs entered into by Chinese iron 
ore buyers in 2012. Chinese iron ore LTCs range from 0.5 to 20 Mt/a over three 
to 15  years. The available data on 20 LTCs entered into by Chinese importers 
(as at 2012) accounted for at least 64.9 to 95.1 Mt/a in 2012.4 
4 The 20 LTCs recorded in the Tex Report (2013: 202) represent just 8.7 to 12.8 per cent of China’s total iron ore 
imports in 2012 (743.4 Mt).
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Table 14.3 shows that over the period 2002–12, Chinese overseas iron ore 
investments  were concentrated in Australia, with 19 investments made, worth 
US$31.3 billion (the average size of each project was about US$1.65 billion); five 
smaller investments were made in Canada, worth a total of US$651.8 million 
(US$127.7 million each, on average); while the remaining six investments were 
spread across five countries, with an average value of US$903.1 million.
Table 14.3 Chinese overseas iron ore investment by country, 2002–12
Host country No. of investments Total value (US$m) Average value (US$m)
Australia 19 31,333.3 1,649.1
Canada 5 651.8 127.7
Peru 2 1,330.4 665.2
Brazil 1 1,121.8 1,121.8
Liberia 1 426.2 426.2
Guinea 1 1,241.3 1,241.3
Russia 1 396.0 396.0
Total 30 36,500.8 1,216.9
Sources: Intierra database; Wilson (2011: 269–70); Tex Report (2013).
In 2009, the Chinese iron ore investors’ preference for Australian projects appears 
to have changed. Just one Chinese overseas investment in iron ore was made outside 
Australia between 2002 and 2008, and none of the seven LTC-only deals was with 
any country other than Australia before 2007. From 2009 to 2012, 10 of 21 Chinese 
overseas investments in iron ore took place in countries other than Australia, and 
five of the 13 LTC-only deals were with countries other than Australia.
Chinese iron ore investors were initially drawn to Australian projects due to the 
relatively stable institutional environment, established infrastructure, technical 
mining knowledge and close geographic proximity. The freight-sharing mechanism, 
which provided Chinese importers with about 80 per cent5 of the transport cost 
differential until 2010, made Australian production expansion particularly attractive 
for Chinese iron ore investors as the price of freight soared in the short run as the 
boom in international demand for iron ore developed (Hurst 2015). 
Over the decade following the surge in China’s international iron ore demand, 
Australia’s operating environment became less attractive to iron ore investors. 
The cost of doing business in Australia rose due to the appreciation of the Australian 
5 The 2008 freight-sharing mechanism.
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dollar—from an average of US$0.54 in 2002 to US$0.85 in 2008 before peaking at 
US$1.10 in 2012—and there were growing labour shortages6 in the mining sector. 
In 2011, Liu Han, former chairman of Hanlong Group,7 said: 
Australia and Brazil both have great resources, but they don’t provide many 
opportunities for Chinese investors due to rising cost pressures and policy barriers. 
Furthermore, most of their sources and the attached infrastructure are controlled by 
the largest mine companies. (Zhang 2011) 
Large-scale investment failures in Australia seared Chinese investors and increased the 
relative attractiveness of pursuing projects in other locations (Laurenceson 2012). Two 
investments were particularly destructive to the perception of Australia as a stable 
and friendly investment location for Chinese iron ore investment: the CITIC Pacific 
Mining Sino Iron Ore project and the failed Rio Tinto–Chinalco tie-up. 
The CITIC Pacific Mining Sino Iron Ore magnetite project in Western Australia, 
announced in 2006, experienced cost blowouts and delays. The budget for 
the project  more than tripled by 2012—from an estimated US$2.5 billion to 
US$7.8  billion—because of poor due diligence, the rising Australian dollar and 
rising labour costs (Garvey 2012). In response to the CITIC Pacific Mining failures, 
China’s State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC) 
suspended all investments in magnetite projects in Western Australia as of 2011 
(Hurst et al. 2012: 21). By late 2018, CITIC had poured more than US$12 billion 
into the project amid multiple writedowns and continuing legal disputes with 
Australian leaseholder Mineralogy (Thompson 2018).
The failed 2009 Rio Tinto–Chinalco tie-up, worth US$19.5 billion (9.5 per cent 
equity), would have been the largest Chinese commercial investment abroad ever 
at that time. In its initial form, the deal would have reserved 30 per cent of Rio 
Tinto’s iron ore production for a jointly run marketing company selling exclusively 
to China (Uren 2012: 106). The failed deal followed the successful 2008 investment 
by Chinalco, worth US$14 billion, for 9 per cent of Rio Tinto’s equity. 
The 2009 Rio Tinto–Chinalco deal fell apart due to failures by all those involved. 
The  ad hoc foreign investment policy reforms undertaken by the Australian 
Government during the proposal screening process were perceived by many as 
signalling likely bias in Australia’s investment review process against Chinese state-
owned investors. For example, the then Foreign Investment Review Board (FIRB) 
general manager, Patrick Colmer, was quoted in a leaked US Embassy cable about 
the new foreign investment guidelines, which had been introduced during the 2009 
Rio Tinto–Chinalco review process:
6 Chinese investors are unable to import labour into Australia.
7 Hanlong Group is a conglomerate with holdings in mineral exploration and other industries. Its subsidiary 
Hanlong Mining failed in a takeover bid for Sundance Resources, which owns mining rights to the Mbalam 
and Nabeba projects in Cameroon and Congo (Ker 2013).
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The new guidelines reduce uncertainty for potential investors, but pose new 
disincentives for larger-scale Chinese investments.
… The new guidelines are mainly due to growing concerns about Chinese investments 
in the strategic resources sector. (Wikileaks 2009)
The failed Rio Tinto–Chinalco tie-up was eventually rejected when Rio Tinto’s board 
withdrew support for the deal before the Australian Treasurer ruled on whether the 
investment was in the ‘national interest’. But even without the government making 
the final call on the fate of the tie-up, the saga caused significant uncertainty and 
frustration for potential Chinese investors in the Australian investment process and 
heightened public anxiety about Chinese state-owned investors.
Chinese foreign investors, especially state-owned investors (discussed below), have often 
struggled to engage in Australia’s investment environment and build local legitimacy. 
The failed Rio Tinto–Chinalco deal also brought to bear the inexperience of many 
Chinese investors in foreign markets and their ignorance of the importance of 
establishing legitimacy with the host public. According to Pokarier (2004: 218), 
identity is a key part of nationalism and therefore fear of investment from culturally 
separate countries is to be expected; this is especially true for state-owned foreign 
investors, which may be seen as pursuing government strategies over profits. 
A  report by the Chinese State Council’s Development Research Centre revealed 
that Chinalco had not been able to match BHP Billiton in terms of its lobbying of 
the public and policymakers:
BHP Billiton took advantage of its skilful mass media propaganda and lobbying 
capacity to arouse the public emotions so as to influence the judgment of the 
government policy makers. BHP Billiton tightly seized the point that Chinalco had 
the state-owned background. (Uren 2012: 109)
State support for Chinese iron ore 
investment abroad
State support for Chinese overseas iron ore investors was provided through the state-
owned banking system, which provided preferential access to financing to increase 
imports from Chinese-owned iron ore projects. Financing was available from two 
state-owned policy banks—the China Export–Import Bank (China Exim Bank) 
and China Development Bank (CDB)—which provide ‘policy finance’, often on 
concessional terms; and four state-owned banks (SOBs), which are mandated to 
finance state-owned enterprise (SOE) activities and to support state industrial plans 
(Laurenceson and Chai 2010: 22; der Heiden and Taube 2011: 60–72; Wilson 
2011: 270). 
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Information is scarce on the terms of financing for Chinese iron ore projects. Data 
collected by Wilson (2011: 269–70) on the source of financing for Chinese iron ore 
projects between 2002 and 2010 are used here as a proxy for the extent of Chinese 
state engagement in iron ore investment. 
Table 14.4 presents the data for 32 international iron ore investments undertaken 
by Chinese investors. It shows that the average value of privately funded projects was 
lowest at US$27.2 million (across two projects), while SOB-funded projects were 
worth, on average, US$943.7 million (across 21 projects); sovereign wealth fund 
(SWF) financing averaged US$475.9 million (across two projects); policy bank–
funded projects averaged $367.8 million (across six projects); and there was one 
provincial bank–financed project worth US$1.3 billion. The average equity taken by 
state-financed investors also appears to have been higher than that taken by privately 
financed investors, who took 16.5 per cent equity, on average. SOB-financed projects 
took, on average, 32.2 per cent equity, SWF projects averaged 57.5 per cent, policy 
bank–funded projects averaged 43.1 per cent equity and the provincial bank–
financed project took 100 per cent equity.
Table 14.4 Source of iron ore investment funding, 2002–10
Source of finance No. of 
investments




Private bank 2 54.3 27.2 16.5
SOB 21 19,816.9 943.7 32.2
SWF 2 1,427.6 475.9 57.5
Policy bank 6 2,206.7 367.8 43.1
Provincial bank 1 1,300.1 1,300.1 100.0
Total 32 24,805.6 3,114.6 49.9
Note: Policy banks are the CDB and China Exim Bank.
Sources: Wilson (2011: 269–70); author’s calculations.
The data in Table 14.5 show that the sources of financing provided to private 
Chinese overseas iron ore investors included a private bank (one project, 
worth US$46.4  million) and SOBs (three projects, worth an average of just 
US$14.6  million). Financing for centrally owned SOEs’ international iron ore 
investments came from SOBs (nine projects, worth an average of US$1.8 billion) 
and policy banks (two projects, worth an average of US$603 million). Subcentral 
(provincial and prefectural) SOEs received financing from all sources; one project 
received US$7.9 million from a private bank, nine projects received financing from 
SOBs worth an average of US$365.7 million, two projects were funded by SWFs 
worth an average of US$713.8 million and one project received provincial bank 
funding of US$1.3 billion.
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Private 0 0 0 1 7.9 7.9 1 46.4 46.4
SOB 9 16,481.3 1,831.2 9 3,291.6 365.7 3 43.9 14.6
SWF 0 0 0 2 1,427.6 713.8 0 0 0
Policy bank 2 1,206.1 603 4 1,000.5 250.1 0 0 0
Provincial 
bank
0 0 0 1 1,300.1 1,300.1 0 0 0
Sources: Wilson (2011: 269–70); author’s calculations.
As suggested above, the GFC appears to have encouraged a large increase in Chinese 
overseas investment in iron ore. According to CDB head Chen Yuan, investing in 
energy and minerals in the aftermath of the GFC provided a hedge against the 
declining US dollar and rising commodity prices. In 2009, Chen stated: 
Everybody is saying that we should go to the international markets to buy up low-price 
assets. But I don’t think we should go to Wall Street. We should think more about 
making acquisitions or partnerships in areas with natural resources. (Downs 2011: 73)
A report published by Ernst & Young estimated that the market value of mining 
and metal companies dropped about 40 to 60 per cent due to the global economic 
downturn (cited in Yang 2009). In 2009, China’s Ministry of Industry and Information 
Technology released the ‘Adjustment and Revitalization Program for the Iron and Steel 
Industry’ (Downs 2011). The program instructed ‘companies [to] seize opportunities 
and actively pursue the Going Global Strategy’—specifically, to make full use of three 
special funds: the Fund for Mining Rights to Overseas Mineral Resources, the Fund for 
Economic and Technical Co-operation Overseas and the Fund for Reducing Risk in 
Prospecting of Overseas Mineral Deposits. The Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) 
also signed agreements on the protection of investments, with many countries and 
the state-owned China Export and Credit Insurance Company to provide investment 
insurance services (der Heiden and Taube 2011). 
China’s iron ore investment push following the GFC is reflected in the data, with 
27 of the 30 state-financed projects tracked in Table 14.5 occurring between 2008 
and 2010. The international iron ore investments occurring between 2008 and 
2010 accounted for 97.4 per cent of the value of state financing for iron ore 
projects from 2002 to 2010. 
The increased push by Chinese investors into iron ore projects largely reflects the 
fact that Western banks were highly risk-averse following the GFC. Chinese state-
owned lenders saw opportunities in investing in iron ore as projects struggled to 
attract financing (Hurst 2013: 528–9). 
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Impact of Chinese state procurement support 
on market outcomes
In 2011, Australian Senator Barnaby Joyce announced that Chinese state-owned 
foreign investors ‘have a long-term view, they don’t necessarily have to rely on 
the market principle’ (Grattan 2011). The remarks by Senator Joyce relate to 
the distortions Chinese state support might have on ‘competitive neutrality’. 
Competitive neutrality requires that government business activities should not 
enjoy net competitive advantages over their private sector competitors simply by 
virtue of public sector ownership. 
The impact of Chinese state support on competitive neutrality has been cited 
widely in the academic literature.8 Proponents of the argument—that preferential 
access to state financing distorts the competitive landscape—conclude that Chinese 
state-backed procurement negatively impacts the ability of private sector actors to 
compete on commercial terms, and that access to state financing can lead to moral 
hazard9 as Chinese investors are able to overbid for procurement contracts without 
fear of reprisal if investments fail. 
The Chinese Government offers several different kinds of loan finance, which 
have supported the majority of iron ore projects (Tables 14.3 and 14.4). Although 
information on the terms of individual iron ore loans is scarce, Bräutigam (2011) 
found that most loans made by China Exim Bank and the CDB (the two sources 
of official bank financing that are used as tools to support government policy) were 
made on commercial terms—London Interbank Offered Rate10 (LIBOR) plus 
a margin—rather than on a concessional basis.11
China Exim Bank’s main mandate in the iron ore industry is to facilitate exports 
and assist imports for Chinese companies with comparative advantages in 
their offshore project contracting and outbound investment, and to promote 
international economic cooperation and trade. To support its mission, China 
Exim Bank loans are given at LIBOR plus a margin,12 usually with a maturity of 
12 to 15 years and a grace period of two to five years. A small proportion of the 
export buyers’ credits are offered at preferential rates, usually with a fixed interest 
rate of 2 or 3 per cent (Bräutigam 2009: 335).
8 See, for example, Buckley et al. (2007); Sauvant and Chen (2014).
9 This refers to a situation where the agent is encouraged to increase their appetite for risk knowing that the cost 
of failure will be incurred by another party.
10 LIBOR is the interest rate applied to comparatively short-term borrowing of funds in the London interbank 
market (loans between banks). LIBOR is a preferential rate for low-risk borrowers and is often used as a baseline 
for less-preferred borrowers who pay a rate of LIBOR plus a margin.
11 When a donor government provides a loan at a rate equivalent to the private capital market plus a margin, this 
is not concessional as there is no subsidy at all (Bräutigam 2011: 755).
12 The lowest rate of credit for which information is publicly available was issued at LIBOR plus 1 per cent 
(100 basis points).
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The CDB was originally set up to provide finance for China’s own development, but 
in recent years it has been providing very large lines of credit overseas.13 The bank 
issues commercial loans based on LIBOR plus a margin—usually at least 200 basis 
points (Bräutigam 2011: 206). For example, the 12-year Karara Iron Ore project 
loan facility was provided on competitive commercial terms principally by the CDB 
and the Bank of China, based on the US six-month LIBOR with a competitive 
margin (the actual margin was not specified publicly) (Gindalbie Metals Ltd 2010).
While the terms of China Exim Bank and CDB loans are generally based on 
international benchmarks plus a margin, the margin appears to be lower than that 
available to international competitors who do not have direct access to Chinese state 
financing. For example, Chinalco’s profits dropped by 99 per cent in 2008 owing to 
the collapse in demand for aluminium, and its original 2008 investment of US$14 
billion for a 9 per cent stake in Rio Tinto lost 70 per cent of its market value—about 
US$10 billion by 2009 (Yao and Sutherland 2009: 829). Despite Chinalco’s losses, 
four of the biggest Chinese state-owned banks—the China Development Bank, 
China Exim Bank, the Agricultural Bank of China and the Bank of China—offered 
to lend US$21 billion, which was more than the US$19.5 billion required for the 
additional 9 per cent equity to fund Chinalco’s Rio Tinto tie-up (discussed above). 
Interest on the loan was just 94.5 basis points above the six-month LIBOR, and 
a repayment period was not set. In contrast, following Chinalco’s bid, BHP Billiton 
offered Rio Tinto a 15-year bond, which charged interest at 345 basis points above 
the six-month LIBOR (White 2009; Yao and Sutherland 2009: 832). 
The above analysis indicates that Chinese overseas iron ore investors did have 
access to cheap state financing that was not directly available to competitors. Song 
(2015: 200–1) notes that the Chinese banking system is dominated by state-owned 
and state-shareholding banks, which traditionally favour SOEs. The favouritism 
towards SOEs by Chinese state banks is due to the perception that SOEs pose 
a lower risk or are ‘at least backed by the government in the event of loan forfeiture’. 
In a paper analysing the impact of state financing on Chinese investment (across all 
sectors), Buckley et al. (2007: 514–15) concluded:
More challenging is the unprecedented finding that Chinese ODI is attracted, rather 
than deterred, by political risk (as measured conventionally and with market returns 
controlled for by market size). This suggests that Chinese firms do not perceive or 
behave towards risk in the same way as do industrialised country firms. In accordance 
with our theory, we attribute this to the low cost of capital that Chinese firms 
13 To complement the increased access to state capital, the CDB set up branch offices in 2006. The branch 
offices operate out of Chinese embassies and are mandated to gather information about the host countries and 
establish relationships with local officials and businesses to support Chinese energy and mining companies to 
find investment opportunities. By the end of 2009, the CDB had established work teams in 141 countries, 
including 45 in Africa (Downs 2011: 28).
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(for the most part SOEs) enjoy as a consequence of home country capital market 
imperfections. Indeed, state ownership can be considered as a firm-specific advantage 
for many Chinese MNEs [multinational enterprises] in this context.
… State-sponsored soft budget constraints make acquisition by Chinese enterprises 
a ‘normal’ mode of entering and penetrating a host economy … Over-bidding by 
Chinese MNEs is attributed to the absence of private shareholders and sanguine 
views of the associated technical, commercial and political risks, to limited fear of 
failure, close government support and low cost of capital.
There are two important questions arising from Buckley et al.’s (2007) conclusion 
that need to be addressed: 
1. Has Chinese state support through low-cost capital provided ownership 
advantages for Chinese iron ore investors over their foreign competitors? 
2. Has the access to state support for Chinese investors reduced opportunities for 
non-Chinese iron ore investors and procurers to compete on commercial terms?
Implications for non-Chinese iron ore investors
In line with the Chinese state’s objective of diversifying supply away from the 
big three, only three14 of the 30 Chinese iron ore foreign investments analysed 
involved any of the big three (all Rio Tinto). The three projects were Baosteel’s 2002 
joint venture with Rio Tinto in the BaoHI Ranges, worth US$34.8 million, and 
Chinalco’s initial investment of US$14 billion for a 9 per cent share of Rio Tinto 
shares in 2008 and a 47 per cent (US$1.5 billion) stake in Rio Tinto’s Simandou 
development project in Guinea. 
The desire to diversify supply away from the big three meant that Chinese investors 
were required to look to less well-established projects to acquire or develop, often 
entailing higher risk. These higher-risk projects frequently faced long financing 
lags with commercial banks (especially following the GFC), which created a new 
business opportunity for the CDB. According to the CDB’s (2004) annual report:
A number of Chinese enterprises have been exploring opportunities overseas and some 
of the potential projects are relatively large. The high risk inherent in such projects 
and their relatively large borrowing requirements have made many commercial 
banks uncomfortable about participating in their funding. Many of the enterprises 
in search of financing for outbound investment have turned to us. In reality, these 
projects are typical of the development financing that we typically undertake and 
we are well positioned to be of service. We are known to have both the adequate 
resources to fund these projects and a demonstrated track record of achievement in 
effectively managing the credit risk.
14 Chinalco’s failed tie-up for a further 9.5 per cent of Rio Tinto shares worth US$19.5 billion was not included 
in the dataset.
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Ownership decisions for international investors are largely based on a firm 
possessing advantages over competitors in the host country, such as managerial skills 
or proprietary knowledge. But the favouritism of China’s banking system towards 
SOEs and the involvement of the CDB and China Exim Bank have seen most of 
the financing for Chinese iron ore investments abroad provided to the largely state-
owned iron and steel production (not mining) sector. 
Of the 30 Chinese iron ore investments reviewed for this study, 21 were made by 
Chinese firms with an operating competency outside mining; only one is listed as 
a specialised iron ore miner. The lack of mining expertise by Chinese international 
iron ore investors suggests they have, on average, few long-run operational 
ownership advantages and instead rely on their access to cheap state capital 
to gain access to concessions. Access to cheap capital and support for Chinese 
investors abroad may have provided short-run ownership advantages over foreign 
competitors that do not have access to the Chinese state capital, as they are able 
to overcome financing lags and can potentially ‘overbid’ for projects due to the 
relatively cheap cost of capital (Buckley et al. 2007).
The short-run ownership advantages provided by Chinese iron ore investors’ access 
to state capital create the potential for moral hazard. Downs (2011: 61), however, 
suggests that, on a straight commercial basis, it may be rational for the CDB to 
offer lower interest rates than Western banks because it is backed by the Chinese 
Government; borrowers who fail to fulfil their loan agreements with the CDB risk 
angering not only the bank, but also the Chinese Government, which could lower 
the risk of moral hazard. 
The acknowledgement of the lack of long-run ownership advantages of Chinese 
iron ore investors is shown in the trend towards taking minority equity positions 
(‘quasi-integration’) in partnership with specialised non-Chinese fringe iron ore 
firms (discussed above). The Chinese iron ore procurement data presented above, 
although incomplete, indicate that Chinese procurers are entering both LTC-only 
deals and vertical integration through minority ownership. The sampled Chinese iron 
ore investments exhibited a preference for joint ventures and minority acquisitions 
(22 of 30 investments) taking, on average, 41.1 per cent equity. Eight investments 
were wholly owned acquisitions or development projects.
Chinese iron ore investors—mainly steel mills—generally lacked the long-run 
ownership advantages required to develop complex iron ore mine projects. The lack 
of long-run ownership advantages caused Chinese iron ore investors to engage in 
quasi-integration, whereby they would take minority ownership shares and partner 
with specialised mining firms, which would develop and operate the projects. This 
quasi-integration provided increased supply security compared with LTC-only 
procurement and the needed capital for large-scale projects to overcome the lag 
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associated with finalising financing. The quasi-integration strategy also ensured 
project partners had specialised skills to develop complex mine projects while having 
more ‘skin in the game’ compared with contractors.
The preference to partner with non-Chinese fringe iron ore firms has meant that 
the provision of Chinese state capital has, in fact, increased access to partnership 
opportunities for non-Chinese iron ore investors, rather than reducing opportunities. 
The increased access to partnership opportunities is especially important in the 
context of the post-GFC business environment, which further reduced opportunities 
for non-Chinese fringe iron ore projects to secure financing.
Impact of Chinese state procurement on competitors’ 
market access 
Analysts have also raised the issue of whether Chinese iron ore investors could 
use their advantageous access to state capital to limit market access for foreign 
competitors. These concerns were highlighted by Brahma Chellaney in his 2012 
testimony to the US–China Economic and Security Review Commission hearing 
on ‘China’s Global Quest for Resources and Implications for the United States’. 
During his testimony, Chellaney (2012) stated:
China has pursued an aggressive strategy to secure (and even lock up) supplies of 
strategic resources like water, energy and mineral ores. Gaining access to or control 
of resources has been a key driver of its foreign and domestic policies. China, with 
the world’s most resource-hungry economy, is pursuing the world’s most-assertive 
policies to gain control of important resources. 
Much of the international attention on China’s resource strategy has focused on 
its scramble to secure supplies of hydrocarbons and mineral ores. Such attention is 
justified by the fact that China is seeking to conserve its own mineral resources and 
rely on imports. For example, China, a major steel consumer, has substantial reserves 
of iron ore, yet it has banned exports of this commodity. It actually encourages its 
own steel producers to import iron ore. China, in fact, has emerged as the largest 
importer of iron ore, accounting for a third of all global imports. India, in contrast, 
remains a major exporter of iron ore to China, although the latter has iron-ore 
deposits more than two-and-half times that of India.
To assess Chellaney’s claims about the ability of Chinese investors to reduce market 
access for competitors, this study applies Moran’s (2010) scorecard approach, which 
attempts to operationalise a definition of ‘tying up’ resources. The scorecard identifies 
four fundamental natural resource procurement patterns a large buyer can take: 
1. Special relationship with major producer.
2. Special relationship with competitive fringe.
3. Loan capital to major producer to be repaid in output.
4. Loan capital to competitive fringe to be repaid in output.
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The first of Moran’s (2010) procurement categories involves the investor taking 
an equity stake in a very large established producer to secure an equity share of 
production on terms comparable with other co-owners. This form of supply 
internalisation provides some degree of control to the investor over the long-run 
strategic decision-making of the project, and is zero-sum (tying up) as the acquired 
project is already in production; the investment does not expand production. 
The second procurement pattern describes when a buyer takes an equity position in 
a project that is yet to reach production on terms comparable with other co-owners; 
this strategy expands the overall supply base while providing the investor some 
degree of control over the long-run strategic direction of the project. 
The third category of Moran’s (2010) scorecard occurs when buyers and/or their 
government make a loan to an already established producer in return for a purchase 
agreement to service the loan, such as an LTC. The LTC in category three does not 
provide long-term control over the operations of the producer but does increase 
the buyer’s legal claim to preexisting resource supply (zero-sum). This is seen as 
a strategy to tie up resources. The final procurement strategy in Moran’s scorecard 
occurs when a buyer and/or their government makes a loan to finance an up-and-
coming producer in return for a purchase agreement to service the loan; this can 
include infrastructure for resources and resource-contingent loans. This category 
supports the expansion of the supply base without conferring long-term strategic 
control to the investor (categories are summarised in Table 14.6) (Moran 2010).
Table 14.6 Summary of Moran’s procurement scorecard
Tying up (zero-sum) Expansion (positive-sum)
Equity Category 1: Special relationship with 
major producer 
Buyers and/or their home governments 
take an equity stake in a ‘major’ 
producer to procure an equity share of 
production on terms comparable with 
other co-owners.
Category 2: Special relationship with 
competitive fringe 
Buyers and/or their home governments 
take an equity stake in an ‘independent’ 
producer to procure an equity share of 




Category 3: Loan capital to major 
producer to be repaid in output
Buyers and/or their home governments 
make a loan to a ‘price maker’ 
producer in return for a purchase 
agreement to service the loan.
Category 4: Loan capital to competitive 
fringe to be repaid in output
Buyers and/or their home governments 
make a loan to a ‘price taker’ producer in 
return for a purchase agreement to service 
the loan.
Source: Kotschwar et al. (2012: 27).
The procurement scorecard provides a useful method to proxy whether there are 
zero-sum (tying up) implications from a country’s procurement activities—that is, 
whether they consolidate their legal claim to resources, which is captured by the 
first and third categories. If the country’s resource procurement activities result in an 
expansion and/or diversification of supply beyond the growth of their demand, all 
consumers will have access to a more competitive export market; this positive-sum 
result is captured by the second and fourth categories in the scorecard. 
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Of the sample of 50 iron ore procurement arrangements entered into by Chinese 
investors between 2002 and 2012 (see Figure 14.2), three were identified as a special 
relationship with a major producer (Category 1); 27 were special relationships with 
the competitive fringe (Category 2); seven saw capital loaned to major producers for 
output (Category 3); and 13 procurement arrangements saw capital loaned to the 
competitive fringe to be repaid in output (Category 4). The results of the scorecard 
suggest the majority of Chinese procurement arrangements were in development 
projects and served to expand the competitive supply base over the long run rather 























Figure 14.2 Chinese procurement arrangements by category, 2002–12 
(by number)
Sources: Intierra database; Wilson (2011: 269–70); Tex Report (2013: 102).
The scorecard result is consistent with Moran’s (2010) analysis of 16 Chinese oil and 
mining procurement arrangements, which found that, in 13 of 16 cases, Chinese 
investors took an equity stake and/or wrote long-term procurement contracts with 
producers on the competitive fringe. In that study, the authors concluded:
Chinese investors will be more willing to take on new frontier—or even fringe—
projects that the major established oil and mining companies might pass by … 
Chinese efforts, like Japanese deployments of capital and purchase agreements in the 
late 1970s through the 1980s, predominantly help expand, diversify, and make 
the global energy-supply system more competitive. (Moran 2010: 2)
15 There were eight LTC-only transactions, but only eight of the 29 projects with publicly available information 
recorded having an LTC with the Chinese investor recipient.
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The findings of the scorecard analysis are also supported by the data collected on 
32 iron ore investments between 2002 and 2010 by Wilson (2011). The investment 
data show that, in nine of 32 iron ore investments, no LTC was entered into by the 
Chinese investors. In the remaining 23 cases where LTCs were entered into, only 
63.8 per cent of projected iron ore output was reserved for the Chinese investor. 
This provides support for the conclusion that Chinese procurement has expanded, 
not tied up, the competitive supply base.
The results of the scorecard analysis on Chinese iron ore procurement outcomes 
contradict Chellaney’s claim that China’s supply security strategy has locked up iron 
ore supply. Chellaney’s testimony is also flawed in its understanding of China’s iron 
ore endowments, as it overlooks the high average cost of China’s iron ore production 
and the fact that domestic producers would be unable to compete on the global 
market with the added cost of seaborne freight. Chellaney is also incorrect in his 
comparison between China’s and India’s iron ore protectionism. In fact, in 2011, 
Indian authorities adopted policies to ensure steel production would be served by 
its own iron ore supply—the same charge of nonmarket orientation that Chellaney 
levelled at China. On 2 January 2012—22 days before Chellaney’s testimony—the 
Indian Government announced a further increase of export tariffs to iron ore lump 
and fines of up to 30 per cent.
Conclusion
The Chinese Government viewed the iron ore price boom as a signal of a coordinated 
effort by the big three to inflate prices. In response, it moved to reduce reliance on 
the big three and to secure long-run market access for its steel industry by supporting 
international investment in alternative (fringe) supplies.
To reduce reliance on the big three and secure supplies for the Chinese steel industry, 
the Chinese Government supported investment in international iron ore projects to 
reduce the barriers for fringe operators to enter the market. Chinese Government 
support was delivered mainly through its state financing institutions in the form 
of project financing, insurance and information. 
Prior to 2008, the majority of Chinese investments and LTC-only transactions 
were undertaken in Australia. Since 2008, the decreasing attractiveness of 
Australia as an investment destination due to the increasing cost of doing business 
and large-scale Chinese project failures have seen Chinese investors diversify in 
terms of destination. There are similarities between China’s movement away from 
Australia and Japan’s push into the Brazilian market, providing an example of 
the long-run contestability of the iron ore market despite Australia’s constrained 
bilateral monopoly with Asia (Hurst 2017: 48).
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Analysis of Chinese iron ore procurement arrangements shows that state-owned 
financing institutions were involved in the majority of investments and most 
investments were undertaken by central and provincial SOEs in concert with 
non-Chinese partners. The link between the Chinese state and the firms procuring 
iron ore has led many commentators to raise concerns that the increased access 
to finance provides Chinese investors with advantages over other competitors and 
creates barriers for investors competing on commercial terms. 
Chinese iron ore investors were most often operating outside their core competency 
and lack of long-run ownership advantages. The lack of iron ore development and 
operating competence meant they generally paired with a non-Chinese specialised 
iron ore fringe producer. The preference for quasi-integration through joint ventures 
with non-Chinese fringe iron ore producers means that Chinese state support 
effectively lowered barriers to market entry for non-Chinese fringe iron ore miners.
The second issue related to the strong link between the Chinese Government and 
firms responsible for the procurement of iron ore is the potential of Chinese iron 
ore procurers to tie up supply and reduce market access for foreign steel producers. 
Moran’s (2010) procurement scorecard was applied to data on a sample of 50 iron 
ore procurement arrangements to assess the claim that ‘[g]aining access to or 
control of resources has been a key driver of [China’s] foreign and domestic policies’ 
(Chellaney 2012). The application of the procurement scorecard to the Chinese iron 
ore procurement dataset suggests that instead of tying up resources, China’s aggregate 
iron ore procurement arrangements have led to a broadening of the competitive 
global supply base and increased access to iron ore for other buyers in the Asian 
market, as did Japanese procurement arrangements in the 1970s and 1980s.
References
Alston, L.J. (2008), The case for case studies in new institutional economics, in É. Brousseau 
and J.-M. Glachant (eds), New Institutional Economics: A guidebook, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.
Bräutigam, D. (2009), The Dragon’s Gift: The real story of China in Africa, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press.
Bräutigam, D. (2011), Aid ‘with Chinese characteristics’: Chinese foreign aid and 
development finance meet the OECD–DAC aid regime, Journal of International 
Development 23: 752–64. doi.org/10.1002/jid.1798.
Buckley, P.J., Clegg, L.J., Cross, A.R., Liu, X., Voss, H. and Zheng, P. (2007), The determinants 
of Chinese outward foreign direct investment, Journal of International Business Studies 
38: 499–518. doi.org/10.1057/palgrave.jibs.8400277.
14. The impact of Chinese state capital during the iron ore boom
305
Bureau of Resources and Energy Economics (BREE) (2019), Resources and Energy Quarterly, 
Canberra: BREE.
Cai, P. (2012), China takes a tougher line, The Age, [Melbourne], 13 April.
Caves, R.E. (2007), Multinational Enterprise and Economic Analysis, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511619113.
Chellaney, B. (2012), Testimony before the US–China Economic and Security Review 
Commission hearing: China’s Global Quest for Resources and Implications for the 
United States, 26 January, Washington, DC.
China Development Bank (2004), Annual Report, Beijing: China Development Bank 
Corporation.
der Heiden, P. and Taube, M. (2011), China’s iron and steel industry at the global markets 
interface: Structural developments and industrial policy interventions, The Copenhagen 
Journal of Asian Studies 29(2): 110–42. doi.org/10.22439/cjas.v29i2.4029.
Downs, E. (2011), Inside China, Inc: China Development Bank’s cross-border energy deals, John 
L. Thornton China Center Monograph Series No. 3, Washington, DC: The Brookings 
Institution.
Drysdale, P. (2009), Australia needs to get its act together on China, and fast, East Asia 
Forum, 7 June.
Drysdale, P. (2011), A new look at Chinese FDI in Australia, China & World Economy 19(4): 
54–73. doi.org/10.1111/j.1749-124X.2011.01250.x.
Garvey, P. (2012), Citic Pacific’s Sino Iron project faces new delay, The Australian, 17 August.
Gindalbie Metals Limited (2010), First drawdown under US$1.2 billion project loan facility 
for Karara iron ore project, Securities Exchange announcement and media release, 
16 August, Perth.
Grattan, M. (2011), Barnaby Joyce warns of threat to resource security, The Age, [Melbourne], 
29 August.
Humphries, D. (2018), The mining industry after the boom, Mineral Economics, 13 March. 
doi.org/10.1007/s13563-018-0155-x.
Hurst, L. (2013), West and Central African iron ore development and its impact on world 
prices, The Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 57(4): 521–38. 
doi.org/ 10.1111/1467-8489.12007.
Hurst, L. (2015), A lesson in market contestability: Calculating the cost of Chinese state 
intervention in iron ore price negotiations, EABER Working Paper 94, Canberra: East 
Asian Bureau of Economic Research, The Australian National University.
Hurst, L. (2017), China’s Iron Ore Boom, London: Routledge. doi.org/10.4324/978131 
5559315.
The Chinese Economic Transformation
306
Hurst, L., Cai, P.Y. and Findlay, C. (2012), Chinese direct investment in Australia: Public 
reaction, policy response, investor adaptation, EABER Working Paper 81, Canberra: East 
Asian Bureau of Economic Research, The Australian National University.
Ker, P. (2013), Sundance slumps after Hanlong bid fails, Sydney Morning Herald, 9 April.
Kotschwar, B.K., Moran, T.H. and Muir, J. (2012), Chinese investment in Latin American 
resources: The good, the bad, and the ugly, Peterson Institute Working Paper Series 12-3, 
Washington, DC: Peterson Institute for International Economics.
Laurenceson, J. (2008), Chinese investment in Australia, Economic Papers 27(1): 87–94. 
doi.org/10.1111/j.1759-3441.2008.tb01028.x.
Laurenceson, J. (2012), Chinese investment is Australia’s great untapped resource, East Asia 
Forum, 12 May.
Laurenceson, J. and Chai, J.C.H. (2010), The economic performance of China’s state-
owned industrial enterprises, Journal of Contemporary China 9(23): 21–39. doi.org/ 
10.1080/106705600112038.
Moran, T.H. (2010), China’s strategy to secure natural resources: Risks, dangers, and 
opportunities, Policy Analysis in International Economics 92(July).
Pokarier, C. (2004), The controversy over Japanese investment in Australia, 1987–1991, 
Japanese Studies 24(2): 215–31. doi.org/10.1080/1037139042000302519.
Sauvant, K.P. and Chen, V.Z. (2014), China’s regulatory framework for outward foreign 
direct investment, China Economic Journal 7(1): 141–63. doi.org/10.1080/17538963.
2013.874072.
Song, L. (2015), State and non-state enterprises in China’s economic transition, in G.C. 
Chow and D.H. Perkins (eds), Routledge Handbook of the Chinese Economy, New York: 
Routledge.
Tex Report (2013), Iron Ore Manual 2011–2012, Tokyo: The Tex Report. 
Thompson, B. (2018), Billion-dollar writedown for China’s flagship Sino Iron project, 
Australian Financial Review, 12 March.
Uren, D. (2012), The Kingdom and the Quarry, Melbourne: Black Inc.
White, G. (2009), Chinalco confident on Rio Tinto deal approval, The Telegraph, [UK], 
31 March.
Wikileaks (2009), New foreign investment guidelines target China, [Online], Cable: 
09CANBERRA 900_a-WikiLeaks, available from: wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/ 09 
CANBERRA 900_a.html.
Wilson, J.D. (2011), Public and private sources of governance in global production 
networks: The case of the Asia-Pacific steel industry, PhD Dissertation, The Australian 
National University, Canberra.
14. The impact of Chinese state capital during the iron ore boom
307
Yang, Z. (2009), Easier loans lean to more mergers and acquisitions, China Daily, 20 April.
Yao, S. and Sutherland, D. (2009), Chinalco and Rio Tinto: A long march for China’s national 
champions, China Quarterly 199: 829–36. doi.org/10.1017/S030574100999049X.
Zhang, Q. (2011), Ore target to break foreign grip, China Daily, 25 July.
Zheng, Y. and Yi, J. (2007), China’s rapid accumulation of foreign exchange reserves and its 





comparative 52, 157, 194, 215, 
218, 267
competitive, of SOEs 8, 15, 266, 274, 
288, 296, 298–300, 304
Africa 266, 297n.13
Agricultural Bank of China 194, 297
Alibaba Group 133–4, 147n.2, 158
aluminium 271, 297
tariffs on 217n.2, 218, 224, 227
Anhui Province 149, 150
Asia 1, 2, 113, 222
iron ore market 15, 287, 303, 304
see also Central Asia, East Asia, 
South Asia
Asia-Pacific 217
Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank 217
Australia 5, 8, 69, 222, 240, 273
foreign investment 269, 270–5, 290–3, 
296, 303
iron ore 288, 290, 291–2
nonstandard employment in 113, 117
Bank of China 171, 194, 297
banking
services 171, 174
shadow 40, 62, 63
banking system 165, 166, 287, 293
efficiency 166
level of development 20, 41, 169, 194
liberalisation 9, 11, 13, 65, 163, 164–5, 
167–8, 171, 174, 176, 187–8
privatisation 164
banks
aid to SOEs 28, 299
credit 164, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187, 
188, 196
credit allocation 13, 20, 64
credit risk 14, 195, 205–8, 211
entry of foreign 166–8, 171, 172, 
174, 187
and information asymmetry 52, 205
licensing 168
loans 26, 28, 39, 184, 296–7
loans to SMEs 193, 194–212
and monetary policy 70, 71n.6, 74, 79, 
221, 225–7
state-owned 293, 294–5, 297
Beijing 46–7, 231n.4
banking services 167, 168, 169, 171, 
187, 217
innovation in 149, 150, 157
Belt and Road Initiative 217
BHP Billiton 215, 273, 275, 287, 293, 297
Boao Forum 163
Brazil 10, 19, 34, 240, 241, 243, 290, 291, 
292, 303
BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and 
South Africa) 10, 11
Bush, George W. 272
Cameroon 292n.7







China Banking Regulatory Commission 
(CBRC) 172, 174, 194, 195, 196, 
207, 212
China Centre for Agricultural Policy 
(CCAP) 94, 97, 99, 100, 101, 110
China Communications Construction 
Corporation 38, 269, 275
China Construction Bank 171, 194
China Development Bank (CDB) 193, 
294, 295, 296, 297, 298, 299
China Export and Credit Insurance 
Company 295
China Export–Import Bank (China Exim 
Bank) 293, 294, 296, 297, 299
China Insurance Regulatory 
Commission 175
China Iron and Steel Association 287
The Chinese Economic Transformation
310
China Minmetals Corporation 269, 290
China National Offshore Oil Corporation 
(CNOOC) 269, 272, 273, 274, 275
China Petroleum and Chemical 
Corporation 38
China (Shanghai) Pilot Free-Trade Zone 
166, 174
China Railway Construction Corporation 
38, 269, 275
China Railway Group Limited 38, 269
China Securities Regulatory Commission 
(CSRC) 173, 174, 182
see also Shanghai Free-Trade Zone
China State Construction Engineering 
Corporation 38
Chinalco 269, 273, 274, 275, 288, 289, 
292, 293, 297, 298
Chinese Academy of Social Sciences 33, 
118, 277
Chongqing 149, 150, 169, 171, 195




Committee on Foreign Investment in the 
United States (CFIUS) 264, 271, 272, 
273, 276, 283
Communist Party of China 8, 143, 194
advantages of membership 28, 29, 238, 
244, 245, 246–8, 251, 253–4, 255
comparative advantage, see advantage—
comparative; advantage—competitive 
of SOEs
‘competitive neutrality’ 8, 9, 266, 274, 296
Congo 292n.7
copper 269, 271
corruption 165, 266, 277
Cui, Tankai 231n.4
Dalian 167, 168, 169, 171
demographic dividend 63, 70
Deng Xiaoping 237
Denmark 117, 240
digitalisation 129, 130n.1, 136







Europe 19, 113, 158, 266, 272
tariffs 217n.2, 223
European Central Bank (ECB) 223
European Commission 218
European Union (EU) 9, 231, 266
FDI, see foreign direct investment
financial liberalisation, see liberalisation—
financial
Finland 240
foreign direct investment (FDI) 9, 10, 266, 
267, 273, 278
Australian policy 292, 293, 296
Chinese openness to 9, 172
Chinese shares of 10, 47n.8
legislation 9, 217, 218, 263
limits on 9, 170, 171
politicisation of 263
restrictiveness index 164, 176–7, 
182, 188
US legislation 264, 278
see also Committee on Foreign 
Investment in the United States
Foreign Investment Law 9, 217
Foreign Investment Review Board (FIRB) 
272, 292
Foshan 169
Fujian Province 134, 149, 150, 195
Fund for Economic and Technical 
Co-operation Overseas 295
Fund for Mining Rights to Overseas 
Mineral Resources 295
Fund for Reducing Risk in Prospecting 
of Overseas Mineral Deposits 295
Fuzhou 118, 119, 121, 122, 169, 171
Index
311
G20 10, 130n.1, 218, 224
Gang Yi 163
Gansu Province 109, 110, 149, 151
gender
discrimination 237, 239, 256
divide 237, 255, 256
as earnings determinant 14, 238, 
239, 240
education gap 237, 254, 255
as employment determinant 122, 
124, 237
employment distribution 122, 238, 
245, 246, 250, 254, 255
income gap 14, 237–56
and inequality of opportunity 237, 
238, 239, 249, 250, 255
political bias 238
Germany 130, 216, 221, 222, 228, 229, 
230, 231, 240
Global Financial Crisis (GFC) 33, 37, 39, 
40, 47, 62, 70, 72, 76, 77, 78, 172, 
193, 288, 295, 298, 300
Global Innovation Index 143
‘Going Global Strategy’ 295
Guangdong Province 46, 47, 134, 149, 
150, 157, 195
Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region 
134, 149, 151




Guizhou Province 134, 149, 150, 195
Hainan Province 149, 151
Hanlong Group 292
Harbin 171
Hebei Iron & Steel 290
Hebei Province 97, 110, 134, 149, 150
Heilongjiang Province 149, 151
Henan Province 149, 150
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region 
7, 47n.8, 109, 110
Hong Kong Stock Exchange 171
household registration, see hukou
Huawei 269, 270, 273, 274, 276
Hubei Province 97, 110, 149, 150, 195
hukou (household registration) system 89, 
98, 100–1, 109–10, 118, 244, 247, 255
as barrier to migration 89, 90, 92
and employment 12, 89–105, 123, 
124, 256
evolution of 12, 90
reform 14, 90–3, 104, 109, 256
relaxation of 12, 90, 91, 92, 93, 97, 
100, 101, 104
Hunan Province 149, 150, 195
Iceland 269, 270, 271, 275
India 5, 34, 222, 240





Industrial and Commercial Bank of China 
171, 194
inequality 92
reducing 13, 131, 139
see also gender—and inequality 
of opportunity; social insurance—




inequality of opportunity 237–56
see also gender—and inequality of 
opportunity; social insurance—
equality of access to
information asymmetry 52, 163, 164, 165, 
184, 186, 189, 193, 205
infrastructure
business 140
critical 264, 265, 271, 272, 278
mining 291, 292, 301
ODI in 264, 265, 282
telecommunications 13, 129, 132, 139
transportation 138
underdevelopment 140
Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region 
149, 151
innovation
activity 3, 144, 145, 148, 157, 158
in Beijing 149, 150, 157
The Chinese Economic Transformation
312
competency 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 
148, 149, 150–1, 152, 153–6, 
157, 159
constraints on 63, 165
cultural 143
demand for 3, 144, 145
as economic driver 35, 79, 143, 157
educational 143
environment for 14, 137, 139, 143, 




Global Innovation Index 143
global leadership 13





policies to promote 8, 13, 79, 137, 144, 
145, 158, 159, 193, 212
reliance for growth 4
role of SMEs 13, 212
scientific 143
in Shanghai 149, 150
stages of development 13, 143, 147, 
157, 159
technological 7, 12, 63, 79, 137, 143, 
145, 146, 150–1, 152, 153–6
insurance sector liberalisation, see 
liberalisation—insurance sector
intellectual property
policy 13, 158, 220
protections 14, 144, 158, 159, 
218, 282
International Labour Organization (ILO) 
115, 116, 117, 122
International Monetary Fund (IMF) 223
International Telecommunication 
Union 132
internet 132, 135, 136, 140
access 13, 131, 133
economic activity on 113, 130, 131, 
132, 133, 134, 135–6, 137, 
139, 140
infrastructure 13, 129, 139
and innovation 147
penetration 129, 131, 137, 140




boom 15, 287, 291, 303
Chinese investment 15, 273, 287, 288, 
289, 290–2, 293–304
Chinese procurement 15, 287–8, 296, 
299–304
exports 288, 300





as economic bystander 216, 221, 222, 
228, 229–30, 231
economy 4, 5, 130, 287n.2
foreign investment 265, 268, 303
procurement 15, 302, 304
Jiangsu Province 134, 149, 150, 195
Jiangxi Province 134, 149, 150, 195
Jilin Province 149, 151, 195
Jinan 171
Joyce, Barnaby 296
Karara Iron Ore 297
Keynesian 12, 71
Kunming 167, 168, 171, 269
Labour Contract Law 117
labour laws 113, 115, 125
Lanzhou 171
Latin America 222, 228, 240
Law on the People’s Bank of China 70
Law on Promotion of Small and Medium-
sized Enterprises 193, 212
Li Xinchuang 287
Liaoning Province 97, 110, 149, 150
liberalisation
financial 13, 20, 163–7, 171–7, 187–9, 
221, 263, 265




Libya 270, 271, 273
Liu, Han 292
London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) 
296, 297
‘Made in China 2025’ policy 217
‘managing the big, liberating the small’ 48
market neutrality, see ‘competitive 
neutrality’
marketisation 38, 40, 42, 60, 64, 91, 
145, 237
Mexico 217, 240, 269, 270, 271, 275
Middle East 264
Ministry of Agriculture 136
Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) 
131, 295
Ministry of Finance 40, 44, 61, 137
Ministry of Industry and Information 
Technology 295
Ministry of Technology 137
Mongolia 269, 270, 271, 273
moral hazard 193, 296, 299
Motorola 269, 270
Myanmar 269, 270, 271, 274
Nanjing 167, 168, 171, 290
Nanning 171
National Bureau of Statistics of China 




‘new normal’ 69, 79
Ningbo 167, 168, 169, 171
Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region 134, 
149, 151, 195
North America, see Canada; Mexico; 
United States
North American Free Trade Agreement 
9, 217
Northwest Non-Ferrous International 
Investment Company 269, 272
Norway 117, 240
Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD) 4, 8, 10, 
11, 113, 117, 122, 176, 182, 188, 264
Organization of the Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (OPEC) 222, 264
outward direct investment (ODI) 14, 
263–84, 297
‘pecking order theory’ 41, 51
People’s Bank of China (PBC) 12, 70, 71, 
72, 76, 77, 163, 173, 221, 225, 226
Law on 70
Peru 291
PetroChina 38, 269, 273
Pombo, Richard 275
Postal Savings Bank of China 195
poverty 6, 13, 14, 19, 131, 132, 137, 138, 
139, 140, 256
protectionism 6, 159, 221, 223, 229, 303
Qingdao 167, 168, 171
Qinghai Province 149, 151
Rajapaksa, Mahinda 274–5
Reagan administration 265
Rio Tinto 269, 273, 274, 275, 287, 288, 
289, 292–3, 297, 298
Russia 10, 11, 291
see also BRICS
Shaanxi Province 97, 110, 134, 149, 
150, 195
shadow banking, see banking—shadow
Shandong Province 134, 149, 150, 195
Shanghai 7
banking services 167, 168, 169, 171
debt ratio 46, 47
innovation 149, 150
labour 118, 119, 121, 124
wages 92, 122
Shanghai Free-Trade Zone 175
see also China (Shanghai) Pilot Free-
Trade Zone
Shanghai Life Insurance 175
Shanghai Pengxin Group Co. 269, 272
Shanghai Stock Exchange 20, 62–3, 182
Shantou 167, 168, 171
Shanxi Province 38, 149, 151
Shenyang 118, 119, 121, 122, 167, 168, 
169, 171, 290
The Chinese Economic Transformation
314
Shenzhen 167, 168, 169, 171
Shenzhen Stock Exchange 20, 63, 182




social insurance 90, 92, 109–10
coverage 12, 119, 120, 121, 123–4, 
125
effects of hukou on 92, 109
equality of access to 91, 92, 114, 256
provision of 116, 117
social protection 115, 116
lack of 119
status 118
social security law 115




South Korea 19, 113, 165, 216, 222
Sri Lanka 269, 270, 271, 275
steel 158, 295, 299, 300, 303, 304
tariffs on 217n.2, 218, 224, 227
Suzhou 169
Taobao villages 13, 131, 133–6, 138, 139
technological frontier 3, 63
Tianjin 46, 47, 149, 150, 167, 168, 
169, 171
Tibet Autonomous Region 46, 47, 109, 
110, 149, 151
trade 4, 6, 10, 78, 140, 215, 221, 266, 283
barriers 229
Chinese balance 232
credit 13, 164, 178, 180–6, 188
exposure 222
exposure, China 216, 228, 229
financial 170, 174
free 215, 267
global rules 6, 267
and national security 216
openness to 3, 6, 215, 296
performance 221, 229, 231
policy 216, 217, 220, 222, 224, 
230, 296
protectionism 6, 159, 221, 223, 
229, 303
shocks 224, 230
unfair practices 215, 217, 218
US agreements 9, 216–17, 231
US balance 216, 232
US deficit 216, 218
US deficit with China 215, 218
‘trade-off theory’ 41, 51, 55
trade, US–China war 14, 163, 215–33, 
272
costs of 14
costs to China 14, 216, 221, 223, 
229, 233
costs to US 216, 221, 223, 229, 
231, 233
diversion benefits 223, 231
threat to global economy 14, 222
Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) 9, 266
Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership (TTIP) 266
Trump, Donald 215, 216, 217n.2, 
218, 224
Turkey 19
United Kingdom (UK) 33, 117, 130, 222
foreign investment 265, 270, 271, 272
United States (US) 35, 113, 130
capital structure 41, 71, 78
Congress 216, 264, 273, 275
economy 33, 218, 222, 223, 232, 268, 
295, 297
foreign investment 264, 265, 266, 268, 
269, 270, 271–3, 274–6, 278, 292
GDP 19, 33, 231
legislation on FDI 264, 278
productivity 19, 21
trade 9, 216–17, 218, 221, 231
trade agreements 9, 216–17, 231
trade balance 216, 232
trade deficit 216, 218
trade deficit with China 215, 218
trade war with China 6, 14, 163, 215, 
216, 218, 219, 220–33
trade with China 173, 215, 217, 218, 
224, 272, 273, 275, 300
Index
315
see also Committee on Foreign 
Investment in the United States; 
North American Free Trade 
Agreement
United States Trade Representative 218, 224
United States Treasuries 225, 226, 231, 232
Unocal 269, 272, 274, 276
Vale 287, 290
World Bank 7, 29, 132, 193, 223
World Intellectual Property Organization 
(WIPO) 143, 278
World Trade Organization (WTO)
China’s accession commitments 218, 
272, 167–72, 173, 175, 187, 188, 
218, 272–3
China’s accession to 1, 9, 166, 167, 
172–3, 176
Wuhan 118, 119, 121, 122, 167, 168, 
169, 171
Wuyi County 138, 139, 140
Xi Jinping 69, 163, 216
Xi’an 118, 119, 121, 122, 167, 168, 171
Xiamen 167, 168, 169, 171
Xiaochuan, Zhou 70
Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region 109, 
110, 134, 149, 151
Yinchuan 171
Yunnan Province 135, 149, 151, 269
Zhejiang Province 41, 46, 47, 97, 110, 
134, 135, 138, 139, 149, 150, 195
Zhuhai 167, 168, 171
